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Three Essays on the Macroeconomics of the Labor Market

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics

by

Ioannis Kospentaris

2018
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Three Essays on the Macroeconomics of the Labor Market

by

Ioannis Kospentaris
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Los Angeles, 2018
Professor Gary D. Hansen, Chair

In this dissertation, I build macroeconomic models to answer questions of empirical relevance for the study of labor markets. The dissertation consists of an introductory overview and three research essays. The first essay is devoted to duration dependence in unemployment, namely the fact that recently unemployed workers have a significantly better chance of finding a job than the long-term unemployed. I build a directed search model to quantify the importance of three common explanations for this fact: (i) unobserved worker differences, (ii) skill loss, and (iii) job-search effort decline. Two novel results emerge: first, the bulk of the effect of unobserved heterogeneity is concentrated in the first six months of the unemployment spell; the drop in job-finding rates observed at longer spells is mostly a result of skill loss and lower search effort. Second, skill loss has a vastly greater impact on job-finding than the decline in search effort. These results have two clear implications for labor market policy: (i) the impact of active labor market programs is expected to be larger for the long-term unemployed; (ii) job-training programs are expected to be more effective than job-search assistance policies at reducing long-term unemployment.

In the second essay I study how information obtained by a worker while trying to find a job affects her job-search effort. Specifically, I analyze how a worker, who is uncertain about her labor market traits and learns about them while looking
for a job, allocates her search effort over the unemployment spell. The main result is that search effort is increasing over time when the worker is optimistic about her traits but decreasing when the worker is pessimistic about her traits. This result can explain discrepant empirical findings from previous literature on search effort. The final essay is devoted to job-search effort as an insurance channel. It builds a model in which workers face substantial risk in the labor market but they have two means of self-insurance against this risk: increase their savings and their search effort. The main result is that when labor market risk becomes more severe workers increase both their savings and search effort but the increase in savings is twice as large as the increase in search effort. That is, workers make use of search effort as an insurance channel but much less than the savings channel.
The dissertation of Ioannis Kospentaris is approved.

Paola Giuliano
Till Von Wachter
Pierre-Olivier Weill
Lee Ohanian
Gary D. Hansen, Committee Chair

University of California, Los Angeles

2018
To my parents, Anastasia and Giorgo;
I owe them a little more than everything.
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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This dissertation builds macroeconomic models to answer questions of empirical relevance for the study of labor markets. I model workers searching for jobs, firms recruiting workers, as well as the interaction of these two parties in the labor market context. The results of these models are nonlinear systems of dynamic equations and their computational solutions provide predictions regarding the behavior of fundamental labor market variables (such as the unemployment rate or the workers’ search effort) that can be compared with actual data. As is customary in macreconomics, the data come from publicly available sources. I perform detailed statistical analysis to understand the empirical properties of the labor market variables contained in the models. Given that the models’ results are close to the actual data, the implications of the dissertation can inform policymakers about which policies should be prioritized in fighting long-term unemployment, as well as which policies could be used to improve the workings of real-world labor markets.

The first essay, contained in chapter 2, is dedicated to duration dependence in unemployment: the fact stating that recently unemployed workers have a significantly better chance of finding a job than the long-term unemployed. Duration dependence is the result of a combination of several mechanisms including: loss of skills during unemployment, decline of job-search effort, and deterioration of the composition of unobserved worker qualities—that is, worker characteristics that are not captured by the available data. For policy purposes, it is important to
know how much each mechanism contributes to the differential job-finding rates among the unemployed. If duration dependence is largely driven by unobserved worker differences, traditional labor market policies will not do much to help the long-term unemployed. On the other hand, if the impact of skill loss and declining search effort is quantitatively significant, then job-training and job-search assistance programs can improve the job-finding prospects of long-term unemployed workers.

Chapter 2 develops a directed search model of the labor market that features all of these mechanisms: (i) unobserved worker heterogeneity, (ii) skill loss, and (iii) search effort choice. I utilize the properties of the model, together with data on reemployment wages, callback rates, and search effort to identify the contribution of each mechanism to duration dependence in unemployment. To evaluate the quantitative significance of each mechanism for duration dependence, I use the model to compute counterfactual job-finding profiles, shutting down one mechanism at a time. The contribution of each mechanism is measured as the difference between two job-finding profiles, one predicted by the full model and one predicted by the version that excludes this mechanism.

The results of this exercise make two novel contributions to the duration dependence literature. First, according to the model, the bulk of the effect of unobserved worker heterogeneity is concentrated in the first six months of the unemployment spell. As the spell evolves, skill loss and search effort become quantitatively more important, accounting for almost 50% of the observed job-finding differences at durations longer than nine months. Second, skill depreciation and declining search effort affect the job-finding rate in different ways. Search effort has a minor impact on job-finding, accounting for less than 10% of duration dependence among workers unemployed longer than nine months. On the other hand, the effects of skill depreciation are much larger, accounting for almost 40% of job-finding differences among the long-term unemployed. These results illustrate that the importance
of each mechanism for the observed duration dependence significantly varies with
the stage of the unemployment spell.

Overall, these results have two important implications for labor market policy.
First, the impact of active labor market programs is expected to be larger for long-
term than short-term unemployed workers. Skill loss and search effort account for
around 15% of duration dependence among the short-term unemployed, hence
one would expect job-search assistance and job-training programs to have modest
positive effects for that group. Among the long-term unemployed, however, these
two mechanisms account for over 40% of duration dependence, therefore active
labor market programs are expected to have sizable positive effects for workers
unemployed longer than six months.

The next two chapters are devoted to job-search effort. Chapter 3 studies the
interaction of worker learning and job-search effort. An important assumption
made in chapter 2 is that job-seekers do not use information acquired from their
own job-search experience to learn about their unobserved qualities. In chapter 3,
I relax this assumption and analyze the interaction between learning about one’s
labor market traits while looking for a job with the choice of search effort. Intu-
itively, trying and failing to find a job for some time may create the impression that
the worker is of low quality and she is suitable for very few of the available jobs.
In other words, trying and failing to find a job may create discouragement, since
it would make the worker more pessimistic regarding her idiosyncratic qualities
and, as a result, about the probability of finding a job.

The main question I answer in chapter 3 is: how does a worker, who is uncertain
about her labor market traits and learns about them while looking for a job,
allocate her search effort over the unemployment spell? The search effort decision
is characterized by an interesting trade-off. On the cost side, the greater is the
search effort, the greater the utility cost the worker has to pay. On the benefit side,
search effort increases the probability of finding a job but also increases the speed
of learning. The worker does not know whether she failed to find a job because of bad luck or because she met a job and was found unsuitable. The greater the search effort the worker exceeds, the greater the probability she remained jobless due to her low-quality traits. Hence, the greater the search effort, the more informative the result of search is, i.e. the more the worker learns about herself.

The main result of the chapter is that search effort is increasing over time when the worker is optimistic about her type but it is decreasing over time when the worker thinks she probably is of low quality. Hence, the predicted path of search effort depends on the initial belief of the worker about herself when she starts looking for jobs. If the worker enters unemployment thinking she is of high quality, then the path of search effort will have a concave shape; that is, it will be initially increasing but then decreasing after some periods in unemployment. On the other hand, if the worker enters unemployment being pessimistic about her type, then the path of search effort will be monotonically decreasing.

This result is interesting not only in its own right but also because it can explain discrepant results found in the empirical literature on search effort. Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014), find that search effort is concave over the unemployment spell, while Krueger and Mueller (2011), Faberman and Kudlyak (2014), as well as the analysis in chapter 2 find that search effort is monotonically decreasing over the unemployment spell. This chapter proposes an explanation for this discrepancy: the slope of the search effort path depends on how optimistic the worker is about herself when starts looking for a job.

Chapter 4 analyzes search effort as an insurance mechanism. Following a long research tradition initiated by Huggett (1993), I build a continuous-time model in which workers face uninsured idiosyncratic labor market risk: in each period they may lose their job and transition to unemployment. Markets are incomplete and, as a result, workers cannot perfectly insure against the probability of losing their
job. The workers, however, have two channels of self-insurance available: they can save a part of their wealth in bonds, as well as they can increase their search effort when unemployed. The interest rate adjusts such that the bonds are in zero net supply in equilibrium. I focus on the stationary equilibrium of this economy and solve for the optimal decisions of asset accumulation and search effort.

The main quantitative question I am after is: how do the agents respond to a worsening of the labor market risk they face? That is, which channel of self-insurance do agents use more to insure against more severe labor market shocks? To answer this question, I solve for the stationary equilibrium of the benchmark model under a standard parameter configuration and I consider a mean-preserving spread in labor market risk. The agents respond by raising both their savings and search effort, as expected, but the response is not symmetric. The increase in precautionary savings is twice as large as the increase in search effort.

In other words, when the available self-insurance instruments are precautionary savings and job-search effort, agents prefer to save more instead of searching much harder to smooth their consumption profiles. This is intuitive: precautionary savings help in consumption smoothing with certainty; search effort, however, raises the probability of finding a job but it does not make it a certainty. Importantly, this result is in contrast with Pijoan-Mas (2006) who finds that labor supply responds similarly to savings when labor market uncertainty becomes more severe. Moreover, it may have important implications for labor market policy, which I plan to explore in future work.
CHAPTER 2

Duration Dependence: A Structural Approach

2.1 Introduction

Unemployment features *duration dependence*: recently unemployed workers have a significantly better chance of finding a job than the long-term unemployed (Kaitz, 1970; Van den Berg, 2001; Alvarez et al., 2016; among others). This reflects a combination of several mechanisms including: loss of skills during unemployment, decline of job-search effort, and deterioration of the composition of unobserved worker qualities—that is, worker characteristics that are not captured by the available data. For policy purposes, it is important to know how much each mechanism contributes to the differential job-finding rates among the unemployed. If duration dependence is largely driven by unobserved worker differences, traditional labor market policies will not do much to help the long-term unemployed. On the other hand, if the impact of skill loss and declining search effort is quantitatively significant, then job-training and job-search assistance programs can improve the job-finding prospects of long-term unemployed workers.

This paper develops a directed search model of the labor market that features all of these mechanisms: (i) unobserved worker heterogeneity, (ii) skill loss, and (iii) search effort choice. I exploit the properties of the model to show that each mechanism has different testable implications regarding the effects of unemploy-

---

1This is true even after taking into account the age, education, industry, and other relevant observable worker characteristics. See Machin and Manning (1999), Kroft et al. (2016), Elsby and Hobijn (2010), and Krueger et al. (2014).
ment duration on job-finding, wages, and search effort. In the data, workers’
job-search effort exhibits a modest decline over the unemployment spell (Krueger
and Mueller, 2011; Faberman and Kudlyak, 2014), while reemployment wages are
only mildly sensitive to unemployment duration (Schmieder et al., 2016; Ortego-
Marti, 2017; Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat, 2016). I employ these empirical
patterns to calibrate the model, and use it to quantify the contribution of each
mechanism to the differences in job-finding rates among workers at different stages
of the unemployment spell.

The mechanisms in the model operate as follows. First, unobserved differences
among workers are modeled as differences in suitability for available jobs; that is,
each worker is able to produce positive output only in a fraction of the jobs at
hand. Workers can be either of broad or limited suitability; the former can perform
a strictly greater share of jobs than the latter. Unobserved heterogeneity results in
duration dependence due to dynamic selection. That is, as the unemployment spell
evolves, broad-suitability workers find jobs faster, leaving more limited-suitability
workers in the unemployment pool. Second, skill loss is captured by depreciation
in workers’ on-the-job productivity while in unemployment. Consequently, the
long-term unemployed have lost a significant part of their productivity and are less
attractive to firms. This creates duration dependence for each individual worker.
Third, as the unemployment spell evolves, the returns to job-search decrease, due
to dynamic selection and skill loss. Workers’ search effort, which depends on the
returns to job-search, follows that decline. This mechanism amplifies the effects
of the other two, resulting in even stronger duration dependence.

To see how the model identifies the effects of unobserved heterogeneity and
skill loss, consider the predictions of the following simpler model variants. First,
in a model with unobserved heterogeneity alone, the probability of locating a suit-
able worker is higher in the pool of short- than long-term unemployed workers.
However, the long-term unemployed perform equally well while working as those
workers who are unemployed for shorter periods. As a result, the long-term un-
employed who manage to find a job incur tiny wage losses, equal to only a tenth
of the decline observed in the data. This suggests that a model with unobserved
heterogeneity alone cannot rationalize the empirical patterns of both job-finding
rates and wages. Second, in a model with skill loss alone, the level of skills at
each duration stage determines both the probability of getting hired and on-the-
job productivity. Consequently, the model predicts a drop of similar magnitude
in both job-finding rates and reemployment wages; yet in the data, job-finding
drops significantly more than wages. This implies that a model with skill loss
alone cannot rationalize the empirical behavior of both variables.

In principle, a model with both unobserved heterogeneity and skill loss would
be able to match the observed patterns of job-finding rates and reemployment
wages. However, two extensive strands of literature on search theory (e.g. Piss-
sarides, 2000; Mukoyama et al., 2014; among others) and the effects of unem-
ployment benefits (e.g. Nekoei and Weber, 2017; Schmieder et al., 2016; among
others) consider job-search effort to be an important determinant of job-finding.
Moreover, the data on search effort indicate a significant decline over the unem-
ployment spell. Therefore, it is important to include search effort in the model,
otherwise its effect on job-finding would be attributed to either skill loss or un-
observed heterogeneity. Since job-search effort amplifies the effects of the other
two mechanisms, its omission would bias the quantitative results, and their pol-
icy implications. To make this amplification empirically plausible, I calibrate the
search effort parameters such that workers in the model participate in job-search
activities with the same frequency as in the data.

The effect of each mechanism in the model is associated with a distinct set of
parameters, which are calibrated using different data sources. First, high-quality
measurements of the effect of unemployment duration on reemployment wages,
which are available in the literature, discipline the extent of skill loss. Second, the
results from the influential audit study of Kroft et al. (2013) are used to inform unobserved worker heterogeneity. Finally, I use weekly data from a weekly survey of unemployed workers, conducted by Krueger and Mueller (2011) to discipline search effort. To evaluate the quantitative significance of each mechanism for duration dependence, I use the model to compute counterfactual job-finding profiles, shutting down one mechanism at a time. The contribution of each mechanism is measured as the difference between two job-finding profiles, one predicted by the full model and one predicted by the version that excludes this mechanism.

The results of this exercise make two novel contributions to the duration dependence literature. First, according to the model, the bulk of the effect of unobserved worker heterogeneity is concentrated in the first six months of the unemployment spell. As the spell evolves, skill loss and search effort become quantitatively more important, accounting for almost 50% of the observed job-finding differences at durations longer than nine months. Second, skill depreciation and declining search effort affect the job-finding rate in different ways. Search effort has a minor impact on job-finding, accounting for less than 10% of duration dependence among workers unemployed longer than nine months. On the other hand, the effects of skill depreciation are much larger, accounting for almost 40% of job-finding differences among the long-term unemployed. These results illustrate that the importance of each mechanism for the observed duration dependence significantly varies with the stage of the unemployment spell.

To put these findings in perspective, consider the following two comparisons. First, in the US, a newly unemployed worker has a 30% greater chance of finding a job, compared to an observationally similar worker who is jobless for three months. According to my model, 85% of this disparity can be attributed to unobserved differences between the average newly unemployed and the average worker who is unemployed for three months, while skill loss and search effort account for a modest 15%. Second, when comparing a worker unemployed for six months with
a worker unemployed for a year or more, the former has a 12% greater chance of finding a job. The model attributes 50% of that disparity to unobserved worker differences, 42% to skill decay, and only 8% to lower search effort exhibited by workers who are unemployed for a year or more.

Overall, these results have two important implications for labor market policy. First, the impact of active labor market programs is expected to be larger for long-term than short-term unemployed workers. Skill loss and search effort account for around 15% of duration dependence among the short-term unemployed, hence one would expect job-search assistance and job-training programs to have modest positive effects for that group. Among the long-term unemployed, however, these two mechanisms account for over 40% of duration dependence, therefore active labor market programs are expected to have sizable positive effects for workers unemployed longer than six months. This result is fully consistent with the meta-analysis of actual labor market programs conducted by Card et al. (2016). They find that real labor market policies helped the long-term unemployed more; the model developed here sheds light on why this is the case. Second, in quantitative terms, the model predicts that job-training programs are expected to have greater impact than job-search assistance policies. Both policies have significant positive effects, yet the model goes a step further. It implies that job-training programs should have a larger effect on reducing long-term unemployment compared to job-search assistance policies.

To my knowledge, there is no other paper that studies the role of unobserved heterogeneity, skill loss, and search effort for duration dependence with an equilibrium search model, together with data on wages and search effort. Most papers in the literature use data on job-finding rates and observable worker characteristics only. There are few exceptions that also consider reemployment wages: Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016), Flemming (2016), and Doppelt (2014).
Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016) were the first to contrast the large decline in job-finding with the mild drop in wages over the unemployment spell. Nevertheless, they only use wages as a non-targeted moment for model validation, and not to calibrate a mechanism contributing to duration dependence, as this paper does. This is an important difference, since it allows me to quantify the role of skill loss for duration dependence, which remains unexplored in Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016).

My work is complementary to Flemming (2016), who also uses wage losses to calibrate skill loss but in a model with home production. In contrast, I employ a model with unobserved heterogeneity to analyze duration dependence. Unobserved heterogeneity is critical because it makes the job-finding rate in the model drop very fast in the first months in unemployment, as in the data. In Flemming’s (2016) home production model though, the drop in job-finding in the first months of the spell is slow. As a result, her model predicts a concave drop in job-finding rates, while in the data this drop is convex; unobserved heterogeneity in my model resolves that issue. The most closely related paper to this one is Doppelt (2014), who also builds a model of unobserved heterogeneity to analyze duration dependence. He has a model in which inference about worker quality takes place over multiple unemployment spells, while this paper focuses on inference from the last unemployment spell only. Because of that, skill loss mitigates duration dependence in Doppelt’s (2014) model, since it lowers the informational value of unemployment. In my model, however, skill loss worsens job-finding prospects, which is consistent with the significant positive impact of actual job-training programs found by Card et al. (2016). Moreover, Doppelt (2014) does not use the observed drop in reemployment wages; skill loss is exogenously set in his approach. Finally, all these papers use the observed job-finding profile to calibrate model parameters, while the model in this paper predicts a realistic job-finding profile without including it in the calibration targets.
It is difficult to obtain results of the type presented here without (i) the use of a structural framework that (ii) includes all relevant mechanisms. First, to identify the magnitude of all three mechanisms with a reduced-form approach, one needs multiple designs with exogenous variation in each mechanism, fixing the rest at different values to control for all potential interactions. Given the unusually extensive data requirements, using a structural framework to make progress seems to be a natural choice. Second, as I will show later, it is the interaction of unobserved heterogeneity with skill loss and search effort that drives the predictions of the model. Intuitively, failing to find a job reveals a lot about the quality of the newly unemployed because these workers are evaluated often by firms due to their high skill levels and search effort. The long-term unemployed have lower skill levels and exhibit lower search effort, thus they are rarely evaluated by firms. An extra period in unemployment is not very informative about the unobserved quality of the long-term unemployed and, as a result, the impact of unobserved heterogeneity on job-finding becomes less important at long durations.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment, defines an equilibrium, and analytically establishes equilibrium existence and characterization. In Section 3, I present the empirical evidence that informs the model. Section 4 discusses the identification strategy of the model, and the calibration procedure. In Section 5, I present the quantitative results. Section 6 contains a discussion of the relevant literature, and Section 7 concludes. Finally, Appendix I contains all proofs, and Appendix II extra material regarding the quantitative analysis of the model.

2.2 Model

This section introduces a tractable equilibrium model of the labor market that contains three important channels of duration dependence: (i) unobserved worker
heterogeneity, (ii) human capital depreciation, and (iii) search effort decline. The model builds on the directed search approach of Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), and Gonzalez and Shi (2010). I begin with a simplified version of the model that incorporates only skill depreciation and unobserved heterogeneity of the unemployment pool, without job separations. I prove existence of equilibrium and characterize its basic properties. In the last part I present a richer version of the model with endogenous participation decision and exogenous separation shocks. This richer version will be used for the quantitative analysis of Sections 4 and 5. All theoretical properties proved for the simple model go through in the full model, albeit with more cumbersome notation.

2.2.1 The Basic Environment

Time is discrete and runs forever. All agents are risk neutral and discount the future with the same factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$. There is a unit measure of workers, divided between the states of employment and unemployment. There is, also, a positive measure of one-worker firms, which will be endogenously determined by free entry. In this section there is no separation of workers from jobs: if a worker gets hired, she keeps this job forever. The only source of separation is an exit shock $\nu$ that forces a worker (employed or unemployed) out of the market. Workers who have exited are replaced by a measure $\nu$ of newly unemployed workers.

Workers. Workers’ human capital has two components. First, they are of either broad ($H$) or limited ($L$) suitability. Suitability is the likelihood of fulfilling the requirements of a job. In other words, suitability captures the probability of a worker producing positive output at a job. If a worker is not suitable for a given job, the match yields zero output. There is a mass $\pi \in (0, 1)$ of broad-suitability workers and $1 - \pi$ of limited-suitability workers. A type-$i$ worker turns out to be suitable for a given job with probability $a^i$ (with $a^H > a^L$). That is, broad-
suitability workers have a higher probability of being productive in a given job than limited-suitability workers. This notion of suitability can be thought of as an extreme form of a match-specific shock, which depends on worker’s type. Notice that even broad-suitability workers will be unsuitable for some jobs. Importantly, this part of workers’ human capital is unobservable to both worker and firms.

Second, workers differ in productivity on-the-job. A job-seeker who is unemployed for $\tau \in \{1, 2, ..., T\}$ periods and turns out to be suitable for a given job, will produce $y_{\tau}$, with $y_{\tau} > y_{\tau+1}$, up to the final period $T$. All workers with unemployment duration greater or equal to $T$ form a homogeneous group. The output of a worker-firm match depends solely on worker’s productivity level at the time of the match. Unemployment duration and productivity are observable to both worker and firms. The deterioration of worker’s productivity over the unemployment spell captures skill loss. Notice that the effect of skill depreciation affects both broad- and limited-suitability workers in the same way.

The fact that broad-suitability workers can produce positive output in more jobs creates duration dependence due to dynamic selection. At longer durations the unemployment pool contains a larger fraction of low-suitability workers, hence long-term unemployed have worse job-finding prospects. The fact that workers’ productivity decreases with unemployment duration creates within-worker duration dependence. This mechanism also worsens the job-finding prospects of long-term unemployed workers. Finally, I do not address search effort at this stage but I incorporate it in the quantitative Section 2.3.

**Labor Market.** Firms are homogeneous. Each firm opens one vacancy and posts a wage aimed at workers with specific characteristics at cost $\kappa$. Meeting workers is subject to matching frictions. Moreover, firms have access to a simple testing technology: after meeting a worker, a firm observes a private, match-specific signal, which perfectly identifies unsuitable workers. Unsuitable candi-
dates are disregarded and only suitable workers are hired. The testing expenses are included in the vacancy creation cost. Neither workers nor other firms learn the match-specific signals generated by the testing process; they only observe the hiring decision. A worker who fails to find a job does not know whether her application has been considered by a firm and found unsuitable or it was not considered at all due to matching frictions.

The labor market consists of many different submarkets, indexed by the unemployment duration and the expected suitability of workers who search for jobs in the submarket. Firms are free to enter any submarket and post any wage they want to attract workers of a specific unemployment duration and expected suitability. Search is directed in the sense that workers of different characteristics search in different submarkets. Hence, when firms post wages and vacancies in a submarket, they calculate the expected profit with workers of only one unemployment duration in mind.

**Information Structure.** A worker’s suitability is unobservable to both the worker herself and potential employers: there is symmetric incomplete information in the model, as in Gonzalez and Shi (2010), Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016) and Doppelt (2014). On the other hand, worker’s unemployment duration, and thus her productivity in suitable matches, is public information. In other

---

3As it will be seen later, the matching function will reflect that feature of the model: it will determine the number of productive matches rather than the number of meetings. The process of receiving applications and the process of evaluating applicants are combined in this model.

4Assuming this market structure is without any loss of generality: it is a standard result in directed search models with heterogeneous workers, homogeneous firms and bilateral meetings that labor market participants endogenously choose to search in different submarkets (see Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Menzio and Shi (2010), Gonzalez and Shi (2010), Guerrieri et al. (2010)). In other words, even if it was assumed that firms are free to post wages for any worker types they want, they would endogenously choose to post a wage directed to workers with a specific unemployment duration and expected suitability. Several papers postulate that firms commit to hire workers of only one type in each submarket; see Doppelt (2014) and Flemming (2016), among others.
words, all firms know the output of a successful match with a worker of specific unemployment duration. Due to the fact that lack of information regarding a worker’s type is symmetric, the worker and the “labor market” (i.e. all firms and other workers) share the same belief about the probability a worker of a given duration be suitable for a job. Hence, workers of the same unemployment duration are observationally equivalent and a worker’s unemployment duration is a sufficient statistic for the probability the worker forming a successful match.

This information structure is based on Gonzalez and Shi (2010); it buys the model a lot of tractability for two reasons. First, it allows me to avoid the complexities arising in the case of adverse selection, analyzed in Guerrieri et al. (2010). Second, when this hiring protocol is combined with a constant returns to scale matching function, it implies that the ratio of suitable workers to vacancies is a summary statistic for all relevant information in a submarket. Hence, the only relevant state variable for workers and firms in a given submarket is the queue length of the submarket. As will be shown shortly, this is crucial for making the model block recursive, in the sense of Menzio and Shi (2011).

**Matching.** In each submarket the number of matches is given by a Cobb-Douglas matching function. The inputs of this function are the number of vacancies, \( v \), posted in the submarket, as well as the total units of suitable workers searching in this submarket: \( u^E = a^H u^H + a^L u^L \), where \( u^i \) denotes the measure of unemployed workers of type \( i \) searching in the submarket. The matching function for a specific submarket is:

\[
m = (u^E)^\alpha (v)^{1-\alpha}
\]

When a firm is deciding in which submarket to post a wage, the only relevant piece of information is the vacancy filling probability in each submarket. Due to the constant returns to scale in the matching function, this probability depends
only on the ratio of the effective units of search over the posted vacancies in each submarket, \( q \):
\[
\lambda = \frac{m}{v} = \lambda(q) = q^\alpha \tag{2.2}
\]
where \( q = \frac{u^R}{v} \) will be referred to as the queue length of the submarket. Moreover, the only relevant pieces of information for a worker is the average job-finding probability for suitable workers, \( x \), as well as her belief about her expected suitability, \( \mu \). It is straightforward to repeat the calculation in (2) to show that:
\[
x = \frac{m}{u^F} = x(q) = q^{\alpha-1} \tag{2.3}
\]
In the next section I will show that a worker’s updated belief about her expected suitability is a function of exogenous parameters and the job-finding probability of the submarket she was looking for a job in the previous period.

To summarize, given the queue length in a submarket (which will be determined in equilibrium), an agent’s expected payoff is independent of the level and the composition of workers and firms in the submarket. Free entry of firms ensures that the wage in each submarket in a function of exogenous parameters and the submarket’s queue length only. This property of the model is known in the literature as block recursivity because it allows the calculation of the equilibrium queues and wages without keeping track of the distribution of worker types in different submarkets. The property of block recursivity crucially rests on the hiring protocol of Gonzalez and Shi (2010), the fact that search is directed, and the assumption of constant returns to scale in matching.

Learning from Unemployment Duration. While in unemployment a worker learns about her \( a \), the probability she will be productive in a randomly selected job.\(^5\) I define the worker’s expectation of \( a \) to be her belief and denote

\(^5\)It is important to stress again that every other participant in the labor market would have
it as $\mu$. For every worker who enters the labor market as newly unemployed, her initial belief about her expected suitability is:

$$\mu_0 = \pi a^H + (1 - \pi) a^L$$  \hfill (2.4)

The updating of beliefs depends on the queue length of the submarket into which the worker was searching in the last period. Applying Bayes rule yields:

$$\mu' \equiv H(\mu, x) = a^H - \frac{(a^H - \mu)(1 - xa^L)}{1 - x\mu}$$  \hfill (2.5)

Notice that $H(x, \mu)$ is decreasing in $x$: the higher the job-finding rate in a submarket, the stronger the signal that the worker did not get match because of her limited suitability.

**Timing.** Each period of the model consists of four stages:

1. Exit of workers and entry of newly unemployed
2. Wage-posting
3. Matching
4. Production

**Value Functions.** To determine the optimal wage-posting policies by firms, I follow Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b) and rely on Bellman’s Principle of Optimality to compute the value of one-period deviations. Consider a firm evaluating the prospect of posting wage $w$ aimed at workers of duration $\tau$ and expected the same belief regarding a worker’s $a$ as the worker herself. It will be shown shortly that the beliefs are functions of publicly observable information, hence the update is symmetric for every participant in the market.
belief $\mu$. In directed search models, workers adjust their behavior in response to different wages posted by firms. In this sense, when a firm posts wage $w$ for workers $(\tau, \mu)$, it anticipates a queue length $q$, which is a function of the posted wage: $q = Q_{\tau, \mu}(w)$. The function $Q_{\tau, \mu}(\cdot)$ represents the firms’ rational expectations about the equilibrium relationship between posted wages to queue length. It is defined for any wage $w$, not only for the wage that will be posted in equilibrium. It is an endogenous object to be determined in equilibrium under a rational expectations condition, which will be articulated in the next section.

The value of posting a vacancy with wage $w$ for workers of unemployment duration $\tau$ and expected suitability $\mu$ is given by:

$$
V_{\tau, \mu}(w) = -\kappa + \left[ \lambda(Q_{\tau, \mu}(w))J_{\tau, \mu}(w) + (1 - \lambda(Q_{\tau, \mu}(w)))V^*_{\tau, \mu} \right] 
$$

(2.6)

where $V^*_{\tau, \mu} = \max_w V_{\tau, \mu}(w)$. This expression captures the fact that the firm receives the maximum value of looking for workers $(\tau, \mu)$ after the current period. The firm pays a cost $\kappa$ to post the vacancy, which is the same for all submarkets. Of course, the probability the vacancy is filled is a function of the expected queue length: $\lambda(w) = \lambda(Q_{\tau, \mu}(w))$ and $Q_{\tau, \mu}(w)$ will be determined in equilibrium. It denotes the queue length a firm anticipates when posts a vacancy paying wage $w$ for workers $(\tau, \mu)$.

Following the same argument, the value of filling a vacancy with an unemployed of duration $\tau$ is given by:

$$
J_{\tau, \mu}(w) = y_{\tau} - w + \beta(1 - \nu)J_{\tau, \mu}(w)
$$

(2.7)

The worker produces $y_{\tau}$ units of produce and is paid the posted wage $w$; when the exit shock hits, the vacancy is destroyed.

---

6 An equivalent way to express that is to say that the firm creates a new submarket for workers of unemployment duration $\tau$ and expected suitability $\mu$, posting a vacancy paying wage $w$. 

19
Turning to workers, the value of being unemployed for $\tau$ periods with expected suitability $\mu$ and applying to a vacancy paying $w$ with queue length $q$ is:

$$U_{\tau,\mu}(w, q) = \max_s \left\{ b - c(s) + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ s\mu x(q)(E_{\tau,\mu}(w) - U_{\tau+1,\mu'}^*) + U_{\tau+1,\mu'}^* \right] \right\}$$ (2.8)

where $x(q) = q^{\alpha-1}$, $\mu' = H(x(q), \mu)$ and $U_{\tau+1,\mu'}^* = \max_{w, q} U_{\tau+1,\mu'}(w, q)$. A worker receives $b$ while unemployed, with $b < y_T$. The job-finding probability is the product of the aggregate job-finding probability given that the worker is suitable, $x(q)$, as well as the probability the worker being suitable for the job. The worker does not know that probability, so she uses her beliefs $\mu$ to calculate the value of unemployment; if she fails to find a job, she updates her beliefs following Bayes rule in equation (5). Finally, the workers get their maximum value of unemployment after the current period.

Similarly, the value of employment can be computed as:

$$E_{\tau,\mu}(w) = w + \beta(1 - \nu) E_{\tau,\mu}(w)$$ (2.9)

As long as the worker is employed, she receives the wage posted in the submarket she was searching when hired. When the exit shock hits, the worker exits the labor market. In Section 2.3 standard separations shocks, sending workers back to unemployment, are introduced in the model.

### 2.2.2 Equilibrium

**Equilibrium Queue Lengths.** Recall that the queue length function $Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)$ represents a firm’s rational expectations about the queue of workers it would face if it posted the wage $w$ directed to unemployed workers of duration $\tau$ and expected suitability $\mu$. The idea is that in equilibrium these expectations should be pinned down by subgame perfection: $Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)$ would be the queue length faced by the
firm in the subgame where it posts \( w \) but all other firms post the equilibrium wage aimed at workers of duration \( \tau \).\(^7\)

Following a common practice in the directed search literature, I do not explicitly study the game-theoretic formulation of the model. Rather, I impose the following equilibrium condition on queue lengths to capture the spirit of subgame perfection, which needs to hold for all \( \tau \) and \( \mu \):

\[
Q_{\tau,\mu}(w) = \begin{cases} 
0, & U_{\tau,\mu}(w, 0) < U_{\tau,\mu}^* \\
(0, \infty), & U_{\tau,\mu}(w, Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)) = U_{\tau,\mu}^* \\
\infty, & U_{\tau,\mu}(w, \infty) > U_{\tau,\mu}^* 
\end{cases}
\] (2.10)

When the firm posts wage \( w \) there are three possible outcomes. First, if the wage is very low (or \( U_{\tau,\mu}^* \) is very high), then the firm attracts no workers and \( Q_{\tau,\mu}(w) = 0 \). Moreover, workers must find it strictly suboptimal to apply to his job (since the wage is too low) even there are no other workers competing for that vacancy and, as a result, \( U_{\tau,\mu}(w, 0) < U_{\tau,\mu}^* \). Second, if the wage is very high (or \( U_{\tau,\mu}^* \) is very low), then the firm attracts all workers and \( Q_{\tau,\mu}(w) = \infty \). A worker must find it strictly optimal to come to apply to this firm, even when she has to compete with all other workers for the vacancy. Third, if the wage is in an intermediate range, then workers will apply to this vacancy until they are indifferent between applying to this job (receiving the value \( U_{\tau,\mu}(w, Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)) \)) or to any other vacancy (receiving the value \( U_{\tau,\mu}^* \)). That is, the queue length \( Q_{\tau,\mu}(w) \) should solve the equation \( U_{\tau}(w, Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)) = U_{\tau,\mu}^* \).

Notice that, as argued in Shi (2002, 2006), the third case is impossible to take place: if the queue length is infinite, the probability a worker gets a job is zero, hence her expected utility from searching in this submarket is zero, which is less

\(^7\)The game-theoretic foundations of the equilibrium queue lengths condition (10) are masterly analyzed in Burdett et al. (2001) and Galenianos and Kircher (2012).
than $U^*_\tau,\mu$, a contradiction of the requirement. Hence, the equilibrium queue length condition can be simplified as:

$$Q_{\tau,\mu}(w) = \begin{cases} 
0, & U_{\tau,\mu}(w,0) < U^*_\tau,\mu \\
\in (0, \infty), & U_{\tau,\mu}(w,Q_{\tau,\mu}(w)) = U^*_\tau,\mu
\end{cases} \quad (2.11)$$

Finally, I show in Lemma 3 that the first case will never be observed in equilibrium. However, condition (11) is important because it pins down the out-of-equilibrium firms’ beliefs about workers’ responses to wage offers that are not observed in equilibrium.

**Definition of Equilibrium.** A competitive search equilibrium is a set of wages offered by firms $W^*_\tau,\mu$, a set of queue length functions $\{Q^*_\tau,\mu\}$, a function of workers’ utility levels $U^*$, a belief function $\mu$ and a set of value functions $\{J^*_{\tau,\mu}, V^*_{\tau,\mu}, E^*_{\tau,\mu}, U^*_{\tau,\mu}\}$, with the following properties:

1. **Optimal Application.** $U^*_\tau,\mu = \sup_{w_{\tau,\mu} \in W^*_\tau,\mu} U_{\tau,\mu}(w_{\tau,\mu},Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w_{\tau,\mu}))$, for all $\tau$ and $\mu$.

2. **Profit Maximization and Free Entry.** $V^*_\tau,\mu = V_{\tau,\mu}(w_{\tau,\mu}) = 0 \geq V_{\tau,\mu}(w)$, for any $w$, for all $w_{\tau,\mu} \in W^*_\tau,\mu$ and for all $\tau$ and $\mu$.

3. **Rational Expectations.** $Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w_{\tau,\mu})$ satisfies the equilibrium queue lengths condition (11), for all $\tau$ and $\mu$ and for all $w_{\tau,\mu} \in W^*_\tau,\mu$.

4. **Beliefs Updating.** A worker with beliefs $\mu$ uses Bayes rule to update her beliefs: $\mu' = H(x(Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w_{\tau,\mu})), \mu)$, if she fails to find a job.

**Equilibrium as a Solution to an Auxiliary Maximization Problem.** An important result, due to Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), is that
the equilibrium can be characterized as the solution to an auxiliary constrained maximization problem. The objective function of the auxiliary problem is the value function of the agents on one side of the market; the constraint is that the agents on the other side of the market receive their optimal values. I extend this equivalence result to a framework with skill depreciation and a declining expected suitability of the unemployment pool.

Consider the following constrained maximization problem:

$$V^*_\tau = \max_{w_\tau,q_\tau} -\kappa + \lambda(q_\tau) \frac{y_\tau - w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)}, \quad \forall \tau \leq T \tag{2.12}$$

subject to the constraints:

$$U^*_\tau \leq b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}(q_\tau) \left( \frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1} \right] \tag{2.13}$$

and $q_\tau \geq 0$ with complementary slackness

$$V^*_\tau = 0, \quad \forall \tau \leq T \tag{2.14}$$

$$\mu_{\tau+1} = H(x(q_\tau), \mu_\tau) \tag{2.15}$$

In this auxiliary problem the firm takes the optimal values of workers as given. Solving this problem yields the optimal $w^*_\tau$ and $q^*_\tau$ as functions of $U^*_{\tau}$, for all $\tau$. The sequence of beliefs is constructed following equation (15) based on the sequence $\{q^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}$ The market values of workers are pinned down by solving equation (14) for all $\tau$.

Suppose for now that this problem has a solution (not necessarily unique): $\{w^*_\tau, q^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}$. Then, the equivalence of the competitive search equilibrium with the solution to the auxiliary optimization problem is obtained through the following lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Equilibrium $\mapsto$ Auxiliary Problem). Let $w^*_{\tau} \in W^*_{\tau,\mu}$ and $q^*_{\tau} = Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w^*_{\tau})$, where $\{W^*_{\tau,\mu}, \{Q^*_{\tau,\mu}\}_{\tau \leq T}\}$ be an equilibrium allocation; then $\{w^*_{\tau}, q^*_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T}$ solve problem (12) under constraints (13), (14) and (15), with $U_{\tau,\mu}(w^*_{\tau}, q^*_{\tau}) = U^*_{\tau,\mu}$ if $q^*_{\tau} > 0$.

Lemma 2 (Auxiliary Problem $\mapsto$ Equilibrium). If some $\{w^*_{\tau}, q^*_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T}$ solve problem (12) under constraints (13), (14) and (15), then there exists an equilibrium $\{W^*_{\tau,\mu}, \{Q^*_{\tau,\mu}\}_{\tau \leq T}\}$ such that $w^*_{\tau} \in W^*_{\tau,\mu}$ and $q^*_{\tau} = Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w^*_{\tau})$, $\forall \tau \leq T$.

Equilibrium Existence and Characterization. The usefulness of Lemmas 1 and 2 is that they enable me to characterize equilibrium as the solution to the auxiliary profit maximization problem (12) under constraints (13), (14) and (15). A standard assumption, satisfied by my preferred Cobb-Douglas specification, is that $\lambda(\cdot)$ is a strictly concave function. This guarantees the existence of an equilibrium in which workers of different unemployment durations search in different labor markets.

Proposition 1. There exists an equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration.

The proof of existence is based on a fixed-point argument that uses Brouwer’s theorem. The strategy of the proof also suggests a computational strategy for how to compute the equilibrium, which is analyzed in Appendix II. It is important to highlight that the algorithm fully exploits the block recursivity of the model: all endogenous variables are computed independently of the distribution of workers across states. Computing the masses of workers across different states becomes a matter of accounting.

An appealing feature of this model is its tractability. Indeed, one can analytically show that workers face declining job-finding probabilities and reemployment wages over a spell of unemployment. The tractability of the model is a result
of the Gonzalez and Shi (2010) hiring protocol, as well as of the equivalence of competitive search equilibrium with the auxiliary problem. Extending the machinery of Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a, 1999b) to the current environment enables me to exploit the firms’ FOCs, as shown explicitly in Section 2.3, and analytically prove the following set of results.

**Proposition 2.** *In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, \( q_\tau \) is increasing and \( w_\tau \) is decreasing in \( \tau \); also, the difference \( y_\tau - w_\tau \) is decreasing in \( \tau \). Hence, the value of a filled vacancy, \( J(w_\tau) \), is decreasing in \( \tau \).*

Other papers in the recent macroeconomic literature on duration dependence feature some troubling implications. For example, for a given cohort of unemployed workers, the model of Gonzalez and Shi (2010) predicts job-finding rates that increase with the duration of unemployment for all workers.\(^8\) The model of Doppelt (2014) makes the same prediction but for a minority of workers. I prove that job-finding rates unambiguously decline for all workers following a specific cohort of unemployed. Finally, in the model of Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016) reemployment wages may increase with unemployment duration. Likewise, reemployment wages in Doppelt (2014) are also non-monotone in unemployment duration. On the other hand, I prove that reemployment wages unambiguously fall over the spell of unemployment, as in the data.

It is worth underscoring that skill depreciation is the primary factor supporting these results, not the declining quality of unemployment pool. In other words, in a model with skill depreciation only, Proposition 2 would still hold. On the other hand, in a model which unobserved worker heterogeneity is the only source of

---

\(^8\)This result is also important because it shows that negative duration dependence is not a trivial outcome when the duration of unemployment provides a signal of worker quality. Learning dynamics may lead workers to target jobs with lower queue lengths to increase the probability of getting hired. If this effect is strong enough, exit rates from unemployment will be increasing in unemployment duration.
duration dependence, Proposition 2 would not be unambiguously true. Actually, queue length would be decreasing over the unemployment spell in this model. This echoes the counterfactual findings described above in papers that feature only unobserved worker quality. This shows that skill depreciation is necessary in order the model to deliver all features of Proposition 2. Unobserved heterogeneity is necessary for the model to deliver convex job-finding rates, as explained in Section 4.2. Finally, these features of the model suggest a calibration strategy, since they demonstrate which mechanism accounts for each observable prediction of the model.

To close this section, I state two technical results, along with a more substantive one. It is common in directed search models that all submarkets open in equilibrium feature positive queue lengths (otherwise, firms would have profitable deviations). Moreover, as expected by the fact that broad-suitability workers find jobs faster than their limited-suitability counterparts, expected worker suitability declines over the spell of unemployment. The hiring protocol of Gonzalez and Shi (2010) captures the declining quality of unemployment pool in a straightforward and intuitive way.

**Lemma 3.** In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, $q_\tau > 0$ for all $\tau$. Hence, the complementary slackness condition (13) holds with equality.

**Lemma 4.** Beliefs about worker’s expected suitability for a given job, $\mu_\tau$, are decreasing in $\tau$.

Finally, since the employment prospects of workers deteriorate over time, the value of unemployment is strictly decreasing in unemployment duration. This result would also hold in a model with skill depreciation only. However, as mentioned above, the deterioration of employment prospects would not be fast enough to rationalize convex job-finding rates in this case.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, the value of unemployment, $U^*_\tau$, is decreasing in $\tau$.

2.2.3 Quantitative Extension

Endogenous Search Effort. The framework presented above can be easily extended to incorporate an extra force of duration dependence: declining search effort. I model search effort as a participation decision: a measure of unemployed workers will not be searching for jobs. This modeling choice is motivated by the empirical evidence on workers’ search effort, presented in Section 3. Using data from Krueger and Mueller (2011), I show that the intensive margin of search effort (time to devoted to search) is insignificant for generating job-offers. On the other hand, the extensive margin of participation in job-search is found to be significant for generating job-offers. Therefore, the appropriate measure of search effort in Krueger and Mueller (2011) data is the participation margin and this explains my modeling choice.

In each period an unemployed worker is hit by an IID search cost shock $\tilde{c}$. The support of $\tilde{c}$ is a bounded interval in the real line, $\text{supp}(\tilde{c}) = [-K_1, K_2]$, and its CDF is a continuous strictly increasing function $F(\tilde{c})$. The Bellman equation for an unemployed worker of duration $\tau$ can be written as:

$$U_{\tau}(w, q) = b + \int_{-K_1}^{K_2} \max \left\{ -\tilde{c} + \beta(1 - \nu)x(q)(E_{\tau}(w) - U^*_\tau + 1), 0 \right\} dF(\tilde{c}) + \beta(1 - \nu)U^*_{\tau+1}$$

The idea here is that if the search cost drawn at a period is low enough, then the worker participates in the labor market facing the job-finding prospects analyzed above. If the search cost is high though, the worker does not participate in the labor market and she enters next period as unemployed.

One can apply the standard quantile transformation to write equation (16) in...
a more concrete form. Define the function \( c'(z) \equiv F^{-1}(z) \), where \( z \) is a uniform random variable with \([0,1]\) support: \( z \sim U_{[0,1]} \).

After the change of variables \( \tilde{c} \equiv c'(z) \), the value function of unemployment can be written as:

\[
U_{\tau}(w, q) = b + \int_0^1 \max \left\{ -c'(z) + \beta (1 - \nu) \mu \tau x(q) (E_{\tau}(w) - U_{\tau+1}^*), 0 \right\} dz + \beta (1 - \nu) U_{\tau+1}^*
\]

(2.17)

Since \( F(\tilde{c}) \) is strictly increasing, its inverse is strictly increasing as well. Hence, the value function can be written as:

\[
U_{\tau}(w, q) = b + \max_{s \in [0,1]} \int_0^s -c'(z) + \beta (1 - \nu) \mu \tau x(q) (E_{\tau}(w) - U_{\tau+1}^*) dz + \beta (1 - \nu) U_{\tau+1}^*
\]

(2.18)

Assuming that \( c'(z) \) is integrable, it has a well-defined antiderivative function \( c(z) \). If one assumes that \( c(0) = 0 \), one can write the value function in the familiar form:

\[
U_{\tau}(w, q) = \max_{s \in [0,1]} \left\{ b - c(s) + \beta (1 - \nu) s \mu \tau x(q) (E_{\tau}(w) - U_{\tau+1}^*) + \beta (1 - \nu) U_{\tau+1}^* \right\}
\]

(2.19)

The interpretation of \( s \) is different, though: instead of denoting the intensity of job search activity (intensive margin), here \( s \) denotes the probability to participate in the labor market (extensive margin). This interpretation rests on the microfoundation presented above, in which the basic assumption is that search cost shocks are IID over time. Alternatively, one could think of this microfoundation as follows: only a measure \( s \) of unemployed workers of duration \( \tau \) participates in the labor market when applying to a job offering wage \( w \) with a queue length \( q \), while a measure \( 1 - s \) does not search for jobs. To summarize, equations (16) and (19) are equivalent and produce the same answer concerning worker job-search effort, supported by two different interpretations.

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9It is trivial to show that \( c'(z) \) has the same CDF as \( \tilde{c} \)
The FOCs for this problem are straightforward to interpret: the probability to participate in the labor market equalizes the marginal cost of participation with its marginal return. Evaluating the FOCs in equilibrium yields:

\[
c'(s^*_\tau) = \beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau x(q_\tau) \left[ \frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau+1 \right]
\] (2.20)

Assuming the standard power search cost function, \(c(s) = \phi^\nu s^\eta\), and a Cobb-Douglas matching function, equation (20) becomes:\(^{10}\)

\[
s^*_\tau = \left\{ \beta(1 - \nu)\phi^{-1} \mu_\tau q^\alpha_{\tau-1} \left[ \frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau+1 \right] \right\}^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}}
\] (2.21)

Substituting back into (19) and a bit of algebra leads to:

\[
q^\alpha_{\tau-1} = \frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = q^\alpha_{\tau-1} U^*_{\tau+1} + \frac{q_\tau}{\beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau} \left\{ \frac{U^*_\tau - b - \beta(1 - \nu)U^*_\tau+1}{\phi^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} \frac{2 - 1}{\eta}} \right\}^{\frac{n-1}{\eta}}
\] (2.22)

This is the enriched version of constraint (13) for the case with endogenous participation choice. One can substitute this constraint into firms’ profit and take FOCs with respect to \(q_\tau\). This gives an expression for the job-finding rate, \(q^\alpha_{\tau-1}\), as a function of \(U^*_{\tau+1}, \mu_\tau\) and parameters only:

\[
q^\alpha_{\tau-1} = \frac{1}{\beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau} \left\{ \frac{U^*_\tau - b - \beta(1 - \nu)U^*_\tau+1}{\phi^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} \frac{2 - 1}{\eta}} \right\}^{\frac{n-1}{\eta}} \frac{1}{\alpha \left( \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau+1 \right)}
\] (2.23)

Finally, one could substitute back into (22) to obtain an expression for equilibrium wage:

\[
\frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = \alpha \left( \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau+1 \right) + U^*_\tau+1 = \alpha \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} + (1 - \alpha)U^*_\tau+1
\] (2.24)

---

\(^{10}\)See Pissarides (2000), Mukoyama et al. (2014), and Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2015).
Based on (24) it is trivial to calculate the value of a filled vacancy for the firm:

\[ J(w_\tau) = \frac{y_\tau - w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = (1 - \alpha) \left[ \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right] \]  

(2.25)

Proposition (2) ensures that \( J(w_\tau) \) is decreasing in \( \tau \); thus, the surplus of the match, \( \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \), must also be decreasing in \( \tau \). Moreover, simple substitution into the Free Entry condition and the participation FOCs yields:

\[ q_\tau = \kappa \pi (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \]  

(2.26)

\[ s^*_\tau = \left\{ \beta(1 - \nu) \phi^{-1} \mu_\tau \kappa^{\frac{\alpha - 1}{\alpha}} (1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right]^{\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\pi - 1}} \]  

(2.27)

which proves that under this specific parameterization the optimally chosen search effort is decreasing over unemployment duration.

**Lemma 5.** Under a power search cost function and a Cobb-Douglas matching function, workers’ participation probability is decreasing in \( \tau \).

**Exogenous Separations.** I also introduce exogenous separation shocks for the quantitative analysis: an employed worker loses her job with probability \( \delta \) each period. Since workers now move from employment to unemployment, I need to take a stance on how their unobserved feature evolves when they enter unemployment. I assume that every time a worker reenters unemployment her suitability type is redrawn. Moreover, the probability to be a broad-suitability worker is decreasing in duration, such that all workers in the same submarket have the same probability to be suitable for a given job. In other words, given \( \pi, a^H, a^L \), and the equilibrium queue lengths, one can construct the sequence \( \{\mu_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \), following the Bayes rule in (5), for some workers who will be unemployed for at least \( T \) periods after they entered the market. I assume that every employed worker in
submarket $\tau$, when entering unemployment, has a probability $\pi^*_\tau$ to be of high ability, with $\pi^*_\tau$ be defined as the solution to the equation: $\mu_\tau = \pi^*_\tau a^H + (1 - \pi^*_\tau) a^L$ or just $\pi^*_\tau = \frac{\mu_\tau - a^L}{a^H - a^L}$. This assumption implies that there is a measure of $\pi$ broad-suitability workers in the unemployment pool at every instant. It also imposes that the fraction of broad-suitability workers at each submarket is decreasing in duration and, most importantly, perfectly known to firms.

What this assumption rules out is the possibility of firms’ expectation regarding the measure of broad-suitability workers in a submarket be different than the actual one. In other words, this assumption combines employer discrimination in callbacks and dynamic selection in hiring into one mechanism. This is a natural assumption in the present paper for, at least, two reasons: (i) the model does not feature a separate interview stage, thus it cannot have distinct implications for callbacks and hires. (ii) The difference between employer discrimination in callbacks and dynamic selection in hiring is quantitatively meaningful for the job-finding rate only if the workers who are discriminated in the interview stage would end up hired if interviewed by firms. Jarosch and Pilossof (2015), in the context of an equilibrium search model, report that this happens very rarely. If firms’ discrimination at the hiring stage does not result in extra jobs being lost, then it is not crucial to consider its effects for duration dependence separately. In other words, this paper assumes, based on the results of Jarosch and Pilossof (2015), that employer discrimination is just a means through which dynamic selection takes place. Because of that, however, the results of the quantitative section should be interpreted as providing an upper bound for the magnitude of unobserved heterogeneity and a lower bound for the magnitude of true duration dependence.
2.3 Empirical Evidence

This section presents the empirical evidence that model the will speak to in Section 5 of the paper.

**Job-Finding Rates.** The main focus of this paper is to decompose duration dependence in unemployment into its key channels. The empirical evidence for duration dependence comes from the empirical relationship between the observed job-finding probability and unemployment duration in the Current Population Survey (CPS). Specifically, I follow Kroft et al. (2016) and Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015) and estimate that relationship in two steps.

![Figure 2.1: Normalized Job-Finding Probabilities by Unemployment Duration](image)

First, I pool CPS data from 1994 to 2014, following the matching process outlined in Nekarda (2009), for workers between 25 and 54 years old. I regress the dummy for finding a job on unemployment duration and a standard set of
demographic controls via weighted nonlinear least squares. Second, I estimate an exponential function for the average job-finding probability at duration $\tau$ relative to the average job-finding probability of workers who have been unemployed one month or less:

$$
\frac{f(\tau)}{f(1)} = b_0 + (1 - b_0) \times \exp(-b_1 \times \tau) \tag{2.28}
$$

The empirical estimates are $\hat{b}_0 = 0.480$ and $\hat{b}_1 = 0.329$, very close to the estimates of Jarosch and Pilossof (2015) and Kroft et al. (2016). Figure 1 plots the normalized job-finding probabilities (i.e. relative to the level in the first month) along with the fitted curve implied by specification (27). This fitted curve will serve as the main evaluation test of the model: the predicted job-finding probabilities will be compared to the estimates of specification (27), as a test for the success of the model to replicate the job-finding profile.

**Reemployment Wages.** In my model only workers suitable for a vacancy are hired. Unobserved heterogeneity implies that some workers are suitable for more jobs than other workers but this heterogeneity is not directly reflected in reemployment wages. Hence, the appropriate measure of wages for this paper should strip out the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in wages. Unfortunately, this cannot be done with CPS data. CPS follows workers for only eight months, hence there are very few workers that move from unemployment to employment twice. Thus, fixed effects cannot be used to strip out the effect of unobserved heterogeneity.

Fortunately, there are good measurements of this effect available in the literature. Schmieder et al. (2016) and Autor et al. (2015) provide causal estimates of non-employment duration on wages. They find that for each additional month in

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11The controls include a gender dummy, a fifth degree polynomial in age, three race dummies (white/black/other), four education category dummies, and gender interactions with all these covariates.
non-employment, wages decline by a bit less than one and two and a half percent, respectively. The sample in Autor et al. (2015), though, consists of SSDI applicants with low labor force attachment, hence this number may be too large for this paper. Moreover, Ortego-Marti (2017), controlling for unobserved heterogeneity with fixed effects in the PSID, finds that an extra month in non-employment lowers wage by one point two percent. Thus, I will use a monthly wage loss of one percent to discipline the decline of human capital in my model. Finally, note that both Schmieder et al. (2016) and Ortego-Marti (2017) report that this drop in wages is linear; that is, it is almost equal for each month in non-employment. I will exploit this feature of the data in my identification strategy, presented in Section 4.2.

**Search Effort.** It is notoriously difficult to obtain reliable measurements of job-search effort (see Hornstein and Kudlyak (2016)). Mukoyama et al. (2014), DeLoach and Kurt (2013), and Gomme and Lkhagvasuren (2015) use minutes devoted to job-search activities as their measure of search effort. Merging the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) with CPS allows them to obtain evidence of how this measure changes over the business cycle. These papers find mixed evidence regarding the cyclicality of time devoted to job-search.

A recent source of reliable evidence is the New Jersey survey of Krueger and Mueller (2011)—KM from now on. I choose to use that data for the following reasons: first, it is a panel survey. They followed the same unemployed workers over time; on the other hand, the ATUS is a cross-sectional survey. As a result, fixed effects cannot be incorporated directly. One needs to project time devoted to search by using the methods of job-search from CPS, as in Mukoyama et al. (2014). This method yields a monthly measure, yet it is plagued by the well-known reporting problems of CPS. Second, the KM survey was conducted on a weekly basis. Hence, the self-reported evidence on job-search are probably more
accurate than those coming from CPS, which is a monthly survey. Finally, Krueger and Mueller (2011) oversampled long-term unemployed workers, which guarantees reliable reports of search effort for workers with high duration of unemployment.

I run two simple fixed effects regressions using the KM data. First, to determine the proper measure of search effort, I use the following specification:

\[
Offer_{it} = a_i + \beta \times SE_{it-1} + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it} \tag{2.29}
\]

where \(Offer_{it}\) is a dummy of whether the individual was offered a job in week \(t\), \(SE_{it-1}\) is a measure of search intensity in week \(t - 1\), and \(\gamma_t\) a week fixed effect. When \(SE_{it-1}\) is the number of hours devoted to job-search (intensive margin), the estimate \(\hat{\beta}\) is not significant, with a t-statistic equal to -0.5: one extra hour of job search has an insignificant effect on generating job-offers. This result was also obtained in a more sophisticated way by Krueger and Mueller (2011) and challenges the use of time devoted to search as the appropriate measure of search effort. On the other hand, when \(SE_{it-1}\) is a dummy variable of whether the individual did anything to find a job in week \(t - 1\) (extensive margin), the estimate of \(\beta\) appears to be significant, with a t-statistic of 5.23. Hence, I choose to work with the extensive margin of participation as the proper measure of search effort in the KM data.

Second, I regress the dummy of search effort on unemployment duration and an individual fixed effect:

\[
SE_{it} = a_i + \beta \times \tau_{it} + \gamma \times \tau_{it}^2 + \delta_t + u_{it} \tag{2.30}
\]

where \(\tau\) is the unemployment duration of the individual in week \(t\) of the survey. The coefficient \(\hat{\beta}\) is estimated to be equal to -0.006, with a t-statistic of -2.90, and \(\hat{\gamma} = 9 \times 10^{-6}\), with a t-statistic of 0.98. I choose to discipline the decline in search effort in my model assuming a monthly linear drop in participation of
around two percent. However, the KM survey was conducted from October 2009 to April 2010, a period of mass unemployment in New Jersey. Hence, the measured discouragement effects are likely higher than the effects in normal times, hence this measurement should be interpreted as the upper bound for the elasticity of workers’ search effort for an extra week in unemployment.

It is worth mentioning that this finding is consistent with the evidence reported in Faberman and Kudlyak (2014). Using data from a job website, they find that the weekly number of submitted applications declines as job-search continues, controlling for individual fixed effects. In their data, the drop seems to have convex and not linear shape, though.

**Callback Rates.** To inform the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in my model I use data from the audit study of Kroft et al. (2013), as reported in Kroft et al. (2016). This paper uses an audit study approach: they submitted carefully constructed fictitious job applications to posted job openings to investigate whether the duration of non-employment affects the likelihood to receive a callback when applying for a job. Kroft et al. (2013) report a steep decline of callbacks along duration, which can be seen in Figure 2.

Unfortunately, the external validity of this evidence is far from established. Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015) offer a thoughtful summary of the literature on audit studies and I summarize their main points here. Ghayad (2013) finds similar results as Kroft et al. (2013); Oberholzer-Gee (2008) finds declining callbacks only for very long unemployment spells; Eriksson and Rooth (2014) find large drops in callbacks for medium and low skilled jobs but not for high skilled jobs; most importantly, Farber et al. (2017) find no evidence of duration dependence in callbacks.

Farber et al. (2017) attribute most of the difference with Kroft et al. (2013) on the age composition of their samples: the former focus on older job appli-
Figure 2.2: Normalized Callback Probabilities by Unemployment Duration as approximated by equation (27) and reported in Kroft et al. (2016)

cants (mid-thirties to mid-fifties) while the latter on younger job-applicants (mid-twenties). There is an intuitive mechanism behind that difference: older applicants have longer employment histories that may outweigh any recent employment experience when resumes are evaluated by potential employers. Younger job-seekers, however, have short employment histories, hence recent unemployment experience may get higher weight in the evaluation of their applications. The fact that the applicants in Eriksson and Rooth (2014) and Ghayad (2013) are all in their twenties, with no more than five or six years of experience, supports that conclusion. Employers seem to employ unemployment duration as a signal of workers’ quality in cases where the information on workers’ CVs is not rich enough to allow for an informed decision (young workers, low-skilled applicants or applicants in slack labor markets; see Kroft et al. (2013)).

Jarosch and Pilossof (2015), in the context of an equilibrium search model, find that interviews lost to statistical discrimination that would otherwise have led to jobs are very rare. Firms discriminate against long-term unemployed because they correctly anticipate being unable to form a viable match with them. Based
on this result, my interpretation of the audit studies results is that discrimination in callbacks is an informed response to workers’ unobserved characteristics. In other words, employers’ beliefs, as captured by duration dependence in callbacks, are informative about unobservable worker quality among the population of job-seekers. I choose to discipline unobserved heterogeneity with the callback results from Kroft et al. (2013) because, given that their applicants were relatively young, the use of unemployment duration as a signal in this study has the best chance of being informative regarding the underlying worker characteristics, among the available audit studies.\footnote{Another piece of evidence supporting this interpretation is the other main finding of Kroft et al. (2013), namely that employers discriminate more in tighter labor markets. In tighter labor markets workers are evaluated more often by firms, hence unemployment duration is a more informative signal of worker’s unobserved quality.}

2.4 Quantitative Analysis

2.4.1 Identification

The first step is to show that the structure of the model is sufficient to separately identify the effect of each mechanism contributing to duration dependence. To put it differently, that there are some features of the data that the model would fail to capture if it did not incorporate all channels of duration dependence. In the model unemployed workers who participate in the labor market face duration dependence caused by skill depreciation and the declining quality of the unemployment pool. Hence, it should be shown that the effects of these two forces are not observationally equivalent through the lens of the model. Workers’ participation choice only amplifies these two channels but it does not constitute a separate mechanism of duration dependence that needs to be identified. The magnitude of this amplification will be disciplined directly by the Krueger and Mueller (2011) data on participation presented above.
Consider a version of the model in which the only force creating duration dependence is the declining expected suitability of the unemployment pool. Workers’ on-the-job productivity stays constant over the spell of unemployment. In search models, workers are paid a share of the match surplus on top of their unemployment value. In this model, this fact is captured by the following equilibrium relationships:

\[ w_\tau = \alpha y_\tau + (1 - \alpha)\left(1 - \beta(1 - \nu)\right)U^*_\tau+1 \]  
\[ w_{\tau+1} = \alpha y_{\tau+1} + (1 - \alpha)\left(1 - \beta(1 - \nu)\right)U^*_{\tau+2} \]  

Without skill loss, the productivity term is constant across \( \tau \). Hence, the wage drop is a fraction of the drop in the value of unemployment over the unemployment spell:

\[ w_\tau - w_{\tau+1} = (1 - \alpha)\left(1 - \beta(1 - \nu)\right)\left(U^*_{\tau+1} - U^*_{\tau+2}\right) \]  

In a model without skill loss, the decline in the value of unemployment is very small for two reasons. First, worker’s productivity on-the-job is constant, which mechanically shuts down an important component of the decline. Second, firms need to be compensated for offering higher wages to workers of short durations, hence the queue lengths are higher early in unemployment and decreasing over the spell. That is, the waiting time to find a job is less for suitable workers at higher durations. This force tends to increase the value of unemployment over the unemployment spell and makes the decline in equilibrium wages even smaller.

In quantitative terms, wage loss in this model is around 10% of the wage decline found in the data, as can be seen in Figure 7. In other words, it is impossible in this model to cook up a distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to replicate the wage drop we see in the data. The larger is the drop in wages, the larger needs to be the decrease in queue lengths to make firms ex ante indifferent between workers. Therefore, this will always create a countervailing decrease in waiting
times over the spell, making the total drop in the value of unemployment and wages quantitatively insignificant.

Turning to the version of the model without suitability considerations, assume that workers are homogeneous and productive for all jobs. On-the-job productivity, though, declines with unemployment duration, capturing skill loss. Following the arguments of Proposition 2 one can show that this model predicts decreasing wages and job-finding rates. Thus, in principle, a version of the model with only human capital could rationalize both data series. This is not true, though: the model cannot rationalize the small linear drop in wages and the large convex drop in job-finding rates at the same time.

To show that, let me derive the equilibrium expressions for job-finding rates and wages in a model with only human capital depreciation:

\[ w_\tau = \alpha (y_\tau - \Delta_\tau) + \Delta_\tau \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.34)

\[ q_\tau^{\alpha - 1} \equiv f_\tau = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\kappa} \left( y_\tau - \Delta_\tau \right)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} \]  \hspace{1cm} (2.35)

where \( \Delta_\tau \equiv (1 - \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \delta))U_{\tau+1}^* \). The results in Schmieder et al. (2016) and Ortega-Marti (2017) show that the decline of reemployment wages over the unemployment spell is roughly linear. Hence, the path of human capital in the model should be calibrated such that the term \( y_\tau - \Delta_\tau \) falls linearly. However, if this is the case, then the term \( (y_\tau - \Delta_\tau)^{\frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha}} \) is a concave function. According to the Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) survey, "A plausible range for the empirical elasticity on unemployment is 0.5 to 0.7...", thus the range of the term \( \frac{1 - \alpha}{\alpha} \) is from around 0.43 to 1, making it a concave function over \( \tau \). However, it is clear from the data that the drop in job-finding rates has a convex shape: it is large for short durations and small for high durations.

Intuitively, the productivity drop for workers of short durations is not enough to rationalize sharp declines in job-offer rates. Workers who are unemployed for
few periods have almost the same productivity as workers unemployed for one period. Firms find it optimal to respond with slightly decreasing job-offer probabilities. Workers who have accumulated a lot of periods in unemployment have lost a large part of their productivity. As a result, they face sharp declines in job-finding rates, which also contradicts the data. The model needs the composition effect to produce job-finding rates that decline fast in low durations and slow in high durations. The intuition for this is, again, that when meeting rates are high and the worker fails to find a job, the probability to be suitable for a given job drops very fast. This force is needed on top of productivity drop to produce convex-shaped job-finding rates.

The argument analyzed above also suggests which data series informs each parameter of the model. The unobserved heterogeneity parameters are identified by the shape of callback rates coming from Kroft et al. (2013). The evidence on wages will determine the drop of productivity, $y_\tau$; it will also pin down the vacancy creation cost $\kappa$ through the Free Entry condition. Finally, the search cost parameters will be chosen so that participation in the model matches the weekly evidence on participation coming from the survey data of Krueger and Mueller (2011).

### 2.4.2 Calibration

I set a period in the model to be a week. I fix the maximum number of weeks in unemployment at $T = 50$. I normalize the productivity of newly unemployed workers to $y_1 = 1$ and impose a linearly depreciating log productivity, motivated by the findings of Schmieder et al. (2016) and Ortego-Marti (2016, 2017). I impose a standard Cobb-Douglas matching function, as in equations (1) – (3).

Several parameters are set outside the model. The discount factor $\beta$ is set to 0.999, consistent with a 5% annual interest rate. I target an average 40-year career.
for workers, implying $\nu = 5 \times 10^{-4}$. The separation rate $\delta$ is set to 0.009 to match the monthly separation rate of 3.4% from Shimer (2012). I set the value of leisure to $b = 0.69$, as in Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016), which lies in the middle of the range of estimates provided by Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2015). Finally, I follow Shimer (2005b) and set the elasticity of the matching function with respect to unemployment to 0.72, which lies towards the upper end of the range of estimates reported in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).

Table 2.1: Exogenously Set Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>Annual Interest Rate of 5 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\nu$</td>
<td>$5 \times 10^{-4}$</td>
<td>40 year working life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>Shimer (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>Shimer (2005b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are seven parameters that are calibrated so the model matches the data reported in Section 3: $\pi$, $a^H$, $a^L$, $d$, $\kappa$, $\eta$ and $\phi$. Following the identification strategy outlined in the previous section, I choose the unobserved heterogeneity parameters ($\pi$, $a^H$ and $a^L$) to mimic the evidence in callback rates; $d$ and $\kappa$ to capture the empirical decline in wages; and the search cost parameters ($\eta$ and $\phi$) to replicate data on weekly participation. More specifically, following Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016), I target the average, standard deviation and skewness of the callback rates from Kroft et al. (2013) to pin down $\pi$, $a^H$ and $a^L$. The targets for $d$ and $\kappa$ are the slope of reemployment wages and the average reemployment wage, based on Schmieder et al. (2017) and Ortego-Marti (2016, 2017). Finally, $\eta$ and $\phi$ are pinned down by the average and standard deviation of the participation profile over the unemployment spell from the Krueger and Mueller (2011) survey.

It is important to notice that the evidence on job-finding rates over the unemployment spell is not included in the calibration targets. That is, none of the
Table 2.2: Jointly Calibrated Parameters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>Average Callback Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a^H$</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>St. dev. of Callback Rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a^L$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Skeweness of Callback Rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d$</td>
<td>-1.17%</td>
<td>Slope of Reemployment Wages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>Average Reemployment Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>St. dev. of Participation Profile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Average Participation Probability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

parameters is chosen such that the model replicates the job-finding data of Figure 1. On the contrary, the ability of the model to produce a duration dependence profile close to the observed one will be used as the main evaluation test for its validity.

Table 2.3: Targeted Moments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\pi$</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>Average Callback Rate</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a^H$</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>St. dev. of Callback Rates</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a^L$</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>Skeweness of Callback Rates</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d$</td>
<td>-1.17%</td>
<td>Slope of Reemployment Wages</td>
<td>-0.009</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\kappa$</td>
<td>3.72</td>
<td>Average Reemployment Wage</td>
<td>0.94</td>
<td>0.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>St. dev. of Participation Profile</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>0.84</td>
<td>Average Participation Probability</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in Figure 3, the model does a good job matching the targeted features of the data. More specifically, it matches the participation and wage profile very accurately and slightly underestimates the drop in callback probability from Kroft et al. (2013). The value of vacancy cost is at the upper end of estimates reported in the literature but, reassuringly, is roughly equal to 2.5 months production in the average match. This estimate is close to the values reported in other papers using directed search models, like Menzio and Shi (2011) or Flemming (2016). Finally, the model predicts a relatively low but realistic fraction of long-term unemployed equal to 12 %, though this was not included in calibration targets.
The unobservable heterogeneity parameters are broadly in line with the values reported in Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016). The step of human capital decline is very close to the empirical estimates in the literature, including Ortega-Martí (2016, 2017), Schmieder et al. (2016) and Autor et al. (2015). Finally, there are very few estimates for the search cost parameters available in the literature. The most common approach is to normalize $\phi = 1$ and set $\eta = 2$. My estimates imply a higher elasticity, reflecting the large drop of participation in the KM survey. As mentioned earlier, though, this is likely an overestimate of the response of participation to the returns to job-search. This observation implies that the calibrated values used here are likely an upper bound for the actual population values of $\phi$ and $\eta$. 

Figure 2.3: Model and Targets: Normalized Callback Probabilities by Unemployment Duration
2.5 Results

**Duration Dependence and Decomposition.** As shown in the previous section, the parameter values in the model were chosen such that the model matches the available data on the channels creating duration dependence in unemployment. An important evaluation test for the model is whether it is able to predict a realistic duration dependence profile; that is, is the model-implied job-finding rate close to the observed one?
As can be seen in Figure 4, the model predicts a duration dependence profile very close to the one observed in CPS, even though job-finding rates were not included in the calibration targets. More specifically, the model provides an excellent match for unemployment spells up to six months and mildly overpredicts the steep decline in job-finding rates at higher durations. It is reassuring that even though parameter values were chosen to make the model consistent with micro data on the sources of duration dependence, the model matches unemployment exit probabilities accurately. This fact demonstrates that the model is an appropriate framework to be used for evaluating the quantitative significance of the three mechanisms contributing to duration dependence in unemployment.

Let the forces behind duration dependence considered in this paper form the set:

\[ I = \{ \text{Unobserved Heterogeneity, Skill Depreciation, Search Effort} \} \]

To accurately evaluate the contribution of each channel \( i \in I \) to duration dependence one should be able to answer the counterfactual question: “How large of a decline in job-finding probability would we observe had channel \( i \) been absent?”.
Moreover, the complete answer to this question should take into account the absence of the effect of channel $i$ on the other channels $j \in I$. In other words, for the appropriate decomposition exercise, one should be able to strip out not only the direct effect of $i$ on job-finding rates but also the interactions of $i$ with the rest of the channels contributing to duration dependence. The model built in this paper will be used to perform this counterfactual exercise.

To be more specific, let the parameters capturing unobserved heterogeneity among workers be summarized by a vector $\xi = [\pi^H a^L]$. The full model predicts the following equilibrium job-finding rate for each duration $\tau$:

$$f_\tau = s_\tau(\mu_\tau, y_\tau) \times \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau, y_\tau) \tag{2.36}$$

where $y_\tau$ is the productivity level of workers with duration $\tau$. To evaluate the effects of skill loss, a version of the model without it will be used to compute the alternative job-finding profile $f^1$:

$$f^1_\tau = s_\tau(\mu_\tau) \times \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau) \tag{2.37}$$

Finally, to evaluate the effects of search effort, a version of the model without it will be used to compute the following job-finding profile:

$$f^2_\tau = \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau) \tag{2.38}$$

Notice that the profile $f^2$ includes only dynamic selection as a source of duration dependence. Hence, it captures the model’s prediction regarding the magnitude of unobserved heterogeneity.$^{13}$

$^{13}$Actually, given the fact that the model cannot distinguish dynamic selection from employer discrimination, this estimate should be interpreted as an upper bound for the importance of unobserved worker heterogeneity through the lens of the model. See, also, the end of Section 2.3.
The results of this exercise can be seen in Figure 5. Generally, and consistent with the findings of Alvarez et al. (2016) and Ahn and Hamilton (2016), unobserved worker heterogeneity accounts for the largest part of total duration dependence in unemployment. The role of skill loss and search effort, though, is quantitatively significant, especially at longer durations. The effect of skill loss plays a major role for spells greater than six months, while declining search effort affects the job-finding rate of all unemployed of duration greater than nine months in a uniform way. Interestingly, search effort slightly mitigates duration dependence for medium-term unemployed workers.

The model-implied significance of the forces causing within-worker duration dependence can rationalize the findings of Abraham et al. (2016) and Bentolila et al. (2017). These authors find strong within-person duration dependence in the data. Importantly, my model can also shed light to the quantitative effect of each mechanism contributing to this result. The effect of skill loss is sizable during the whole unemployment spell but it becomes especially pronounced at durations longer than six months. On the other hand, the impact of declining search effort is small and uniform for spells longer than nine months. Finally, the initial steep decline in job-finding probabilities can be attributed mostly to dynamic selection, that is, to the fact that “good” workers find job faster than “bad” workers.

The model can reconcile the empirical estimates in the following way. In data sets in which there is substantial mass of unemployed workers with unemployment duration longer than six months, the aggregate contribution of within-person duration dependence is expected to be significant. In data sets in which most unemployed workers have relatively short unemployment durations, as in US for instance, unobserved heterogeneity can account for the largest part of job-finding differences over the unemployment spell.

To put the importance of each channel in perspective, it would be instructive to go deeper in the decomposition. As expected by the non-linear nature of the
model, the order of the decomposition matters for the magnitude of each channel.\textsuperscript{14} That is, instead of the process above, one could evaluate the effects of search effort by using the following counterfactual job-finding profile:

\begin{equation}
    f^3_{\tau} = \mu_{\tau}(\xi, x_{\tau}) \times x_{\tau}(\mu_{\tau}, y_{\tau})
\end{equation}

In this case, the effect of human capital would be measured by evaluating the difference between $f^3$ and $f^2$.

![Diagram showing decomposition of normalized job-finding probabilities by unemployment duration.](image)

Figure 2.7: Decomposition of Normalized Job-finding Probabilities by Unemployment Duration I

To evaluate the effects of each mechanism, one can define the following ratios, based on the weekly losses in job-finding:

\textsuperscript{14}Reassuringly, though, the order does not change the key messages of the exercise.
Figure 2.8: Decomposition of Normalized Job-finding Probabilities by Unemployment Duration II

\[ R_{\tau} = \frac{f_{\tau} - f_{\tau}^2}{1 - f_{\tau}} \quad (2.40) \]

\[ R_{\tau}^{HC} = \frac{0.5(f_{\tau}^2 - f_{\tau}^3) + 0.5(f_{\tau} - f_{\tau}^1)}{1 - f_{\tau}} \quad (2.41) \]

\[ R_{\tau}^{SE} = \frac{0.5(f_{\tau}^2 - f_{\tau}^1) + 0.5(f_{\tau} - f_{\tau}^3)}{1 - f_{\tau}} \quad (2.42) \]

The first ratio, \( R_{\tau} \), measures the contribution of within-worker channels on the total amount of duration dependence predicted by the model, for different stages of unemployment duration. The next two ratios perform a similar measurement but focus on skill loss and search effort decline as sources of duration dependence. \( R_{\tau}^{HC} \) captures the contribution of human capital depreciation to overall duration dependence. It is the average of two decomposition scenarios: (i) begin from the full model and shut down skill loss; (ii) add skill loss to a model that contains only unobserved heterogeneity. Each scenario of those would quantify a part of duration dependence due to skill loss. The answers, though, will differ because of the non-linear interactions of the model’s mechanisms. To make the exercise
robust, I take the average of all possible decomposition exercises for each force.

Correspondingly, $R^{SE}_\tau$ measures the impact of declining search effort on the model-implied overall duration dependence. It is the average of the corresponding scenarios analyzed above for human capital depreciation. Notice that all ratio measures are indexed by the length of the unemployment spell, $\tau$. This is done to highlight the fact that at different lengths of an unemployment spell, the quantitative importance of each mechanism for the observed duration dependence will be different.

However, one could shut down the mechanisms following many different sequential orders. Specifically, the decomposition analyzed above does not consider a version of the model with only within-worker duration dependence. For robustness, in Figure 6 below, I present the averages for all different permutations of decompositions for each mechanism, including versions without unobserved heterogeneity. The details of each calculation can be found in Appendix II. They key messages are the same, though, regardless of the sequential order of the decomposition.

Plotting the ratio measures in Figure 6 is illuminating. First, consider the classic question, “How large is the part of duration dependence that is attributed to unobserved worker differences?” The model-implied response is, “It depends on the length of the unemployment spells of the workers at hand”. Overall, when comparing unemployed at most durations, unobserved heterogeneity accounts for the largest share of the differences in job-finding. For long-term unemployed workers, though, the accumulated effects of skill loss and search effort are quantitatively significant and account for almost half of the observed differences in job-finding between workers.

Digging into the structure of within-person duration dependence is, also, revealing. As expected from Figure 5, the effect of declining search effort is quantitatively small and symmetric for workers unemployed longer than nine months. On
the contrary, the impact of skill loss needs some time to accumulate and become quantitatively significant. For spells longer than six months, skill loss becomes an important cause of duration dependence.

To make these findings clearer, consider the following two comparisons. First, in the US, a newly unemployed worker has a 30% greater chance of finding a job, compared to an observationally similar worker who is jobless for three months. According to my model, 85% of this disparity can be attributed to unobserved differences between the average newly unemployed and the average worker who is unemployed for three months, while skill loss and search effort account for a modest 15%. Second, when comparing a worker unemployed for six months with a worker unemployed for a year or more, the former has a 12% greater chance of finding a job. The model attributes one half of that disparity to unobserved worker differences and the other half to a combination of skill decay and lower search effort exhibited by workers who are unemployed for a year or more. Importantly, the model implies that skill loss accounts for a vastly larger part of the disparity than the decline in search effort.

The quantitative results of the model highlight the importance of policies tight to the length of spell of different unemployed workers to improve their job-finding prospects. According to the model, there is little space for policymakers to improve the job-finding rates of the short-term unemployed. The prospects of these workers decline very fast due to the declining average quality of the unemployment pool. On the other hand, the model points to the appropriate short-term policy responses for improving the job-finding prospects of medium- and long-run unemployed workers. Specifically, the model implies that policymakers should invest in both job-training and job-search assistance programs to fight long-term unemployment. The impact of job-training programs, though, is expected to be greater.

It is worth emphasizing that the model-implied policy implications are consis-
Figure 2.9: Contribution of Various Channels to Duration Dependence by Unemployment Duration

The findings of Card et al. (2016) regarding the impact of active labor market policies on fighting long-term unemployment are consistent with the model developed in this paper. In a meta-study of various active labor market programs around the world, Card et al. (2016) found that more than 70% of job-training and job-search assistance programs in their sample had a significant positive impact for the long-term unemployed. Importantly, though, they also found that the effects of active labor market programs are more positive for the long-term unemployed than for short- or medium-term unemployed. Moreover, they find that job-training programs are significantly more likely to bring positive impacts for the long-term unemployed than for workers at shorter durations. The model developed in this paper illuminates how the interaction of unobserved heterogeneity with skill loss and declining search effort can generate these policy conclusions.

Showing the predicted paths for reemployment wages in Figure 7 is useful to understand the mechanics of the model. As mentioned earlier, in versions of the model without skill loss, reemployment wages drop by less than 0.1% per month, a counterfactual prediction. This highlights the importance of skill depreciation.
in order the model to match the data, as well as the fact that wages in the model are pinned down by the speed of skill depreciation. The fact that wages are higher in the version of the model with endogenous search effort is a result of directed search. Wages price waiting times in competitive search; waiting times (job-finding rates) are higher (lower) in the model with search effort, hence wages needs to be higher to compensate workers who do not differ in productivity over their unemployment spell.

Finally, to highlight the importance of unobserved worker heterogeneity it would be useful to consider the predicted job-finding profile of a model in which this mechanism is absent. Figure 8 plots the normalized job-finding profiles for the full model and for a model that contains only skill loss and search effort. The concave shape of the profile makes clear that a model without unobserved worker differences and learning cannot generate the large drop in job-finding observed in the first months of the spell. Skill losses need time to accumulate to make firms not willing to hire the long-term unemployed. Hence, unobserved heterogeneity is crucial for the model to capture the empirical pattern of duration dependence in unemployment.
Intuition: How the Model works. At this point it may be instructive to explain how the different channels of the model interact to make its predictions consistent with the data. First, consider the submarkets populated by job-seekers with short unemployment spells. Workers who are found suitable in these submarkets have relatively high productivity, leading to high match surplus. As a
result, firms post a lot of vacancies directed to newly unemployed workers, since they are very productive and have good chances of being suitable for a job’s tasks. Given the high probability of job applications be reviewed by firms, if a worker fails to find a job early on her spell, this says a lot about her quality: unemployment duration is a very informative signal for short durations, because of the large number of worker-firm meetings. Thus, $\mu_\tau$ drops very fast in the first few periods of unemployment. Moreover, since the returns to job-search are high for the newly unemployed, most workers engage in job search in the beginning of their unemployment spell.

As their unemployment spell evolves, workers become less productive, due to skill loss. Hence, the match surplus declines and firms offer less job opportunities to workers with high unemployment durations: $x_\tau$ declines, following the path of skill depreciation. However, because worker-firm meetings are scarce, the probability a worker to be tested is low. Thus, failing to find a job is not very informative about workers’ quality: $\mu_\tau$ drops slowly for high durations of unemployment. Finally, the returns to job search decrease, hence workers of high $\tau$ exhibit lower effort to find jobs: $s_\tau$ drops due to discouragement.

2.6 Discussion and Related Literature

This paper is related to several strands of literature in Macroeconomics and Labor Economics. This section describes how the paper fits into these strands and how its contributions advance the relevant lines of work.

**Competitive search.** The model in this paper uses the machinery of competitive search, developed by Moen (1997), Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), Burdett et al. (2001), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Shi (2002, 2006), Shimer (2005a),
and Inderst (2005). It generalizes the competitive search framework to an environment in which interacting non-stationary forces cause duration dependence in unemployment. It establishes the equivalence between competitive search equilibrium and the solution of an auxiliary optimization problem, in the tradition of Acemoglu and Shimer (1999a,b), and characterizes the equilibrium analytically. It develops an algorithm to compute the equilibrium of directed search models that fully exploits the fixed-point structure of the auxiliary optimization problem. However, this paper remains silent regarding the efficiency properties of equilibrium, a theme analyzed very often in the competitive search literature.

Models of Duration Dependence. This is the strand of the literature this paper is most related to. Early contributions include the random search models of Lockwood (1991), Pissarides (1992), Blanchard and Diamond (1994) and Acemoglu (1995). Gonzalez and Shi (2010) provide the first directed search framework that could speak to the question of duration dependence. They construct a model in which workers learn about their type while searching for a job to explain the stylized fact that reemployment wages are decreasing in unemployment duration. This paper uses a variation of the matching process developed in Gonzalez and Shi (2010). Their paper is an exclusively theoretical contribution (provides no quantitative results) and, most importantly, has an important counterfactual implication: duration dependence in unemployment is positive. The hazard rates within individual workers out of unemployment are increasing over the unemployment spell. This paper fixes that problem by introducing skill loss in the model. As I show above, my model is capable of successfully rationalizing both job-finding rates and reemployment wages data, as well as providing answers to relevant quantitative questions.

The most recent and closely related papers are Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016), Jarosch and Pirossoph (2015) and Doppelt (2014). Fernández-Blanco and
Preugschat (2016) build a directed search model to rationalize the evidence presented in the audit study of Kroft et al. (2013). Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015) evaluate the quantitative significance of firm discrimination against long-term unemployed on job-finding rates. Their results imply that the contribution of stigma to job-finding rates is weak, a finding this paper takes seriously and builds upon. Doppelt (2014) is a skillful quantitative extension of Gonzalez and Shi (2010) that features learning about a worker’s quality over her whole career.

A shared limitation of these studies is that the only source of duration dependence is unemployment stigma—meaning, employer discrimination against long-term unemployed in hiring. As a result, they remain silent regarding the importance of skill depreciation and search effort decline for observed duration dependence. Moreover, their elegance and significance notwithstanding, these studies have some troubling implications. Reemployment wages in Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016) may increase with unemployment duration; the firm-worker meeting rates in Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015) are exogenous, so they cannot perform counterfactuals useful for policy analysis; finally, Doppelt (2014) shares the counterfactual result of Gonzalez and Shi (2010), with a minority of workers facing increasing job-finding rates over the unemployment spell. This paper predicts unambiguously decreasing job-finding rates and reemployment wages for all workers in the labor market, while the meeting rates are endogenous objects, determined in equilibrium.

It should be mentioned, however, that through the lens of the model analyzed here, dynamic selection in job-finding and employer discrimination in interviews cannot be distinguished. The model does not incorporate a separate interview stage in the hiring process; hence, it is not capable of providing an estimate of

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15To be fair, Doppelt (2014) provides a version of his model with skill depreciation. However, skill decay in Doppelt’s model attenuates the drop in job-finding rates! In other words, skill depreciation improves the prospects of workers in Doppelt’s model, which is at odds with the empirical findings of Card et al. (2016).
the effect of employer discrimination at the interview stage. Since dynamic selection is conflated with employer discrimination, the results of my model should be interpreted as an upper bound for the magnitude of unobserved worker heterogeneity and a lower bound for the magnitude of within-worker duration dependence. Jarosch and Pilossoph (2015), however, show that employer discrimination at the interview stage has a small effect on duration dependence.

Other relevant contributions include Flemming (2016) and Potter (2017). Flemming (2016) rationalizes duration dependence in unemployment with learning-by-doing and home production. Her model predicts unambiguously decreasing job-finding rates and reemployment wages but the decline of the model-implied job-finding rates does not have the convex shape found in the data. This result highlights the importance of a composition/learning mechanism to account for the convex shape of job-finding rates. Potter (2017) builds a partial equilibrium model to emphasize the effect of learning on workers’ search intensity, one of the mechanisms at work in this paper too. He uses the data from Krueger and Mueller (2011) survey but he works with the intensive margin of search effort, which is shown not to have a significant effect on job-finding probability. Finally, the consequences of human capital depreciation in random search models are studied by Ortego-Marti (2016, 2017) and Laureys (2014), in a line of work initiated by Pissarides (1992) and Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998).

**Empirical Work.** Turning to the empirical front, the first paper that analyzed duration dependence in unemployment was Kaitz (1970). After him, a large econometric literature tried to measure duration dependence by estimating duration models with observational data. This literature made progress by imposing strong parametric identifying assumptions to identify within-worker duration from unobserved heterogeneity. It is nicely summarized by Van den Berg (2001) and Machin and Manning (1999). More related to this paper is a series of recent
contributions that estimate within-worker duration dependence either by using sophisticated econometric techniques or more reduced form methods. The former include Alvarez et al. (2016), Ahn and Hamilton (2016) and Bentolila et al. (2017), while the main paper in the latter is Abraham et al. (2016). Abraham et al. (2016) and Bentolila et al. (2017) find a strong role for within-worker duration dependence. The results in Ahn and Hamilton (2016) and Alvarez et al. (2016) emphasize the importance of unobserved heterogeneity but they still find a small positive role for within-worker duration dependence.

This paper analyzes duration dependence through the lens of an equilibrium search model. Hence, it can measure the magnitude of the effects of specific mechanisms on observed duration dependence. The empirical approaches are primarily concerned with distinguishing within-worker duration dependence from dynamic selection, thus they are not equipped to measure the magnitude of different mechanisms contributing to within-worker duration dependence. Other relevant empirical contributions include the papers measuring the effect of unemployment duration on reemployment wages (Schmieder et al. (2016), Autor et al. (2015), Nekoei and Weber (2017)), on search effort (Krueger and Mueller (2011), Faberman and Kudlyak (2014)), as well as a series of influential audit studies (Kroft et al. (2013), Eriksson and Rooth (2014), Ghayad (2013), Oberholzer-Gee (2008), Farber et al. (2017)). Finally, Card et al. (2016) is a meta-study of active labor market policies, the results of which are fully consistent with the results of this paper.

**Methodology.** This paper uses an equilibrium search model to assign magnitudes to forces causing duration dependence. To measure the effect of each channel, it computes counterfactual job-finding profiles over the unemployment spell. For each counterfactual, a specific mechanism of duration dependence is shut down and the difference of the predicted job-finding profile with the profile
of the full model is attributed to the missing channel. This methodology is employed by many recent studies in Macroeconomics: Burdett et al. (2016), Jarosch (2014), and Wolcott (2017) use rich search models to perform similar quantitative decompositions. Moreover, Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016), Jarosch and Pilossof (2015) and Doppelt (2014) employ this methodology to evaluate the effects of employer discrimination against long-term unemployed in hiring. I am not aware of any paper, though, that uses a directed search model to evaluate the effects of dynamic selection, skill loss and search effort decline.

2.7 Conclusion

In short, this paper makes two contributions: (i) it introduces a directed search model of the labor market, featuring unobserved worker differences, skill loss in unemployment, and endogenous job-search effort; (ii) it combines the structure of the model with data on reemployment wages and search effort to evaluate the significance of each mechanism for the observed duration dependence in unemployment. The results of interest include: (i) the model successfully replicates the job-finding profile in US data, even though the latter was not used to pin down any model parameters; (ii) in agreement with recent empirical literature, overall, the most important factor behind the total observed duration dependence is unobserved worker heterogeneity; (iii) the bulk of the effect of unobserved worker heterogeneity is concentrated in the first few months of the unemployment spell; more than 40% of the differences among workers at longer spells should be attributed to skill loss and declining search effort; (iv) skill loss is quantitatively more important for drops in job-finding at spells greater than six months. These results have sharp implications about how active labor market programs should be tailored to help short- and long-term unemployed workers find jobs.

To conclude, let me summarize some future research directions based on this
paper. First, an interesting direction would be to make the model stochastic to incorporate aggregate shocks. This would be a useful framework to study the effects of extensive unemployment benefits on duration dependence in recessions. Second, one could study the efficiency properties of the framework developed here and compare the results with Fernández-Blanco and Preugschat (2016). Third, the modeling of human capital could be extended to reflect skills as measured directly in the data, following Macaluso (2017). Finally, and more broadly, it would be of interest for one to study the forces evaluated in this paper in a model of stock-flow matching (Ebrahimy and Shimer (2010)).
2.A Appendix I: Proofs

Lemma (Equilibrium $\mapsto$ Auxiliary Problem). Let $w^*_\tau \in W^*_{\tau,\mu}$ and $q^*_\tau = Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w^*_\tau)$, where \{\$W^*_{\tau,\mu}$, \{$Q^*_{\tau,\mu}$\}$\tau \leq T$\} be an equilibrium allocation; then $\{w^*_\tau, q^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}$ solve problem (12) under constraints (13), (14) and (15), with $U_{\tau,\mu}(w^*_\tau, q^*_\tau) = U^*_{\tau,\mu}$ if $q^*_\tau > 0$.

\textbf{Proof.} First, notice that the Beliefs Updating condition ensures that the constraint (15) is satisfied. Also, note that Optimal Application ensures that constraint (13) is satisfied.

Now, suppose that some $w^*_\tau$ and $q^*_\tau$ do not maximize (12). That is, there are $q'_\tau > 0$ and a $w'_\tau$ that achieve a strictly positive value for the firm, while satisfying constraints (13), (14) and (15). Formally:

$$-\kappa + \lambda(q'_\tau) \frac{y_\tau - w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} > 0$$

while $U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, q'_\tau) = U^*_{\tau,\mu}$. By the definition of competitive search equilibrium, it has to be the case that $U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau)) \leq U^*_{\tau,\mu}$, due to Rational Expectations. Hence, $U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, q'_\tau) \geq U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau))$. By definition:

$$U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, q'_\tau) = b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu(x(q'_\tau)) \left( \frac{w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(q'_\tau)} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(Q^*_{\tau,\mu})} \right]$$

$$U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau)) = b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu(x(Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau))) \left( \frac{w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(Q^*_{\tau,\mu})} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(Q^*_{\tau,\mu})} \right]$$

where $\mu'(q'_\tau) = H(x(q'_\tau), \mu)$ and $\mu'(Q^*_{\tau,\mu}) = H(x(Q^*_{\tau,\mu}), \mu)$.

There are two scenarios making the inequality $U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, q'_\tau) \geq U_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau, Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau))$
hold:

- **Case 1:** \( x(Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau)) \leq x(q'_\tau), \mu'(q'_\tau) \leq \mu'(Q^*_\tau,\mu) \), and \( U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(q'_\tau) \leq U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(Q^*_\tau,\mu) \). Then, the following chain is true: \( x(Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau)) \leq x(q'_\tau) \Leftrightarrow Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau) \geq q'_\tau \Leftrightarrow \lambda(Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau)) \geq \lambda(q'_\tau) \).

As a result:

\[
-\kappa + \lambda(Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau)) \frac{y_\tau - w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} > 0
\]

which contradicts the Profit Maximization and Free Entry conditions of equilibrium.

- **Case 2:** \( x(Q^*_\tau,\mu(w'_\tau)) \geq x(q'_\tau), \mu'(q'_\tau) \geq \mu'(Q^*_\tau,\mu) \), and \( U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(q'_\tau) \geq U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(Q^*_\tau,\mu) \). Then, one can find a slightly greater queue length, \( q''_\tau \), such that \( q''_\tau > q'_\tau \), but also \( U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(q''_\tau) \geq U^*_\tau + 1,\mu'(q'_\tau) \), which yields the same value of unemployment for the worker at duration \( \tau \).

As a result:

\[
-\kappa + \lambda(q''_\tau) \frac{y_\tau - w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} > 0
\]

which contradicts the Profit Maximization and Free Entry conditions of equilibrium.

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**Lemma (Auxiliary Problem \( \mapsto \) Equilibrium).** If some \( \{w^*_\tau, q^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \) solve problem (12) under constraints (13), (14) and (15), then there exists an equilibrium \( \{W^*_\tau, \mu^*\}_{\tau \leq T}, U^* \) such that \( w^*_\tau \in W^*_\tau,\mu \) and \( q^*_\tau = Q^*_\tau,\mu(w^*_\tau), \forall \tau \leq T \).

**Proof.** Let me start with the constructive part of the claim. It is straightforward to construct \( \{\mu^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \) as a function of \( \{q^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \). Define \( \mathbb{W}^*_{\tau,\mu} = \{w^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and

\[16\]The value of unemployment is strictly increasing in expected suitability; for a formal proof see Gonzalez and Shi (2010), Theorem 3.1.
$Q^*_\tau \mu (w^*_\tau) = q^*_\tau, \forall \tau \leq T$, given the constructed series of expected suitability. Set the following recursively:

$$U^*_\tau \mu = b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu x (q^*_\tau) \left( \frac{w^*_\tau}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U (w^*_\tau + 1, q^*_\tau + 1) \right) + U (w^*_\tau + 1, q^*_\tau + 1) \right]$$

and

$$U^*_{T, \mu T} = b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x (q^*_T) \left( \frac{w^*_T}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U (w^*_T, q^*_T) \right) + U (w^*_T, q^*_T) \right]$$

Now, define $Q^*_\tau \mu (w)$ to satisfy:

$$U^*_\tau \mu = b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu x (Q^*_\tau \mu (w)) \left( \frac{w}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau + 1, \mu + 1 \right) + U^*_\tau + 1, \mu + 1 \right]$$

and

$$U^*_{T, \mu T} = b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x (Q^*_\tau \mu (w)) \left( \frac{w}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U^*_T, \mu T \right) + U^*_T, \mu T \right]$$

or $Q^*_\tau \mu (w) = 0$ if there is no solution to any of these equations.

By construction, $\{W^*_\tau \mu, \{Q^*_\tau \mu\}_\tau \leq T, U^*\}$ satisfy the Profit Maximization, Free Entry and Beliefs Updating conditions. It remains to be shown that it satisfies Optimal Application. Suppose to the contrary that there are equilibrium $w'_\tau$ and $Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau) > 0$ that yield greater utility to the worker than $U^*_\tau \mu$:

$$U^*_\tau \mu < b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu x (Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau)) \left( \frac{w'_\tau}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau + 1, \mu' (Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau)) \right) + \right.$$

or $Q^*_\tau \mu (w) = 0$ if there is no solution to any of these equations.

By construction, $\{W^*_\tau \mu, \{Q^*_\tau \mu\}_\tau \leq T, U^*\}$ satisfy the Profit Maximization, Free Entry and Beliefs Updating conditions. It remains to be shown that it satisfies Optimal Application. Suppose to the contrary that there are equilibrium $w'_\tau$ and $Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau) > 0$ that yield greater utility to the worker than $U^*_\tau \mu$:

$$U^*_\tau \mu < b + \beta (1 - \nu) \left[ \mu x (Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau)) \left( \frac{w'_\tau}{1 - \beta (1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau + 1, \mu' (Q^*_\tau \mu (w'_\tau)) \right) + \right.$$

or $Q^*_\tau \mu (w) = 0$ if there is no solution to any of these equations.

If Optimal Application is satisfied, then the Rational Expectations condition holds by the construction of $Q^*_\tau \mu (\cdot)$ and $\{U^*_\tau \mu\}_\tau \leq T$. 

65
But then there is a $q'_\tau > Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau) > 0$ such that:

$$U^*_{\tau,\mu} = b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu x(q'_\tau) \left( \frac{w'_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(q'_\tau)} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1,\mu'(q'_\tau)} \right]$$

Then it is true that $\lambda(q'_\tau) > \lambda(Q^*_{\tau,\mu}(w'_\tau))$; that is, $(w'_\tau, q'_\tau)$ yield strictly greater profit to the firm. That is, I have shown that $(w'_\tau, q'_\tau)$ yield strictly greater profit than $(w^*_\tau, q^*_\tau)$ while satisfying constraints (13), (14) and (15), a contradiction.

\[\square\]

**Proposition.** There exists an equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration.

**Proof.** First, consider the simple firms’ maximization problem (12) under constraint (13) only. The objective function is a continuous function. Also, every $q_\tau$ is bounded below by zero and constraint (13) puts an upper bound on it for every duration $\tau$. Therefore, Weierstrass Theorem ensures the existence of a solution to this simple maximization problem.

To proceed, let $f : K \rightarrow K$, where $K \equiv [a^L, a^H]^T \times [1 - \beta(1 - \nu), 1 - \beta(1 - \nu)]^T$ is a compact set. I define $f$ to be the composite correspondence $f \equiv \psi \circ g$, where $\psi$ and $g$ are defined as follows. First, let $z \equiv (\{q_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}, \{w_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}, \{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T})$ and $g(z)$ be defined as the set of elements $(q_\tau, w_\tau, U^*_\tau)_{\tau \leq T}$ that satisfy the zero-profit condition (14) and solve the firms’ profit maximization problem (12) under constraint (13). $U^*_\tau$ is obtained by using the complementary slackness condition (13). Second, let $\psi$ be defined as $\psi((w_\tau)_{\tau \leq T}, (q_\tau)_{\tau \leq T}, (U^*_\tau)_{\tau \leq T}) \equiv (\{\mu'_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}, \{U'_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T})$, where $\{\mu'_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}$ is uniquely determined by the Bayesian updating equation (15) with $\mu_1 = \pi a^H + (1 - \pi)a^L$ and $U'_\tau = U^*_\tau$ for all $\tau$. Notice that the equilibrium can be

---

\[\text{Again, Gonzalez and Shi (2010) prove that the value of unemployment is strictly increasing and, as a result, continuous.}\]
identified as a fixed point of $f$.

I need to show that $f$ is a continuous function. First, $\psi$ is obviously continuous. It remains to be shown that $g(z)$ is singleton and continuous for every $z \in K$. After substituting constraint (13) in (12) firms’ problem becomes:

$$V_\tau^* = \max_{q_\tau} -\kappa + \lambda(q_\tau) \left( \frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right) + q_\tau \left( \frac{U^*_\tau + b}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau} \right), \quad \forall \tau \leq T$$

Having assumed that $\lambda(\cdot)$ is strictly concave ensures that this function is strictly concave in $q_\tau$, thus there is a unique optimum. Hence, $g$ is a function. Finally, the Maximum Theorem guarantees that $g$ is continuous at $z \in K$. Therefore, the composite function $f$ is also continuous. Hence, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem ensures that $f$ has a fixed point in $K$, so there is an equilibrium with segmented labor markets.

**Proposition.** In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, $q_\tau$ is increasing and $w_\tau$ is decreasing in $\tau$; also, the difference $y_\tau - w_\tau$ is decreasing in $\tau$. Hence, the value of a filled vacancy, $J(w_\tau)$, is decreasing in $\tau$.

**Proof.** First, notice that by constraint (14) (Free Entry) the sequences $y_\tau - w_\tau$ and $q_\tau$ must move in opposite directions. That is, since $\lambda(q_\tau) \frac{y_\tau - w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = \kappa$, for all $\tau$, and $\lambda(\cdot)$ is strictly increasing, in order the Free Entry condition to hold, $y_\tau - w_\tau$ and $q_\tau$ have to be moving in opposite directions over different submarkets.

I will prove this statement by induction. To begin with, I will show that it is true for $\tau = T - 1$ and $\tau = T$. Following the algebra developed in section 4.1, one can compute equilibrium wages and the value of a filled job for submarkets $T - 1$
and \( T \) as follows:

\[
w_{T-1} = \alpha y_{T-1} + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))U_T^* \\
w_T = \alpha y_T + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))U_T^* \\
y_{T-1} - w_{T-1} = (1 - \alpha)(y_{T-1} - (1 - \beta(1 - \nu)U_T^*) \\
y_T - w_T = (1 - \alpha)(y_T - (1 - \beta(1 - \nu)U_T^*)
\]

Subtracting the last two equalities yields:

\[
(y_{T-1} - w_{T-1}) - (y_T - w_T) = (1 - \alpha)(y_{T-1} - y_T)
\]

or just

\[
w_{T-1} - w_T = \alpha(y_{T-1} - y_T) < y_{T-1} - y_T
\]

The difference \( w_{T-1} - w_T \) is positive and smaller than \( y_{T-1} - y_T \). Also, \( (y_{T-1} - w_{T-1}) > (y_T - w_T) \), hence \( q_T \) has to be greater than \( q_{T-1} \).

To proceed with the induction, assume that \( w_\tau > w_{\tau+1}, (y_\tau - w_\tau) > (y_{\tau+1} - w_{\tau+1}) \) and \( q_\tau < q_{\tau+1} \); to complete the proof it needs to be shown that \( w_{\tau-1} > w_\tau, (y_{\tau-1} - w_{\tau-1}) > (y_\tau - w_\tau) \) and \( q_{\tau-1} < q_\tau \). Subtracting wages yields:

\[
w_{\tau-1} - w_\tau = \alpha(y_{\tau-1} - y_\tau) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))(U_\tau^* - U_{\tau+1}^*)
\]

The idea here is to use the information on \( w_\tau \) and \( w_{\tau+1} \) to gain information on the difference \( U_{\tau+1}^* - U_{\tau+2}^* \) which, in turn, will be useful for bounding the difference \( U_\tau^* - U_{\tau+1}^* \) and the difference in wages.
Using the standard expression for equilibrium wages yields:

\[ U^*_{\tau+1} = \frac{w_{\tau} - \alpha y_{\tau}}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))} \]
\[ U^*_{\tau+2} = \frac{w_{\tau+1} - \alpha y_{\tau+1}}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))} \]

or just:

\[ U^*_{\tau+1} - U^*_{\tau+2} = \frac{w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1} - \alpha(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1})}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))} \]

Now, consider the difference \( U^*_{\tau} - U^*_{\tau+1} \):

\[
\begin{align*}
U^*_{\tau} - U^*_{\tau+1} &= b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau}) \left( \frac{w_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1} \right] - \\
&\quad - b - \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \left( \frac{w_{\tau+1}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+2} \right) + U^*_{\tau+2} \right] \\
&\geq \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \left( \frac{w_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1} - \frac{w_{\tau+1}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} + U^*_{\tau+2} \right) + U^*_{\tau+1} - U^*_{\tau+2} \right] = \\
&= \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \left( \frac{w_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - \frac{w_{\tau+1}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} \right) + \left( 1 - \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \right) \left( U^*_{\tau+1} - U^*_{\tau+2} \right) \right] = \\
&= \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \left( \frac{w_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - \frac{w_{\tau+1}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} \right) + \left( 1 - \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \right) \frac{w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1} - \alpha(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1})}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))} \right] = \\
&= \beta(1 - \nu) \left( 1 - \alpha \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}) \right) \frac{(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) - \alpha(1 - \mu_{\tau+1}x(q_{\tau+1}))(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1})}{(1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))}
\end{align*}
\]
Hence, the difference \( w_{\tau-1} - w_{\tau} \) can be bounded as:

\[
w_{\tau-1} - w_{\tau} = \alpha(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) + (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))(U^*_\tau - U^*_{\tau+1}) \geq \n
\geq \alpha(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) + \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \alpha \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) - \beta(1 - \nu)\alpha(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1})
\]

Assuming a linear drop \( D \) in workers’ productivity, as in the quantitative analysis of the paper, yields:

\[
w_{\tau-1} - w_{\tau} = \alpha D y_{\tau-1} - \beta(1 - \nu)\alpha(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1})) Dy_{\tau} + \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \alpha \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) \geq \n
\geq \alpha D y_{\tau}(1 - \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))) + \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \alpha \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) \geq 0
\]

Now, consider the following differences:

\[
(y_{\tau-1} - w_{\tau-1}) - (y_{\tau} - w_{\tau}) = (1 - \alpha)(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) - (1 - \alpha)(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))(U^*_\tau - U^*_{\tau+1}) \geq \n
\geq (1 - \alpha)(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) - \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \alpha \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) + \beta(1 - \nu)\alpha(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1}) \geq \n
\geq (1 - \alpha)(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) - \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(w_{\tau} - w_{\tau+1}) + \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(y_{\tau} - y_{\tau+1}) = \n
= (1 - \alpha)(y_{\tau-1} - y_{\tau}) + \beta(1 - \nu)(1 - \mu_{\tau+1} x(q_{\tau+1}))(y_{\tau} - w_{\tau} - (y_{\tau+1} - w_{\tau+1})) \geq 0
\]

Finally, since \( q_{\tau} \) and \( y_{\tau} - w_{\tau} \) move in opposite directions in equilibrium, the last step proves that \( q_{\tau-1} \leq q_{\tau} \). [Q.E.D]

**Lemma.** In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, \( q_{\tau} > 0 \) for all \( \tau \). Hence, the complementary slackness condition (13) holds with equality.
Proof. Suppose that there exists at least one duration group of workers such that its associated queue is 0. Let us denote by $\tau_0$ the first duration for which the queue length is 0. All queues associated with longer durations must also be 0, since $y_\tau < y_{\tau_0}$ for all $\tau > \tau_0$ and Proposition A.2 proved that the value of a filled vacancy is decreasing in $\tau$. Then, the unemployment value of workers with unemployment duration greater than or equal to $\tau_0$ must be $b - \beta (1 - \nu)$, as they will remain unemployed forever.

Let $w_{\tau_0}$ be the profit maximizing wage for workers of duration $\tau_0$. Given that $y_{\tau_0} > b$, there exists an arbitrarily small, but positive $\epsilon$ such that $b + \epsilon < y_{\tau_0}$. Consider now the alternative wage $w'_{\tau_0} = b + \epsilon$. This wage offer will attract a positive queue of workers and delivers strictly higher profits than $w_{\tau_0}$, so $w_{\tau_0}$ and $q_{\tau_0} = 0$ cannot be profit-maximizing. Therefore, $q_\tau > 0$ for all $\tau$ in any equilibrium. ■

Lemma. Beliefs about worker’s expected suitability for a given job, $\mu_\tau$, are decreasing in $\tau$.

Proof. By construction $a^L \leq \mu_\tau \leq a^H$ for all $\tau$. It is straightforward to notice that:

\[
\frac{a^H - (a^H - \mu_\tau)(1 - x_\tau a^L)}{1 - x_\tau \mu_\tau} \leq \mu_\tau \iff (1 - x_\tau \mu_\tau)a^H - (a^H - \mu_\tau)(1 - x_\tau a^L) \leq (1 - x_\tau a^L)(a^H - \mu_\tau) \iff a^L \leq \mu_\tau
\]

which is always true, since in equilibrium $q_\tau > 0$. ■

Proposition. In any equilibrium in which the labor market is segmented by unemployment duration, the value of unemployment, $U^*_\tau$, is decreasing in $\tau$.
Proof. I prove this by induction. First, it is straightforward to notice that $U_T^{*} - 1 \geq U_T^{*}$ since $q_T - 1 < q_T$, $\mu_T - 1 \geq \mu_T$, $w_T - 1 \geq w_T$ and $x(\cdot)$ is strictly decreasing:

$$U_T^{*} = b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x(q_T) \left( \frac{w_T}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U_T^{*} \right) + U_T^{*} \right]$$

Now assume that $U_T^{*} \leq U_T^{*} - 1$ to show that $U_T^{*} \leq U_T^{*} - 1$:

$$U_T^{*} - 1 = b + \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x(q_T) \left( \frac{w_T}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U_T^{*} \right) + U_T^{*} \right] -$$

$$- b - \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x(q_T) \left( \frac{w_T}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U_T^{*} - 1 \right) + U_T^{*} \right] \geq$$

$$\geq \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x(q_T) \left( \frac{w_T}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U_T^{*} - 1 \right) + U_T^{*} \right] =$$

$$= \beta(1 - \nu) \left[ \mu_T x(q_T) \left( \frac{w_T}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U_T^{*} - 1 \right) + U_T^{*} \right] +$$

$$+ \left( 1 - \mu_T x(q_T) \right) \left( U_T^{*} - U_T^{*} - 1 \right) \geq 0$$

2.B Appendix II: Quantitative Model

2.B.1 The Fixed-Point Problem

The proof of equilibrium existence applies Brouwer’s fixed point theorem on the auxiliary optimization problem of maximizing (12) under the constraints (13), (14) and (15). Recall that the objective is the firm’s value of posting a vacancy, given that is supplies the worker with her market value, the Free Entry condition holds and beliefs about worker quality follow Bayes rule. The structure of this
problem implies a straightforward algorithm for the computation of equilibrium.

The algorithm rests on the structure of this auxiliary problem and I conjecture that it could be used for all block recursive directed search models. It is similar in spirit to the famous Menzio and Shi (2011) method but it differs from their work in that it exploits the tractability of firm’s FOCs in the auxiliary problem, instead of the worker’s optimal submarket choice.

The equilibrium in my model is a fixed point in the space of workers’ market values, \(\{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}\). One can see that by carefully inspecting the auxiliary optimization problem as analyzed in section 2.3. First, note that the market value constraint (22) defines a relationship between \(w_\tau, q_\tau, \mu_\tau\) and \(U^*_\tau, U^*_{\tau+1}\):

\[
q_\tau^\alpha \frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = q_\tau^\alpha U^*_{\tau+1} + \frac{q_\tau}{\beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau} \left\{ \frac{U^*_\tau - b - \beta(1 - \nu)U^*_{\tau+1}}{\phi^{1 - \frac{1}{\eta}} \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}} \right\}^{\frac{n-1}{\eta}}
\]

This relationship is substituted into the objective function of the auxiliary problem to strip out wage from the value of a vacancy. Taking FOCs with respect to \(q_\tau\) yields an expression for queue lengths as a function of \(\mu_\tau, U^*_\tau\) and \(U^*_{\tau+1}\):

\[
q_\tau^{\alpha-1} = \frac{1}{\beta(1 - \nu)\mu_\tau} \left\{ \frac{U^*_\tau - b - \beta(1 - \nu)U^*_{\tau+1}}{\phi^{1 - \frac{1}{\eta}} \frac{\eta - 1}{\eta}} \right\}^{\frac{n-1}{\eta}} \frac{1}{\alpha\left(y_\tau \frac{y_\tau}{(1 - \beta(1 - \nu))} - U^*_\tau + U^*_{\tau+1}\right)}
\]

The next step is to substitute this expression back into the market value constraint (22). This will lead to an expression of equilibrium wages as a function of workers’ market values, as in equation (24):

\[
\frac{w_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} = \alpha\left(\frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau+1}\right) + U^*_{\tau+1} = \alpha\frac{y_\tau}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} + (1 - \alpha)U^*_{\tau+1}
\]

Notice that the beliefs do not appear in that equation. This is a result of the assumption made in Gonzalez-Shi hiring protocol that unsuitable workers are never hired, as well as of the assumption that workers redraw their types when
enter unemployment. As a result, wages do not directly reflect the probability for a successful match.

Next, one can substitute the expression for wages in the Free Entry condition and express equilibrium queue lengths as a function of market values only, as in equation (26):

\[ q_{\tau} = \kappa^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}(1 - \alpha)^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \frac{y_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_{\tau + 1} \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \]

Hence, a guess of \( \{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \) pins down the sequences \( \{w_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and \( \{q_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \), via equations (24) and (26). Notice that the optimal choice of search effort is given by equation (27):

\[ s^*_\tau = \left\{ \beta(1 - \nu)\phi^{-1}\mu_1\kappa^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}}(1 - \alpha)^{\frac{1}{\alpha} - \frac{1}{\alpha}} \left[ \frac{y_{\tau}}{1 - \beta(1 - \nu)} - U^*_\tau \right]^{-\frac{1}{\alpha}} \right\}^{\frac{1}{\eta - 1}} \]

Finally, given that \( \mu_1 \) is pinned down by the unobserved heterogeneity parameters, one can use (27) to compute \( s_1 \). Then, \( \mu_2 \) is a function of \( q_1, s_1 \) and \( \mu_1 \). Using (27) again helps pin down \( s_2 \) and, by iteration, all subsequent \( \{s_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and \( \{\mu_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \). One then can use the definition of the value of unemployment to compute a new sequence \( \{U''_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \), based on the values of \( \{w_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \), \( \{q_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \), \( \{s_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and \( \{\mu_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \). If \( \{U''_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) is close to the initial guess \( \{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \), the fixed point is computed; if not, the algorithm should repeat the process.

In short, the algorithm works as follows:

1. Guess a sequence \( \{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \).

2. Use the structure of the auxiliary problem to compute \( \{w_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and \( \{q_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \), via equations (24) and (26).

3. Use workers’ FOCs for optimal search effort and Bayes rule to compute \( \{s_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \) and \( \{\mu_{\tau}\}_{\tau \leq T} \).
4. Use the definition of the value of unemployment to compute the updated \( \{U^n_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T}\).

5. If \( \{U^n_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \) is close to \( \{U^*_\tau\}_{\tau \leq T} \), stop; otherwise, go to step 1 and repeat.

2.B.2 Average Contribution of Each Mechanism

Recall that the full model predicts the following equilibrium job-finding rate for each duration \( \tau \):

\[
f_\tau = s_\tau(\mu_\tau, y_\tau) \times \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau, y_\tau)
\]

Now, one can construct all the possible scenarios by shutting down one or two mechanisms in each version:\(^{19}\)

\[
f^1_\tau = s_\tau(\mu_\tau) \times \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau)
\]

\[
f^2_\tau = \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau)
\]

\[
f^3_\tau = \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau) \times x_\tau(\mu_\tau, y_\tau)
\]

\[
f^4_\tau = s_\tau(y_\tau) \times x_\tau(y_\tau)
\]

\[
f^5_\tau = x_\tau(y_\tau)
\]

\[
f^6_\tau = \mu_\tau(\xi, x_\tau)
\]

The top panel of Figure 6 reports the results for the following ratios:

\[
R^U_{\tau} = \frac{0.5(1 - f^6_\tau) + 0.5(f^4_\tau - f_\tau)}{1 - f_\tau}
\]

\[
R^W_{\tau} = \frac{0.5(1 - f^4_\tau) + 0.5(f^6_\tau - f_\tau)}{1 - f_\tau}
\]

\(^{19}\)The only uninteresting case is a model that contains only endogenous search effort. This simply is the standard directed search environment that does not predict negative duration dependence.
where $R^{WW}_\tau$ aggregates the effects of skill loss and search effort (within-worker duration dependence).

The bottom panel of Figure 6 reports the results for the following ratios:

$$R^{HC}_\tau = \frac{\frac{1}{3}(f^{6}_\tau - f^{3}_\tau) + \frac{1}{3}(f^{1}_\tau - f^{7}_\tau) + \frac{1}{3}(1 - f^{5}_\tau)}{1 - f^{7}_\tau}$$

$$R^{SE}_\tau = \frac{\frac{1}{3}(f^{6}_\tau - f^{1}_\tau) + \frac{1}{3}(f^{3}_\tau - f^{7}_\tau) + \frac{1}{3}(f^{5}_\tau - f^{6}_\tau)}{1 - f^{7}_\tau}$$

In other words, each ratio is the average of the effect of each mechanism on job-finding rate over different model scenarios; in each scenario either the mechanism is shut down at various sequential orders or is the only force creating negative duration dependence (this only applies to unobserved heterogeneity and skill loss; see footnote 19).
CHAPTER 3

Worker Learning and Job Search Effort

3.1 Introduction

An important assumption made in chapter 2 had to do with the relationship between learning and search effort. Specifically, it was assumed that an unemployed worker does not take into account the results of her own search effort when she updates her beliefs about her labor market traits. This assumption simplified the analysis considerably and allowed me to make both theoretical and computational progress.

However, the interaction between learning about one’s type while looking for a job with the choice of search effort may be important. Intuitively, trying and failing to find a job for some time may create the impression that the worker is of low quality and she is suitable for very few of the available jobs. In other words, trying and failing to find a job may create discouragement, since it would make the worker more pessimistic regarding her idiosyncratic qualities and, as a result, about the probability of finding a job.

Potter (2017), using the same data as in chapter 2, provides empirical evidence that a mechanism of this sort is indeed at play. He finds that workers lower their search effort after having accumulated a lot of time looking for a job but failing to find one. Moreover, he finds that workers increase their search effort after they receive a job offer. That is, workers change their search effort when their beliefs regarding the labor market change. I focus on a specific aspect that workers may
be learning about while looking for a job: their own idiosyncratic labor market traits.

The aim of this chapter is to analyze this question: how does the path of search effort look like when workers learn about their own idiosyncratic qualities based on the results of their job market experience? More specifically, following the analysis in chapter 2, I assume that the probability of finding a job depends on the worker’s idiosyncratic suitability type. The worker does not know for how many jobs she is suitable for, but she learns about this feature based on the success of finding a job. The question I am trying to answer is: what is the search effort path the worker chooses when her beliefs about her type depend on the results of accumulated search time?

To make the relationship between worker learning and search effort as clean as possible, I assume away all other forms of duration dependence analyzed in chapter 2. Moreover, I consider only an unemployed worker’s decision problem but not the firms’ equilibrium response. In other words, the wage and meeting rate are exogenous, as well as constant over the worker’s unemployment spell. Conditional on the worker meeting a job, she will get hired if she is suitable for it. As in chapter 2, high quality workers have a greater probability of being suitable for a given job than low quality workers. The worker does not know her type but she learns about it based on the results of her job search.

The only decision the worker has to make is about her search effort: in each period the worker chooses the intensity with which she will be looking for a job. With higher search effort the worker increases the probability of meeting a job but she also has to pay a utility cost for exceeding greater effort. The trade off, however, now is more complicated than in chapter 2. In the cost side, the worker has to pay a utility cost of search effort. The benefit from search, though, is more involved: it includes the standard value of finding a job, but also the learning value of search. To understand how the learning value of search operates, consider a
worker who failed to find a job last period. The worker does not know whether she failed to find a job because she did not meet one or because she met a job and was found unsuitable. The greater the search effort the worker exceeded last period, the greater the probability she remained jobless due to her low quality. Hence, the greater the search effort, the more informative the result of search is, i.e. the more the worker learns about herself. This is the learning value of job-search effort.

The main result of the chapter is that search effort is concave with respect to the worker’s belief about her labor market traits. That is, search effort is increasing over time when the worker is optimistic about her type but it is decreasing over time when the worker thinks she probably is of low quality. Over the unemployment spell, the worker becomes more pessimistic about her type, since she accumulates failed job searches. Hence, the predicted path of search effort depends on the initial belief of the worker about herself when she starts looking for jobs. If the worker enters unemployment thinking she is of high quality, then the path of search effort will have a concave shape; that is, it will be initially increasing but then decreasing after some periods in unemployment. On the other hand, if the worker enters unemployment being pessimistic about her type, then the path of search effort will be monotonically decreasing.

This result is interesting not only in its own right but also because it can explain discrepant results found in the empirical literature on search effort. Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014), find that search effort is concave over the unemployment spell, while Krueger and Mueller (2011), Faberman and Kudlyak (2014), as well as the analysis in chapter 2 find that search effort is monotonically decreasing over the unemployment spell. This chapter proposes an explanation for this discrepancy: the slope of the search effort path depends on how optimistic the worker is about herself when starts looking for a job.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment, explores the effects of learning, and defines the worker’s decision problem. In
section 3, I present the quantitative results: the model solution, as well as a set of comparative statics exercises. Section 4 concludes by analyzing future research steps for this project.

3.2 Model

In this section I analyze the decision problem of an unemployed worker who optimally chooses the level of job-search effort at each period of her unemployment spell while learning about her job-market quality. The problem is set in discrete time.

3.2.1 The Basic Environment

The worker is risk neutral and discounts the future with a discount factor $\beta \in (0, 1)$\(^1\). In this chapter there is no separation of workers from jobs: if a worker gets hired, she keeps this job forever.

I model worker’s quality as an extreme form of job suitability, which can take only two values: broad ($H$) or limited ($L$). Suitability is the likelihood of fulfilling the requirements of a job. In other words, suitability captures the probability of the worker producing positive output at a job. If a worker is not suitable for a given job, the match yields zero output. When the worker enters unemployment there is a probability $\pi \in (0, 1)$ of her being a broad-suitability worker and $1 - \pi$ being a limited-suitability worker. A type-$i$ worker turns out to be suitable for a given job with probability $a_i$ (with $a_H > a_L$). That is, broad-suitability workers have a higher probability of being productive in a given job than limited-suitability workers. This notion of quality/suitability can be thought of as an extreme form

\(^1\)To keep things as simple as possible, assume that there is a probability $\nu$ the worker leaves the labor market at each period. This probability is included in the worker’s discount factor.
of a match-specific shock, which depends on the worker’s type. Notice that even in the case the worker is of broad-suitability, she will be unsuitable for some jobs. Importantly, a worker’s quality is unobservable to the worker herself.

The labor market consists of many identical jobs. The worker enters the labor market as unemployed, searching for one of these jobs. In each period the worker can meet up to one job. When the worker meets a job, there is a screening stage, in which the firm determines whether the worker is suitable for the job. If she is found suitable, she gets hired and earns a wage \( w \) forever after. If the worker is found unsuitable, she is automatically disregarded. I assume that the worker does not know whether she was evaluated or not. That is, at the end of each period she only learns whether she got hired or not. In case she does not find a job, the worker does not know whether she met a firm and found unsuitable or she did not even meet a firm.

**Learning from Unemployment Duration.** The probability of finding a job in each period depends on three factors: the probability of meeting a job, \( x \); the worker’s search effort, \( s \); and the worker’s suitability type. However, the worker does not know her suitability type, \( a_i \). Instead, while in unemployment, the worker learns about it. I define the worker’s expectation of her \( a_i \) to be her belief and denote it with \( \mu \). When the worker enters the labor market as newly unemployed, her initial belief about her expected suitability is:

\[
\mu_0 = \pi a_H + (1 - \pi) a_L
\]  

(3.1)

If the worker fails to find a job, she updates her belief downwards, as she becomes more pessimistic about the probability of her suitability being high. Specifically, the worker uses Bayes rule to compute the probability of being of
high quality, given that she did not find a job last period:

\[ P'_H \equiv \Pr(a_H\mid \text{unemployed}) = \frac{P_H(1 - sxa_H)}{P_H(1 - sxa_H) + (1 - P_H)(1 - sxa_L)} = \frac{P_H(1 - sxa_H)}{1 - sx\mu} \]

where \( \mu \) is the belief in the current period, that is \( \mu = a_H P_H + a_L (1 - P_H) \). Notice that one can use this relationship to express \( P_H \) as a function of \( \mu \):

\[ P_H = \frac{\mu - a_L}{a_H - a_L} \]

Moving a period forward, the updated expected suitability given that the worker does not find a job today is:

\[
\mu' = a_H P'_H + a_L (1 - P'_H) = \frac{a_H P_H(1 - sxa_H)}{1 - sx\mu} + a_L \left( 1 - \frac{P_H(1 - sxa_H)}{1 - sx\mu} \right) = a_L + (a_H - a_L) \frac{P_H(1 - sxa_H)}{1 - sx\mu}
\]

Substituting the expression for \( P_H \) as a function of \( \mu \) yields a recursive relationship between today’s and next period’s beliefs:

\[
\mu' \equiv H(\mu, x, s) = a_L + \frac{(\mu - a_L)(1 - sxa_H)}{1 - sx\mu} \tag{3.2}
\]

Notice that \( H(\mu, x, s) \) is decreasing in \( x \) and \( s \): the higher the probability to meet a firm, the stronger the signal that the worker did not find a job because of her limited suitability, instead of bad luck (i.e. not meeting one). Moreover, notice that in the case the worker exhibits zero search effort, then \( \mu' = \mu \). That is, if the worker does not meet any jobs, then the probability to be evaluated by a firm is zero, hence not finding a job is not informative at all about worker’s
For a given level of search effort, equation (2) defines a first-order difference equation in \( \mu \). Setting \( \mu' = \mu \) and assuming \( s > 0 \) yields two steady states, \( \bar{\mu}_1 = a_H \) and \( \bar{\mu}_2 = a_L \). Using the first-derivative criterion of stability reveals that:

\[
\frac{dH}{d\mu}(\bar{\mu}_1) = \frac{1 - xa_L}{1 - xa_H} > 1
\]

\[
\frac{dH}{d\mu}(\bar{\mu}_2) = \frac{1 - xa_H}{1 - xa_L} < 1
\]

That is, \( a_H \) is locally unstable and \( a_L \) is locally stable. To summarize, the belief process starts at a natural prior \( \mu_0 \), with \( a_L \leq \mu_0 \leq a_H \), and converges to \( a_L \) while the worker is unemployed. Of course, the speed of convergence depends on the level of search effort chosen by the worker, which is analyzed in the next section\(^2\).

**The Worker’s Choice Problem.** The dynamic programming problem of a job-seeker with expected suitability \( \mu \) can be written as:

\[
U(\mu) = \max_s \left\{ b - c(s) + \beta \left[ sx\mu \frac{w}{1 - \beta} + (1 - sx\mu)U(\mu') \right] \right\} \tag{3.3}
\]

subject to the constraint:

\[
\mu' = a_L + \frac{(\mu - a_L)(1 - sx a_H)}{1 - sx\mu} \tag{3.4}
\]

where \( b \) denotes the level of unemployment benefits and \( c(s) \) the cost (in utility terms) of exhibiting search effort \( s \).

\(^2\)Obviously, the choice of search effort will not be constant over the unemployment spell, but rather a time-changing path. The level of search effort will be contingent on the value of \( \mu \), which is the state variable of the worker’s choice problem. Hence, equation (2) will be a non-autonomous difference equation that needs to be analyzed together with the worker’s optimal search effort choice.
The FOCs of the problem can be written as:

$$c'(s) = \beta \left[ x\mu \left( \frac{w}{1-\beta} - U(\mu') \right) + (1-sx\mu) \frac{\partial U(\mu')}{\partial s} + \frac{\partial U(\mu')}{\partial \mu'} \frac{\partial \mu'}{\partial s} \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.5)$$

The marginal value of search effort consists of two parts. The first term in the RHS of (5) denotes the standard returns to job-search: if the worker exceeds one extra unit of search effort, the probability to enjoy the relative value of employment next period increases. This is the employment value of search effort. The second term in the RHS of (5) captures the learning value of search effort. The harder a worker searches, the higher is the probability she will meet a firm and get evaluated by it.

As a result, the informational value of staying unemployed after a period of more intense search effort is greater, hence she would become more pessimistic about her type (this effect is reflected in the term $\frac{\partial U(\mu')}{\partial \mu'} \frac{\partial \mu'}{\partial s}$). This decrease in the worker’s belief about her suitability is reflected in next period’s value of unemployment (this effect is reflected in the term $\frac{\partial U}{\partial \mu'}$).

The optimal level of search effort should equate the marginal cost of search effort with the sum of the employment and learning values of job-search. In the general case, this yields the following forward-looking difference equation:

$$c'(s) = \beta \left[ x\mu \left( \frac{w}{1-\beta} - U(\mu') \right) + \beta s' x^2 \left( \frac{w}{1-\beta} - U(\mu'') \right) \frac{(a_L - \mu)(a_H - \mu)}{1-sx\mu} + \frac{\partial U(\mu')}{\partial \mu'} \frac{\partial \mu'}{\partial s} \right]$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.6)$$

As a useful benchmark, consider a worker who knows she is of either high or low quality (that is, a worker for whom the learning value of search is zero). In this case, the FOCs for the intensity of search simply reflect the employment value of search:

$$c'(s_i) = \beta x a_i \left( \frac{w}{1-\beta} - U(a_i) \right)$$  \hspace{1cm} (3.7)$$

where $i \in \{H, L\}$. 

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Assuming the standard quadratic cost function, \( c(s) = \frac{s^2}{2} \), the value of unemployment becomes analytically solvable when the worker knows her type:

\[
U(a_i) = \frac{w}{1-\beta} + \frac{1-\beta}{(x\beta a_i)^2} - \frac{1}{x\beta a_i} \left(2(w-b) + \left(\frac{1-\beta}{x\beta a_i}\right)^2 \right)^{1/2}
\]

(3.8)

Substituting back into equation (7) yields the “boundary conditions” \( s_H \) and \( s_L \) of the path of search effort for the forward-looking difference equation (6).

3.3 Quantitative Exploration

**Basic Environment.** To solve the problem numerically, I continue to work with a simple quadratic cost function, \( c(s) = \frac{s^2}{2} \), and assume a standard parameterization, presented in Table 1:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \beta )</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>Discount Factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( x )</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Job-meeting Rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( w )</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( b )</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a_H )</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>Pr(suitable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( a_L )</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Pr(suitable</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1: Model Parameterization

To solve the model, I follow a simple strategy. First, I impose that when \( \mu \) takes a value very close to \( a_L \), say \( \mu_T = a_L + \epsilon \), then the problem becomes stationary at \( U(a_L) \) and \( s_L \). I put equation (6) in the Matlab solver *fsolve* to obtain the level of search effort at the previous period, \( s_{T-1} \). Then, I use the belief equation to get \( \mu_{T-1} \), and the value function to get \( U_{T-1} \). Finally, I iterate backwards for a sufficiently big number of periods to ensure that the initial level of \( \mu \) is very close

\(^3\)In the sense, that the value of unemployment would be \( U(a_L) \), search effort \( s_L \), and the worker’s belief equal to \( a_L \) forever after. Note that I cannot set \( \mu_T = a_L \) as the terminal point, because \( a_L \) is a steady state and if \( \mu \) takes this value, it would stay there forever.

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to $a_H$, and the whole state space has been covered. Reassuringly, $\mu$ converges to $a_H$, $U(\mu)$ converges to $U(a_H)$, and $s$ converges to $s_H$, as the iterations proceed backwards.

Figure 3.1: Value of Unemployment in the Benchmark Model

Figure 1 graphs the value of unemployment for various levels of the worker’s belief about her suitability. As is standard in learning problems, the value function is convex. Figure 1 highlights this convexity by comparing the value function with a straight reference line that connects $U(a_L)$ with $U(a_H)$. As one can see, $U(\mu)$ curves below the straight reference line, indicating that it is convex.

(Weak) Convexity of $U(\mu)$ comes from standard arguments, as explained by Gonzalez and Shi (2010); see also Kiefer (1989) and Nyarko (1994). Kiefer (1989) provides the following intuitive proof for the convexity of the value function, based on Blackwell’s criterion for the comparison of experiments. To get started, fix the level of beliefs $\mu$; notice that by construction $\mu = a_H P_H + a_L (1 - P_H)$, so by fixing $\mu$, one mechanically fixes $P_H$. Consider an experiment which gives complete information about worker’s quality. The value at $\mu$ is $U(\mu) = U(a_H P_H + a_L (1 - P_H))$; the value after the experiment is either $U(a_L)$ or $U(a_H)$. The expected value after the experiment is simply $P_H U(a_H) + (1 - P_H) U(a_L)$. Now, this experiment is
sufficient for the alternative action of not experimenting (that is, of exceeding zero search effort), and therefore, by Blackwell’s theorem, the value of the experiment must be greater than or equal to the value of not searching at all. This argument establishes that:

\[ P_H U(a_H) + (1 - P_H) U(a_L) \geq U(a_H P_H + a_L (1 - P_H)) = U(\mu) \]

Now, it is straightforward to generalize this argument for any level of beliefs \( \mu \). For any \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \), with \( \mu_1, \mu_2 \in (a_L, a_H) \), there is a \( \lambda \in (0, 1) \) such that \( \mu = \lambda \mu_1 + (1 - \lambda) \mu_2 \). Consider an experiment (a level of search effort) which, beginning with beliefs \( \mu \), yields new beliefs \( \mu_1 \) with probability \( \lambda = \frac{\mu_2 - \mu}{\mu_2 - \mu_1} \) and new beliefs \( \mu_2 \) with probability \( 1 - \lambda \). This is just a conditional version of the previous experiment. It is Blackwell sufficient for not experimenting at all (zero search effort), hence:

\[ \lambda U(\mu_1) + (1 - \lambda) U(\mu_2) \geq U(\mu_1 \lambda + \mu_2 (1 - \lambda)) = U(\mu) \]

Sufficiency of the experiment for the alternative of zero search effort (not experimenting at all), together with Blackwell’s theorem implies the desired inequality. To generalize, it suffices to consider a second experiment, yielding certainty, beginning from any \( \mu_1 \) and \( \mu_2 \). Finally, since a convex function is almost everywhere differentiable, \( U \) is almost everywhere differentiable.

The main result of this chapter is that search effort is concave in beliefs, as it can be seen in Figure 2. This concavity is a result of the learning value of search effort. Consider a worker with beliefs lower than but very close to \( a_H \). The employment value of search for this worker is roughly equal to the employment value of search for a worker of suitability \( a_H \), who exceeds \( s_H \) units of search effort. If, however, the worker is uncertain about her type, she is willing to search harder to learn about her type faster. There is a non-trivial probability that she may be
of low quality, so she would like to adjust her search effort to \( s_L \) and avoid the extra cost of searching harder.

Similarly, consider a worker with beliefs greater than but very close to \( a_H \). The employment value of search for this worker is roughly equal to the employment value of search for a worker of suitability \( a_L \), who exceeds \( s_L \) units of search effort. If, however, the worker is uncertain about her type, she is willing to search harder to learn about her type faster. There is a non-trivial probability that she may be of high quality, so she would like to adjust her search effort to \( s_H \) and increase the probability of finding a job.

To sum up, workers with beliefs close to \( a_H \) and \( a_L \) would exceed greater search effort than \( s_H \) and \( s_L \), respectively, due to the learning value of search. Now, as was mentioned above, the value of unemployment is almost everywhere differentiable and, as a result, continuous. Hence, by the Theorem of the Maximum, the optimal level of search effort should be continuous, too. Intuitively, the level of search effort should change from values greater than \( s_H \), for beliefs close to \( a_H \), to values greater than \( s_L \), for beliefs close to \( a_L \), in a continuous way. This continuity results in the concave shape of search effort of Figure 1.
Search Effort over the Unemployment Spell. The concavity of the optimal level of search effort with respect to the worker’s belief about her quality can rationalize all available data on search effort over the unemployment spell. First, consider a worker who enters unemployment having a relatively pessimistic belief regarding her quality, $\mu_1$ in Figure 1. Then, the model predicts that the worker will exceed monotonically lower search effort for each extra period in unemployment. This is exactly the empirical pattern documented by Krueger and Mueller (2011), Faberman and Kudlyak (2014), and the empirical analysis of chapter 2. In this case, learning about one’s quality in the labor market works as a mechanism of endogenous duration dependence: the worker becomes more pessimistic about her quality, exceeds lower search effort, and prolongs the duration of unemployment.

However, consider a worker who enters unemployment having a relatively optimistic belief regarding her quality, $\mu_2$ in Figure 1. Then, the model predicts that the worker will have a concave search effort profile over her unemployment spell. Her effort will be increasing in early periods of unemployment and decreasing later in the unemployment spell. This is exactly the empirical pattern documented by Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014), using CPS and ATUS data.

Comparative Statics. To better understand the workings of the model, I conduct a series of computational comparative static exercises. All exercises

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4This can happen for many reasons. First, the worker may have collected negative information from previous unemployment/employment spells and her updated beliefs are close to $a_L$. Second, if the worker was fired, she may interpret that event as evidence of her being of low quality. Third, her belief may be based on standard labor market observables, such as a low education level or her skills being in low demand.

5Accordingly, this can also happen for many reasons. First, the worker may have collected positive information from previous unemployment/employment spells and her updated beliefs are close to $a_H$. Second, maybe the worker voluntarily quit her previous job because she thinks she is of high quality and can find a better one. Third, her belief may be based on standard labor market observables, such as a high education level or her skills being in high demand.
correspond to a 5% decrease in the variable of interest.

![Graph showing search effort with low unemployment benefits](image)

**Figure 3.3: Search Effort with low Unemployment Benefits**

First, consider a decrease in the level of unemployment insurance, $b$. This means that the value of unemployment is now lower and the employment value of search effort is greater. This leads to an upward shift of the search effort path for all levels of the worker’s belief, as can be seen in Figure 3. The shift is less pronounced for beliefs close to $a_H$ and $a_L$. That is, the increase in search effort over the unemployment spell is more concentrated on the belief interval in which the worker is less certain about her quality.

Second, consider a decrease in the meeting rate, $x$. This means that the returns to job search decrease, since the probability of becoming employed is now lower. The shift, however, is small, because the learning value of search drops slower, as can be seen in Figure 4. For each period that the worker stays unemployed, the update in her beliefs is slower, due to the lower meeting rate. The worker attributes joblessness more to bad luck and does not change her search effort too much. The shift is less pronounced for beliefs close to $a_H$ but for lower belief levels is almost parallel.

Third, consider a decrease in the wage level, $w$, the effects of which are shown
in Figure 5. This drop affects both types of the returns to search effort. The value of employment is now lower, hence the employment value of search effort is lower too. Moreover, the learning value of search decreases, since the value of learning about one’s type decreases as well.

It is worth mentioning that the effects of each parameter change can be ranked quantitatively. This comparison is meaningful, since all parameters change by 5%. Interestingly, as can be seen in Figures 3, 4, and 5, the decrease in the wage level induces the largest shift in the path of search effort, followed by the drop in unemployment insurance. The shift due to the drop in the meeting rate is much smaller. This result is intuitive: a change in $w$ affects the values of employment and unemployment, as well as the learning value of search in the same way. All three forces contribute to the drop in the level of search effort, making it quantitatively sizeable. In the case of lower $b$, the value of employment and the learning value of search are not affected. Unemployment, however, is more painful, making the worker exceed significantly greater search effort to find a job. Finally, when $x$ decreases, the learning value of search effort moves to the opposite direction that the employment value of search. The former effect, along with the fact that unem-
employment becomes more painful, make the worker to search harder. As a result, the shift in search effort is quantitatively smaller than the other two scenarios.

To conclude, consider a drop in both $a_H$ and $a_L$, such that the new difference between them would be 5% lower than the initial one. As can be seen in Figure 6, it is not the case that the resulting search effort path is greater or lower than the benchmark for all belief levels. On the contrary, the two search effort paths intersect once, and the ranking between the paths changes over the belief space.
That is, to the right of the intersection point, the benchmark search effort path is above the search effort path induced by the lower type difference. To the left of the intersection point though, the new path is above the benchmark one. There is a reversal of the search effort paths when the difference between types decreases.

This says that more optimistic workers search harder when the type difference is greater, while more pessimistic workers search harder when the type difference is smaller. When the type difference is large, the difference between the optimal search effort levels under complete information is large as well. As a result, optimistic workers search harder to learn their true type faster and choose either $s_H$ or $s_L$. On the other hand, when the difference between the optimal search effort levels is small, pessimistic workers search harder to learn fast whether they are of high type and avoid the $a_L$ state.

### 3.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed the solution of the simplest possible learning problem for a worker who learns about her unknown labor market qualities while searching for a job. The main result is that the path of optimally chosen search effort has a concave shape with respect to the worker’s beliefs about her quality. That is, search effort is increasing when the worker is relatively optimistic about her quality but decreasing when the worker is relatively pessimistic.

This result is interesting not only in its own right but also because it can rationalize all available data on search effort over the unemployment spell. For workers who enter unemployment with pessimistic beliefs, the model predicts a monotonically decreasing path of search effort, as reported in Krueger and Mueller (2011), Faberman and Kudlyak (2014), and the empirical analysis of chapter 2. On the other hand, a worker who enters unemployment with optimistic belief about herself would produce a concave search effort profile over her unemployment spell,
as reported by Shimer (2004) and Mukoyama et al. (2014).

I see three main directions of future work based on this chapter. First, I should solve for the directed search equilibrium of the model, following the analysis of chapter 2, to check whether the search effort pattern is robust. Second, in this equilibrium version of learning model, the question of optimal policy should be tackled: what is the optimal unemployment benefits policy for a worker who uses search effort not only to find a job but also learn about her type? Finally, it would be interesting to interact worker learning with some other form of duration dependence and check the effects of this interaction on search effort over the unemployment spell.
CHAPTER 4

Precautionary Savings or Searching Harder?

4.1 Introduction

It is common in the search and matching literature to assume that agents have linear utility functions. As a result, the incentives to smooth consumption across states are muted. However, when one models workers trying to find jobs, this assumption may have important implications. Specifically, the assumption that workers have linear utility rules out any interesting interactions between the workers’ asset levels with their choice of search effort.

The purpose of this chapter is to study exactly this question: how does the worker’s level of wealth affect her search effort? To do so, I extend the framework built in the last two chapters in two ways. First, I assume that the worker’s utility function is concave in consumption and search effort. Hence, the worker has the incentive to save a part of her income when employed to equilibize the marginal utilities of consumption across the states of employment and unemployment. Second, following a popular line of research initiated by Huggett (1993), I assume that markets are incomplete and, as a result, the worker cannot perfectly insure against the probability of losing her job. The worker, however, has two channels of self-insurance available: she can save a part of her wealth in bonds, as well as she can increase her search effort when unemployed.

The model is set in continuous time, exploiting the machinery developed and generously shared by Achdou et al. (2017). Workers transition from employment
to unemployment with some exogenous Poisson rate. When unemployed, though, they can influence the probability of finding a job by exceeding greater search effort. As is customary in Huggett-type models, agents can save in unproductive bonds. The interest rate adjusts such that the bonds are in zero net supply in equilibrium. I focus on the stationary equilibrium of this economy and solve for the optimal decisions of asset accumulation and search effort.

This set up of incomplete markets with idiosyncratic unemployment shocks is a natural one for the study of wealth and search effort. Lentz and Tranaes (2005) used it to analyze the interaction of savings with search effort in partial equilibrium. They proved that search effort is monotonically decreasing in wealth, provided that the worker’s utility function is separable between consumption and search effort. This chapter replicates their result in an equilibrium framework: using a separable CRRA utility function, the path of search effort is computed to be monotonically decreasing in wealth in the economy’s stationary equilibrium. This says that this labor market exhibits positive duration dependence: workers exceed increasing search effort over the unemployment spell. As a result, the probability of finding a job increases for workers who have been unemployed longer.

After I solve for the stationary equilibrium and characterize the policy rules for savings and search effort, I use the model to answer a quantitative question: how do agents respond to a worsening of the labor market risk they face? That is, which channel of self-insurance do agents use more to insure against more severe labor market shocks? This quantitative exercise is in the spirit of Pijoan-Mas (2006) who asked a similar question but having precautionary savings and the choice of hours worked as the instruments for self-insurance. He finds that when moving from a complete markets economy to an economy with incomplete markets, the increases in agents’ savings and hours worked are of roughly the same magnitude. That is, when labor market shocks become more severe, agents use precautionary savings and endogenous labor supply roughly to the same extent.
to self-insure against labor market risk.

In this chapter I solve for the stationary equilibrium of the incomplete markets model under a standard parameter configuration and I consider a mean-preserving spread in labor market risk. The agents respond by raising both their savings and search effort, as expected, but the response is not symmetric. The increase in precautionary savings is twice as large as the increase in search effort. In other words, when the available self-insurance instruments are precautionary savings and job-search effort, agents prefer to save more instead of searching much harder to smooth their consumption profiles. This is intuitive: precautionary savings help in consumption smoothing with certainty; search effort, however, raises the probability of finding a job but it does not make it a certainty. Notice that this result is in contrast with Pijoan-Mas (2006) who finds that labor supply responds similarly to savings when labor market uncertainty becomes more severe. Moreover, it may have important implications for labor market policy, which I plan to explore in future work.

This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model environment, explores the market structure, and defines the stationary equilibrium. In section 3, I present the quantitative results: the model solution, as well as the results of the quantitative experiment. Section 4 concludes by analyzing future research steps for this project.

4.2 Model

The model economy is a continuous-time version of Huggett (1993), following closely the formulation of Achdou et al. (2017). It is a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and uninsured idiosyncratic risk. Individuals are hit by idiosyncratic unemployment shocks and they have two means to self-insure against these shocks: they can save in unproductive bonds (that are in fixed supply) and
increase their search effort while unemployed. The model is set in continuous time and I solve for a stationary equilibrium.

4.2.1 The Basic Environment

Agents. There is a unit measure of individuals that are heterogeneous in their wealth \( a \) and instantaneous income \( y \). The state of the economy is the joint distribution of income and wealth. Individuals have standard strictly increasing and strictly concave preferences over utility flows from future consumption \( c_t \) and leisure \( l_t \), discounted at rate \( \rho_t \):

\[
\mathbb{E}_0 \int_0^\infty e^{-\rho t} u(c_t, l_t) dt
\]  

(4.1)

Every individual has income \( y_t \) that depends on her employment state. An individual can be either employed or unemployed. If she is employed, her income is equal to a fixed wage \( w \) and she has to work a fixed part of her time endowment, \( \bar{n} \). If the individual is unemployed, she receives unemployment benefits \( b \) and she chooses a fraction of her time endowment, \( s \), devoted to job search. This will be the measure of search effort for this chapter. Of course, \( w > b \), so the individual has the incentive to exceed positive job-search effort.

The individual’s wealth takes the form of bonds and evolves according to:

\[
\dot{a}_t = y_t + r_t a_t - c_t
\]  

(4.2)

where \( r_t \) is the interest rate. Importantly, individuals face a borrowing limit: \( a_t \geq a \), where \(-\infty < a < 0^1\). This borrowing constraint simply means that the

\[^1\text{See Aiyagari (1994) for a very illuminating discussion regarding the natural borrowing limit imposed by the model primitives.}\]
individuals are not going to be able to borrow as much as they want to fully insure against the idiosyncratic labor market shocks they face.

The labor market income shocks are modeled as transitions from employment to unemployment and vice versa, following a two-state Poisson process $y_t \in \{w, b\}$. The individual moves from employment to unemployment with intensity $\delta$, which is the exogenous job-destruction rate. The intensity of moving from unemployment to employment is the job-finding rate $\lambda s$: it is the product of the economy’s job-meeting rate, $\lambda$, times the individually chosen search effort, $s$. I take $\delta$ and $\lambda$ as exogenously given. The pioneering works of Krusell et al. (2010) and Bils et al. (2011) show how to endogenize the transition rates with a matching function in environments with exogenous search effort. See also Lalé (2016) and Vejlin (2017).

Individuals maximize (1) subject to (2), (3) and the process for $y_t$, taking as given the evolution of the equilibrium interest rate $r_t$ for $t \geq 0$. Denote with $g_j(a, t), j \in \{e, un\}$, the unconditional distribution of wealth for a given employment state; that is:

$$\int_a^\infty g_e(a, t)da + \int_a^\infty g_un(a, t)da = 1 \quad (4.3)$$

**Market Structure.** Following Huggett (1993), I assume that the only price in this economy is the interest rate $r_t$, which is determined by the requirement that, in equilibrium, bonds must be in zero net supply:

$$\int_a^\infty ag_e(a, t)da + \int_a^\infty ag_un(a, t)da = 0 \quad (4.4)$$

I treat the wage as a parameter and not an equilibrium price; again, see Krusell et al. (2010) and Bils et al. (2011) about how to endogenize wages with Nash
4.2.2 Stationary Equilibrium

As shown by Achdou et al. (2017), individuals’ consumption-saving and search effort decisions, along with the evolution of the joint distribution of their income and wealth can be summarized with two differential equations: a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation and a Kolmogorov Forward (or Fokker-Planck) equation. In a stationary equilibrium these take the form:

\[
\rho V_e(a) = \max_c u(c, 1 - \bar{n}) + V'_a(w + ra - c) + \delta(V_{un}(a) - V_e(a)) \tag{4.5}
\]

\[
\rho V_{un}(a) = \max_{c,s} u(c, 1 - s) + V'_a(b + ra - c) + \lambda s(V_e(a) - V_{un}(a)) \tag{4.6}
\]

\[
0 = -\frac{d}{da}[\sigma_e(a)g_e(a)] - \delta g_e(a) + \lambda s(a)g_{un}(a) \tag{4.7}
\]

\[
0 = -\frac{d}{da}[\sigma_{un}(a)g_{un}(a)] - \lambda s(a)g_{un}(a) + \delta g_e(a) \tag{4.8}
\]

The function \(\sigma_j\) in the KF equation is the savings policy function, that is the optimally chosen drift of wealth:

\[
\sigma_j(a) = y_j + ra - c_j(a) \tag{4.9}
\]

with \(c_j(a) = (u_c)^{-1}(V'_j)\), for each \(j \in \{e, un\}\).

As has been popularized by Achdou et al. (2017), one of the perks of writing the model in continuous time is the tractability with which the borrowing constraint can be handled. The reason is that the borrowing constraint never binds in the interior of the state space (for \(a > a\)) and as a result an undistorted first-order condition \(u_c(c_j(a), l_j(a)) = V'_j(a)\) holds everywhere. The borrowing constraint is incorporated in the system (5)-(8) through a state constraint boundary condition,
to be included in the computation of the equilibrium\footnote{The formal mathematical analogue of equation (9) is the \textit{constrained viscosity solution} of the HJB equation; see Achdou et al. (2017) and references therein.}

\[ V'_j(a) \geq u_c(y_j + ra), \ j \in \{e, un\} \tag{4.10} \]

The KF equation (7)-(8) requires no boundary condition at \( a \): the state constraint is satisfied by virtue of \( \sigma_j \) being the optimal saving policy function from the HJB equation (5)-(6). The first-order condition for search effort has the following intuitive form:

\[ u_l(c_{un}(a), 1 - s(a)) = \lambda \left( V_e(a) - V_{un}(a) \right) \tag{4.11} \]

When unemployed the worker equates the marginal cost of search effort, expressed in units of utility in the LHS, with the expected value of finding a job. This equation has been studied in a partial-equilibrium setting by Lentz and Tranaes (2005).

Finally, the stationary equilibrium interest rate \( r^* \) has to satisfy the market clearing condition (4):

\[ \Sigma(r^*) := \int_{a}^{\infty} ag_e(a, t)da + \int_{a}^{\infty} ag_{un}(a, t)da = 0 \tag{4.12} \]

The set of differential equations (5)-(8), together with (9), (10), (11) and the equilibrium condition (12) fully characterize the stationary equilibrium of this economy\footnote{This structure is usually called a \textit{Mean Field Game} in the more formal literature; again, see Achdou et al. (2017) for details, especially their pp 11-12.}.
4.3 Quantitative Exploration

**Basic Environment.** I choose to work with a classic utility function:

$$u(c,l) = \frac{c^{1-\gamma}}{1-\gamma} - \eta \frac{l^{1-\phi}}{1-\phi}$$ (4.13)

where $\gamma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, $\phi$ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and $\eta$ is just the coefficient of the disutility from working or searching for jobs. Moreover, I use a standard parameter configuration for the model, which can be found in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parameter</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Discount rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Risk aversion coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Disutility of search/work coefficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\phi$</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Frisch elasticity of search/work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b$</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>Unemployment Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$w$</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Wage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\bar{n}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Normalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\delta$</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Job-destruction rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\lambda$</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>Job-meeting rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$a$</td>
<td>-0.5</td>
<td>Borrowing limit</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Benjamin Moll has generously shared a lot of material about how to use the finite difference method to numerically solve for the equilibria of heterogeneous agents models in continuous time\(^4\). I build upon his approach to solve for the equilibrium of a Huggett (1993) model with endogenous search effort, as presented in section 4.2.2.

\(^4\)http://www.princeton.edu/~moll/HACTproject.htm
Figure 4.1: Wealth Distributions in the Benchmark Model

Figure 4.2: Saving Behavior in the Benchmark Model
The results of the benchmark model can be seen in Figures 1-3. The solution has the standard features found in all heterogeneous agents economies in which agents of different wealth behave differently. First, there is a spike in the mass of unemployed agents at $a = -0.5$; that is, the model predicts a positive mass of poor agents that would like to borrow more but are constrained by the borrowing constraint. The wealth distribution features a very flat right tail and Achdou et al. (2017) prove that is actually bounded above. The empirical wealth distribution, though, has a much thicker tail, resembling a Pareto distribution. This is a well-known limitation of heterogeneous agent models with idiosyncratic labor market income risk only and endogenous search effort cannot remedy that.

Second, the saving policy rules have the familiar shape and properties. Under this parameter configuration only employed agents save and the wealthier agents save less. Unemployed agents dissave, since they use the savings that have accumulated while employed to smooth their consumption when are hit by the unemployment shock. The saving policy rules are almost linear in wealth at higher wealth levels, while they are pretty concave for poorer agents. This says that poorer agents adjust their savings (and, as a result consumption levels) more
than wealthier agents.

Third, Figure 3 replicates the main result of Lentz and Tranaes (2005), namely that poorer workers exceed greater search effort, in an equilibrium environment. The speed of the drop is greater for poorer agents. This says that poorer agents use search effort to self-insure against labor market shocks more than wealthier agents, as they do with savings. This is intuitive: poorer agents are those that need to self-insure against labor market shocks.

Finally, the equilibrium level of interest rate for this economy is 3.4%. I will use the level aggregate savings in bonds as a measure of (changes in) the willingness of agents to use bonds for self-insurance. Since only employed agents save, the level of aggregate savings simply is:

$$S = \int_{a}^{\infty} ag_e(a, t) \, da \quad (4.14)$$

The level of savings in the benchmark case equals 4.25. Similarly, define $SE$ to be the units of aggregate search effort:

$$SE = \int_{a}^{\infty} s(a) g_e(a, t) \, da \quad (4.15)$$

The value of $SE$ is 84.33 for the benchmark economy. I will use the units of aggregate search effort as a measure of the agents’ willingness to self-insure against labor market shocks by using search effort.

**Search Effort over the Unemployment Spell.** The decision rules for savings and search effort allow me to characterize the path of search effort over the unemployment spell. Specifically, when an agent with wealth $a$ loses her job, she starts dissaving her assets, moving to the left of $a$ in the wealth distribution. Hence, she also moves to the left of $a$ in the search effort rule, that is, she increases
her search effort as she gets poorer. This means that we have positive duration dependence in this economy. The meeting rate is constant but the agents increase their search effort over the unemployment spell.

This is a classic result in the search and matching literature but it really depends on the assumption of separability between consumption and leisure in the instantaneous utility function. Specifically, as shown by Lentz and Tranaes (2005), the relationship between wealth and search effort depends on the mixed partial derivative \( u_{cl}(c, 1 - s) \). In the separable case used in most of the literature and in this chapter, this derivative is zero and search effort is monotonically decreasing in wealth (and, as a result, monotonically increasing over the unemployment spell). However, if this derivative is non-zero and its value changes over wealth, then the model can produce a very broad range search effort paths with different. Interestingly, Lentz and Tranaes (2005) provide an example in which search effort is concave over the unemployment spell, which is the main result of chapter 2. I see as an important future research goal to use data to disentangle the effects of these two mechanisms on search effort.

Precautionary Savings or Searching Harder? The model developed here can be used to answer the following quantitative question: when labor market shocks become more severe, how do agents react? Specifically, to what extent do they increase their savings or their search effort to self-insure against more severe idiosyncratic uncertainty? This exercise is inspired by Pijoan-Mas (2006) who studies the same question but in a model in which agents can self-insure by adjusting their savings and hours worked.

To answer this question, I analyze the analogue of a mean-preserving spread in labor market uncertainty. Specifically, in the long run, an individual spends
approximately \( \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda} \) part of her time in unemployment, and \( \frac{\lambda}{\delta + \lambda} \) being employed\(^5\).

Hence, the unconditional long-run return from the labor market simply is:

\[
E = \frac{\delta}{\delta + \lambda} b + \frac{\lambda}{\delta + \lambda} w
\tag{4.16}
\]

To simulate a mean-preserving spread in labor market shocks, I assume that \( b \) and \( \lambda \) decrease by 10\%, \( \delta \) increases by 10\% and solve for the wage level that makes the new expected return equal to the initial one. The intuition is straightforward: the agent will spend more time in unemployment with lower unemployment insurance but the increase in wage level mechanically guarantees that the unconditional expected returns in both cases are the same. For the parameter values into consideration, the wage needs to increase by 7.8\% to leave the average returns constant.

\[ \text{Wealth} -0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 \]
\[ \text{Densities} 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 \]

\[ g^* \text{ un} (a) \quad g^* \text{ e} (a) \quad g \text{ un} (a) \quad g \text{ e} (a) \]

Figure 4.4: Wealth Distributions after a mean-preserving spread

\(^5\)“Approximately” because this calculation ignores the effect of search effort. Search effort affects the intensity of transitioning to employment but it is endogenously chosen as a response to the experiment at hand, so it should not be included in the calculation of the unconditional long-run mean.
The effects of the mean-preserving spread in labor market uncertainty can be seen in Figures 4-6; the starred variables are the solutions to the economy with more severe labor market uncertainty. First, there is an increase in the mass of constrained agents, as well as in the mass of poor unemployed agents. Labor market shocks are more severe and the self-insurance channels cannot offset completely their effects. As a result, the density of poor agents is now greater and the mass of employed wealthy agents is smaller.

Second, there are substantial changes in the saving behavior of individuals.
Employed agents with relatively low asset levels save more than before, while unemployed individuals with high wealth dissave more than before. Interestingly, wealthy employed individuals save less in the economy with more severe uncertainty. As I will show shortly, the aggregate level of savings increases, and this increases comes exclusively from the poor employed agents.

Third, there is an increase in search effort, which is more pronounced for poorer individuals. As expected, agents with low wealth levels use their search effort to insure against the greater labor market uncertainty. The aggregate search effort $SE$ increases from 84.23 to 91.31, that is a 8.28% increase. The measure of unemployed agents increases by only 1.4%, hence the average search effort per unemployed worker increases approximately 7%. This increase is the response to a mean-preserving spread (of magnitude in the order of 10%) in labor market uncertainty. Quantitatively, this is a substantial increase: unemployed workers increase their search effort by a similar order of magnitude as the increase in labor market uncertainty.

The interest rate in this economy is 2.6%, much lower than the level of 3.4% in the economy with less severe labor market shocks. This decrease reflects a sizable increase in the level of aggregate savings: $S$ increases from 4.25 to 5.05, that is 19% increase. Moreover, the mass of employed workers decreases by 1% and now the richest employed workers dissave. That is, the measure of agents who save in the economy decreases with greater labor market uncertainty. The average agent who saves though saves 20% more than the average saver in the economy with less severe labor market shocks!

This is the main result of this chapter and it is worth summarizing it here. In an economy with idiosyncratic shocks, agents use both channels of self-insurance, namely precautionary savings and search effort, to respond to an increase in labor market risk. The magnitude of the increase in precautionary savings, however, is twice as large as the increase in precautionary job search effort. Savings quantita-
tively dominate search effort as a self-insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic labor market shocks.

4.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed a model of uninsured idiosyncratic labor market risk in which individuals have two available channels of self-insurance: precautionary savings and job-search effort. I used the model to answer the following quantitative question: how much do agents increase the use of each self-insurance channel when labor market shocks become more severe? The model provides a clear answer: the increase of savings as a response to more severe labor market uncertainty is twice as large as the increase in job-search effort. Precautionary savings dominate the use of search effort as a self-insurance mechanism.

The next step forward would be to perform policy exercises in this model, in the spirit of Mukoyama (2013) and Vejlin (2017). The optimal unemployment policy depends on the trade-off between insurance and job-search incentives. Given the main result of the paper, namely that workers use savings much more than search effort, this trade-off needs to be reexamined through the lenses of the set up considered here.

Moreover, it is important to use data on assets and search effort to discipline the effects of each self-insurance channel in an empirically plausible way. Finally, I plan to improve the theoretical structure of the model by endogenizing the meeting rates and wages in a directed search environment, as well as by including the worker’s participation decision and the choice of hours worked, following Krusell et al. (2010).


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