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The Electoral Origins of Governing Coalitions

A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Political Science

by

Royce Alexander Carroll

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2007
The Dissertation of Royce Alexander Carroll is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and forum for publication on microfilm:

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2007
For Brandalyn
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Vita

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“How parties create electoral democracy, chapter 2.” with Gary W. Cox and Mónica Pachón. 2006. Legislative Studies Quarterly. 31(2) 153-175
In this dissertation, I investigate a key distinction in the electoral origins of governing coalitions: whether bargaining among parties to form the government is primarily pre-electoral or post-electoral. Post-electoral bargaining refers to competing parties negotiating to form a governing coalition after an election. Pre-electoral bargaining involves parties committing before an election to govern together as a unit. In the first part of the dissertation, I argue that parties form pre-electoral pacts with an eye to gain portfolios, conditional on electoral costs. These costs vary in predictable ways tied to
variations in the structure of the world’s electoral systems. In the second part, I present
two main findings on the consequences of the electoral origins of governing coalitions.
First, pre-electoral coalitions are more proportional in their internal allocation of offices.
I argue that this distribution of spoils is designed to encourage contributions to winning
elections rather than purely legislative contributions to majorities. Second, I argue that
the more pre-electoral a coalition, the more it is likely to take a majoritarian ‘bonus’ in
the distribution of offices in the legislature. Cross-national empirical analyses are
conducted on samples of coalitions from developing and advanced democracies since the
1990s.
Chapter 1: Introduction

The literature on governing coalitions focuses on a range of issues, among them: how long parties negotiate prior to agreeing on a new government, the type of government that forms, how long governments last, and why they end. Traditionally, this research has focused on Western European parliamentary systems, but has recently expanded to emerging democracies and presidential regimes (Deheza 1997, Amorim-Neto 2006, 2002, Altman 2000). A consistent theme in this literature is that electoral parties able to govern with a legislative majority differ significantly from multiparty coalition governments. They last longer (Powell 1982, Lijphart 1999). They typically do not face the same sorts the destabilizing events that can drive wedges between the partners in a multiparty coalition (Lupia and Strøm 1995). They foster more stable presidential regimes (Mainwaring 1993, Jones 1995, Mainwaring and Scully 1995; though see Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004). There is sometimes a sharp normative edge to the discussion, with champions of durable and decisive government touting the virtues of single-party majorities (e.g. Bagehot 1867, APSA 1950, Moe and Caldwell 1994), and advocates of representative and broadly based government touting the virtues of multiparty coalitions (e.g. Lijphart 1984, 1999, Powell 2000).

There is less literature on precisely why single parties that build majorities without post-electoral bargaining should differ from multi-party coalitions, but most scholars have in mind simply that multi-party governments must contain potentially more diverse
actors and are less hierarchically organized, whereas single-party governments contain potentially less diverse actors who are more hierarchically organized. Conflicts of interest are thus more likely and harder to manage internally in multi-party governments than in single-party governments.

In this dissertation, I explore the electoral origins of governing coalitions that give rise to the foundations of many of these traditional distinctions. At its core, the thesis that follows is concerned with the relationship between voters and their collective representatives, in particular the organizational forms employed to meet demands for democratic representation. In this, the following sections add further substance to the link between electoral and legislative organization. Among other things, I argue that a key distinction among governing coalitions is the extent to which those coalitions are composed of groups that committed to cooperate during elections and share electoral roots. The extent of this cooperation influences how much the coalition’s collective electoral identity matters and the extent to which parties are electorally interdependent.

I thus draw a key distinction in electoral origins between whether bargaining is pre-electoral or post-electoral. Post-electoral bargaining means that distinct agents, each with an electoral mandate, must cooperate to form a government. These agents’ cooperation may or may not be identifiable before the election, but in either event the vetoes over governance are controlled by separate electoral actors.

Pre-electoral bargaining means that interest groups or parties determine before an election that they support a common governing alternative – and let voters know this.
Thus, when voters vote for one part of an electoral coalition, they are voting for a coalition committed to work as a whole.

This dissertation investigates the formation of alliances between parties prior to the onset of an election whose explicit goals are twofold: first, campaigning together; second, governing together. Some alliances are *only* electoral—their members cooperate during the campaign, with the goal of winning more seats; but they do not commit to entering government together. Other alliances are *only* governmental—their members cooperate during the inter-electoral period, with the goal of enacting a legislative program; but they do not commit to campaigning together. The alliances I focus on encompass cooperation both in the electoral and legislative arenas.

These “long” coalitions can potentially accrue substantial gains from trade, as they can trade votes in both the electoral and legislative arenas. However, in order to reach their collective goal of attaining and maintaining control of government they face a set of organizational pitfalls. Thus, they need to structure the incentives of their relationship in such a way that each has an incentive to avoid actions that would harm the other, and undertake actions that would help the other, at both stages.

I argue that long coalitions can alleviate their problems by (1) agreeing to electoral tactics that lessen the direct electoral competition between the partners; (2) allocating portfolios and other office spoils in proportion to each member party’s contribution (of seats) to the coalition; (3) agreeing to governance practices that give the government greater internal control over the legislative process.
1.1 “Pre-electoral” vs. “Post-electoral” bargaining

How deeply entangled a government is in the electoral process matters. In the absence of electoral association, legislators would exist in an anarchic environment faced with insurmountably costly transactions and little basis to enforce internal agreements. Party affiliations, in defining the authority delegated by constituents, impose basic bargaining constraints upon legislative agents, as well as presidents. Electoral alliances, of all forms, act as contracts among electoral agents seeking to minimize uncertainty and opportunism (Jones and Hudson 1998).

Electoral alliances or pre-electoral coalitions are groups of individuals, factions and/or parties who cooperate during elections and government formation, and satisfy certain properties. In particular, forming an electoral alliance entails: (1) some form of common identity; (2) a public agreement to govern together as a team, if the allies jointly win control of government. Electoral alliances may employ any number of specific tactics: some may agree to a common platform; some may use joint lists or vote pooling between lists; some may formally create a new joint label separate from the individual parties’ names. But these tactics are extrinsic to the definition of pre-electoral coalitions used here. All of the electoral coalitions under study here meet the definition above – engaging in public cooperation for the purpose of forming a government.

When parties form a pre-election coalition, it introduces an inertial element to governing. One cannot abandon pre-election allies as easily as post-election allies, as this would entail reformulating an electoral strategy, not just a legislative strategy. Having discarded electoral cooperation, an electoral actor must invest in repositioning itself vis-
à-vis its erstwhile allies. Having discarded a common label, electoral actors either must forfeit the value of that label, fight to seize it, or develop a new label—because any common label of value carries with it votes.\footnote{By definition. Whatever the content of party labels, the ultimate goal in cultivating one is to generate votes.} Having discarded the agreement to enter government, parties must offer new reasons to voters and contributors why they will likely get into government and fulfill their promises.

At its core, the distinction between pre- and post-electoral bargaining is about cooperation among legislative parties and how it can transcend the legislative arena. I employ the analogy of “trading” between the electoral and legislative arenas, and the “gains from trade” obtained by participants. In the legislative arena, cooperation among individuals can capture gains from trade in legislative votes. A legislator can win more often on legislative votes with the cooperation of partners, in exchange for her cooperation on other votes. Since many opportunities for such vote trades will occur over time, the temptation to defect on vote trades in the short-term (in order to curry immediate favor with constituents or interest groups) is overcome by considerations of the future gains that would thereby be sacrificed.

The more frequently legislators believe that they will trade votes with one another in the future, the more that they will trust each other in the present. When vote-trading agreements are long-term, persisting across legislative periods, they take on an electoral identity of their own. This fact adds to the legislative rationale for cooperation among legislators an electoral rationale, as they develop a common fate
in terms of survival. The more that legislators believe that their electoral fortunes are correlated, the more they will work together to win and the more they can trust each other to fulfill agreements.

Legislative aggregation for vote trading and the bonds of electoral aggregation coexist and interact in important ways; and the notion of “trading” need not be restricted to purely legislative interaction. The same incentives that drive vote trading in the legislature are present in the electoral arena as well, in the form of electoral cooperation. For example, parties may “trade” votes across electoral districts just as they trade votes in the legislature. To the extent coalitions do both, trading will cross these arenas. That is, electoral cooperation depends upon promises of legislative cooperation, and vice versa.

Those same incentives extend to legislative arena—when the trading of individual votes institutionalizes and gives way to the creation and trading of larger portions of the legislative pie. Controlling a committee or having influence over the agenda, for example, can influence the entire pattern of individual votes and thus alter the type and direction of policy.

In this dissertation, I look at governments based on electoral alliances as “long” trading agreements between interest groups that span both the legislative and the electoral process. From this perspective, an electoral coalition consists of various sub-units (factions, individuals, delegations) that “specialize” in producing votes, whether votes in electoral districts, or votes on legislative motions. The "revenue" of
the electoral coalition (the set of offices, resources and policy it wins) depends on it winning both sorts of votes at the right time and in the right amounts. Thus, the coalition must pay its components their marginal revenue product and must obtain sufficient resources from its office winnings in order to meet these demands.

I apply this logic specifically to multiparty electoral coalitions. When coalitions are purely legislative phenomena, the contribution of a component party depends on its legislative voting power, which in turn dictates the executive and legislative power it can obtain. When coalitions are purely electoral phenomena, a component’s contribution depends on the number of seats each can produce.

The theme throughout the following thesis is that electoral origins matter. In particular, when governing coalitions distribute power amongst themselves and to others, recent and future electoral context is always at play. I operationalize one aspect of this – whether parties have engaged in explicit alliances in elections – and evaluate why this may be costly or advantageous and why it has effects that continue well into the legislative arena. Those effects involve two key issues: the manner in which component parties are rewarded for their contribution to their coalition, and the extent to which a coalitions seizes a greater share of key offices, leaving less to the opposition.

Among the other contributions of this dissertation is inclusion of "new" or developing democracies -- particularly those of Latin America and Eastern Europe -- in coalition and electoral studies traditionally focused on West European and OECD
nations. This means treating presidential and parliamentary regimes, as well as countries with varying democratic experience, in commensurate terms. The project also contributes to the infant but growing cross-regional study of legislative politics, following the tradition of much work on electoral systems. It also sheds new light on traditional topics, such as the distribution of portfolios and electoral aggregation. Finally, this project is highly relevant to the long-standing interest comparativists have in the differences between single-party and multi-party democracy.

Following are descriptions of each of the next chapters.

1.2 Overview

This dissertation is organized to answer three main questions:

- What are the costs and benefits of engaging in electoral cooperation and what factors can explain its emergence?
- How does a coalition’s electoral origin affect intra-coalitional organization and its distribution of the spoils of office?
- How does a coalition’s electoral origin affect its tendency to control the legislative arena?

The following sections outline how each of the subsequent chapters addresses these questions.

Part 1: Electoral Origins

Chapter 2
Previous works on electoral cooperation envision parties forming electoral coalitions in order to maximize seats due to district-level proportionality or legal thresholds (Duverger 1954, Golder 2005). In Part 1, I emphasize the use of electoral alliances to maximize “portfolios”, by which I mean portions of government power in the form of formal offices. In Chapter 2, I treat parties as portfolio-maximizing entities to explain the emergence of campaign cooperation between parties in the form of electoral pacts. I present a decision model of electoral cooperation revolving around the goal of controlling government that isolates the pivotal role of reputation in driving the costs of coalitions.

Electoral cooperation among legislative parties is advantageous to the extent it ensures “winning” – participation in the governing coalition. When a national-level prize—control of government—is the overarching goal of political actors, parties have strong reasons to form a pre-election alliance if they can. Under these conditions, office-seeking parties capable of costless, credible alliances would ultimately coalesce into at most two large blocs. If the costs are low enough, even very committed interest and constituent groups will support a viable vehicle for representing their interests in government.

The decision model emphasizes the expected relationships between votes, seats and portfolios and how alliances alter them on four dimensions: electoral coordination benefits, reputation costs, party bargaining power and coalition bargaining power. The key conclusion is that the alliance effect on votes—associational costs of the kind envisioned by Strøm (1990)—is the decisive factor in the decision to ally.
In Chapter 3, I present a clarification of some definitions necessary to apply the logic of Chapter 2 to the real world of party competition, including a more detailed description of the characteristics of pre-electoral alliances. I use several cases to illustrate related concepts related to the following chapter’s exploration of the empirical correlations between alliances and electoral systems.

In Chapter 4, I examine several empirical correlates of alliance formation. Among the key findings are the connections between alliances and the size and number of electoral districts, party fragmentation, and the distinction between party-list and nominal electoral systems. The key claim is that these institutions, which can drive party competition away from local politics and toward party reputations, contribute to the costs that prevent alliances from forming. I make use of an original cross-national data set of electoral pacts among parties since the early-1990s across over 200 elections in over 50 countries. While my findings echo those from the literature on disproportionality and electoral aggregation more generally, I emphasize how these correlations are consistent not just with seat maximizing but also with reputationally-constrained portfolio-seeking behavior.

Part 2: The Consequences of Different Electoral Origins

Chapter 5: Dividing the Spoils

In principle, coalitions may divide the spoils of electoral success in any way they see fit, given exogenous constraints. In a parliamentary regime, for example, it is typically the case that any coalition of legislators achieving a legislative majority will be
able to allocate cabinet portfolios among its membership. It must determine how it should distribute these rewards among the parties involved—since they are all necessary for maintaining control of the executive.

When making this determination, one possible referent for determining the allocation rule is the “importance” of the party in creating the majority. There are some parties, for example, that must be included in many of the possible coalitions that form in a given legislature. Others parties are necessary for only a few possible coalitions. Parties in the former situation have the ability to “pivot” among many possible coalitions and can (on that basis) demand concessions from their less pivotal partners.

If we consider, however, that parties negotiate government formation before the election, they may choose to agree on a rule that, if successful, would limit post-electoral bargaining power in the allocation of offices among members. That is, they can agree to reward all the participants based upon their contributions to the successful electoral effort, rather than their post-electoral bargaining position. I argue that by creating an institution that ties all partners’ individual fortunes (their office payoff) to the collective outcome (winning) the coalition can ensure that each party (and its backers) will have the incentive to “invest” on behalf of the group electoral effort. This means that the backers of a particular party can invest in its success knowing it is ex ante more likely to get into government and, if successful, guaranteed a degree of influence proportional to its contribution to the electoral success of the coalition.
Following this logic, I argue parties who have committed to cooperate before an election will have more seat-based allocations, reflecting a prior agreement to reward contributions to the collective electoral success (investments). By contrast, an unconstrained post-electoral bargaining environment will allow exploitation of any advantageous position in which parties may find themselves. When parties negotiate entirely after an election, the effect of bargaining advantages such as voting weight or agenda setting will be important in predicting the shares of portfolios received by parties.

Presidential systems also often involve multiparty cabinet coalitions (Cheibub, Przeworski and Saiegh 2004, Amorim Neto 2006). Many of these however reflect the electoral coalitions formed behind a victorious presidential candidate, rewarding partners for their electoral contributions. Others reflect post-electoral dealing among parties, factions and presidents attempting to build a reliable legislative majority—trading portfolios purely for legislative votes. The key distinction between the scenario described above and that within a presidential system is the independence of the executive from the legislative majority. That the president will stay in office regardless of whether he gains support from the legislature has two consequences for portfolio allocation. First, the president has greater latitude in making appointments to the cabinet than does a parliamentary party in the position of “formateur,” or proposer. Second, the post-electoral bargaining position of legislative parties is valued only by the importance of achieving majority legislative support, and not (generally) by the threat of bringing down the government itself.
Thus, a (non-presidential) party’s post-electoral bargaining position in a presidential system is inherently less valuable than it is under a parliamentary regime, else equal. This fact makes the opportunity to contribute to the electoral success of a presidential coalition, in exchange for government membership, that much more important. A president wishing to attract partners in an electoral alliance should commit not to fully exploit the cabinet appointment and dismissal powers of the presidency to benefit his own party or non-partisan associates.

Presidentialism by itself, then, does not change the basic prediction above. Presidents that have cooperated with other parties before the election should reward parties less for their post-electoral bargaining advantages and more for their electoral contribution. They should also take less advantage of their proposal position in the distribution of portfolios compared to presidents making deals with parties based only on their offers of legislative support.

Portfolios are not the only means by which a coalition can allocate power internally. Obtaining cabinet portfolios is certainly a useful reason to form a party and for parties to form coalitions. Just as joining a party aids in obtaining a greater overall likelihood of winning on legislative votes by coordinating with others, the group can use its collective votes and seats to achieve collective access to posts much more valuable than individual seats. These certainly include ministerial posts, but also may include the chairs of committees and membership in the legislative directorate. By joining a party, becoming a cabinet minister, obtaining some other executive appointment, chairing a committee or controlling the directorate becomes possible through their collective
success. Parties therefore create another collective good—“better access to legislative power”—in which all members can share. The last section of Chapter 5 takes into account this broader universe of offices, extending the logic of the above predictions into the realms of committee chairs and directing board seats.

I empirically test each of these propositions in Chapter 5 using cross-national data on portfolios, committees and directing-board allocations across presidential and parliamentary regimes.

Chapter 6: Legislative Majoritarianism

A given assembly can employ a variety of institutional mechanisms that increase or decrease the influence of the governing coalition relative to the opposition, and of the government’s leadership relative to its rank-and-file. One measurable way coalitions can influence the pattern of political control of the institutions within the assembly is in the distribution of offices. For example, a governing coalition may distribute control of those legislative committees only to its benefit—perhaps excluding the opposition entirely from holding committee chairs. Similarly, the governing coalition may dominate the central agenda setting body of the assembly to varying degrees.

In Chapter 6, I argue that govts that are more “pre-electoral” in origin will tend to take larger shares of all legislative posts. I argue that parties that share no electoral roots have more to fear from their partners’ abuse of delegated power. To monitor and check those partners, it helps to distribute power more widely – even to the opposition. In
contrast, parties that share a common electoral fate can better trust one another not to
damage their collective reputation: the marginal value of monitoring electoral allies
declines relative to the marginal value of preventing the opposition from delaying too
much or harming the government’s record. Thus, empirically, we should see that the
governing majorities would control a greater share of the available posts when member
parties have engaged in pre-electoral cooperation (and particularly when they involve
only a single party). Specifically pre-electoral coalitions therefore take a greater share of
standing committee chairs and the legislature’s directorate, relative to the opposition. To
test this proposition, I employ an original database of the distribution of intra-legislative
offices among parties across over 50 countries since the mid-1990s.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

In the final chapter, I review the main findings. Chief among these are the
following. First, parties form pre-electoral pacts with an eye to gain portfolios, not just
seats (pre-electoral coalitions seek control of government, not just greater representation).
Second, the more pre-electoral a coalition, the more proportional its internal allocation
agreement (the distribution of spoils rewards electoral contributions rather than
legislative contributions), even in presidential systems and premier-presidential systems.
Third, the more pre-electoral a coalition, the more ‘majoritarian’ its behavior (i.e., the
more it endeavors to concentrate the distribution of offices within the coalition). Each of
these propositions also apply to seeking and distributing other important posts for
governments, not just portfolios; here, committees and the directorate of the legislature
are emphasized and measured. Finally, I discuss how the phenomena I treat here as
“consequences” of electoral origins may feed back into electoral behavior, causing electoral strategy, bargaining patterns and legislative organization to equilibrate.
Chapter 2: “Portfolio Seeking” and Electoral Cooperation

2.1 Introduction

In the long history of the study of parties, scholars have sought to explain the number and size of parties in terms of the seat-allocation features of electoral systems (e.g. Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994). A related concern given less attention until recently is another form of electoral aggregation: inter-party cooperation. Because studies of multiparty systems typically presume post-electoral bargaining among independent entities, the presence of such alliances is significant.

Duverger himself originally highlighted aspects of electoral systems associated with cooperation among parties, especially disproportionality. Since then, a number of studies have examined the matter. Duverger’s emphasis on disproportionality and ideological compatibility is validated in recent work: Rochon and Pierce (1985), Tsebelis (1988), Valen (1994), Bartolini (1984), Laver and Schofield (1990), Christiansen (2000), Cox (1997) and, most recently and comprehensively by Golder (2006).

The main thrust of these studies is that (1) parties want to maximize seats, and hence want to ally when it produces more seats and (2) parties are ultimately seeking to implement policy and hence will want to ally with ideological neighbors. Implicit in this emphasis on seat-maximization is the premise that electoral systems differ primarily in terms of disproportionality. However, electoral systems differ in the manner in which alliances affect parties’ reputations. Parties in one system may find their reputations
easily sullied when they ally, while other parties may find themselves relatively free to pursue agreements with other parties. In some systems, voters react less negatively to the necessity for policy compromise in interparty cooperation and parties may even benefit from enhanced viability as a potential governing entity. That is, as parties increase their chances of obtaining office, they (collectively and individually) can become a better investment for supporters (e.g. interest groups), better enabling them to attract voters. Moreover, office-seeking considerations may well act independently from the concern that each party has for its own number of seats. These are themes addressed theoretically in this chapter.

Inter-party electoral cooperation can take a variety of forms. As Duverger (1954) put it, such pacts “can be either tacit or explicit, local or national.” Here I focus on explicit (public) and national electoral cooperation aimed toward joint governance. Some alliances are only electoral—their members cooperate during the campaign, with the goal of winning more seats; but they do not commit to entering government together. Other alliances are only governmental—their members cooperate during the inter-electoral period, with the goal of enacting a legislative program; but they do not commit to campaigning together. The alliances I focus on encompass cooperation both in the electoral and legislative arenas.

Within this group, joint-lists or withdrawal agreements may or may not emerge depending on the seat allocation features of the system. Some, but not all, such alliances also feature formal joint platforms, in addition to a less formal collective identity. All of
those with which I am concerned here involve a public commitment to jointly enter government.

The distinction between tacit and explicit cooperation is important because the former tend to be especially driven by seat allocation concerns while maintaining independence in the campaign and in post-electoral bargaining. Such alliances characterize limited and purely technical efforts to navigate the electoral rules that occasionally occur in countries such as Finland. Others involve no campaign cooperation whatsoever, except the expectation of forming a coalition. The alliances at issue here are designed to influence collective bargaining positions of parties in pursuit of government access (by which I mean here directly holding government power).

Here, I consider parties as office-seekers for which seats are primarily a vehicle to government access. That is, I treat parties as portfolio-maximizing entities to explain the emergence of pre-election coalitions. In what follows, I present a decision model of electoral aggregation revolving around the goal of “government access” that isolates the pivotal role of reputation and votes in driving association costs and viability benefits.

2.2 “Portfolio-Seeking” Parties: The National Arena as an Electoral District

To allocate seats, many rules exist ranging from single-seat plurality to various forms of proportional representation. To allocate portfolios—portions of control of the government—the allocation rule is nearly always “winner-take-all”: a majority of seats
suffices to secure all portfolios.\textsuperscript{2} If parties only sought national portfolios, if how many national assembly seats a party gets were unaffected by any pre-election alliances it forms, and if alliance bargains were always credible, then parties not expecting to achieve a majority alone would always form a pre-election alliance if they could\textsuperscript{3}. Given these rather rigid conditions, purely portfolio-seeking parties within a polity would ultimately coalesce into at most two large blocs under incentives analogous to a nationwide instance of Duverger’s law\textsuperscript{4}--a “block vote” that allocates an entire slate of offices (portfolios) on a winner-take-all basis.

Consider the example of three parties of equal electoral strength, each purely portfolio-seeking\textsuperscript{5}, whose votes and seats are independent of their alliance behavior. Absent any electoral relationship, each party has an equal probability (2/3) to enter the governing coalition whereupon they expect to receive half of the available portfolios. Let $E(P_j \mid j \in \text{Gov})$ represent $j$’s expected portfolio share given that it is a member of the government.\textsuperscript{6} Party $j$’s expected portfolios, given no alliance, $P_j(0)$, can be written:

$$P_j(0) = \Pr \{ j \in \text{Gov} \mid A_j = 0 \} \cdot E(P_j \mid j \in \text{Gov})$$

$$\approx \left( \frac{2}{3} \right) \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{3}$$

\textsuperscript{2} Assuming parliamentarism, the exceptions being power-sharing arrangements. In a presidential system, the rule would be a majority or plurality of votes.

\textsuperscript{3} Parties that do expect single party majorities are certainly electoral alliances themselves—of social groups or of parties having at an earlier time subordinated to a single label.

\textsuperscript{4} Or, the “M+1 rule” under plurality (Cox 1997). At the district level, the M+1 rule refers to the pressures of strategic voting that produce candidate entry incentives leading to, in equilibrium, one more candidate than the number of seats available on a district.

\textsuperscript{5} By “portfolio”, I refer to a unit of executive office that may allow control over policy implementation just as well as targeted benefits to constituents or patronage for supporters.

\textsuperscript{6} In legislative bargaining models, this concept is called “voting weight” (Morrelli 1999).
where \( \text{Gov} \) represents the set of governing parties and \( A_j \) represents the alliance decision (party \( j \) remains unallied when \( A_j = 0 \)). By entering a pre-electoral coalition agreement, however, party \( j \) and a willing ally increase their respective odds of entering government, \( \Pr [j \in \text{Gov} | A_j=1] \), to virtual certainty. In bargaining terms, the two parties have monopolized the legislative bargaining “weight,” emulating the post-electoral position of a single-party majority. Even facing the same division of the spoils, the expected utility of allying exceeds that of competing independently:

\[
P_j(1) = \Pr [j \in \text{Gov} | A_j=1] \ E(P | j \in \text{Gov})
\]

\[
\approx 1 \left( \frac{1}{2} \right) = \frac{1}{2}
\]

Under these conditions, Riker’s (1962) expectation of minimum winning coalitions should hold even in the electoral arena, so long as votes and the mechanics of the vote-seat translation are known with certainty.\(^7\) This simple example demonstrates how majorities should form even before the election, if alliances are credible and votes are insensitive to public cooperation among parties.

Some party systems do in fact behave similarly to this proposition. Some pre-electoral majorities are alliances among candidates in countries such as the US, or among candidates and factions as in Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party. Analogously, Argentina’s Partido Justicialista is such a coalition of provincial parties (Jones and Hwang 2005). In all of these cases, the cost of alliance – in terms of sullying a

\(^7\)The logic of this example holds even with some variance in the expected vote shares, so long as no one party expects a sole majority.
candidates reputation for hewing to a broad set of policies – is typically perceived as small. The attraction of allying (increasing ones chance of government access) outweighs the cost (the necessity of compromise).

Yet, multiparty governing coalitions generally do not emerge in this manner. Instead, they usually involve electoral competition among partners with independent constituencies and post-electoral bargaining. In the following sections, I highlight the impact of the distinct goal of “winning government” and why we would or would not see national-level electoral cooperation to reach that goal. In particular, I identify the conditions under which the alliance conditions above should hold and identify factors likely to counter these incentives, even for office-seeking parties.

2.3 A Decision Model of Inter-Party Cooperation

From the discussion above, it follows that parties will find pre-electoral relationships most attractive when mainly interested in obtaining national portfolios and when standing to gain (or not lose) seats in the process. To evaluate this claim and its limitations in more detail, I outline a decision model for “portfolio-maximizing” parties. Any given office-seeking party recognizes a particular value of a seat ($u_s$) and a portfolio ($u_p$), with the latter greater than the former ($u_p > u_s$). We might think of a range of “alliance effort,” from ad hoc instances of local level cooperation to joint platforms and other formal pronouncements entailing a deep, cooperative electoral investment. For

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8 Certainly, when parties have significant policy seeking interests, the value of policy influence may become important independent of governing status (Strøm 1990). In the context of this dissertation, “policy-seeking” manifests as an electoral component of “office-seeking”—in the form of votes won via “ideological reputation.”
present purposes, it is helpful to simply dichotomize the concept between \( A_j = 1 \) if party \( j \) enters into an alliance and \( A_j = 0 \) if it enters no alliance. The decision to ally may affect a party's votes, a party's seats, and ultimately the total "office payoff" of alliance. A party \( j \) chooses \( A_j \) to maximize its office payoff:

\[
\max_{A_j \in \{0,1\}} S_j(A_j,V(A_j))u_s + P_j(A_j,S_j(A_j,V(A_j)))u_p
\]

The notation here is read as follows. First, \( V(A_j) = (V_1(A_j), V_2(A_j), \ldots, V_n(A_j)) \) is a vector representing the distribution of votes across the \( n \) parties, given \( j \)'s alliance decision. It is possible that voters do not care whether party \( j \) enters an alliance, in which case \( V(1) = V(0) \). Second, the notation \( S_j(A_j,V(A_j)) \) represents the seats that party \( j \) gets, given its alliance decision, \( A_j \), and the resulting vote vector, \( V(A_j) \). This notation allows for \( j \)'s alliance decision to affect its seat total in two ways: indirectly, by affecting its and other parties' vote totals (the second argument); and directly, by affecting the translation of votes into seats (the first argument). I provide examples of both mechanisms below.

Third, \( S(A_j) = (S_1(A_j), S_2(A_j), \ldots, S_n(A_j)) \) is a vector representing the distribution of seats given \( j \)'s alliance decision, of which \( S_j(A_j) \) is an element. Fourth, \( P_j(A_j,S_j(A_j,V(A_j))) \) represents the portfolios \( j \) obtains given its alliance decision, where again there is both an indirect (second argument) and direct (first argument) effect of forming an alliance on \( j \)'s portfolios.\(^9\)

1. **Electoral coordination benefits, when forming an alliance does not affect votes.** The direct impact of alliances upon seats occurs even when votes are unaffected

\(^9\)Note that here I take other parties' alliance decisions as fixed, considering party \( j \)'s decision independent of other parties' choices.
by j’s alliance behavior, \( V(1) = V(0) \). This path results from coordination among allied parties to optimize their joint clearance of “electoral thresholds” (Cox 1997, Golder 2005). Many cases of pre-electoral coordination among multiple parties within electoral blocs involve, for example, joint lists (as in Croatia and Poland) or mutual candidate withdrawals in single-member districts (as in France, Lithuania, Italy, India and Hungary). Regardless of the specific form, these pacts are essentially “trades” of votes for votes where each ally (and the group) gains in seats. Thus, even if the alliance does not affect the amount of votes that each ally receives, it can convert the given joint total of votes more efficiently into seats, either by passing a legal threshold or by minimizing wasted votes. Such efficiency gains are generically available, and so if alliances do not affect votes, parties will always gain seats by forming alliances. Formally, \( S_j(I;V(1)) > S_j(0;V(0)) \) if \( V(1) = V(0) \).

2. Reputation costs and/or benefits. It may be, however, that \( V_j(1) < V_j(0) \). That is, forming an alliance imposes association costs of the kind envisioned by Strøm (1990) with regard to post-electoral coalitions. In this case, it is possible that \( S_j(I;V(1)) < S_j(0;V(0)) \) and parties must balance the association costs (in the form of vote losses) they incur by forming an alliance against the efficiency gains.

One possible route for \( S_j(I;V(1)) > S_j(0;V(0)) \) is via effects on reputation. Allying with another party can enhance your credibility in the eyes of new voters, perhaps by association with viable partners. Often, however, electoral cooperation has the potential to undermine a party’s reputation in the eyes of its core supporters despite possible seat gains, so that \( S_j(1;V_j(1)) < S_j(1;V_j(0)) \). For example, several Polish parties of the right in
1993 created alliances that detracted from their prior individual polling support and opted out of potential alliances expected to do so (Kaminski 2001). Such fears also arose in the 2002 alliance between the Workers Party and the Liberal Party in Brazil. In Finland, Helander (1997, 68) notes that parties are hesitant to the use of even local technical alliances since “an electoral alliance may erode support of the party on the ideological scene.” This element is discussed at length in the next section.

Figure 1 below presents a path-analytic depiction of the decision to ally and the sequence of potential consequences for the distribution of seats, both directly (Arrow 1) and indirectly through changes in votes (Arrow 2).

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10 PT founding member Raul Pont speculated at the time that “it could have very serious consequences,” and saw echoes of a past mayoral race where the party label was so diluted that “many militants of the PT didn’t feel very enthusiastic about the way the campaign was run.” “In our case,” he added, “when the militants don’t go into the streets, it’s difficult to carry a campaign.” (interviewed in International Viewpoint, September 2002)

11 Regarding the Center Party (the most frequent large participant in alliances), Helander notes, “it may be noticed that the party has even lost a lot of votes…” (68).
As mentioned above, parties' desire to overcome electoral hurdles, enhance viability or risk reputation costs depends ultimately on the office payoff. Figure 2 builds on this relationship between alliances and seat outcomes and introduces the alliance decision's direct and indirect (through seats) effects on obtaining portfolios.
3. **Seats effect on portfolios.** Arrow 3 represents portfolios derived from obtaining seats. Portfolio shares, in many cases, may be directly contingent upon seat shares when seat shares directly influence a party's (1) likelihood of achieving “formateur” status, and therefore the premiership (Warwick 1994, Diermeier and Merlo 2000), or (2) importance in the bargaining process of forming majorities (Morelli and Montero 2003, Ansolabehere et al. 2005), or (3) portion of internal portfolio distribution (O'Leary, Grofman, and Elklit 2005). From a party's perspective, obtaining portfolios always requires obtaining at least some seats.
4. Obtaining collective bargaining power. Arrow 4 depicts the direct path between alliances and portfolios as described in the three-party example above, holding seats and votes constant. Recall that in the example used above, two of three parties each expecting about one third of total votes and seats increased their expected portfolio payoff by allying, without any change in seats. For any given seat/vote share held by a party, alliances can create greater probabilities of inclusion in winning legislative coalitions with direct access to office payoffs. Bargaining weight depends upon both an individual party’s seat share and the entire distribution of seats. (See Appendix 1 for further discussion of the implication of seats and portfolios as separate goals)

2.4 The Costs and Benefits of Association

When the Irish Labour party debated the continuation of a pact with Fine Gael in the 1982 elections, their members explicitly weighed the costs and benefits. Farrell (1987, 22) recounts the tension as party factions debated the strategy: “One side argued that Labour had bought access to government at the cost of socialist principle …Others responded that … no socialist policies could be implemented from the opposition benches…” For some in Labour, allying meant access to government. For others it meant sacrificing programmatic ‘identity’. Both make an electoral label valuable and yet, as here, they may be at odds.

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12 As Helander (1997, 68) notes regarding one Finnish party’s willing to accept seat losses: “even if the party has lost seats [due to an alliance] it may have counted on support from its small parties in legislative work.”
A party label provides an information cue to voters on both a party's likelihood of obtaining access to government, what I will refer to as ‘viability reputation’, and its preferred policies once in government, or its ‘programmatic reputation’. A party's programmatic reputation—the collective policy promises associated with the party label—may be represented in spatial terms by an ideal point $x$, with which voters associate it. Viability reputation, in this context, means only the perceived probability of getting into or accessing government, $p$, which is the probability of forming part of the coalition that controls the executive.\footnote{I always refer to viability here in terms of governing viability on the national stage (that is, the probability of controlling part of the government), which is in principle quite distinct from electoral or district viability (the probability of winning representation) (cf. Cox 1997, Lijphart 1994). A party may be electorally viable in winning representation in, e.g., a single district and yet not be perceived (even by those same voters) as likely to be part of a governing coalition.} As an electoral organization relies more exclusively on its viability, it resembles less the prototypical programmatic party and more a sort of “machine” – once famously called a “non-ideological organization interested less in political principle than in securing and holding office for its leaders…[relying] on what it accomplishes in a concrete way for its supporters, not on what it stands for…” (Scott 1969, 1144).

Most electoral labels provide some information regarding the impact an organization or candidate would have on public policy if it were to govern. Almost all electoral organizations therefore have a programmatic reputation, even if that reputation is vague or apparently has a negligible effect upon their electoral fate. Conversely, no matter how central programmatic positioning is to its electoral success, any electoral entity can and will benefit from the perception that it actually has the ability to fulfill its promises—that is, government access.
It is important to emphasize that, when choosing among representatives, voters wish to know who among those promising a desirable provision of goods—public or otherwise—will be best able to deliver. Thus it is expected government actions (be it policy outcomes or targeted resources) from which voters expect to derive their utility and it is reputation with which they inform their voting decision. The actors most directly reactive to viability may not be voters, of course, but might instead be activists, interest groups or campaign financiers, whose investment of effort will be conditional upon likely government access. This influences votes by way of the benefits of increased resource investment, regardless of voters’ actual knowledge of a party’s office-winning potential.

As I broaden the core argument of this part of the dissertation, it is now helpful to view what we earlier called $A_j$ as a continuous measure of the depth of alliance behavior—accounting for the strength and permanence of electoral aggregation. Given this, we can now draw due attention to the increment by which a party’s office payoff $Q_j$ changes as alliance activity is deepened, represented by $\partial Q / \partial A_j$. This increment, I argue, increases as the programmatic component of the party label becomes less important and the viability component becomes more important. To see why this would be so, consider two conclusions that follow from previous sections’ arguments:
Claim 1. Assuming a party’s ideological position is optimal, programmatic reputation is never enhanced by electoral alliances and may be worsened, in that association with other parties entails some movement away from that ideal ideological positioning.

Consider a party Y with spatial policy position $x_Y$ that allies with a party Z having policy position $x_Z$. If $x_Y = x_Z$ the ideological reputation of each is obviously unaffected. As the two points diverge pre-alliance, each point dilutes the other post-alliance, rendering each closer to the other in the minds of voters. Assuming, then, that all policy positions are optimal ex ante and that no two parties have identical positions, all alliances are costly to programmatic reputation.  

More generally, let $x_j(A_j)$ represent the spatial policy position attributed to party $j$ given some degree of alliance, $A_j$. This position $x_j(A_j)$ always deviates from its ex ante optimal value $x_j^*$ when $A_j > 0$. If we imagine $A_j$ as normalized between 0 and 1, $x_j^* = x_j(0)$, the position attributed to party $j$ when it is wholly unconstrained by alliances and can position itself at its vote maximizing policy point. At the other extreme, $x_j(1)$ is the position attributed to $j$ when forced to fully compromise its programmatic reputation (along the lines of the illustration above where $x_Y$ and $x_Z$ are not aligned). This effect is analogous to the negative impact of a US president's reputation upon his party's congressional membership in midterm elections (Calvert and Isaac 1981), since

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14 Along these lines, Bartolini (1984) and Golder (2006) find that Western European party dyads indeed are less likely to ally electorally as their ideological distance increases.
association with presidents can harm legislator’s optimal positions vis-à-vis their legislative district’s median voter.

Claim 2. **Viability reputation** is always enhanced or unaffected by alliances, in that the probability of entering government is increased or unchanged.

Let $p(A_j)$ denote party $j$’s viability reputation – its perceived probability of entering government – given a degree of alliance involvement. A party with only one seat, for example, contributes so little to majority building that it cannot claim to have a significant chance of entering into one, particularly when other parties are large. Such a party’s legislative voting weight is therefore minuscule. A legislature predominantly composed of such one-seat parties would therefore face a tremendously uncertain bargaining environment, subject to continually shifting coalitions. If all legislators were truly independent from one another, even a legislature as small as 10 seats can produce 210 different minimal winning coalitions. With only five more seats, the number of minimal winning coalitions that can be formed among these 15 individuals becomes 6435.

Credible electoral alliances change this situation dramatically. As legislators coalesce into more predictable legislative blocs, the number of possible majorities
decreases rapidly.\textsuperscript{15} If the average “effective number” of bargaining blocs is just above 2, for example, voters can expect each component party's probability of government access to be roughly equal, at about .5. As the effective number of legislative bargaining blocs sinks below 2, members of the largest bloc rapidly increase in viability while all other parties rapidly decrease.\textsuperscript{16} Electoral alliances of all sorts provide predictable structure to such legislative blocs, and as a result, improve (or do not harm) the actual and perceived probabilities of governing viability for a member party who obtains a share of the coalition’s collective expected power.

Note that this logic rests upon an important ceteris paribus clause. One might object that some alliances do in fact decrease $p_j(A_j)$ because under various scenarios the ideology-reputational impact of the alliance—such as one including a “pariah” party—might be so devastating that party $j$ would become thoroughly unacceptable to voters, potential post-electoral partners, or both.\textsuperscript{17} For this reason, references to viability reputation herein refer strictly to the direct impact of electoral strength upon governing viability reputation, holding constant perceived $x$.

\textsuperscript{15} For example, if just two of the 15 members above have previously agreed to bargain as a unit, bargaining uncertainty is cut in half. If eight of these 2-member ‘blocs’ existed, only 56 possible minimal winning coalitions remain. Meanwhile the viability of groups within the blocs increases just as dramatically.

\textsuperscript{16} This logic depends on a notion of “effective number” less like Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and more like Molinar (1991) in that fragmentation among those outside a dominant bloc should not be measured as increasing overall fragmentation for this purpose. On the contrary, when one legislative bloc has a persistent hegemonic majority, fragmentation of the opposition can only be said to enhance that hegemony, not counteract it. It is important to note here that these ‘out parties’ have a significant incentive to pursue contrarian electoral strategies within the system, e.g. ideological appeals, given that their viability reputation is exogenously constrained by the governing parties.

\textsuperscript{17} Hence, $p$ for a party $j$ is more accurately defined by $p_j(A_j; x_j(A_j))$. An even more prevalent phenomenon might be the ideologically pivotal position held by centrist parties in a unidimensional context. Since the concept of viability involves voter’s expectations of other voters’ perception, support among even a party’s most committed voters will dissipate as they learn that others are abandoning their party. However, given this clear threat, such an ideologically destructive alliance would not occur in contexts where ideological reputation actually matters.
Given claims 1 and 2, some general patterns emerge. The cost of allying depends on the “weight” of party ideology, here referred to as $\alpha$ ($1>\alpha>0$), in determining the party’s vote share. As $\alpha$ declines, a party’s likelihood of gaining access to government, its viability, eventually becomes the most valuable information contained within its party label. If (1) votes are determined entirely by reputation; and (2) perceived reputation is jointly determined by viability $p_j(A_j)$ and position $x_j(A_j)$; then the vote share for party $j$ is a weighted average of its ideology and viability reputations: $V_j(p_j,x_j) = (1-\alpha)p_j + \alpha W_j(d(x_j,x_j^*))$. Here, $d(x_j,x_j^*)$ represents the difference between a party's actual ideological position and its ideal (vote optimizing) position and $W_j$ is a monotonically declining function taking values between zero and one.\(^{18}\)

To integrate this argument into the model described above, recall that the payoff to party $j$ from alliance is $Q_j=S_j(V_j(A_j),A_j)u_s+P_j(S(V_j(A_j),A_j),A_j)u_p$. Thus, the change in payoff given a change in alliance is

$$\frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial A_j} = \frac{\partial}{\partial A_j} [S_j(V_j(A_j),A_j)u_s + P_j(S(V_j(A_j),A_j),A_j)u_p] \quad (0.1)$$

The direction of the ‘alliance effect’ on votes will thus depend, in this model, on whether the net impact is dominated by programmatic cost (see Appendix 2 for further discussion). In short, $\frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j}$ increases as the importance of ideology declines (see Appendix 3 for elaboration). This reasoning leads to the prediction that, all else equal, a

\(^{18}\) Also, its ideal position and $W_j(d(x_j,x_j^*))$ is subject to the following constraint: $W_j(0)$ equals the vote share when $x_j = x_j^*$.\)
party is more likely to join an electoral alliance when a party is more dependent on its reputation for viability and less on its programmatic positioning. Formally, $\frac{\partial^2 Q_j}{\partial A_j \partial \alpha_j} < 0$

2.5 Conclusion

Previous literature on electoral cooperation has emphasized parties forming electoral coalitions in order to maximize seats (Duverger 1954, Golder 2005). I have emphasized the use of electoral alliances to maximize “portfolios,” by which I mean portions government access. Electoral cooperation among legislative parties is advantageous to the extent it ensures consistent access to the winning majority—the governing coalition. When a national-level prize—control of government—is the overarching goal of political actors, any party not already capable of achieving a majority alone has strong reasons to form a pre-election alliance if it can. Under these conditions, purely office-seeking parties with access to costless, credible alliances within a polity would ultimately coalesce into at most two large blocs. In practice, associational costs of the kind envisioned by Strøm (1990) make electoral coalitions among multiple parties difficult. Association costs and viability benefits play a pivotal role in driving incentives to ally.

In the remaining chapters of Part 1, I first clarify the concept of a pre-electoral alliance in order to apply this chapter’s arguments empirically and use several cases to illustrate the basic ideas behind the subsequent chapter’s exploration of the empirical correlations between alliances and electoral systems. I then examine empirically the correlation between electoral rules and alliance formation.
2.6 Appendices

Appendix 1: Seats versus portfolios

In this section I derive several predictions based on a general office seeking assumption, where seats always have some value greater than zero but that value is always less than that of portfolios: \( 0 < u_s < u_p \). We can see each of these scenarios more clearly in Figure 3 below. This graph plots the line at which \([S_j(1) - S_j(0)]u_s + [P_j(1) - P_j(0)]u_p = 0\) substituting example values of \(u_s = 1\) and \(u_p = 10\) -- meaning that portfolios are 10 times more valuable than seats -- to produce an illustrative slope. The dark shaded area represents all values of \([S_j(1) - S_j(0)]u_s + [P_j(1) - P_j(0)]u_p > 0\) where alliances are optimal. The light area represents all values of \([S_j(1) - S_j(0)]u_s + [P_j(1) - P_j(0)]u_p < 0\), where seat and portfolio considerations, taken together, do not merit an alliance and parties will prefer independent competition.
When parties choose alliances. In this general office-seeking example, alliances occur when \([S_j(1) - S_j(0)]u_s + [P_j(1) - P_j(0)]u_p > 0\). In the clearest case, depicted by quadrant A.1 in Figure 3, both seat and portfolio payoffs are improved. This scenario represents cases where improved chances of controlling government occur along with either reputation benefits or electoral coordination advantages, or both. Within this range, we also find cases of coalition-insensitive seats, where direct portfolio gains alone induce
alliance. Less obviously, quadrant A.2 shows the range in which parties will still form alliances even in the face of seat losses \( S_j(1) < S_j(0) \) if those losses do not outweigh portfolio gains: \([S_j(0)-S_j(1)]u_s < [P_j(1)-P_j(0)]u_p\). When might this occur? Imagine if the two parties that ally in the three-party example above expect not to reach the predicted 66% majority of seats because they each will pay some reputation costs in votes such that they obtain only 30% each. The alliance still produces the same expected portfolio gain due to majority status, and the overall office payoff still favors alliance. A more interesting example occurs when a more seat-independent route to portfolio gains exists, as by presidential appointment. In such cases, parties may tolerate even larger seat losses, as long as their efforts bring votes to the presidential coalition qualify them for sufficient office spoils. I explore these implications in detail in Appendix 4 below.

**Choosing independent competition.** Alliances do not occur when \([S_j(1)-S_j(0)]u_s+[P_j(1)-P_j(0)]u_p \leq 0\). This is clearly true when alliances would produce fewer portfolios and fewer seats, depicted in quadrant I.1 in Figure 3. In such cases, reputation costs are high enough that parties would win fewer seats in an alliance, impairing seat-dependent portfolio gains. Even if an alliance produces more seats, however, fewer portfolios could still arise, leading parties to opt for independent competition. In this case, depicted by quadrant I.2, parties seek to avoid a scenario resembling the following: if Party 1 gains a small amount in seats due to alliance, and its partner, Party 2, does not gain much, the total bargaining weight of the coalition may be no better than bargaining weight of the party alone. In this instance, Party 1 sees no benefit to alliance since they
gain no bargaining advantage relative to Independent Competition and may even lose portfolios due to the internal distribution process.

The Effects of the intrinsic value of seats. Figure 3 also reveals two less straightforward possibilities. First, as shown by region A.3, it is possible that party \( j \) prefers an alliance that produces sufficiently more seats than independent competition even though it could obtain a greater number of portfolios independently. Since the model assumes even office seeking parties find some intrinsic value in legislative representation, parties seize opportunities for dramatic gains with respect to seats. In this relatively small set of cases, party \( j \) must counteract each portfolio lost by the alliance decision. In this case, party \( j \) would need to obtain 10 seats for each portfolio lost. Conversely, as shown by region I.3, it is possible that party \( j \) prefers independent competition even when an alliance would produce more portfolios, simply because of an accompanying seat loss so large that it outweighs any portfolio advantage via alliance. Again, given the intrinsic value of legislative representation, parties avoid alliances resulting in such extraordinary costs in support. In this example, 10 seats would have to be lost for each portfolio gained in order for the independent competition option to remain optimal.

The relevance of these two categories depends entirely upon the slope—that is, the relative values of \( u_s \) and \( u_p \) within the range \( u_p > u_s \). If, hypothetically, parties deemed one portfolio only slightly more valuable than one seat, cases A.3 and I.3 would be
almost as common as cases A.2 and I.2. In reality, even the values of $u_s = 1$ and $u_p = 10$
used above understates the probably dramatic divergence between these values. Using a
more extreme disparity between seat and portfolio payoffs, say $u_s = 1$ and $u_p = 100$, the
slope becomes effectively flattened and cases A.3 and I.3 become far less relevant. It is
important to note, however, that under all possible values these scenarios remain
possible.
Appendix 2:

Looking at each relationship in isolation, in a more expanded form

\[
\frac{\partial Q_j}{\partial A_j} = u_s \left[ \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial V_j} \frac{\partial V_j}{\partial A_j} + \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial A_j} \right] + u_p \left[ \frac{\partial P_j}{\partial S_j} \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial V_j} \frac{\partial V_j}{\partial A_j} + \frac{\partial P_j}{\partial S_j} \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial A_j} + \frac{\partial P_j}{\partial A_j} \right]
\] (0.2)

Consider the directions of each relationship. In almost all cases, vote-seat responsiveness, \( \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial V_j} \), the degree of potential coordination benefits, \( \frac{\partial S_j}{\partial A_j} \), and the impact of seats and alliances directly on portfolios, \( \frac{\partial P_j}{\partial S_j} \) and \( \frac{\partial P_j}{\partial A_j} \), are always either zero or positive. That is, under normal circumstances, alliances and additional votes can only help (not hurt) the direct allocation of seats; alliances and additional seats can only help (not hurt) the direct allocation of portfolios. Votes, however, may very often decline as a result of interparty cooperation. This means that the remaining component, the change in votes given a change in alliance or \( \frac{\partial V_j}{\partial A_j} \), determines the sign of the entire office payoff \( Q_j \).

This rate of change \( \frac{\partial V_j}{\partial A_j} \) reflects the net impact on voters of a party's cooperation with other parties—whether they respond positively or negatively to party \( j \)'s deepening entanglements with other parties.
Appendix 3:

This claim can be stated more precisely using a quantity \( \alpha \), representing the weight of programmatic reputation in determining a party's votes: \( \frac{\partial (\partial V_j / \partial A_j)}{\partial \alpha} < 0 \).

To demonstrate this claim, I return to the argument suggested above: that party \( j \)'s vote share is a weighted average of votes gained through viability reputation (the probability of entering government) and programmatic positioning: \( V_j(p_j, x_j) = (1 - \alpha) p_j + \alpha W_j(d(x_j, x_j^*)) \).

The distance \( d(x_j, x_j^*) \) (reflecting ideological cost) and the probability of government access (the viability benefit \( p \)) are each weighted by \( \alpha \) and \( 1 - \alpha \) respectively. When \( \alpha = 1 \), a party's votes are entirely determined by programmatic reputation. Since votes depend exclusively on ideological positioning and alliances invariably modify that position away from a previous ideal point (again, assuming here that parties ‘begin’ at this ideal point), \( \alpha = 1 \) implies that \( \frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j} \) is negative\(^{19} \). At the other extreme, when \( \alpha = 0 \), a party's votes depend entirely on its probability of gaining government access – essentially, its ability to deliver on its promises. In such a case, \( \frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j} \) is positive\(^{20} \). Only when \( \alpha \) is such that

\[ \frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j} = \frac{\partial W_j}{\partial d_j} \frac{\partial d_j}{\partial A_j} < 0 \]

\[ \frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j} = \frac{\partial (p_j(A_j))}{\partial A_j} > 0 \]

\(^{19}\) That is, at \( \alpha = 1 \),

\(^{20}\) That is, at \( \alpha = 0 \),
where \[ \frac{\partial V_j(A_j)}{\partial A_j} = 0 \], a scenario similar to that described above, vote-seeking concerns are irrelevant and alliances can be sought based on purely legislative considerations.
Appendix 4: Allying under the separation of powers

In presidential systems, parties can obtain portfolios not because they have won legislative votes and seats but rather because they have helped win presidential votes. Presidents with exclusive control over cabinet appointments and dismissals may appoint cabinet members with less regard for the legislative strength, instead rewarding their own partisans or those of parties who have supported them in the presidential election. Given a seat-independent route to portfolios, parties may ally electorally even if they would stand to lose legislative seats. A party fielding a presidential candidate seeks to supplement its vote share through agreements with parties lacking viable candidates. In exchange for their mobilization efforts, those parties can seek rewards in the form of portfolio shares.21

To see how a presidential electoral coalition can mirror that of a parliamentary regime, consider the following scenario in a two-round election. In Brazil’s 2002 election, successful candidate Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva included the PCdoB and PL in his first-round electoral coalition centered around his own party, the PT. Winning a plurality (46.4%), Lula attracted parties aligned with unsuccessful first round candidates (namely, PPS, PDT, PTB and PSB) as well as the previously unallied PV to achieve a second-round victory of 61%. After the election, Lula rewarded these partners with, among other things22, portfolios, but fell short a joint legislative majority (43% of seats).

21 See Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of portfolio allocation in presidential regimes.
22 Other payoffs included the heads of state enterprises. More directly, the former treasurer of Lula’s party, the PT, admitted later in the term that the party paid about $4.25 million to the Liberal Party (PL) in return for joining the 2002 alliance.
From this point, the fully post-electoral portion of the legislative support coalition emerged. First, Lula negotiated an agreement with a faction of another party, the PMDB (who would later join the cabinet). Further post-electoral growth of the coalition’s potential legislative contingent occurred via individual party switches by “opportunists” into coalition parties, notably the PL and PTB.

There is a portfolio value to parties’ contributions to the president’s election $E_j$ in a presidential alliance $J$. That value relates to the (seat-independent) portfolio benefits obtained through the impact of party $j$’s participation on the alliance’s vote share:

$$P_j^E (E_j (A_j^E)) u_p.$$  

In purely parliamentary systems, where all possible paths to portfolios run through the assembly, $E$ is always zero. Figure 4 describes these dual paths to portfolios.

**Figure 4: Paths to portfolios in a separation of powers system**
Integrating these “dual paths” into the payoff $Q_j$ introduced earlier produces the function

$$Q_j = S_j(V_j(A_j), A_j)u_s + P_j(S_j(V_j(A_j), A_j), A_j)u_p + P^E_j(E_j(A_j^E))u_p$$

23, where seats

and portfolios from each path sum to produce the overall office payoff. From this reasoning, it follows that the presence of a chief executive with cabinet appointment power always has an additive impact on the benefits to cooperation, simply by shifting some portion of the portfolio payoff into a winner-take-all contest.

Pre-election alliances have become governments in many competitive regimes with presidential cabinet influence, particularly in Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay. Presidential alliances are analogous to the abstract coalitions discussed above in that they revolve around competition for the slate of portfolios and involve electoral cooperation, a common label (the presidential candidate), and agreements to divide the spoils of government.

Presidents appointing cabinets subject to legislative confidence—premier-presidential systems such as France, Lithuania and Poland – are also potential sources of seat-independent influence on portfolio allocations (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006), at least relative to purely parliamentary executives. Even partial control of the cabinet appointment process enables presidents to secure some portion of the cabinet for their allies separately from post-electoral pressures. Though more limited than a pure presidential case, parties should see presidential elections in premier-presidential regimes as a partially independent source of portfolios. In short, because the presidential election

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23 $P^E_j(0) = 0, E_j(0) = 0; A_j^E = 0$ If the system has no directly-elected chief executive.
is another point at which parties can contribute to the origin of the executive (and the only point in pure presidentialism), parties should face strong incentives ally when a separately elected president exists and has cabinet appointment power.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{24} Of course, parties might face weaker incentives to cooperate if presidents are not apparently constrained by bargaining reputation within the party system. This is partly addressed in later chapters by including only countries considered to have free democratic competition.
Chapter 3: Defining “Electoral Origins”

3.1 Types of Electoral Origins

In the previous chapter, I have outlined the abstract notion of a type of electoral origin, “pre-electoral coalitions,” and why they should form. In this chapter, I elaborate on the characteristics of such coalitions in practice under a range of legislative electoral institutions.

The coalitions associated with most multiparty governments are “post-electoral,” formed among electoral competitors. Their component parties keep their distance in the election campaign and openly compete for votes. After the results are in, various possible majorities negotiate in order to form a stable government. Post-electoral bargaining may be relatively simple or quite complex, but all instances of such bargaining have in common these basic features.

Yet, as I discussed at length in the last chapter, politicians can also to form a coalition prior to the election aimed at controlling government. The most familiar of these coalitions are individual electoral parties capable of winning a majority and, hence, control of government without need for post-electoral bargaining.25 Such parties develop a collective label that confers information about the nature of their organization. The information conveyed may concern programmatic goals or may simply concern governing viability—this alone being of substantial electoral value. Parties capable of

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25 That is, for the purpose of forming a government.
single-handedly winning power are known in part for just that – their ability to win power.

Although single-party electoral coalitions are certainly diverse internally, their inner workings are largely obscured. In principle (and, for the most part, in practice), a “single-party” electoral coalition entails the submission of component parts to a single label—even if that label varies in its exact connotations. To the extent factions and individuals are visible as electoral entities such “parties” are essentially electoral alliances of these groups. That is, they are composed of somewhat distinct agents coming together to ensure that they collectively win power. However, because internal party operations are obscure, it is often difficult to ascertain, especially in cross-nationally comparable terms, how portions of a party come together and negotiate rewards for their various contributions.

In the context of this project, large parties capable of governing alone may be thought of as “pre-electoral coalitions” of the highest degree. But when can multiparty coalitions be “pre-electoral coalitions”? To have the requisite properties, separate parties must make a public announcement during an election campaign of their intent to cooperate for the purpose of governing jointly. Such coalitions are what I refer to interchangeably as “multiparty pre-electoral coalitions” or “electoral alliances.” Multiparty pre-electoral coalitions share with a single large party the viability value that comes with the possibility of winning control of government without post-electoral uncertainty. They

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26 Across regions or interest groups, for example.
27 The notable exceptions include precisely those countries where factions are identifiable, such as Japan (Leiserson 1968, Kato and Laver 1998), Uruguay (Morgenstern 2001, Altman 2000) and Italy (Mershon 2001).
differ from large single parties in that the electoral labels of component parties remain intact, although incurring whatever costs emerge from public cooperation. They therefore are rather less “pre-electoral” than are single parties, though they have some commonalities with more loosely organized parties whose components are electorally identifiable\textsuperscript{28}. Yet multiparty pre-electoral coalitions provide an opportunity to look within an electoral alliance and understand how they differ from post-electoral coalitions.

In a parliamentary system, particularly a unicameral one, “control” by a single electoral coalition means parties that publicly committed to cooperate are able to form the government. Pre-electoral coalitions form in parliamentary regimes among a party aiming for the premiership and one or more parties seeking to win a portion of portfolios in exchange for its pre-electoral commitment to support the government. In a presidential regime, a pre-electoral coalition is quite similar – one party aims for the presidency while several junior partners aim to ensure positions in government in exchange for their pre-electoral support (see Appendix 4, Chapter 2). In either case, “winning control of government” in the strongest sense means taking control of the executive without relying on post-electoral bargains with competitors.

Successful multiparty pre-electoral coalitions not necessarily a “normal” phenomenon, however. Electoral alliances often do not form at all, and when they do form, they are still often not successful at winning control government without additional agreements with other parties. One could accurately describe the vast majority of

\textsuperscript{28} Examples might include the major governing parties in the US, as well as Japan (Kato and Laver 1998) and Argentina (Jones \textit{et al.} 2002)
governments that have occurred recently around the world as either single-party
governments or multiparty post-electoral governments.29

One straightforward reason why pre-election coalitions among parties are not
widespread may be that they rely on seemingly contradictory conditions. On one hand,
as discussed in Chapter 2, parties have strong incentives to aggregate their collective
bargaining power and ensure that they can get into government when the election
concludes. On the other hand, some incentives to disaggregate must exist such that
separate electoral agents with distinct identities appear in the first place. Thus, we might
expect that pre-electoral coalitions are not likely to persist in the same form indefinitely.
If the aggregative interests triumph, subsidiary labels may lose relevance and eventually
gave rise to a single party. If the disaggregative interests win out, we might expect these
“marriages of convenience” to disintegrate.

Though there is much to these points, whether pre-election alliances can exist as a
type of long-term competition pattern or whether they consistently contain the “seeds of
their own destruction” is an open question outside the scope of this project. This thesis is
concerned less with highlighting the long-term importance of pre-electoral coalitions than
with what we can learn from them. That is, electoral alliances can tell us something more
general about interest aggregation and cooperation that provides insight into how all
political systems and political organizations work. The central aim of this project is to
emphasize the transactions between both electoral and legislative agents and the

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29Nearly 80% of elections in the data used in Chapter 4 produced one of these types of governments.
importance of distinguishing “pre-electoral” and “post-electoral” interactions, broadly conceived.

### 3.2 What is not a Pre-electoral Coalition

Many forms of interparty cooperation in elections might loosely be called “alliances” but are not *government-seeking* pre-electoral coalitions of the sort relevant for this project. Some forms are “tactical” or “technical” alliances in the sense that they are designed to manipulate some aspect of the electoral system but the parties have no interest in committing to one another for post-electoral purposes. Usually, these involve temporary arrangements made among groups of (usually small) parties who make no commitments and make no effort to become a prospective government in the electoral arena. Most of the local interparty alliances formed in Finland (Törnudd 1968), for example, come under this category. A “government-seeking alliance,” beyond campaigning as a committed unit, *may* choose to employ technical devices designed to benefit its seat allocation, but this is a secondary concern not crucial to its overall purpose.

As later chapters make clear, it is important that parties are publicly connected and that all members have been involved in the joint commitment. Thus, this study also does not consider instances in which cooperation is either implicit (parties do not formally cooperate) or unilateral (only one party encourages cooperation) or primarily voter driven (voters engage in unprovoked strategic behavior). When one party merely instructs its voters to assist a smaller party due to its potential post-electoral importance,
these events are not “pre-electoral coalitions.” In dual ballot MMP systems, for example, voters may independently (or be informally encouraged to) “split their tickets” to assist a small party’s effort to overcome a list threshold or for other reasons. Such behavior has been observed for example in Germany, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales (Pappi and Thurner, 2002, Johnston and Pattie 2004). However, these activities do not constitute conditions for “pre-electoral coalitions” and some parties may even publically disavow them.

The basic necessary component of a pre-election alliance is the explicit public commitment to enter government together. When parties indicate a cooperative commitment, they make some type of announcement disseminated through the mass media of their goals.

Media reports regularly cover these events at the time of announcement or at the time of government formation. For example, in 1997 Albanian television reported that “the Agrarian and Socialist Parties reached a political agreement on the 29th June elections,” that “they will enter a coalition for the period of elections and after the elections” and that “both parties agreed to support each other during the campaign and announce common candidates for deputies to the People’s Assembly in several constituencies.”

This last piece of information, the use of common candidates, was not necessary for the case to qualify as a pre-electoral coalition for this project, but one of the many possible tactics parties may employ to execute an agreement to cooperate.

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30 Discussed further below
31 “Socialist, Agrarian Parties agree on election coalition” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts June 13, 1997
A pre-election coalition agreement also differs from a merely “identifiable” coalition (Strøm 1990, Powell 2000, Shugart 2001). While identifiability can come about for a variety of reasons, both active and passive, preelectoral coalitions are always an active form of cooperation. To be identifiable, a coalition simply needs to be widely “expected” to form. This may be due to no activity on the part of any parties, and may even be despite pronouncements to the contrary. As I explained in Chapter 2, despite the clear and universal office-seeking benefits of alliances, parties have strong incentives to avoid developing too strong a connection with one another, to the extent that their differences are at the core of their electoral existence. In terms of the basic distinction in electoral origins highlighted here – between engaging in open public cooperation and not – situations of high identifiability as well as even unofficial cooperation are “post-electoral” along with those of open competition. Since this project is interested in understanding these active commitments and their consequences, it is important to clarify how public expectations alone do not qualify as pre-electoral commitments.

Germany, for example, is sometimes thought of as having a high degree of “pre-electoral” coalition politics due to the high degree of identifiability of prospective alliances (e.g. Powell 2000). My usage of the concept of pre-election coalition here, however, requires a degree of commitment that has not typically been present among successful German coalitions, at least in the period under study. Thus, it is a useful example in clarifying these concepts. A genuine pre-election alliance exists in Germany in the form of the CDU and CSU, in which the latter specializes in winning (conservative) votes in Bavaria. Indeed, their cooperation has been so close and long-
standing that electoral and legislative data are frequently undifferentiated between the two. The CDU/CSU relationship is very much in keeping with the notion of allying to create collective bargaining weight while maintaining label differentiation and specialization. The CSU’s survival relies on its reputation for both its Bavarian identity and its somewhat deeper social conservatism, as well its viability as part of a frequently empowered electoral bloc. Yet, as these two parties have never been in a position to form a government without post-electoral bargaining, they have not constituted successful pre-electoral coalitions in the period under study. Despite high identifiability, commitments between the CSU/CDU and their frequent partner, the FDP, have not involved commitments that preclude post-electoral bargaining and the exploitation of bargaining weight. In particular, due to a desire to avoid dilution of the FDPs independent reputation, commitments between the parties have tended to be implicit.  

Germany’s most recent elections have been marked by, in some ways, even more post-electoral bargaining, with smaller parties growing in importance, though the trajectory for the FDP has not been entirely consistent. In 2002, the FDP broke

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32 For example, the use of the dual ballot to vote for a major party in constituencies and provide threshold insurance for the FDP via the list vote was informal. The major parties “on occasions, publicly (if grudgingly) supported vote borrowing” (Saalfeld 2000: 39), but the FDP “made it clear that it would not support any of the major parties which won in absolute majority” (von Beyme 1983: 22,24). The extent of the FDP’s desire for independence is described in detail by Kirchner and Boughton (1988, 77): “…the FDP has been able to attract support over time from ‘first’ [district] voters of both major parties … [but] such people can be alienated as well as attracted, with the FDP having to be careful that its appeal can be reshaped and refocused as necessary in time for the next election.” Kirchner and Boughton also note the significant post-electoral bargaining power the FDP held compared to its prewar predecessors, consistent with the argument in Chapter 5 of this thesis (78): “…the FDP has been able to exert more influence and extract more concessions as the price for its participation … This is most clearly reflected in the party’s ability to assume more ministerial portfolios than it would normally be due on the basis of the seats which it contributes to the coalition as a whole.” Kirchner and Boughton specifically address the extent of stated pre-electoral commitment on the part of the FDP (81): “The party is usually content merely to let voters assume that it wants a continuation”
precedent to seek the Chancellery officially in its own right\textsuperscript{33} (a move toward an even more independent stance) but in 2005 moved in just the opposite direction, forming a nearly successful formal pre-electoral alliance with the CDU/CSU that met the criteria used here.\textsuperscript{34} As for the SPD in that election, then Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, when asked about post-electoral plans with either the FDP or Greens responded that: “the election campaign was not the time to talk about government constellations. Out of respect for the voters, one had to wait for the result … Only then should one think about the formation of a government.”\textsuperscript{35} The eventual outcome, the grand coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU, was of course one of the least identifiable (and post-electoral) in many decades (Richter 2006, Proksch and Slapin 2006).

3.3 Pre-electoral coalitions and electoral tactics

Although all pre-electoral coalitions have in common a public commitment, their operation may manifest in myriad ways. Once parties have decided to associate, some electoral systems provide varying opportunities by which partners can avoid direct competition. One of these is the practice of coordinating candidates in electoral systems involving many or all single-seat districts, such as India (Wilkinson 2005), France (Tsebelis 1988), Lithuania (Pogorelis 2003), Japan (Metraux 1999), and Italy 1993-2005 (Bartolini \textit{et al.} 2004). Several alliances in these cases involve agreements to run

\textsuperscript{33} See Pulzer (2003, 156) and Hogwood (2004, 252).
\textsuperscript{34} The three parties committed to govern and announced a joint platform prior to the election. See “German opposition parties plan rapid coalition talks, labour reform” \textit{BBC Monitoring Europe} September 1, 2005, Thursday
\textsuperscript{35} “German chancellor not considering coalition with liberals, Greens” \textit{BBC Monitoring Europe} August 22, 2005, Monday
candidates only in certain electoral districts and not in others, allowing parties to focus on
the districts in which they are strongest without competing as directly for the voters in a
given district. Although the logic of this particular tactic is seat efficiency, the greatest
potential for seat efficiency exists in precisely the cases where such agreements are less
desirable. That is, if each potential ally has a strong chance of winning a plurality in each
district, across a set of districts, withdrawing candidacies may be quite (individually)
costly. The more that each partner party is regionally concentrated, however, the less
there is to lose from these agreements.

India presents an example where such costs appeared to be low and accordingly
multiparty alliances involving mutual withdrawals flourish. Chhibber and Kollman
(2004) have documented how regional parties proliferated with the decentralization of
resources to states in India. This shift, according to these authors, created greater
incentives for parties to form in pursuit of state-level political control via electoral
vehicles tailored to the local electoral environment. The more this is the case, the more
difficult it becomes to mobilize voters and interest groups with a national label; thus local
notables come to join parties with more local viability. Local parties will be less willing
to subjugate local identities for the sake of achieving national viability when such a goal
is secondary to their objective of maintaining a strong presence in state politics. Hence,
if parties wish to form national pre-electoral coalitions, there is good reason for them to
exist as multi-label entities.

The Indian BJP is a useful case study in the relative costs of party expansion versus
“piecing together” electoral weight via interparty alliances. In the 1980s, the BJP
employed a strategy of appealing to Hindu nationalism, an approach that brought them from 2 to 120 seats in the Lok Sabha elections between 1984 and 1991. By this point, however, the consolidation of the BJP’s upper caste Hindu constituency reached its limits and proved insufficient to win control of the national government. The Congress party having disintegrated due to its failure to integrate regional elites, many regional parties emerged, some attempting to form alliances among themselves. The regional parties found however, that, despite the localization of their vote, insignificant additional value in national power did not justify forming costly alliances united only by center-periphery politics. The BJP, for its part, sought to expand its base further through moderation of its programmatic stance with the goal of forming alliances with regional parties—including Muslim parties who would have been threatened by the BJP of years past. By 1997, a portion of regional parties found the BJP-led alliance an acceptable route to power and a pre-electoral commitment to power sharing at the center emerged (Pai 1998).

India shows how distinct regional contests across districts can make alliances profitable as parties seek to obtain government power. As Pai (1998, 850) describes, “Regional parties … allied with the BJP or Congress to improve their political position in their own states, and increase their bargaining power with the centre…Moreover, while entering into coalitions, regional parties preserved their distinct identity, ideology and agenda.” This latter advantage would not be so had the method of aggregation been a form of merger beyond the loose coalition identity employed in the campaigns. The regional parties are dominant electoral forces in the districts where they operate. By allying, the BJP could ensure that those parties’ seats would contribute to a winning
coalition (i.e., would bring forth portfolio payoffs) in exchange for promises of executive power and distributive benefits, while standing down primarily in districts where it would not be competitive.

The BJP, as the most nationalized party in the alliance, faced reputational costs in the view of its “hardliners,” who argued that the BJP’s cooperative strategy had produced a “dilution of the ideology and social base of the party” (Pai 2000, 13). Yet, despite concerns within the party, multiparty alliances continued unabated, and the 1999 elections brought forth the National Democratic Alliance coalition, led by the BJP. Swaminathan and Kugler (1999, 191) note that “alliances are dictated by a party’s desire to gain control over the political decision-making process…and have occurred among ideologically disparate parties.” Indeed, prior to 1996, BJP allies were often strenuously at odds on national issues, but did not compete with one another at the regional level. The table below shows the alliances that formed between the BJP and parties from various states in the 1998 election.
When the government that formed in 1998 failed to maintain the support of its partners, the BJP stepped up its alliance efforts in an election the next year. BJP itself
won only three more seats (182) than in the previous election (also winning fewer votes), but its allies won another 117 seats, giving the NDA a pre-electoral majority in 1999.

At the same time, activists within BJP’s chief national rival Congress emphasized winning office alone and deemed the compromises associated with alliances unacceptable. In fact, the party resolved at its 1997 organizational meeting that it had “the will and capacity to ensure and acquire the support of the people of this country for a viable and stable one-party government in the country” (Pai 1998, 840). Despite such pronouncements several regional parties still joined with Congress (as shown in the table), though amounting to only 29 seats beyond the 142 obtained by Congress alone. In 2004, both the BJP and Congress formed alliances that were potentially capable of achieving a majority, although Congress eventually was able to form a government only with the post-electoral cooperation of a third leftist alliance. When Congress regained power in 2004 with its alliance, it won only 4 more seats than it did in 1996 (when it did not achieve a position capable of forming government), but its bargaining position was strengthened by the pre-electoral support of 72 additional seats from parties with 1 to 21 seats each.

It should be clear from the Indian example that the presence of a great many (30-40) regionalized parties, often with strong distributive concerns, along with “national” parties who are weak in many areas eases the building of electoral coalitions across districts. That is, even without the alliance, the direct competition for votes is limited by the district divisions. Whatever reputational costs do exist, they appear to be lessened by the relatively low level of consistent ideological positioning.
To give a contrasting example in the world of plurality elections, parties in Canada rely quite heavily on programmatic positioning and do not agree to mutual withdrawals or coordinated campaigns. In the first half in the 20th century, these arrangements occurred on occasion (Johnston and Cutler 2006). While there are certainly regional disparities in party strength, parties are dispersed enough to have the potential to win many pluralities alone and have tended to run candidates across many or all districts. Further, parties appear to survive heavily on their national policy positioning. Johnston and Cutler argue that the Liberal Party’s positions on national issues in particular create a series of incompatible partners. What is noteworthy for present purposes is that the systemic value of ideological positioning is so great, by comparative standards, as to create disincentives for party cooperation in the form of potential reputational penalties that would hurt office-seeking goals. Given this, the parties that (given their vote distribution) might benefit most from such agreements would not risk the vote losses that would accompany attempts to gain power in conjunction with another party.

**Nominal Electoral Systems with a List Tier**

Although India is an extreme case in the sheer number of agreements involved in constructing a viable pre-electoral governing alliance, the basic principle of joining forces with parties that specialize in certain districts, rather than contesting them, is at work in other countries and other electoral systems. Many mixed-member systems employ nominal voting (voting for candidates in districts) alongside separate party list voting, each for a portion of the legislature. Shugart and Wattenberg (2001) call these MMM or “Mixed-Member Majoritarian.” Votes for losing parties in these districts do not
influence seat allocation. In several related systems, including Italy and Hungary, there is some compensation to nominal tier losers, but the party list tier remains separate. Effectively, then, these mixed systems act as a modified nominal system, with many of the same opportunities for cross-district coordination, despite that party lists are also present.

I noted above that electoral coalitions derive from two contradictory incentives – to aggregate for national bargaining power and to maintain multiple labels – existing simultaneously. MMM, in particular produces an environment in which incentives for parties to fragment exist alongside districts that simplify the use of pre-electoral alliances among parties. The list tier promotes the existence of separate parties, allowing relatively small parties to win seats even if they are not geographically concentrated. List competition discourages cooperation between those parties, since each must remain distinct enough to maintain its own support in the same list district. At the same time, the single-member districts in the nominal tier provide an environment in which parties better organized locally will succeed. Such parties have organizations across districts bringing local interests into their coalition. Some parties will tend to be primarily dependent upon the aggregate success of their individual candidates (for example, the Japanese LDP), while others depend primarily (or exclusively) on their performance in the list tier. The centrifugal tendencies of lists (for factions to separate) thus plays a role similar to the regional pressures create fragmentation in India.

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36 As they would in New Zealand’s or Germany’s MMP system if those votes are reflected on the party ballots
37 From 1994-2005, most of the period under study
38 Meaning that votes go to candidates independently of the party
In Lithuania, for example, allied parties coordinate on district candidates. As the independence movement, Sąjūdis, fragmented before the 1992 election and small parties formed their own lists and several coordinated nominations in both the nominal and list tiers. Many of these initial alliance members soon disintegrated or were absorbed and failed to win government as a unit (Pogorelis 2003). By 2000 an electoral alliance formed able to take control of government. Rolandas Paksas of the New Union Social Liberals formed a government-seeking alliance calling itself the “New Policy” bloc, which also included the New Union, Modern Christian Democratic Party, and Centre Union. The parties took the name "new policy" from the annual report of non-partisan President Valdas Adamkus (which effectively became their joint platform). The effect of their commitment to form a governing alternative was to make their campaign claims credible by signaling their ability to win power. For example, the tiny Center Union, which received only three seats, managed to attract funding from the same sectoral sources as that of the much larger partners, due to donors tendency to give to multiple parties within the coalition.39

Once in place, the parties of New Policy agreed to allocate the prime minister to the Liberals, the Speaker’s post to the New-Union and the ministries and vice-ministries to all parties in proportion to seats40. Their success came with more post-electoral bargaining than they had hoped however, falling five seats short of a majority. Yet, the coalition had overcome the hurdle of forming a government that did not include the largest party in parliament – the ex-Communist Social Democrats – who would likely

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39 Baltic News Service November 10, 2000
40 Baltic News Agency October 13, 2000
have been appointed formateur by the president had the opposition coalition not formed an electoral bloc. Their arrangement ultimately collapsed, but the strategy of using electoral coalitions to increase odds of entering government was not abandoned. In 2004 the Homeland Union (Conservatives) and the Liberal and Centre Union agreed to cooperate in constituencies and to form a coalition after the election. The Social Democratic and New Union parties made a similar arrangement.

The Role of Party Lists

Thus far, I have emphasized how successful alliances can make use of the division of district contests for their collective gain. More commonly, electoral systems provide the fragmenting incentives of the party lists just described without far fewer mitigating factors. One such system where list competition appears to discourage alliances is “MMP” (mixed-member proportional), used in the Germany example above, as well as New Zealand. MMP is characterized by the centrality of the list tier. Parties whose nominal tier wins do not reflect their overall vote totals are compensated with additional seats from the list tier until proportionality is approximated. Ultimately, seat shares are determined entirely by the party votes in the list tier.41

New Zealand provides a useful example of how list competition in large (in this case, national) districts discourages electoral cooperation between parties who might

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41 This does not mean that the result is exactly as if only the list tier existed, because party vote totals are themselves potentially influenced by this arrangement. For example, if one party manages to recruit more popular candidates for its plurality nominations and wins votes for their party as a result, such parties would be doing relatively better than they would had the plurality tier not existed. However, the overarching incentive created by the system is to maintain a distinct collective label – especially for those smaller parties relying most heavily on the list tier.
otherwise benefit. Since 1996, under MMP, New Zealanders have two votes: a nominal vote that influences which individual will represent their electoral district, and a party vote that influences the representation of their preferred party within Parliament. The first vote determines the (roughly) half of parliamentary seats that remain elected by single-member districts and plurality rules. The other half of seats are allocated based on the party vote, so that all parties ultimately receive seats directly proportional to their vote share. To achieve this outcome, these seats are distributed on a compensatory basis such that the overall seat totals per party, including those seats won in the plurality districts, will reflect the national list results.

The two party organizations that once alternated in power, Labour and National, emerged as “leaders” in a bipolar competition pattern. Several smaller parties on the right, the neo-liberal ACT, the Christian parties, the nationalist New Zealand First party and the centrist United party. On the left, small parties including Labour defectors and the Green party formed a leftist alternative known as The Alliance.

In principle, as with almost all electoral systems, some technical incentives for electoral cooperation remain. In order to be electorally viable, minor parties must maintain 5% support nationally or win a constituency seat. The latter strategy might be significantly easier if the major party with which a minor party competes for constituency votes would withdraw from the districts where that minor party could otherwise win a plurality. Beyond these seat efficiency concerns, even minor parties without such immediate fears may wish to be associated, in a broader sense, with a major party to

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42 So long as they either obtain more than 5 percent of the total votes, or obtain at least one constituency seat
signal to their voters that they will be part of a viable governing coalition. Working powerfully against these factors, however, is the importance of party list votes under MMP, and the importance of a distinct reputation to obtain those votes. The support for party lists in New Zealand depends largely upon the maintenance of a particular platform distinct from other parties, which is undermined by cooperation with other parties.

It is not surprising then that interparty cooperation did not manifest in the first MMP election (other than within the small Alliance itself)\textsuperscript{43}, where uncertainty was at its highest. On the contrary, the two parties that emerged as the governing coalition in 1996, National and New Zealand First, campaigned against one another during the election, the former actively seeking to displace the latter (Vowles 1996). Since New Zealand First held the balance of power in the post-electoral arena, it was positioned to throw its support to either major party. After more than two months of closed negotiations, NZF chose the National Party, to the surprise and disappointment of many of both parties’ supporters (Miller 1998: 127-28).

Some limited “technical” electoral cooperation did emerge. By 1999, the practice of major parties strategically aiding minor parties in obtaining representation was common. National had withdrawn its candidates from the constituency of potential partners ACT and United Future, enabling them to cross that threshold and obtain their list seats. However, only Labour and the Alliance, by then without the Greens,

\textsuperscript{43} The Alliance was originally formed to contest the 1993 election among four small parties: the New Labour Party, the Green Party, Manu Moithake and the Democratic Party. In 1996, The Alliance did propose an electoral commitment with Labour, which was refused.
cooperated as a pre-electoral coalition.\textsuperscript{44} These parties publicly committed to govern together if the election outcome made it possible.

Despite the clear effort to obtain a majority based on a pre-electoral coalition, an unpredictable series of events (whereby the Greens were revealed to have won representation weeks after the election) left Labour and Alliance with a minority coalition government.\textsuperscript{45} Yet, like New Zealand First before them, the Greens held the balance of power within Parliament. Although the Greens did not formally enter government, they did publicly commit to supporting the government.\textsuperscript{46}

The Labour-Alliance coalition in 1999 came to have significant pre-electoral and post-electoral components. On one hand, the Labour-Alliance electoral coalition represented the entire executive. This meant that an identifiable representative of the electorate maintained control over policy implementation and much of the legislative process. The two parties presented a relatively coherent platform and moved swiftly to implement it.

Meanwhile, the Alliance slowly disintegrated over its apparent subservience to Labour. Leading up to the election, Labour successfully attracted former Alliance supporters as the latter faded\textsuperscript{47}, while maintaining an electoral pact with the Alliance’s

\textsuperscript{44} Although they did not withdraw their candidate, Labour also informally encouraged support for the Green party’s leader in her constituency seat, which she won. (See “Key electorates could play vital part in election outcome” The Daily News (New Plymouth) November 23, 1999, Tuesday). Underscoring the independence of tactical cooperation from pre-electoral coalitions, the Progressive party continues to contest seats against its electoral alliance partner Labour.

\textsuperscript{45} In this instance, the Greens were not invited into formal post-electoral bargaining because their seats emerged after the Labour-Alliance coalition agreement was in place.


\textsuperscript{47} See “Can Labour win big enough to go it alone?” New Zealand Herald June 15, 2002
former leader Jim Anderton, now heading a “party” even more specialized on winning his own district. Although Labour was polling at 52.1% as the 2002 campaign began, they ultimately lost support to the Greens whose independence helped solidify their most important asset as a list-based party: their ideological position. The Greens have pursued a strategy aimed primarily at maintaining their independent identity, while Alliance’s cooperation with Labour exchanged for governing viability rapidly eroded its relevance.\textsuperscript{48}

**Alliances in Purely Party List Systems**

New Zealand is thus a stark example of why cooperation between lists where both compete for all of their votes in the same district can be detrimental to the reputation of one or both parties. Other examples of government-seeking alliances do however occur in systems using only party lists. Several of them are well known, such as the several recent elections in Norway, Sweden and Denmark and more temporarily in the Netherlands in the early 1970s. Most cases do not involve any technical cooperation beyond the public commitment. In some cases, joint lists (which allow vote pooling between the parties and may require negotiation on list positions) are a part of the process. Yet, these tactics are not the driving force behind the agreements, whose overarching goal is to form an electoral coalition capable of controlling government.

The “Opposition Six” in Croatia’s 2000 election, for example, was composed of two joint lists – among the four smallest and two largest parties respectively – involving

\textsuperscript{48} In 1999, without the Greens, the allied Alliance won over 7% of the vote in 1999 against the Green’s 5%. By 2002 the Alliance’s successor fragment, the Progressive Party (still allied with Labour) was reduced to less than 2% of the vote, while the greens reached 7%.
six parties that had committed to govern together if successful.\textsuperscript{49} The main components of the “Opposition Six” were the Croatian Social Liberal Party (HSLS) -- a centrist liberal party polling at about 11% – and the reformed communists in the Social Democratic Party (SDP) polling just over 20%.\textsuperscript{50} Given these ideological profiles, it was by no means a costless alliance, but it provided each with credible access to majority status. The two parties’ leaders, Budiša and Račan, made joint appearances during the campaign and HSLS negotiated with the SDP to take 56 of the 140 electoral list positions.\textsuperscript{51} These parties created the first pact in 1998, well before the election campaign and prior to the larger six-party agreement.

The other four parties created their own joint list. The IDS took the leadership (top slots of the list) in the Istrian region (the eighth district) where it could garner a majority of the vote, despite being weak elsewhere in the country. For similar reasons, HNS led in the seventh district. The HSS was a larger party, but specialized in older and rural votes, campaigning in local markets across the countryside, on local TV and door-to-door. Two other parties that allied with the Opposition Six were not full members: the ASH managed to get on only one list in the district of Zagreb, while another tiny party the PGD joined the SDP-HSLS in one district only. In the end, the Opposition Six went on to win over 60% of the assembly seats based on many unanticipated district victories against the ruling parties (Cvijetić 2000).

\textsuperscript{49} See “Croatian Opposition Parties Sign Electoral Cooperation Agreement” BBC Monitoring Europe, September 3, 1999, Friday
\textsuperscript{50} “2000 Croatian Parliamentary Election” International Republican Institute
\textsuperscript{51} See “Opposition parties present election candidates list” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, December 06, 1999, Monday
In the following election of 2003, cooperative patterns continued. The DC and HSLS allied in all electoral units while the SDP allied with the IDS, Libra and LS only in constituencies where those parties were specialized. A third force, the HNS also created alliances with two very small parties, the SBHS in the region of Slavonia and PGS in Northern seacoast counties.

Pervasive joint lists are not a common form of alliance tactic among allies in party list systems. In the data used in this project, out of 232 seat-winning party observations involved in pre-election alliances in party-list systems\textsuperscript{52}, I found only 32 involved in joint lists that had clearly maintained their identities and had not effectively merged. A much larger number of joint lists formed only to clear legal thresholds involve very small parties – often too small to be reported separately in any electoral or legislative data, and so the joint list can only be treated as a single party.

Even more rarely does an entire government-seeking alliance use a joint list across all member parties in all districts. One notable exception is the case of Chile where all major parties are involved in one of two government-seeking joint lists. This occurs in the context of Chile’s two-member district system, where obtaining a pre-election majority means winning a seat in almost every district and two in some districts. The smaller the number of seats per district, the more useful it is employ only one list for the alliance in each district. The open lists in particular allow the candidate from the most locally popular party to “lead” the vote-getting (Morgenstern 2004, 93). The most

\textsuperscript{52} Here including any form of party lists
significant other example of a successful universal joint list occurred in Uruguay among the member parties of the Frente Amplio.

In contrast to New Zealand (where the party list tier is nationwide), parties in these cases with moderate or high numbers of districts appear to find cooperation – even with joint lists – less dangerous to their individual existence when they can benefit from their own regional strengths. Without the ability to for partners to have more of their “own” districts, joint lists especially tend to be such close forms of cooperation that they are difficult to maintain.

**Alliances as Short-term prospects**

If alliances are not productive in winning government power, they are unlikely to continue as an electoral strategy. The governing Chilean alliance just mentioned has been highly successful and, despite many challenges (Siavelis 2005), has remained an effective tool for its members’ individual and collective maintenance of power. Others have failed to accomplish their goals. One historical example occurred in the Netherlands 1971 where a “Progressive Alliance” (including a pan-left joint platform) formed among the parties of the left and explicitly designed to win exclusive joint control of the government. While votes increased for the member parties, the alliance inspired a splinter party and the group failed to gain a joint majority in 1971 and 1972 (Daalder 1986, 515). Such electoral alliances have not occurred since.

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53 Where two-member districts make up 11 of the 19 districts
54 This point is elaborated in the next chapter
A recent example of a nearly successful but ultimately failed alliance occurred in Romania during the 2004 elections between the Social Democratic Party (PSD) and the Romanian Humanist Party (PUR). Given that the PSD was a primary target of PUR criticism during the local elections, a decision in 2004 to form an electoral alliance was a risky prospect. Indeed, the mayor of Bacău – their only major success in the 2004 local elections – left the party because of this decision.

As PUR had hoped, the two parties jointly won a parliamentary plurality under a “National Union” banner and could reach a majority with a third partner who had also backed their presidential candidate. However, they failed to obtain a crucial component of their electoral strategy, the presidency.

Like several other premier-presidential systems, Romania’s president has the ability to appoint the prime minister. But in this case, the president emerged from the opposing coalition – The Justice and Truth Alliance (DA), an electoral coalition itself, composed of the National Liberal party and the Democratic Party. Thus, the president refused to appoint a PSD premier and instead wished to appoint the prime minister from within its own minority coalition, despite facing a clear alternative majority coalition of the opposition.

Some observers believed at the time that the president’s alliance might have benefited from calling early elections. To avoid new elections, the PUR first offered

55 later known as the Conservative Party
56 “Bacău are primărie "liberală"” Evenimentul October 18, 2004
57 They also had the support of 18 representatives of ethnic minorities, elected on a special basis. Although they lacked a majority in the Senate, it was expected that a new PSD government would obtain the necessary two additional senators on an individual basis (see “Hungarian minority in Romania: testing the Constitution”, UNPO report, December 20, 2004).
support to a DA-led government, yet allowed their electoral partners in the PSD to obtain the presiding officer’s post in both houses of parliament. This would mean that legislative procedures would be strongly influenced by the opposition. In response, DA offered both the PUR and UDMR full government membership (ministerial portfolios and appointed local leadership posts) in exchange for fully abandoning their opposition partners. Although we do not yet know the full ramifications of this series of events for party competition in Romania, this case shows how falling short of success can easily undermine the permanence of a multi-party electoral alliance.

3.4 Summary

In this chapter, I have defined the concept of a “multiparty pre-electoral coalition,” emphasizing the importance of commitments and government-seeking intentions for its use in this project. I have also discussed several examples of the forms that government-seeking electoral alliances take on as they decide to cooperate under a variety of electoral systems. Using these examples, I noted several factors that appear to affect the costs incurred by parties seeking alliances. In the next chapter, I operationalize and test systematically the importance of the themes emerging in this anecdotal overview – the size and number of districts, the dependence of parties upon a list vote, and the presence of fragmentation.
Chapter 4: Empirical Patterns

4.1 Introduction

In Chapter 2, I argued that there is an overarching incentive in any political system to form an alliance before elections that can control government—whether that means controlling a single house of parliament or capturing the presidency—in order to enhance one’s probable share of executive power (portfolio maximizing). I also discussed reinforcing and countervailing incentives. Of the former, I highlighted “seat efficiency” as an additional impetus toward forming and maintaining pre-electoral alliances, meaning that allying could enhance not only collective size but also individual size. Of the latter, I emphasized the possible negative reputational impact on a party of announcing before an election its connection to another party, and how that can in turn reduce the vote share of parties and discourage cooperation.

This chapter empirically investigates the factors that motivate parties to form coalitions prior to an election. While this question has been studied before, as early as Duverger and most comprehensively by the recent groundbreaking work of Golder (2005, 2006), this study is distinguished in several important ways from this previous work. First, this chapter focuses on pre-electoral alliances aimed at jointly controlling government as later chapters investigate the proximate consequences of such coalitions. Thus I restrict this analysis to groups of parties who publicly and formally commit to form a government jointly, whether or not they had reason to engage in formal electoral cooperation. Purely technical cooperation, without governing commitments, is not of
interest here. Second, while the broadest cross-national work to date (Golder 2006) focuses on 23 advanced parliamentary democracies across the post-War period, I broaden this study to consider a broader set of democracies, including both presidential regimes and developing democracies. The period considered runs from the early 1990s to 2006 (57 countries in all, 29 newly democratized or developing). Third, while my findings complement those in the previous literature, I provide an alternative possible interpretation of some of the main empirical patterns. In particular, where the previous literature on alliances (going back to Duverger) stresses seat efficiency gains, I argue (following Ch. 2) that the prospects for gaining portfolios is the main reason for forming alliances. Seat efficiency gains may add to the utility of alliance, but often allying produces costs that hurt portfolio-seeking goals.

The goal of this chapter, then, is to explain why electoral alliances whose signatories aim to govern together are likely to have come about. Subsequent chapters explore several consequences of such alliances when they do form and succeed.

4.2 Electoral Systems: “Seat Efficiency” vs. “Portfolio maximizing”

Throughout Chapter 2, I made reference to the “seat benefits” of creating electoral alliances, the same benefits often cited in the literature explaining party fragmentation. The earliest articulation of the basic argument is often attributed to Duverger (1954). Observing that single seat plurality electoral systems tend toward two-party systems, Duverger argued that this was because a) voters will ultimately prefer voting for candidates to have a chance of winning and b) there can typically be at most two such
candidates in a single-member district. Such electoral rules motivate electoral coordination—in particular, district-level coordination. Subsequent analyses of electoral rules and party competition have tended to focus on aggregate outcomes (Rae 1967, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Lijphart 1994) but have consistently emphasized the relationship between disproportionality and district magnitude—the number of seats per district ($M$). Cox (1997) refocuses on seat allocation within the individual district, explaining that (under certain conditions) no more than $M+1$ candidates or lists will tend to compete in a district of magnitude $M$.

It is now well established that countries with more, low magnitude districts are associated with the success of fewer, larger parties. We might also expect that, if smaller parties nevertheless exist in such systems, it is more likely that they will forge alliances, compared to their counterparts in similarly fragmented party systems with large districts.

One potential reason to form alliances derives from the number of seats per district—alliances under low district magnitudes produce greater seat efficiency gains than under larger district magnitudes. Lower district magnitudes, according to this argument, provide a high local barrier to entry for smaller parties and they are therefore likely to seek relationships with other parties for survival. This is Golder’s (2005) main concern for which she finds evidence in advanced parliamentary democracies. A version of the seat efficiency argument can be stated: To the extent the party system is fragmented, lower district magnitudes should be associated with a greater prevalence of electoral alliances between parties, whether government-seeking or not, by increasing

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58 Or, at least, that there is usually an advantage to being such a party.
seat gains. Similarly, we should expect legal thresholds (percentages of national votes necessary to win any seats) to provide the same sort of incentive to avoid exclusion, again even for purely seat-maximizing purposes.

As explained in Chapter 2, however, seat efficiency provides only one component benefit for an interparty electoral alliance. This component is present even for technical alliances (those whose signatories do not intend to govern or bargain together) with which I am not concerned here. Forming a pre-election coalition that is itself a committed prospective government has the additional value of producing a bargaining unit better capable of seizing control of government. Thus, alliances may form in order to increase seat efficiency (seat-maximizing alliances), to increase prospective shares of executive power (the “portfolio maximizing”\textsuperscript{59} incentive), or some mix of the two. Parties seeking to maximize their expected share of portfolios can always benefit from making commitments to govern together before the election, subject to any electoral costs. Thus, no seat efficiencies (whether due to district-level coordination or legal thresholds) need exist for portfolio-maximizing parties to ally.

If one accepts that, in all political systems, parties stand to reap a substantial office payoff by joining electoral coalitions, it is important to consider what may influence the system-level costs separately from any additional seat-maximizing benefits. In particular I discuss below why, all else equal, certain electoral institutions traditionally connected to disproportionality may also reduce or increase the reputational constraints to forming alliances facing portfolio-maximizing parties.

\textsuperscript{59} Note that “portfolio maximizing” and “government-seeking” are used interchangeably in this document.
4.3 Districting and Specialization

Aside from seat-efficiency gains, another reason districting should influence alliance formation stems from the possible reduction in zero-sum competition that comes with a multitude of districts. When two parties associate themselves within the same district they ask the same set of voters to recognize both the value of their government-seeking team and the value of each component party. Yet for some of these voters these will obviously be in contradiction, since the electoral association with other parties will devalue the independent position that each party had cultivated. While this does not necessarily eliminate the net benefit of alliances, it reduces that net benefit relative to situations where each party specializes in its own district(s) in competing with a mutual opponent.

Districting, by localizing direct electoral competition and increasing the possibilities for cooperation across districts can thus reduce the “association costs” of interparty alliances. The more districts there are, the more parties can, in effect, “specialize” in winning votes in one set of districts. With greater specialization, offering their support to the alliance as a whole, with whatever reputational costs that entails, is less threatening to each party’s local identity.\(^{60}\) That is, districting can reduce the sensitivity of parties to an alliance, in that the joint campaigning need not directly target the same voters. Districting allows parties to “piece together” coalitions of voting blocs

\(^{60}\)This point is related to the phenomenon of large parties themselves being able to hold a local identity independently of what parties do at the national level (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 416)
that are not necessarily in competition within the district. Put simply, cross-district cooperation should be less risky than within-district cooperation.

An example is in the relationship between the Liberal and National parties in Australia in the form of The Coalition. The smaller Country Liberal Party is also involved and is straightforward example of a regional specialist party, for the Northern Territory. The National party, meanwhile, primarily gets votes in certain districts within New South Wales, Queensland, and Victoria. The preference voting system\(^{61}\) undoubtedly made the emergence of this relationship much easier, since uncoordinated votes can be transferred. But the key here is that the pressure for the parties to keep their distance is minimized by the opportunity to operate in independent contests. Similarly, (as mentioned in Chapter 3) the party-list system of Germany employs a separate district for each state. As such, it is possible for the CSU to run in the region of Bavaria without competing with the CDU for the same pool of votes. The relationship is so stable (as is the individual position of each party) that they are often called “sister parties” and aggregated in formal data reporting. This stands in contrast to the experience, discussed in the last chapter, of the Alliance in New Zealand, which allied with its partner Labour within the same national electoral district and quickly dissolved.\(^{62}\)

In more fluid party systems with even larger numbers of less institutionalized parties, opportunities for these types of relationships abound. As we saw in the previous chapter, an impressive case of specialization among allied parties exists in India. Allies

\(^{61}\) The “Alternative Vote” allows voters to rank candidates. Votes for weaker candidates are transferred to stronger candidates based on these rankings.

\(^{62}\) Each of these contrasting cases are discussed in Chapter 3.
commit to govern jointly, yet maintain their specialization in winning votes in their respective regions, or even just a few districts. In many list systems, specialization across districts is similarly evident. Chapter 3 discussed the example of Croatia where alliances in 2000 and 2003 pieced together smaller regionalized parties to build up national electoral fronts aimed at controlling the government. The pattern across these examples is that the ability to separate electoral contests by region allows a slightly different campaign strategy in each. Just as inside a single party, where the goal is to assign members to districts that put the best local “face” on the party (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen 2005), multi-party coalitions can exchange local and national vote-winning talents with greater efficiency as contests become formally separated. *To the extent the party system is fragmented, more districts should be associated with a higher likelihood of successful government-seeking electoral alliances between parties.*

### 4.4 Competition Under Party Lists

Another feature of electoral systems that should shape the sensitivity of parties’ programmatic reputations to alliance is the primacy of parties and party labels in the electoral rules themselves. In some contexts, programmatic party labels are the primary means by which parties seek votes and legislators’ careers are largely subject to the will of party leadership. In other cases, legislators’ mandates are derived more independently and the parties they form are more office-seeking and less sensitive to programmatic position.
At a highly general level, this distinction derives from inherent differences between electoral systems dominated by party lists, and those that use primarily nominal rules (where votes are allocated at the candidate level) (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, Shugart, Moreno and Fajardo 2006). Certainly, electoral rules by themselves cannot compel legislators to an electoral strategy emphasizing programmatic or viability reputations, but they can provide them the opportunity to become more or less dependent upon national programmatic consistency in several ways. Nominal systems, including Single Member District Plurality (SMD), preference voting (Alternative Vote and Single Transferable Voter) and multi-member plurality (e.g. SNTV), encourage individuals to represent a particular, geographically-defined subset of the population independently of their party label. That is, candidates have the opportunity to emphasize their success as local servants. Such legislators will therefore (at least) rely less from the programmatic content of a party label and may even benefit from a label that signals to voters a high likelihood of government power (that is, viability).

List proportional representation typically draws emphasis to the general electoral reputation of the party. That is, lists must justify their existence as independent entities from other lists in order to win votes. As such, programmatic positioning should be, all else equal, of greater importance to such parties. On this Mainwaring and Shugart are clear that “without party lists…it is easier for local chapters of a party or even individual candidates to tailor their campaigns to suit local concerns…Thus, parties in non-party-list
systems can be more internally diverse”. For much the same reason candidates or local chapters of a party can more easily specialize, individual parties within an alliance should find it easier to coexist under nominal rules.

Systems where lists exist but are independent from seats won by candidates in districts (the Mixed Member Majoritarian system discussed in Chapter 3) are essentially nominal systems within this classification. The incentive is to vie for SMD seats, which will also translate into supplementary success in the lists; small parties will tend to compete independently in SMDs only with the hope of aggregating those votes across districts into representation via lists. The other major form of mixed system, MMP, is primarily a list system, however. In these systems it is the SMDs that are secondary because, even if parties generally valued SMD seats over list seats, seat-maximizing parties will wish to maximize total seats – via list votes – first and total SMDs second.

Restating the above within the theoretical framework of Chapter 2, nominal rules can reduce the weight of collective programmatic reputation in determining party fortunes. Although there is not a direct relationship between nominal rules per se and alliance behavior, both of these intermediate effects make parties as a whole less sensitive to interaction with other parties. Because of these characteristics, parties seeking votes in a nominal system should be more concerned with office-seeking and face a lower probability of negative reputational consequences due to alliance. Electoral systems that

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63 One could argue that this may be less so in the open list variant of party-lists (which allows candidates to win preference votes relative to co-partisans). However, as Mainwaring and Shugart (1997: 416) note, “even with open-lists, party leadership has control over the nominations that it would lack in systems…not using lists.”
are predominantly based on party lists should reduce the likelihood of a successful government-seeking electoral alliance between parties

4.5 Operationalizing

To disaggregate the relevant features of electoral rules discussed above, I take the following approach. First, I separate out districting itself, which is included as a separate variable in two conceptualizations. The first is the widely used quantity District Magnitude. District magnitude is the number of seats in a district, and is here based on the average across districts with the conventional log transformation to capture the greater impact of differences between smaller numbers (e.g., the distance between 1 and 10 is more important than that between 91 and 100). 64

Districts/Seat (“Districts per seat”) is an alternative measure designed to capture the multitude of districts relative to the assembly size, in line with the argument made above. It is calculated by simply dividing the total number of electoral districts by the total number of seats in the assembly. This correlates highly (linearly) with the logged variant of District Magnitude just described, due to the relationship between population and assembly size, and so is used only as an alternative measure here. However, Districts/Seat is conceptually clearer in light of the argument put forward above regarding the opportunities for cross-district alliances.

64 The log transformation has been used by most cross-national electoral studies at least since Taagepera and Shugart (1989). MMM systems are based on a weighted average of district magnitudes the two tiers. Coding for MMP systems is based on the number of districts in the list tier and the number of seats in the entire assembly. Although coding of these systems is not yet standardized in the literature, these follow most closely the reasoning used for ordinary nominal and party list systems.
Second, I distinguish between the predominance of party lists versus nominal voting. Mixed systems – both majoritarian and proportional (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001) – are special cases, but I fit them within this scheme by dividing them into categories as close as possible to those used for other systems. Because MMP systems give priority to the list tier, they are treated as primarily list systems. MMM (or “parallel”) systems, are primarily nominal systems and are therefore placed on the opposite side of that dichotomy, despite the fact that lists are present. Thus *Party Lists* refers to all party list proportional representation systems, as well as MMP systems, and is otherwise zero (for all nominal systems and MMM).

*Effective Number of Parties (ENP).* Party-system fragmentation allows alliances to form, and is measured using Laakso and Taagepera’s (1979) formula, based on seat fragmentation. At very low ENP the opportunities for government-seeking alliances are always minimal – parties will typically have a chance to win majorities on their own. Thus, some degree of fragmentation is necessary in order for alliances to emerge in the first place.

More importantly, I try here to determine the extent to which district specialization is possible in the aggregate using ENP and the districting variables

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65 I use seat fragmentation rather than vote fragmentation for two reasons. First, I have obtained it for a much larger number of cases, and they correlate highly. Second, seat fragmentation better measures the concept designed to interact with districting: a high seat fragmentation in conjunction with lower magnitude districts can be more safely interpreted as a series of more regionalized parties (since parties with dispersed support would be less likely to win seats), while vote fragmentation might derive from either dispersed or concentrated voting patterns.

66 Golder (2005) also includes this variable as a part of a secondary concern to test (and ultimately reject) a “signaling hypothesis” that smaller parties are interested in demonstrating their relevance. I interpret this notion in the context of the previous chapter’s discussion of “viability reputation” – the smaller parties are, the more they would rely on alliances for demonstrating their potential power within government.
discussed above. As party seat fragmentation grows under low district magnitudes, we can infer that parties are somewhat more regionalized. That is, districts are likely have simpler competition patterns than indicated by the national party system. When there are few districts, however, fragmentation suggests systems in which parties are in more direct competition for the same votes.

*Legal Threshold* is the national percent of votes necessary to achieve representation (coded as zero if there is no such requirement). The expectation is that some parties will be very likely to seek alliances, particularly in the form of joint lists, if a legal threshold is employed.

*Presidential.* As noted in Chapter 2, when directly and concurrently elected presidents have sole cabinet appointment power, there is a concentrated benefit to seeking partners to obtain a joint majority of the vote. As mentioned in Chapter 2 (and elaborated in the next chapter) in presidential systems parties can obtain portfolios because they have helped win presidential votes. Presidents with exclusive control over cabinet appointments and dismissals may appoint cabinet members with far less regard for legislative connections, making it useful for portfolio-seeking parties to make arrangements with presidential candidates’ parties beforehand. Given a seat-independent route to portfolios parties may ally electorally even if they stand to lose legislative seats. A party fielding a presidential candidate seeks to supplement its vote share through agreements with parties lacking viable candidates. To account for this, I include a dummy variable indicating a presidential regime.
Years of Democracy is a count of the total years since 1900 the country have been Democratic up until a given election. Its inclusion allows some control for any independent impact that the stabilization of party competition might have upon the propensity to form alliances. For example, more established parties with known concerns about their long-term reputations might be more credible alliance partners, all else equal.

Data

To test the above arguments, I have compiled an original database of instances of explicit electoral cooperation from parties in all countries considered “Free” by Freedom House during a given election between 1991 and 2006. The coding of electoral alliances relied on case literature or journalistic sources acquired by the author. In all, in the 210 elections in the 57 democracies across these elections, there were 538 governing parties for whom information on electoral cooperation was obtained.

If a set of parties during an election campaign made an explicit public statement of intent to govern jointly, they were coded as a multiparty pre-electoral coalition (MPEC). Cooperation was ruled out either when public statements indicated multiple coalition options or nonalignment; or when there were no public announcements regarding government intent at all. Thus, cases where alliances are reported to be ‘technical’, ‘local’ and otherwise non-binding for post-electoral purposes are not

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67 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Sweden, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, UK, USA, Uruguay.
included, nor are cases of implicit cooperation or merely ‘expected’ post-electoral partnerships (including those among incumbent governments).

Because the phenomenon of interest here is the presence or absence of a coalition seeking to control the government, the dependent variable \( y \) is dichotomous. It is designed to distinguish between elections that involved credible government-seeking electoral alliances and those that did not. I employ two alternative methods to capture this. First, I code \( y=1 \) for all cases where a multiparty pre-election coalition was successful in winning control of government for itself. Of the 210 elections I consider here, 44 resulted in multiparty governments whose members campaigned together as a bloc. This measure has the advantage of isolating MPECs that were most obviously viable contenders for government, but excludes cases in which a potentially viable electoral coalition emerged but was unsuccessful. Using a looser definition accounting for ex post unsuccessful but ex ante viable MPECs, I employ an alternative dependent variable which counts any bloc of parties that a) formed and avowedly government-seeking alliance and b) collectively reached more than 40 percent of seats in the lower house. This adds 13 additional positive cases.

4.6 Results

Table 2 below presents results of probit regression of these variables on the two dependent variables designed to indicate that a given election had produced a multiparty pre-election coalition. The first set of models employ a dependent variable coded as positive only for “successful” MPECs, meaning that no or minimal post-electoral
bargaining was necessary to form a government. The second set has coded as positive the larger set of cases in which the eventual prime minister or president’s party had joined a viable MPEC, even if it was unable to govern without the inclusion of other parties in government via post-electoral bargaining.
Table 2: Determinants of Government-Seeking MPECs, Probit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>DV=Successful MPEC controls govt.</th>
<th>DV= any MPEC achieves 40% seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean Dist Mag.(log)</td>
<td>-0.269** 0.253</td>
<td>-0.296*** 0.0440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.11) (0.25)</td>
<td>(0.11) (0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP</td>
<td>0.248*** 0.499*** -0.0165</td>
<td>0.224*** 0.394*** 0.0171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068) (0.14) (0.100)</td>
<td>(0.065) (0.13) (0.089)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Threshold</td>
<td>0.235*** 0.219*** 0.172***</td>
<td>0.235*** 0.224*** 0.168***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068) (0.067) (0.060)</td>
<td>(0.062) (0.062) (0.056)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party List</td>
<td>-0.738** -0.799*** -0.715**</td>
<td>-0.593** -0.636** -0.547*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.29) (0.29) (0.34)</td>
<td>(0.27) (0.27) (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential</td>
<td>1.181*** 1.123*** 1.114***</td>
<td>1.320*** 1.278*** 1.233***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.35) (0.36) (0.35)</td>
<td>(0.32) (0.32) (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years of Democracy</td>
<td>0.0107*** 0.0112*** 0.0114***</td>
<td>0.009*** 0.009*** 0.009***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0040)</td>
<td>(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP X Dist Mag.</td>
<td>-0.123** -0.0814</td>
<td>-1.884*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.057)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Districts/Seat</td>
<td>-2.805**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENP X Districts/Seat</td>
<td>1.049***</td>
<td>0.823***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.984*** -2.915*** -1.669***</td>
<td>-1.624*** -2.235*** -1.605***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42) (0.63) (0.60)</td>
<td>(0.38) (0.56) (0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>210 210 210</td>
<td>210 210 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-84.92 -82.36 -77.81</td>
<td>-98.22 -96.91 -94.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PseudoR2</td>
<td>0.212 0.236 0.278</td>
<td>0.200 0.211 0.233</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
As expected, *District Magnitude* provides a negative predictor for the likelihood of electoral alliance formation overall. However, as shown by Model 2, this is conditional upon the degree of fragmentation already present in the party system. As fragmentation increases, the negative impact of district magnitude upon the probability of MPEC formation grows. When fragmentation is low, district magnitude does not have this impact. This corroborates a similar result found by Golder (2005). However, differing somewhat from Golder’s findings, *Legal Threshold* has an unconditional relationship with the emergence of government-seeking alliances.68

Though I cannot provide any definitive evidence here, I argue that the strength of *District Magnitude* is likely due to multiple factors working in the same direction. First, higher district magnitudes indeed decrease the advantages to alliance in terms of the “seat payoff,” driven by the district-coordination benefits when the system has a higher potential for “wasted votes.” At the same time, higher magnitude also entails fewer electoral districts and fewer opportunities for less-costly cross-district cooperation among parties with regional. *Districts/Seat* is designed to measuring the latter concept directly and, as shown in Model 3, produces the same basic effect and interaction with ENP, but has and even greater (positive) impact with greater fragmentation and continues to have a significant impact (albeit flatter) even with low fragmentation.

Figure 4 plots the predicted values from Models 2 and 3 against *District Magnitude* and *Districts/Seat* to illustrate the interaction with fragmentation.

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68 Though Golder combines district magnitude and legal thresholds into a single “effective threshold” when testing this argument.
Party List systems are negatively associated with electoral cooperation. The direction of this relationship is consistent with the notion that the central role of party identity in party list systems makes it more costly to engage in electoral cooperation, relative to nominal systems where the party identity is (at least formally) secondary. Though this concept is linked with districting (since nominal systems on have many more low magnitude districts on average), this dichotomy nevertheless captures additional variance created by the mere presence of party lists independently of the magnitude or number of districts.

Each of the control variables has a positive effect. Presidential, as expected, raises the probability of alliances, suggesting that parties are more likely to shift bargaining into the electoral arena when presidents offer a seat-independent route to portfolios. Interestingly, the baseline probability of multiparty pre-electoral coalitions
increases with *Years Of Democracy*, perhaps as repeated interactions enhance the credibility of mutually profitable exchanges, appropriate partners are discovered and established and as techniques for pursuing joint interests are learned and tried.

### 4.7 Summary and discussion

Factors usually associated with electoral disproportionality clearly add to the value of forming alliances (Duverger 1954, Cox 1997, Golder 2005). However, this must be only part of the story. As there are already portfolio-seeking incentives to increase the national electoral "size" of a coalition, much variation should be driven by factors making alliances *costly*. Parties will seek to cooperate nationally only if the expected payoff of improving one’s bargaining position outweighs the costs.

From the previous section’s discussion, it follows that a parliamentary polity that employs party lists with only few high-magnitude districts represents the least likely environment for electoral alliances to emerge, particularly if there are no or low legal thresholds. Parties in such a case are in direct competition for votes and rely to a great extent upon collective reputations that allying would hurt. Although government power may be more likely under an alliance, parties will not risk their programmatic reputation in exchange for a relatively less valuable improvement in viability. Such parties likely employ a longer-term strategy to obtain power, subjecting themselves to greater uncertainty in post-electoral bargaining. Several factors raise the value of cooperation and/or lower the costs—lower district magnitudes, more districts, higher thresholds, directly elected presidents, and nominal voting. As we now look into the consequences
side of this study, it is useful to take note that the patterns of electoral coalitions that we are about to examine do not arise entirely as idiosyncratic phenomena, but are induced to some extent by formal and cross-nationally comparable features of the systems they inhabit. In this chapter, I emphasized the role of institutions that exacerbate reputation costs by driving party competition away from local politics and toward national party reputations.

Despite that many also engage in electoral coordination of some sort, most of the alliances under study here do not form simply because they wish to maximize seat efficiency, but because of the benefits for getting into government. The seat maximizing gains of these alliances might be obtained simply by technical alliances without joint commitments. Yet, such noncommittal alliances are relatively rare in my research compared to those with clear collective governance aims. Instead, I suggest that most alliances – and all of them coded in my sample – are fundamentally the result of the overarching imperative of portfolio-maximizing that is sometimes supplemented with additional seat-efficiency concerns. The pre-electoral coalitions I focus on are, by definition, rather grand enterprises capable of (or at least aiming at) accumulating large enough collective portions of votes to control the entire government—not just for the sake of increasing their seat shares or protecting the survival of smaller partners. The variation in the patterns of electoral alliances is as much as result of systematic factors making such portfolio-maximizing behavior more or less costly. The empirical analysis here by no means proves this claim, but suggests interpretations of the correlational evidence consistent with this notion.
In the following chapters, the relationship between distributing offices (not just ministerial portfolios) and “pre-electoralness,” will be explored further. I consider the consequences of these varying electoral origins in detail with regard to the internal distribution of the spoils of office and distribution of legislative power to the opposition, comparing these multiparty electoral coalitions to post-electoral coalitions and single-party governments.
Chapter 5: Dividing the Spoils

5.1 Introduction

Governing coalitions must determine how to reward partners for their contribution. Perhaps the most commonly studied form of “reward” within a winning coalition is the allocation of cabinet portfolios. Whether they are interested primarily in controlling a policy jurisdiction or accessing the resources of the ministry for particularistic purposes, obtaining cabinet ministries is a primary objective of an office seeking party. In this chapter, I examine these expectations and their assumptions through the lens of the pre- and post-electoral distinction highlighted throughout this dissertation.

Theories on how portfolios should be divided among governing partners have pointed to three factors – seat share, bargaining power, and agenda-setting advantages. for coalition formation are able to take more than their seat share. Gamson (1961) argued that parties forming a government “will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to [that] coalition” (p. 376).\(^{69}\) For Gamson, the relevant resources are the seats in the assembly contributed by each party in government.

Strictly seat-based allocations are, however, not consistent with theories of bargaining. Bargaining theory literature emphasizes “pivotalness,” based on the notion of “bargaining weight” or “voting weight.” A party’s bargaining weight depends on how

\(^{69}\) See Browne and Franklin (1973), Browne and Frendreis (1980), Laver and Schofield (1985), Warwick and Druckman (2001), and Druckman and Roberts (2005) for empirical evidence.
many alternative majority coalitions for which the party is necessary. Bargaining models expect that a party’s portfolio payoff will be higher when it can pivot between more alternative minimal winning coalitions (Schofield 1976; Ansolabehere et al. 2005; Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere 2005).

In addition, an “agenda-setting” argument suggests that the party in a position to propose the coalition – usually called the “formateur” party in parliamentary regimes\textsuperscript{70} – will take shares of portfolios beyond either their bargaining weights or seat shares. The theory behind the “formateur bonus” derives from Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) model of legislative bargaining. The formateur in their model has a monopoly right to propose governments and portfolio allocations and can thus make a single take-it-or-leave-it offer. Rejecting this offer means waiting until the formateur party completes its subsequent bargaining before another chance at forming a government would emerge, entailing delay costs.\textsuperscript{71} Empirical evidence of a formateur effect has not been strong when controlling for governing parties’ seat contribution to the coalition, unless additional value is assumed for the prime minister’s position compared to other portfolios (Warwick and Druckman 2001). Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere (2005) show however that a formateur bonus is present if one controls for each governing party’s bargaining weight.

In this chapter I argue that the principle behind the “pivotalness” and “agenda-setting” theories are implicitly connected to post-electoral bargaining, when bargaining is unconstrained by previous commitments. I argue that parties that have formed pre-

\textsuperscript{70} usually a prospective prime minister

\textsuperscript{71} In the event of a rejected offer, any party – including the initial formateur – can be chosen to make a new offer with the same probabilities that led to the initial selection.
electoral agreements have an incentive to shift investment incentives toward the collective goal of coalition success. Assigning portfolios in proportion to seats provides incentives for each party to work for the coalition, since it will be rewarded for maximizing its own contribution regardless of its post-electoral position, and seat share is the closest measurable approximation to its contribution. As a result, the proportional allocation is strongest when parties have preempted post-electoral bargaining via pre-electoral negotiations. In these cases, parties’ post-electoral bargaining weight – their pivotalness in forming a majority – should not play the strong role it should in coalitions formed entirely after the election. Similarly, pre-electoral bargaining should limit any advantages held by the party proposing the coalition.

5.2 Bargaining before the Election: Aligning Individual Incentives and Collective Goals

Post-electoral environments present parties with varying degrees of pivotalness in the formation of coalitions. This depends not just on their seats, but on the possible combinations of seats that can form majorities. To clarify, consider a parliament with three parties holding 44%, 34% and 22% of the seats, respectively. Were the largest and smallest parties to form a coalition, a proportional (seat-based) allocation would give the largest party 2/3 of the portfolios, as it contributes 2/3 of the coalition’s total seats. In bargaining theory, the resource each party brings is “ability to form a majority coalition.” In this example, each party can form a majority with any other single party, and thus they
are equal in this resource. Therefore, bargaining theory suggests that the two parties’
expected payoffs will also be equal (Schofield 1976; Laver and Schofield 1985; Morelli
1999; Snyder, Ting and Ansolabehere 2005), despite that one contributes far fewer seats.
These models predict that small parties who are equally necessary to the majority can
propose and receive a number of portfolios equal to that of the larger partner who has the
same “weight” in government formation.

Each of these expectations treats parties and their agreements as purely legislative
phenomena. However, parties can commit to govern together and agree to a distribution
rule prior to the election campaign. Electoral pacts alter the bargaining environment and
introduce additional opportunities for parties to “contribute resources.” In particular,
office-seeking parties bear opportunity costs in that the effort and resources that they
invest in a particular campaign are not available for other purposes. Because the return to
their investment depends largely on whether they get into government, any changes in
their prospects of doing so will affect their investments. Pre-election pacts can therefore
affect both their signatories’ chances of getting into government and their signatories’
willingness to invest in the campaign.

If negotiations to build the governing coalition are entirely post-electoral, and
therefore unconstrained by previous agreements, parties should attempt to extract the
largest possible share of portfolios they can obtain given their bargaining position. In
particular, the more important a party is to producing the majority (given its relative size
and alternatives), the more it should demand in return for this contribution. Thus,
opportunistic post-electoral behavior should be associated with "pivotal" parties obtaining office benefits exceeding their seat shares in government.

If, however, pre-electoral coalitions negotiate tacit or explicit contracts that will regulate the government formation process, should the coalition win a majority, partners have good reason to agree to a distributional rule that restricts post-electoral bargaining advantages. In order for the alliance to be successful, they must collectively win the election (be able to form a government). How much parties will work toward that goal depends on their individual incentives. If a partner’s payoff will depend only on post-electoral circumstances, there is no assurance that contributing more to the (costly) collective election effort by winning more seats will bring any marginal increase in voting weight. However, partners can agree *ex ante* to be rewarded for their output – the seats they win. With this understanding, all partners have an incentive to maximize their own contribution to the coalition’s electoral effort, thereby enhancing the coalition’s probability of reaching its majority goal.

If some parties do form a pact, each member party’s investment in the electoral campaign produces not just more seats for that particular party (a private good for the party) but also an increased probability of a coalitional majority (a public good for the coalition as a whole). Because members will discount the benefits their investment

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72 It may seem counterintuitive that any party would ever employ less than its entire arsenal of resources in maximizing its votes. While seats can have some inherent value, parties interested in maximizing overall utility will weigh the instrumental value of additional seats against the costs of generating more votes by campaign investments such as mobilizing potential supporters. A party must find the cost of mobilizing "enough more votes to win another seat" to be worth the costs. An additional seat may not impact a party’s own bargaining position at all, even though it would help a potential coalition collectively reach a majority. The premise here is that if parties can do better *for themselves* (in portfolios) by merely increasing votes and seats, they have an incentive to engage in such costly effort and contribute to the coalition’s collective goal of reaching an electoral majority.
confers on their partners, a sub-optimal provision of the public good (majority status) will occur. By agreeing ex ante to a proportional division of office spoils *ex post*, the coalition can motivate members to campaign cooperatively and invest in the coalition’s success, thus conferring external benefits on all.\textsuperscript{73} Thus, *portfolio allocations should be more proportional (to seat share) in governments based on pre-election pacts than in other governments, holding constant other factors, while bargaining weight should not be important.*

These arguments lead me to three empirical predictions:

1. A governing party’s share of portfolios will be more proportional to its contribution of seats to the governing coalition when the coalition has agreed to govern jointly before the election.

2. A party’s contribution of voting weight to a governing coalition will produce a “bonus” in their portfolio allocation—that is, a bonus relative to what the party would get based on its seat share—only when the coalition has *not* negotiated before the election (in governments formed through post-electoral bargaining).

3. A party’s “proposer advantage” will produce a “bonus” in its portfolio share only when the coalition has *not* negotiated before the election – in governments formed through post-electoral bargaining.

\textsuperscript{73} See Carroll and Cox (2007) for a formalization of this argument and an application to all post-war Western European governments. Arguments there are extensions of sections 5.1 and 5.2 of this chapter.
5.3 Electoral Cooperation in Parliamentary Regimes

To test these predictions, I focus on a sample of parties in pure parliamentary regimes from 1990-2007. Alliances are defined here as governments whose members have committed to governing prior to election campaign in some explicit fashion. They do not include cases where cooperation is only technical, where parties have not committed to govern together.

The concepts discussed above are operationalized as the following variables. “Seat contribution” is a party’s seats divided by the total seats of all government parties. “Voting weight” is measured as a party’s voting minimum integer weight \(^74\) divided by the total weight of all governing parties. “Formateur” is a dummy variable indicating whether the party was regarded as having formed the government, almost always the prime minister.

In order to estimate each coefficient separately in both pre and post-electoral samples, and test their difference, I interact the Alliance dummy with each of the above variables. Table 3 below shows the results for a sample of multiparty parliamentary regimes. I first exclude premier-presidential regimes to ensure that any formateur bonus

\(^74\) Minimum integer weights are defined in Strauss (2003). I used Strauss’ algorithm and software in computing voting weights, as do Snyder et al (2005).
is disconnected from possession of a partisan presidency. This sample provides the cleanest opportunity for the above predictions to be tested.
Table 3: Internal Coalition Proportionality in Parliamentary Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DV=Party Share of Portfolios</th>
<th>Parliamentary Govts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>-0.035</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contribution</td>
<td>0.589</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contrib. X Alliance</td>
<td>0.460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.116)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight Contribution</td>
<td>0.231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight X Alliance</td>
<td>-0.245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.100)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.015)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur X Alliance</td>
<td>-0.112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.009)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level
The first prediction, that pre-electoral coalitions would more closely adhere to a proportional allocation, is clearly borne out. *Seat Contribution* is a strong determinant of portfolio allocations in post-electoral coalitions (.59). But in multiparty governments derived from electoral alliances, the proportionality of the allocations is far stronger—with each partner being rewarded for the seats they produced, rather than for the “pivotalness” they obtained. In fact, the subset of parties in successful alliances shows a “perfectly” proportional relationship between seats and portfolios in that the effect

**Figure 5: Allocation of Portfolios in Parliamentary Cases, Coefficients and Confidence Intervals**
(.589+.460=1.04) is statistically equivalent to ‘1’, while the constant is not distinguishable from ‘0’ (.050-.035=.15).

*Voting weight*, my measure of post-electoral bargaining leverage, is a substantial factor driving variation in portfolio distributions in post-electoral governments. The coefficient in the post-electoral sample suggests a strong effect, about half that of the direct seat impact. The coefficient in the pre-electoral subsample (-.03) is wrong signed and statistically indistinguishable from zero.

The advantage of being the formateur (the ability to make a take-it-or-leave it offer), is not strong even in post-electoral bargaining, where we would expect such an advantage to be most likely to occur (about .03, significant at .10). However, there is clearly no such effect when pre-electoral bargaining has taken place (-.003, statistically zero).

In sum, the results for parliamentary regimes suggest that pivotal parties and formateur parties positioned for an opportunistic extraction of portfolios are constrained by commitments they have made before the election to cooperate with other parties. In these cases, portfolio distributions follow a “pure” Gamson’s Law. Previous works (e.g. Browne and Franklin 1973) have found a strong but imperfect bivariate relationship between seats and portfolios in parliamentary regimes. In pre-electoral coalitions, Gamson’s law exists in a (statistically) perfect form even when controlling for bargaining weight, with no bonus for either small or large parties. In post-electoral coalitions, controlling for bargaining power significantly weakens the seat-portfolio relationship.
5.4 Electoral Cooperation in Premier-Presidential Regimes

Some regimes with a prime-minister are not strictly “parliamentary” and are not included above since they also have a separately elected president with cabinet appointment power (Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart 2005). Most studies of portfolio allocations, including all aforementioned, lump these premier-presidential regimes (notably France) in with parliamentary regimes when covering Western Europe. The concept of “formateur” takes on greater weight in premier-presidential regimes, which in a number of the countries covered in this study\footnote{Specifically Bulgaria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Romania}. In such regimes, a directly elected president is in a position to privilege certain coalitions over others by limiting alternatives to their proposed formateur. As a result, the leverage of a formateur in such regimes will tend to be greater, given that the president (by appointing or playing the role of an “informateur”) will likely give a preferred formateur (i.e., a co-partisan or ally) a chance to retain that status under a wide variety of bargaining outcomes, making the offer much closer to “take it or leave it” (cf. Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006).

In light of this, I briefly examine premier-parliamentary regimes separately. Predictably, the formateur advantage is far greater in these regimes, regardless of pre- or post-electoral status. However, other results are similar to those found in the parliamentary sample. First, the seats-portfolio relationship is closer to proportionality for pre-election coalitions. Second, voting weight contribution is a significant positive
predictor of portfolios in post-electoral coalitions, but is in fact negative in pre-electoral coalitions.

Table 4: Portfolio Allocations in Premier Presidential Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Premier-Presidential Only</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>0.0291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.043)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contribution</td>
<td>0.582***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contrib. X Alliance</td>
<td>0.602*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight Contribution</td>
<td>0.290**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight X Alliance</td>
<td>-0.779**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur</td>
<td>0.0864***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur X Alliance</td>
<td>0.0844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.063)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5.4 Electoral Cooperation in Presidential Regimes

and Deheza (1997), have noted these patterns. In this section I highlight another portion of that connection – pre-election coalitions. What makes electoral coalitions important is not just that they are another route by which presidents can obtain legislative support.

Electoral pacts in presidential regimes provide an even closer approximation to traditional conceptions of parliamentary coalitions in that they influence the de facto degree of “separate origin” and “separate survival” (Shugart and Carey 1992; Carroll and Shugart 2007).

First, a president elected as part of the same electoral bloc as a legislative coalition reduces the extent to which the legislature and executive are part of separate “chains” of democratic delegation (Strøm and Bergman 2006). That is, if both the president and a stable legislative coalition derive from the same electoral bloc, control of each branch can be said to have the same – or certainly more similar – electoral origin. Second, the electoral arena is a place where parties other than the president’s party can influence the selection of the chief executive. Hence, by considering the electoral bargaining arena, we open the possibility of exchanges built around contributions by legislative parties (in their electoral forms) to winning the presidency, even in the formal context of separate origin.

In presidential systems, the president plays the role of what in parliamentary regimes we called the *formateur*, meaning the party in a position to form a government. That is, a president can make an offer to attract support to a governing coalition, just as do the parties vying for a premiership. The key difference is the value of the legislative coalition, which, in presidential regimes does not include upholding the government.
Thus, along with the separation of survival is the separation of government formation from coalition formation. To the extent coalition formation is about forming and maintaining governments, presidentialism’s formal structure works against the cooperation between the legislative and executive branch (relative to parliamentarism).

Nonetheless, the need of even the most powerful presidents to achieve some measure of legislative support counters this tendency (Altman 2000, Amorim Neto 2006, Deheza 1997). The pursuit of statutory majorities therefore apparently leads to a more frequent occurrence of coalition formation in presidential regimes than suggested by the structure of government survival only (Amorim Neto 2006, Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004). Amorim Neto and Santos (2001) argue that ministries are currency used for buying legislative votes in order to build these statutory majorities. Yet, there is a sense in which ministries can buy more than just post-electoral voting blocs. While presidents do not generally rely on legislative votes to attain and retain power or appoint the cabinet, they can and do rely on the electoral votes of other parties’ support bases in gaining access to the presidency. In this sense, presidential coalitions can in fact be built around majorities—of votes—supporting the “formateur’s” very access to the office. In the process, a prospective president decides whether and how much to expand a coalition before an election, and how much to leave to purely post-electoral bargaining.

Imagine a presidential election in a country that employs a run-off system. First, parties choose whether to run a presidential candidate in the first round (which itself may reflect less an attempt to win the presidency than to establish electoral strength). Those not doing so may form a pact with one of those that do. In the second round, only the top
two vote getters have presidential candidates. In that round, the remaining presidential candidates’ parties may conclude additional pacts with other parties in an effort to amass a majority of votes via acquisition, rather than persuasion. When the legislature is concurrently at stake, parties may also consider the value of membership in a legislative majority. In total, parties running a candidate may:

- Run alone or
- Pact as a senior partner (form an electoral alliance with other parties);

Parties without a candidate may:

- Pact as a junior partner (join an electoral alliance of another party’s candidate)
- Remain unaligned for the election

Coalitions, uniting a ‘senior partner’ with one or more ‘junior partners,’ may be formed either before the first round, between the first round and second round, or after the second round. To illustrate the full spectrum of presidential coalition building, take the example of Brazil’s 2002 election. Successful candidate Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva acquired two core allies in the PCdoB and PL in his first-round electoral coalition centered around his own party, the PT. Winning a plurality (46.4%), Lula then attracted parties aligned with unsuccessful first round candidates (PPS, PDT, PTB and PSB) as

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76 If the presidential election is concurrent with that of the legislature, the votes and seats won by a party can serve as a measure for that contribution. In the event of a second round, the recent election still provides a rough measure of a party’s potential contribution. When elections are not concurrent, the party’s seat shares are a less useful proxy since they are not tied to current support. When parties with fixed seat shares join electoral coalitions their contribution is harder to measure. Though their previous votes (and, thus, previous seats) could still serve as a rough measure of a party’s ability to deliver votes for the presidential candidate, this information is less reliable.
well as the previously unallied PV to achieve a second-round victory of 61%. After the
election, Lula rewarded these partners with portfolios, but fell short a joint legislative
majority (43% of seats). From this point, Lula negotiated an agreement with a faction of
another party, the PMDB, who soon joined the cabinet.

Exactly what presidential candidates and junior partners exchange depends on the
point at which the pact is formed. After the second round of the election, each party’s
share of assembly seats is known, as is the identity of the president. While a president
does not normally need assembly support to become or remain head of government, one
may need assembly support to pass a legislative program and ensure the appointment of a
cooperative directing board or committees. Thus, after the second round is complete, an
exchange of portfolios for assembly support may occur.

As discussed above with regard to parliamentary regimes, the formateur of a
government will pay an equal price in portfolios per unit of assembly support
(Ansolabehere et al. 2005). Moreover, the appropriate “unit of a support” is not each
party’s seat share, but its legislative voting weight—its contribution to the majority.
Thus, to the extent that presidents are focused on building legislative majorities after the
second round election has concluded, portfolios should be allocated to allies in proportion
to their contribution of voting weight to the presidential coalition – just as in
parliamentary models of post-electoral bargaining.

When a pact is formed before the second round of voting, the president needs parties’
support in the form of second-round votes to win the presidency. In exchange for their
voters’ support, the president can only offer a promise to deliver portfolios, if elected. Thus, between first and second round, an exchange of promises of portfolios for second round votes occurs. This means allocating promises of portfolios in proportion to partner’s value in generating second round votes. Assuming parties’ potential second-round vote contribution approximates their seats, there should be a rough relationship between seat shares and portfolio shares.\footnote{Of course, the arrangement may not be based upon the votes delivered but perhaps by degrees of endorsement and financing activity. Generally, however, I expect that a party’s non-vote resources are often correlated with its size. Although such cases present an even greater challenge for the use of vote/seat shares as a proxy for “contribution”, the key point is that the payment is not based entirely upon legislative voting weight (and thus even parties of little consequence for legislative majorities can receive a portion of executive power).}

In either case, the president only need give up as much of the government necessary so that other parties consider joining the coalition to be a net gain. Since no party has the leverage of “breaking” the government, the president’s formateur advantage (Baron Ferejohn 1989) is always present. If we take presidential candidates to be different entities from their electoral vehicles, we may think of even their own party as a coalition partner to be paid only a competitive price, with the residual given to loyalists (independents or loyalists nominally in the president’s party). As the president’s party becomes more central to electoral success, beyond a mere technical vehicle, the presidential bonus becomes more a reward for co-partisans. These opportunities represent the costs faced by a president considering a coalitional strategy, whether electoral or legislative.

Consider now these scenarios from the perspective of potential \textit{junior} partners in an electoral alliance. With an electoral pact, small parties like Brazil’s PPS or PV can
insulate themselves from the uncertainty post-electoral bargaining. That is, assuming the pact is credible, they can “lock in” more favorable agreements with regard to the spoils of government access, including policy, resources and appointments. Parties interested in reaching these goals via the cabinet or by obtaining legislative power have significant incentives to extract promises from the presidential candidate they support: that the coalition, if successful, will allocate internally on a partisan basis and proportional to their contribution to winning. When this is the case – just as in the parliamentary case – each party has an incentive to increase its contribution to the coalition’s success, helping the coalition achieve its collective goal. Thus, as long as the president’s offer is credible, the arrangement can produce mutually beneficial results for the partners in terms of a governmental payoff. Whether the offer is made or accepted is, of course, subject to the costs and benefits of alliances discussed in Chapters 2-4 and case-specific conditions. But without an expectation of a “fair” portfolio payoff as a return on their investment, where membership confers some benefits that cannot be simply revoked by president’s formal power or the final accounting of bargaining importance, such alliances are not as valuable even if the costs are limited by factors discussed in previous chapters.78

Predictions

A presidential candidate seeking to make electoral cooperation worthwhile will want to promise a large “pie” and offer an equitable distribution. These offers increase the attractiveness of the alliance, and the effort of other parties in producing an electoral

78 Recall that in Chapter 2 an expected positive monotonic relationship between seats and portfolios was simply assumed in order to simplify the decision model. Here I emphasize that electoral allies would in fact demand such assurances when bargaining before the election.
victory for the alliance by increasing each party’s expected share within the alliance. Thus, when a president’s offer is credible (i.e. there is reason to believe reneging is costly), alliances are likely to form and their distributions will be more internally proportional (despite the president’s formal advantage) and more partisan.

If controlling the government is all that matters, the president’s advantage in proposing the government means that the president should “take all” portfolios. This is the Baron-Ferejohn formateur bonus taken to the extreme. That is, under Baron-Ferejohn, as applied to parliamentary systems, the proposer is constrained by a) the necessity of getting an assembly majority b) If the initial proposal does not attract majority support, other parties have positive probability of being chosen to propose. Hence, the formateur will make an offer that maximally exploits its advantage by offering the prospective parties their reservation price—just above the amount at which the whole arrangement would be rejected and another formateur chosen. Since a president’s status does not depend on legislative support, a Baron-Ferejohn perspective predicts that the president should take all portfolios for co-partisans or loyalists.

For this prediction, a Baron-Ferejohn model assumes that all value lies with portfolios. We might instead assume, as does Amorim Neto (2006), that statutory majorities have a separate, if conditional, value. Moreover, as I suggest in the next section and the following chapter, there is additional value in the posts that can be controlled by the assembly majority—the directorate and the legislative committees. Either way, securing a legislative majority is valuable independent of portfolios, somewhat mitigating a president’s proposer advantage.
Amorim Neto emphasizes that legislative majorities are sought via partisan cabinet appointments when the president is institutionally weakest or politically distant from the legislature. Some presidents lack much institutional authority to govern independently of the legislature and even for those that do, it may be a costly route. Hence, Amorim Neto predicts “weaker” presidents will make more inclusive allocations under post-electoral bargaining in search of assembly support for policy implementation.

Though not distinguished in his analysis (which is interested in the extent of cabinet inclusion relative to the legislature), Amorim Neto’s account helps us highlight two basic types of outcomes that must also be factored into a party’s decision to cooperate with a presidential alliance. One of these is the outcome where a largely nonpartisan cabinet is appointed and partisan considerations are generally ignored.\(^{79}\) The other emerges when the allocation is “unfair” in terms of seats—equivalent to an allocation rule where the president bargains with other parties based on consideration of their bargaining power and the need for a statutory majority.

Figure 6 below presents a simplified illustration of the range of outcomes that parties might expect in a presidential regime. In cells I and II, we have the outcomes analogous to those described above with regard to a parliamentary environment, where all portfolios are available for partisan distribution, and the president’s party has no special role. In case I, the president agrees to allocate all portfolios in proportion to partner’s contribution to the government in terms of seats, regardless of the actual

\(^{79}\) See also Amorim Neto and Strøm (2006) for a discussion of presidential power and non-partisan appointments.
bargaining power held by certain parties. In case II, the president allocates portfolios in proportion to the leverage held by parties after the election, such as that held by “pivotal” parties in forming majorities. In case III, the president disregards both parties potential seats, as well as their importance in forming majorities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>President’s Advantage</th>
<th>Distribution Rule</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coalition cabinet</td>
<td>Proportional to Contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(I) Relatively proportional partisan cabinet</td>
<td>(II) Partisan cabinet based upon post-electoral bargaining weight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Dominant</td>
<td>(III) Nonpartisan and President’s Party dominant</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6: Expected Basic Types of Portfolio Allocation rules, Presidential Regimes

While Amorim Neto is concerned primarily with a president’s decision to bring parties into the cabinet or not, my purpose here is to distinguish between bargaining scenarios among coalitions in terms of when they form, given that many recent presidential coalitions do not derive from a purely post-electoral environment but are in fact the result of bargaining well before the election. The tests below are designed to determine whether the resulting portfolio allocation better reflects an investment of members in the electoral victory or are driven more by the advantages obtained by parties after the election.
When presidents build coalitions, they may bring in other parties to the cabinet (Amorim Neto 2006, 2002; Altman, 2000) in exchange for legislative support. Just as in parliamentary regimes, the distribution might be in accordance with a party’s seats or reflect its bargaining position. Although bargaining weight may take many forms, an objectively measurable notion of “bargaining weight” reflects the number of minimal winning legislative coalitions in which a given party must be a member (Snyder et al. 2005). According to the above arguments, pre-electoral bargaining should affect these quantities as follows.

1. Legislative parties will obtain portfolio allocations better reflecting their seat contribution when parties allied before the election; bargaining weight will not impact allocations when post-electoral bargaining is constrained by pre-election alliances.

2. Legislative parties will obtain portfolio allocations reflecting their bargaining weight when post-electoral bargaining is unconstrained; bargaining weight will not impact allocations when post-electoral bargaining is constrained by pre-election alliances.

As noted above, in presidential regimes, the president’s party always has an advantage in portfolio distribution, given that all coalitions must include the president. Parties who reject an offer from the president therefore also reject the possibility of cabinet membership. This leverage can be – and should be – exploited by a president in appointing their own partisans. However, with pre-electoral commitments, doing so will limit their ability to reward electoral allies. Thus:

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80 Specifically I employ here “minimum integer weights”, using the procedure developed by Strauss (2003).
3. The president’s party will receive a significant “bonus” of portfolios, relative to partners when post-electoral bargaining is unconstrained; the president’s party will not obtain a as a significant a “bonus” when post-electoral bargaining is constrained by pre-election alliances.

The above notion of a president’s “formateur” bonus does not capture the president’s ability to go beyond merely taking a greater share portfolios for the party with which he or she is associated. Instead, it may be argued that the appointment of “independent” cabinet members provides equally little – or even less – recognition for partners’ contributions to the forming and maintaining government.\footnote{Although independents may well be close presidential loyalists, in some cases we might imagine that independent technocrats are considered preferable by partners compared to formal co-partisans of the president. However, such appointments in either form necessarily represent a reduction in partners’ partisan influence over the executive.}

As explained above, as such appointments can be interpreted as reducing the “pie” from which partisan allocations may be made. This behavior is consistent with presidents exploiting their institutional role at the expense of partners (on whom he does not depend for survival) and inconsistent with our expectations of presidents having prearranged membership rights for those who contribute to forming the government by cooperating during the campaign.

4. The president’s party will appoint fewer of their “own” ministers in the form of independents when post-electoral bargaining is constrained by pre-electoral commitments.
In the table below, I apply the previous analysis to presidential regimes, regressing seats bargaining weight and presidency status on the portfolio distribution for each governing party, interacting each with a dummy variable indicating whether the coalition had allied during the campaign. When there is no pre-election pact among coalition partners, and presidents put together a coalition after the election, the allocation of cabinet portfolios appears driven primarily by a party’s bargaining weight and its possession of the presidency, with seat contributions having no impact. When there is a pre-election agreement, the allocation of cabinet portfolios is driven primarily by each party’s seat contribution (.83, p=0.003) while seat share has no significant relationship among post-electoral governments).

Given that “bargaining weight” in presidential regimes is not reflective of pivotalness in forming the government, but only in passing legislation, we might not expect this quantity to have such a strong effect on portfolio distributions. Yet, in post-electoral bargaining this measure has a strong relationship (1.36) with portfolio share. However, this factor loses influence entirely (p=.421) when electoral alliances have been made. The effect of a party’s post-electoral bargaining advantage seems therefore to be nonexistent when electoral cooperation has taken place among parties within the presidential coalitions.
Table 5: Portfolio Allocations in Presidential Regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dependent Variable</th>
<th>(1)</th>
<th>(2)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>0.103</td>
<td>0.080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)*</td>
<td>(0.040)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Share</td>
<td>-0.493</td>
<td>-0.485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.364)</td>
<td>(0.325)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat × Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>1.326</td>
<td>1.178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.451)**</td>
<td>(0.403)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Voting Weight</td>
<td>1.361</td>
<td>1.210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.378)**</td>
<td>(0.337)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Wt. × Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>-1.593</td>
<td>-1.476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.475)**</td>
<td>(0.424)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency (Formateur)</td>
<td>0.272</td>
<td>0.483</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.046)**</td>
<td>(0.041)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidency × Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>-0.204</td>
<td>-0.123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)**</td>
<td>(0.058)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.030)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 7: Allocation of Portfolios in Presidential Cases, Coefficients and Confidence Intervals

Equally remarkable is the president’s own “formateur bonus.” Since the president in fact does formally have a monopoly proposal advantage, we should expect a significant bonus for their own partisans, and a sizable bonus is present for those forming post-electoral coalitions. Yet, presidents appear to take a significantly less disproportionate shares for their own parties when successful alliances have been made—
with a bonus that is not statistically greater than zero (p=.142). Figure 8 shows the effect of the presidential party bonus in the seat-portfolio relationship, under each type of electoral origin.

![Figure 8: Presidential Bonus (Seat Contribution vs. Portfolio Share, Presidents Only)](image)

Since presidents frequently appoint non-partisan ministers as part of their executive contingent, one could argue that they should be treated as part of the president’s share. Repeating the analysis treating all non-partisan ministers as if they are presidential partisans (column 2) we of course find a much greater bonus for the president overall. But even with this measure, the total portion of portfolios denied to partners is
still significantly less for the presidential cabinets emerging from pre-electoral alliances. That is, including independents as part of the presidents share does not erase the apparent constraints places upon presidents who have made electoral alliances and promised rewards to partners.

It also is interesting to note how pre-election alliances appear to lead to small parties paid well beyond their voting weight in portfolios. That is, some quite small parties weakly positioned for post-electoral bargaining receive ministries by virtue of their membership in the electoral team. Figure 9 illustrates the difference in the slope of the predicted bargaining weight effect for each sample. Portfolio allocations in electoral alliances most exceed voting weight contributions for small parties, those with little weight, who appear to receive rewards directly for alliance membership.
An Example: Pre-Electoral and Post-Electoral Cabinets in Brazil 1989-1995

To better illustrate mechanics behind this cross sectional relationship, consider the case of Brazil in the 1990s. While Brazil has become especially prone to electoral alliances, interparty cooperation in Brazil’s 1989 presidential election was minimal (Samuels 2003, 89; Deheza 1997). Brazil began its latest era of electoral democracy in 1989 with many factors working strongly against such cooperation at the national level.

First, the election was non-concurrent – it could not change the balance of power within the assembly – and in this case were distant from the last legislative election.
While parties could offer their support there was little real connection between their own existence as legislative parties and what they could provide for the coalition electorally. Since the election occurred in isolation from legislative and other races, alliances that formed at those other levels were not carried over into the presidential realm. The lack of cooperation was evident in that every major party and many minor parties ran candidates – 23 in all. The second round also did not produce electoral alliances of the sort discussed above.

Second, while the emerging party system was generally weak (Mainwaring 1995) Collor’s own personalist vehicle, the PRN, was especially detached from the building of interparty relationships. While independent candidacies were formally disallowed this “party” was created only for the purpose of Collor’s populist and anti-party campaign. Collor’s status as what Mainwaring and Siavelis (forthcoming) call a “free wheeling independent” did not attract explicit cooperation from other parties in the election who ran their own candidates, despite some informal second-round, unilateral endorsements by the PFL and PTB (on which, see Ames 1994). Underscoring the shallowness of this support, the PFL’s leader had in fact openly advocated an “anti-Collor” alliance with the PMDB just two months before. Collor’s endorsements were thus more analogous to those parties -- the PDT and PSDB – who reluctantly endorsed Collor’s opponent (Lula Da Silva) in the second round of that election.\textsuperscript{82}

\textsuperscript{82} By contrast, Lula’s own small unsuccessful alliance in 1989 was a ‘true’ electoral coalition in the sense that the PT and other leftist parties who formed the “Brazilian Popular Front” explicitly agreed to form a “government of joint responsibility” if successful.
Indeed, Collor wore his lack of entanglements proudly, boasting that it would give him greater freedom to govern. As a result, Collor’s cabinet was not designed to achieve even legislative support and was dominated by non-partisan “cronies” (Amorim Neto 2002), although a post-electoral arrangement with members of the PFL brought them some ministries and the PMDB was represented. As Ames (2002, 163) explains, “no coalitional strategy, no single motivation except the recruitment of personally loyal followers, explains Fernando Collor’s cabinet appointments.”

Itimar Franco, who took office after Collor’s impeachment, put together a cabinet that was rather more partisan, but still disconnected from the electoral arena. The remainder of the term was marked by reshuffles and ad hoc coalitions.

By 1994, after Collor’s removal from office and two years under president Franco, the environment had changed dramatically. First, presidential elections became concurrent in 1994 coinciding with legislative, gubernatorial and state assembly elections and allowing a far closer relationship between legislative parties and executive contests. Second, the winner of the first round – Cardoso – belonged to a major party, which made Cardoso a more credible bargaining partner. Both the PSDB and Opposition PT formed their closest alliances in exchange for the most immediate executive post – the vice presidential candidacy (given to the PFL by Cardoso’s PSDB and to the PDT by the Lula’s PT). Considered centrist or even center-left at the time, the PSDBs cooperation with the right-wing PFL came with some costs. Despite Cardoso’s efforts to emphasize

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the need to exploit the PFL’s electoral organization northeast, local PSDB organizations in the region threatened to “go their own way” if the alliance proceeded. However, what costs came to the PSDB were tempered by the fact that the PFL operated largely in the states (that is, districts) of the underdeveloped north-east, where the PSDB was far less competitive. Meanwhile, membership in the Cardoso’s alliance brought success to the first round partners, the PFL and PTB, in other races. The PMDB and PPR “climb[ed] aboard Cardoso’s bandwagon,” abandoning their own weak nominees and associating themselves with Cardoso’s coalition (Schneider 1996, 124).

The practice of “trading” electoral contributions for posts emerged, but was by no means fully institutionalized in this first concurrent election with the strong contenders associated with pre-existing parties. The pressure of the alliance upon the distribution of government offices was greater even than Cardoso and the PSDB leadership had anticipated. One PSDB leader noted, "it is obvious that those who supported his candidacy have an assured right to participate in the government. But you can be certain that we will not be witnessing a physiological orgy in the sharing out of posts.” Another PSDB leader said days after the election, “Rather than reduce the size of the [27-member] cabinet as we have proposed, we would have to increase the number of ministries to around 40 to meet the demands for posts' from parties that supported Fernando Henrique Cardoso.” The tension between the alliance’s collective desire for sharing power and spoils and the president’s formal role in cabinet appointment was explicit. Cardoso

84 See “Lula causes unease in the barracks; Retired general praises ‘excellent’ Cardoso”, Latin America Weekly Report May 5, 1994
85,86 See “Alliance members expect reward for backing Cardoso”, Latin America Regional Reports: Brazil, October 27, 1994
himself at one point was inclined to reaffirm the presidential prerogative: “I do not intend to be their hostage…while we are going to govern together, I am the one who will choose the members of my team.” 86 The very need for such pronouncements underscores the enormous shift in the degree to which electoral origins shaped interparty relations in Brazil. Ultimately, several top posts went to the PSDB and non-partisans, while each of the alliance members were rewarded with a portion of the remaining ministries.

Unlike Collor’s coalitions, which displayed little party-level bargaining, and Franco’s which were fully disconnected from the electoral realm, parties contributed electoral support to Cardoso’s alliance with the clear expectation that they would be rewarded with executive appointments—though they perhaps expected an even more partisan cabinet. Unlike Collor, Cardoso and his party were part of the long-sighted game of interparty bargaining and reputation building. And electoral roots mattered as the government unfolded 87. Kingstone (1999, 199) recounts “Cardoso’s coalition appeared much more solid than Collor’s had because several of his coalition partners did not field presidential candidates….” This despite the fact that the main partners were similar across each president’s coalition.

Further, as the apparent inevitability of the partisan makeup of Cardoso cabinet suggests, the relationship between the presidential party and partners had been significantly leveled. Amorim Neto et al (2003), who first highlighted the change in

87 This can be seen in the governing parties’ “roll-rates” – the percent of roll call votes supported by governing parties that are lost on the floor (Amorim Neto, Cox and McCubbins 2003). To that point, only Cardoso’s period suggested the formation of a “cartel” that prevent shifting coalitions from influencing the agenda. Cardoso’s coalitions are considerably more successful in preventing government “rolls” than Franco, who had an even more inclusive coalition.
government success between the Collor/Franco and Cardoso governments, note that “one might conjecture that Cardoso chose to build a large electoral coalition for both presidential and legislative purposes, then leveraged this into a workable legislative majority” (575, emphasis added).

Indeed this seems to be the case, and subsequent elections have followed a similar pattern as noted above. Although Cardoso’s successor, Lula de Silva did not manage to reach a majority with only pre-electoral partners in 2002, the bulk of the cabinet membership was determined based on pre-electoral relationships, rather than post-electoral bargaining with parties. Despite Brazil’s reputation for ad hoc executive-legislative negotiations, post-electoral bargaining since 1994 (at least over the identity of governing partners) appears to have been significantly constrained by pre-electoral agreements, with each coalition since then reaching majorities or sizable minorities with the aid of their electoral allies.

5.5 Sharing internal Legislative Posts

In the previous section I noted the potential importance of controlling the bodies that compose the organization of the assembly. Committees sometimes have delaying or proposal power (Strøm 1990, Mattson and Strøm 1995) while posts in the directorate of the assembly (presiding officers or seats on the directing board) can also strongly influence the flow of legislation. These posts serve not only to regulate the power of the government relative to the opposition (or the majority to minority), but also within the government. Indeed this is closely related to the discussion in the last section on
government control of legislative posts: the more control over these posts and the stronger they are, the more opportunities and the more valuable is power-sharing within the coalition. As argued above, the expectation that legislative posts will be distributed in accordance with each party’s investment in winning the election, as opposed to an uncertain post-electoral bargaining game, enhances the value of electoral coalitions.

I also expect that multiparty pre-electoral coalitions should allocate legislative posts among coalition members based on their seat contribution. As with portfolios, these positions are part of the spoils of office with which parties can be rewarded contribution to the government, rather than their pivotalness. In pre-election coalitions, there is a greater incentive to emphasize the basic contribution to electoral success, which should be closely related to seats. In post-electoral alliances, parties can use their leverage in building the coalition with less concern about the consequences for their relationship with the other parties. Thus, we should expect that:

(1) Internal distributions in pre-electoral coalitions should be based more on seat contributions than in post-electoral governments.

(2) Post-electoral advantages should be weaker when parties have negotiated before the election.

To test this, I replicate the models used above for portfolios using the share of the governing partners’ internal distribution of directing board power and committee chairs across all cases. The results are shown in Table 6.
Directing boards generally allow almost as much freedom in distribution inside the governing coalition as portfolios, and may well be nearly as important. As predicted, we find that seat contribution is a stronger predictor of directing board allocation when governing coalitions are electoral alliances. Voting weights are a strong predictor of allocations in post-electoral coalitions, and again have no impact when partners have allied before the election.

Since committee chairs are generally less important than the cabinet and regulated somewhat more formally in many cases, we might expect more limited incentives and opportunities for differences between coalitions to emerge. Indeed, the difference across pre- and post-electoral cases for the coefficient for seat contribution (.69 and .94) is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p=.121). However, the seat coefficients are best examined in comparison to “perfect” seat-based internal proportionality. Following the same pattern discussed above, the magnitude of the seat contribution effect is closer to proportionality in electoral alliances than post-electoral coalitions. While the coefficient for post-electoral allocation (.69) is statistically distinct from one, that in pre-election alliances (.94) is statistically indistinguishable from unity and the constant within that sample (-.009+.007) is indistinguishable from zero. A visual comparison among the coefficients is shown in Figure 10.
Table 6: Internal Allocation of Directing Board Seats And Committee Chairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(2) Directing Board seats</th>
<th>(1) Committee Chairs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electoral Alliance</td>
<td>-0.042</td>
<td>-0.010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.032)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contribution</td>
<td>0.520</td>
<td>0.700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.139)**</td>
<td>(0.097)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seat Contrib. X Alliance</td>
<td>0.473</td>
<td>0.241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)*</td>
<td>(0.155)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight Contribution</td>
<td>0.380</td>
<td>0.217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.149)*</td>
<td>(0.102)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voting Weight X Alliance</td>
<td>-0.271</td>
<td>-0.153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.217)</td>
<td>(0.149)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur</td>
<td>-0.023</td>
<td>0.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.038)</td>
<td>(0.026)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formateur X Alliance</td>
<td>-0.093</td>
<td>-0.070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.069)</td>
<td>(0.050)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.043</td>
<td>0.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.024)</td>
<td>(0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1%

Voting weight again is associated with a significant increase in committee chairs (.217), while the effect does not exist in pre-election governments. Formateurs in post-election governments similarly obtain a significant bonus in their intra-governmental share of committee shares that is not present in pre-election coalitions.
The coefficients predicting the internal distribution among governing parties on the directing board follow even more closely the pattern demonstrated above in the distribution of portfolios. A comparison of coefficients and confidence intervals for each variable across government types is illustrated in Figure 7. The coefficient for seat contribution when the government is an electoral alliance (.99) is statistically no different from 1, while the constant within this sample (-.042+.042) is zero. The coefficients for voting weight, however, have the opposite pattern: while providing a significant bonus.
(.38) in the context of post-electoral bargaining, among electoral alliances the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero (p=0.49).

Interestingly, while there is no “formateur bonus” on directing boards in post-electoral governments, the coefficient among electoral alliances is negative and significant (-.11, p=.045). This suggests that pre-electoral coalitions have a greater tendency agree that parties that do not receive the prime ministership will be compensated with overrepresentation in the legislative leadership.
5.7 Summary

In this chapter I have investigated the internal distribution of offices across portfolios each across parliamentary, presidential and premier presidential systems. In these cases, the electoral origins of the governing coalitions mattered for the internal division of the spoils. In each case, I saw substantial differences between pre- and post-
electoral governments in terms the tendency to distribute “fair” seat-based allocations compared to their bargaining weight or proposal advantages. In each sample examined with regard to portfolio distributions, the pivotalness (voting weight) advantage is always present in post-electoral cases and, never present in a positive and significant form when pre-electoral commitments are made. In unconstrained post-electoral bargaining, a party’s pivotalness in the formation of majorities leads to a substantial bonus in all samples examined. Voting weight is not a positive and significant predictor of portfolio allocations when bargaining is governed by pre-electoral commitments.

For the most part, the same is true for the agenda-setting (formateur) advantage. Some formateur effect occurs in parliamentary regimes, but not when parties have cooperated in elections. In premier presidential systems, there is a stronger formateur bonus overall, due to institutional powers, but no distinction across electoral origins. In presidential regimes, the formateur effect is quite substantial in post-electoral bargaining, yet minimal when the cabinet is formed by electoral allies. For presidential regimes, if we treat independents as part of the president’s contingent, the “formateur bonus” is present and substantial regardless of electoral origins, but is significantly less for presidents who have formed pre-electoral alliances, indicating a tendency to benefit pre-electoral partners at the expense of president’s non-partisan appointments, as well as the president’s party.

In the next chapter I examine how coalitions examine the *external* division of offices, specifically whether “to the victors go the spoils.”
Chapter 6: Legislative Majoritarianism

6.1 Introduction

In the previous chapter, I argued that whether coalitions originate from "pre-electoral" or "post-electoral" bargaining is consequential for internal distributive decisions. In this chapter, I focus on how negotiations before an election can affect costs and benefits of collectively controlling greater shares of legislative power. The basic premise of this chapter is that organizing to skew the distribution of power in a legislature requires cooperation and trust, which can be induced by electoral origins. Specifically, as a coalition's collective electoral identity becomes more important relative to the individual electoral identity of its component parties, coalition members can derive a greater benefit from seizing a disproportionate share of power within the assembly. Conversely, the more post-electoral bargaining necessary to form and maintain coalition, the more risky become majoritarian distributions of legislative power.

6.2 Legislative Organization and Cooperation

It its core, legislative organization is about cooperation. Arrangements to distribute power require the assent of a majority and stable decisions that remove power from some and distribute it to others. In Chapter 1, I used the example of vote-trading members of a diverse party to demonstrate why temptation among partners to defect on agreements in the short-term can be overcome by considerations of the
future gains that would thereby be sacrificed. The more frequently legislators believe that they will trade votes with one another in the future, the more that they will trust each other in the present. This, as I noted, is the reasoning behind the notion of legislative parties calls “long coalitions” (Schwartz 1989): parties functioning as legislative organizations to solve the problem of credible trades. As the prospects for future interaction overwhelm the advantages of defection the incentives to renege on agreements are reduced.

The electoral arena acts as external mechanism to create the expectation that coalition partners will cooperate. As their electoral fates intertwine, legislators have an even stronger incentive to expect cooperation from one another. The more legislators believe that their electoral fortunes are correlated, the more they should trust each other to fulfill agreements in the legislature. That is, if their faction is likely to rise and fall together on the basis of their collective behavior—as may be the case when they have a common brand for electoral purposes—they can expect greater cooperation from one another. This external interconnection, I argue, can emerge among parties and brings reduces the risks of organizing the legislature in favor of the government or majority.

The literature on U.S. congressional parties gives us some guidance as to how electoral incentives can function in fostering cooperative behavior among agents. Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2005) view party legislative records as contributing to a valuable collective good - the party vote in elections that helps maintain control of Congress. They thus view much of legislative organization in the U.S House as an
attempt to regulate the electoral externalities that legislators' actions might impose on one another. In a multiparty context, Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006) make a similar argument with regard to West European parliamentary governments that, unlike the interest groups that informally influence single-party governments, independent parties in multiparty governments with narrower mandates have incentives to use government with less regard for overall efficiency. The reason, again, is that single parties induce cooperation via a unified, rather than dispersed, electoral accountability.

In this chapter, I extend the argument that connected electoral fates enhance legislative cooperation to a cross-regional study of inter-party politics, using the pre-electoral coalitions studied in previous chapters as a measure of electoral association. The core argument is that greater electoral interconnection—as measured by inter-party pacts or mergers—leads to incentives for deeper legislative cooperation. The cooperative activity under study is the agreement to skew the distribution of major legislative posts – committee chairs and the directorate – in favor of the majority. If they win control of the assembly, I argue, coalitions that have campaigned together are more likely to work together in taking greater shares of legislative posts as the risks of allowing partners greater power are mitigated by their shared investment in

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88 Other recent work on the US has also emphasized the electoral component of legislative cooperation. Lipinski (2004), for example, argues that members of the majority party in the U.S. House campaign on the majority's collective record (rather than “running against Congress,” as they might if they saw themselves as independent), while the minority campaigns against it. Similar themes emerge in the study of “message politics” (e.g. Evans and Oleszek 2001), whereby the parties work to enhance their general reputation as a means to influence the election of individual members and, in turn, their behavior as legislators.
the electoral value of the coalition.

6.3 Distributing power under linked versus separate electoral origins

All majority coalitions, regardless of their origins, would seem to have good reason to seek maximum control over a legislature that they win. After all, seizing control of the spoils of office is often considered one of the benefits of “winning,” certainly in terms of controlling executive portfolios. Moreover, if a coalition has a majority, they usually have the ability to enact any distribution they (collectively) wish. Why then should pre-electoral allies and post-electoral partners behave differently vis-à-vis allowing greater representation to the opposition? The answer, I suggest, lies in the extent to which parties in each situation are likely to “trust” their governing partners.

When parties have jointly announced their intent to form a government together, they have made an investment in their collective fortunes beyond that of post-electoral coalitions, acquiring some elements associated with single party organizations. The more that governing partners expect to have a collective electoral identity, the more difficult for member parties or factions to divorce themselves electorally from the government with which they participate. When the members of electoral coalitions have weak individual reputations and rely more on their collective reputation, they should have a greater desire to protect it, and should expect their partners to share that desire. Yet, if opposition legislators can block the government’s agenda, or propose bills that expose the government’s internal divisions, the governing coalition’s ability to regulate its collective
reputation is weakened. Hence, the more parties expect one another to be concerned with their *joint* reputation, the greater control all governing partners should want the government as a whole to have over the most important posts in the legislature. Conversely, the more parties expect one another to be concerned with their *own* reputation (independent of their coalition) the less additional power they should want their partners to accumulate.\(^{89}\)

To be more precise, consider two parties who have committed to forming a governing coalition. For present purposes, I describe legislative organization along two key dimensions: the government’s share of legislative posts, \(\pi\), and each governing party’s share of that pie, \(\alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\), such that \(\pi\alpha_1 + \pi\alpha_2 + (1-\pi) = 1\). For simplicity, these shares \(\alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\) are held fixed and are assumed to be proportional to each party’s seat contribution to the coalition. Thus, the only decision the partners face concerns the share of power for the government (\(\pi\)) and for the opposition (1-\(\pi\)).

Why would governing partners leave any power to the opposition? To suggest an answer, consider a spatial analogy to illustrate the notion of “trust”: suppose that politics is unidimensional and that the final policy outcome chosen by the legislature, denoted \(X\in\mathbb{R}\), is a weighted average of the ideal points (i.e., electoral positions) of the three parties, denoted \(x_1\), \(x_2\) and \(x_3\) respectively, where \(x_1 < x_2 < x_3\). Formally, \(X(\pi) = \pi\alpha_1 x_1 + \pi\alpha_2 x_2 + (1-\pi)x_3\). Each party seeks to get the best possible outcome, where the utility to

\(^{89}\)That is, beyond what they “deserve” based on their size.
party j from the outcome X is $U_j(X) = -(x_j - X)^2$. Thus, party j prefers the value of $\pi$ that maximizes $U_j(X(\pi))$.

Given that party 1 is ‘farther’ from the opposition in its electoral positioning (by assumption), 1’s preferred value of $\pi$ is 1. This gives all power to the government and, assuming that 1 and 2 are of equal size so $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$, the final policy $X$ will be at the midpoint between the two governing parties’ ideal points, $(x_1 + x_2)/2$. The more “centrist” party, 2, prefers a value of $\pi$ less than 1. The reason is that $(x_1 + x_2)/2 = X(1) < x_2 < X(0) = x_3$. The best value for party 2, denoted $\pi^*_2$, is such that $X(\pi^*_2) = x_2$, and this implies $0 < \pi^*_2 < 1$. Thus, the more “centrist” partner always has a reason to allow the opposition some influence, if final legislative outcomes can be modeled as a weighted average of the parties’ ideal points, where the weights reflect their share of important posts in the legislative process. I assume that the government’s chosen share of legislative posts, $\pi^*$, is some compromise between the two parties’ optima, $\pi^*_1$ and $\pi^*_2$, implying that $\pi^* < 1$.

Why is there any reason to expect that governing partners who had entered into a pre-election pact will take a larger share of the most important posts—i.e., choose a larger $\pi^*$? Note first that $\pi^*$ increases as the two partners’ ideal points converge. In the extreme, when $x_1 = x_2$, both parties prefer to take all important legislative posts. Note also that the value of policy $X$ depends on its contribution to promoting an electorally valuable reputation. The ideal points $x_1$ and $x_2$ in fact can be taken to represent the optimal electoral reputations of the parties. Just as we might equate a congressional
district’s median voter with a corresponding legislator’s ideal point, the ideal points here are simply the public reputations that maximize the future prospects for returning to power for each party. Hence, \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) are *induced* by the campaign context – the electoral origins – where competition separates and cooperation conjoins.

The key argument of this chapter is that \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) will become closer and closer as the *collective reputation* for 1 and 2 together becomes more and more important relative to the individual reputations of each party, from the perspective of generating votes. In the extreme, if the two parties have lost any distinct “brand name” and rely wholly on the collective or alliance brand name, the two should agree on what position best maximizes the electoral prospects for the alliance as a whole. Since electoral strategy is an important factor driving the parties’ ideal points (along with, of course, their policy goals), they will converge more the more they share an important joint reputation.

Parties that form pre-election alliances are precisely those which are creating a more important joint reputation (via joint lists, joint platforms, and other cooperation), at the expense of their individual maneuverability. They have put themselves into an electoral situation where their interests are closer. Thus, all else equal, their induced ideal points will be closer and they will choose to take a relatively larger share of important posts in the legislature. Single party majority governments, by this same reasoning, with the greatest pre-electoral convergence, have the least reason to allow opposition power, and the most to lose.
We can now summarize these conclusions in more concrete terms. A purely *post-electoral* coalition (as I have defined it) is formed by parties who are to some degree electoral adversaries—more like firms in a competitive market. Such parties will cooperate in government, but are free to work at cross purposes in elections. A pre-electoral coalition, in contrast is formed by parties who are electoral allies. Such parties will cooperate both in government and *during election campaigns*. The key difference, from a legislative organization standpoint, is that post-electoral partners have more reason to fear their partners' gaining legislative power given that they are competing individually for votes. Pre-electoral partners, by contrast, recognize the investment made by each in the electoral coalition and can thus expect greater cooperation from one another.

### 6.4 Individual versus Collective Goals

The themes discussed above emphasize that creating a legislature that empowers governing parties requires cooperation among those parties. Pre-electoral coalitions are groups composed of individual units of some sort, each agents of a distinct constituency. These may be individual legislators as in the US, provincial parties as in Argentina, or parties as in Italy, Chile or France. Yet all have in common the existence of some degree of office-seeking electoral cooperation *between* these distinct agents. Facing an otherwise highly complex electoral environment, agents charged with distinct representational tasks cooperate to achieve these tasks more efficiently.

However, allying electorally means sacrificing some freedom of future bargaining interaction. Joining a party means an individual legislator *invests* in the party label
Joining an electoral coalition entails for a party similar, if not as deep, investment in the outcome of that coalition. One campaign advantage of electoral coalitions is efficiently conveying to supporters and interest groups a signal of quality—the ability to obtain office, the dependability for delivering goods once elected, and the nature of those goods. The association may involve an efficient means to signal anything from a package of policies (Snyder and Ting 2003) to ensuring distribution of public resources to a locality. This also produces a legislative advantage: other legislators with a common fate are similarly constrained. As a result, incentives for opportunism, whereupon certain members of a party abandon their coalition’s cause for private gain, should be weakened by expectations of more common electoral goals.

This notion of an electorally-defined coalition stands in contrast to a post-electoral grouping of unaffiliated individuals, each of whom would wish to retain legislative independence and the ability to freely undermine legislative bargains as it suits them. When legislative majorities are defined pre-electorally, however, they are identified more easily as prospective governments and are thus – for better or worse – more collectively accountable (Strøm 1990, Powell 2000, Shugart 2001).

Yet, so long as access to government is a public good shared by all members of an electorally-defined coalition, each component agent still faces considerable incentives to defect in favor of its own interests (i.e., its ‘base’) once in the legislature, such as by cooperating with the opposition on certain issues. The presence of this collective responsibility imposed upon actors in the legislative arena, prompts greater concern from
each component about opportunism—the pursuit of some more particularistic or otherwise short-sighted aim—that might undermine an optimal electoral strategy for the coalition as a whole. Hence, as diverse agents coalesce to form a collective identity via electoral association they develop a greater incentive to structure legislatures to protect that collective identity in the face of opportunistic incentives.

By definition, authority to limit ‘opportunism’ undermines differentiation within the coalition. As a coalition seizes control of legislative institutions, it minimizes opportunities for any given member to act contrary to the coalition for individual benefit. In turn, that party, faction or individual loses some of its freedom to make credible independent appeals, claim credit for legislation and propose or alter legislation in favor of their constituency and more dependent upon the collective governing record, be it asset or burden.

6.5 Implications for Controlling Legislative Institutions

So far, I have referred to “legislative posts” in the abstract. In any legislature, there is a clear distinction between “ordinary” legislators with only seats and privileged legislators who hold some form of special post. Often, such possession of these posts confers some form of special positive or negative agenda-setting powers, oversight power, informational advantages and/or staff resources. Most visible, perhaps, are those in the executive, such as ministers, junior ministers or heads of state agencies. I focus here on two basic kinds of special legislative post available for distribution to the government and opposition: 1) the chairs of a permanent committees and 2) membership
in the legislative directorate, which generally includes presiding officer post(s) and in most cases additional seats on a directing board.

Committees often have some form of power over the content of bills and the timeframe in which they are considered, as well as various oversight functions. To the extent this is so, the chair may act as an agenda-setter over the committee’s use of whatever power it has been given (Strøm 1998, Mattson and Strøm 1995). Practices governing their distribution are not only under the control of majorities but allow a range of possible distributions. In many legislatures, committees elect chairs internally, but few do so without predetermined arrangements or some form of external influence—allowing informal negotiations that may produce a range of outcomes. In other cases, either the board or the parties determine which members are awarded chairs, often subject to a series of floor votes organized by the majority. Opposition representation under either structure generally depends on informal negotiation.  

Usually, a directorate—such as the Rules Committee in the U.S. House, the Council of Elders in Germany’s Bundestag or the Presidium in the Polish Sejm—is empowered to control which bills come to debate and under what circumstances (e.g., under special rules or urgency) (Döring 1995, Figueiredo and Limongi 2000). Presiding officers and directing board members are often elected formally by a series of floor votes, but (like committee chairs) outcomes vary due to informal negotiations.

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90 In other words, these institutions are endogenous and can be almost always be changed by a legislative majority (McGann 2006).
Committee chairs, for the most part, represent jurisdictionally-defined portions of legislative. Often, they provide tools with which alternative coalitions can slow, complicate or expose the actions of government. Directing boards generally provide opportunities to add to the agenda, potentially allowing legislation to come to a vote that portions of the governing coalition might oppose. In either case, distributions that are more egalitarian allow members of the opposition have greater ability to use these institutions to undermine the government as opportunities arise.

Once created, coalitions with the greatest desire to control the agenda should seek substantial control over these legislative institutions. For purely post-electoral partners this is especially threatening, since greater “government” control means disproportionate power for their temporary partners. Electoral allies, however, can reap the benefits of government control with less threat of partners working at cross purposes. Following the arguments above, I expect an increased share of legislative leadership posts secured by governing parties within an electoral coalition compared to governing parties that have aligned more purely in the legislative arena:

*Parties in electorally allied governing coalitions will obtain a greater proportion of important legislative posts (per seat) than governing parties in post-electoral coalitions.*

And, for the governments as a whole:

*Governments formed by electoral allies will obtain a greater share of important legislative posts than those formed post-electorally.*
6.6 Empirical Analysis

To test these propositions, I have constructed an original dataset on directing boards and committee chair distributions for 87 majority governments across 47 democracies between 1992 and 2006, considered “free” by Freedom House during the time under study. The analysis is restricted to majority governments both because they provide the clearest distinctions among the relevant concepts and because they have the numerical strength needed to control the organization of the legislature. To measure “legislative posts” I have gathered data on committee chair and directorate allocations for each governing party in each government-year.

To measure the degree of electoral cooperation, I have obtained information on each election and government formation to determine whether parties had in fact been public electoral allies with a pact to govern jointly, or not, so as to distinguish “multiparty pre-electoral coalitions” (MPECs) from “post-electoral coalitions”. The MPEC variable is coded as follows. First, if sources\(^{91}\) indicated that the governing parties in a country-year had publicly announced their intention to enter government together prior to the election\(^{92}\), I coded \(MPEC = 1\). Other cases coded \(MPEC = 1\) involved even stronger public interparty cooperation – a formal joint platform or joint policy statements in combination with a joint list or general coordination on

\(^{91}\) Newspapers and other journalistic sources, including Keesing's World News Archives

\(^{92}\) In some cases such mutual announcements revolved around a presidential candidate
candidacies. Cases coded as “post-electoral” are based on information ruling out this possibility. If the governing parties had made clear (either before or after the election) that they would not necessarily enter government together, or if they indicated a preference not to enter government together, then $MPEC = 0$, as both are inconsistent with. All told, about 22% of the majority governments covered in this analysis qualified as $MPEC=1$.

“Posts per seat” at the party level

Table 7 presents the results of a test of the first hypothesis above on a cross-section of governing parties, all in multi-party governments. “Share of Directing Board Seats” refers to the share of a legislative steering body controlled by a given governing party, while “Share of Committee Chairs” provides the same calculation for percentage of committee chairs held by a governing party. I regress each governing party’s share of committee chairs or the directing board on governing party seat shares, the dummy for multi-party electoral coalition ($MPEC$) and an interaction of the two. Governing parties within electoral alliances consistently receive a larger share of important legislative posts per seat than those in post-electoral coalitions, which tend to receive near proportional allotments—that is, not much more than seat share. While the post-electoral coalitions adhere to closer to proportionality in distributing posts to parties, parties in electoral

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93 To clarify some of these terms, note that “joint list” means either a joint national list or a comprehensive series of joint district lists. Examples of pre-election coalitions based on “comprehensive negotiations of mutual withdrawals” include the Polo in Italy and the coalition of right-of-center parties in France. Note that, merely because a government is identifiable (cf. Powell 2000), may not qualify it as a pre-election coalition by the criteria just given.

94 While 21% were single-party majorities and the remainder were post-electoral multi-party majorities.
alliances (*MPEC*) receive a “bonus” in the amount of each form of legislative power allocated per seat of about 43% and 37% respectively.
Table 7: “Payoff per Seat” in Share of Legislative Posts, Governing Parties (OLS)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of Committee Chairs</th>
<th>Share of Directorate Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seat share</td>
<td>1.056</td>
<td>0.886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.058)**</td>
<td>(0.084)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party Electoral Coalition (MPEC)</td>
<td>-0.034</td>
<td>-0.050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.020)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPEC X Seat Share</td>
<td>0.387</td>
<td>0.486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.095)**</td>
<td>(0.137)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.024</td>
<td>0.049</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.014)</td>
<td>(0.020)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Committee Chairs

Directorate Seats

Figure 12: Party Bonuses per Seat across Governing Parties in MPEC vs. POST
The Government-level Bonus

This pattern is obviously related to, and a product of, the collective share of legislative posts taken by the governing coalition as a whole after a given election. The structure of this question resembles the extent of “responsiveness” in the standard seats-votes curve (Kendall and Stuart 1950, Gelman and King 1994), where the government and opposition are like two “parties” taking a portion of the seats on the directing board or across the roster of chairs. The extended beta binomial model is one designed for this type of proportions data (Palmquist 1999, Cox and Katz 2002), combining the within-group binomial distribution with the beta distribution, accounting for non-binomial variance across or within groups, so that the raw data are usable without modification.

The dependent variable is the count of chairs/directorate seats held by the governing majority relative to the total number of such seats. In addition to the size of the governing coalition (which controls for any potential advantages held by coalitions with larger majorities), the independent variables include dummies representing two of the three categories of government—multi-party pre-electoral coalitions (MPEC) and single-party governments (SPG), where multiparty post-electoral coalitions are the residual category (POST). Again, all cases have majorities in the assembly.
### Table 8: Government Bonuses on Directing Boards and Committee Chairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chairs</th>
<th>Directorate Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beta</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Coalition Seat Share (%)</td>
<td>3.397** (1.45)</td>
<td>3.446* (1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party Electoral Coalition (MPEC)</td>
<td>0.757*** (0.24)</td>
<td>0.933*** (0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Government (SPG)</td>
<td>1.152*** (0.31)</td>
<td>1.592*** (0.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.397** (1.45)</td>
<td>3.446* (1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gamma</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0838*** (0.024)</td>
<td>0.0997*** (0.037)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
The results show that governments based on electoral alliances consistently take a significantly larger portion of the committee chairs and directorate seats available in a legislature, compared to those based on post-electoral bargaining.

To better gauge the substantive difference across each category, I plot fitted values in Figures 13 and 14 below across the coalition’s seat share. Figure 13 shows the extent to which the government bonus in chairs within the MPEC cases differs from that of the POST cases and comes closer to that of SPGOV.
Figure 13: The Government “Bonus” in Committee Chairs by Electoral Origin, Fitted Values
We see a similar pattern with directorate seats, shown plotted in Figure 14, with an large distinction between these “pre-electoral” cases and the POST cases in terms of the bonus for a given government size. Note for example that a POST coalition with 55 percent of seats has a representation “bonus” of only about 5 percent while a MPEC coalition with the same number of seats obtains about an additional 25 percent share of the directing board.
Figure 14: The Government “Bonus” in Directorate Seats by Electoral Origin, Fitted Values
Obviously, committees and directing boards are not created equal, as I have assumed above. Although I have suggested that who controls committees matters even in the weakest cases, it should not be ignored that some committee systems are quite weak while others possess significant positive and negative agenda power (Strøm 1998). As such, one might argue that the extent of a more or less “majoritarian” distribution of legislative posts depends in part on their relative power. On one hand, the power of broader membership of the assembly (backbenchers and opposition) might be weakened by having weak committees. In cases such as Brazil, committee chairs are distributed to the opposition with numerical proportionality but committees are subject to provisions that severely limit any potential gate keeping power and, hence, their ability to interfere with the government’s agenda (Santos and Renno 2004). In such instances, the marginal value of controlling additional chairs would not be significant. In the US, gate-keeping power for committees is famously and perhaps uniquely strong, but the practice of centralized majority control over the allocation of committee positions—producing chairs and majorities on all committees—renders them effectively subordinate to the majority party caucus (Cox and McCubbins 1993). It is reasonable to expect then that, in countries where strong committees are present there is always a higher baseline level of concern for keeping their control within the government, and less so elsewhere.\footnote{An assumption here is that the formal powers of committees (which tend to be clearly specified), are in some sense more exogenous to the will of a given coalition then their distribution.}

I attempt to address this by introducing a dummy variable for cases considered to have “strong” committees (in the sense of agenda influence) by Mattson and Strøm.
which I have extended to include or exclude several other cases with similar features to those identified by these authors. This dichotomous coding, though highly simplified and one-dimensional, is designed simply to capture whether a chamber’s committees have a combination of powers of amendment, delay and initiation to make them formidable sources of power—at least formally—in the legislative process. Cases not coded as “strong” represent a mixed category, ranging from very weak to moderate powers, though all certainly have in common an apparent lack of negative power. The strength of committees is closely, though not perfectly, related to the strength of directing boards as well. Though not directly a negative function, committee strength necessarily reduces the power of the directing-board to influence the agenda. This operationalization thus allows us to test, to some extent, the independent impact of the strength of committees on the tendency to dominate the distribution of each kind of post.
Table 9: Government Bonuses on Directing Boards and Committee Chairs Revisited

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chairs</th>
<th>Directorate Seats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Beta</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Govt. Coalition Seat Share (%)</td>
<td>4.038***</td>
<td>3.255*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multi-party Electoral Coalition (MPEC)</td>
<td>0.710***</td>
<td>0.959***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Single Party Government (SPG)</td>
<td>1.160***</td>
<td>1.452***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Committees</td>
<td>0.484***</td>
<td>-0.450*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.842**</td>
<td>-1.199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.84)</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gamma</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>0.0716***</td>
<td>0.0915**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.036)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo R2</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The results in Table 9 replicate the analysis in Table 8, introducing a “strong committees” dummy. Each of the results is qualitatively similar to the previous table. The earlier results suggesting stark differences between electoral alliances and post-electoral coalitions are not affected by controlling for committee power. Instead, these results suggest that governments in countries where committees are strong always take somewhat greater control over the distribution of chairs, regardless of “electoral origin.” Assuming that in countries where committees are considered strong, the directing board is weaker in relative terms, the negative coefficient for strong committees can be interpreted as indicating that directing boards coexisting to stronger committees (i.e., relatively weaker ones) are always allocated more favorably to the opposition, all else
equal. In either case, we can draw the tentative conclusion that, since taking greater
shares of legislative post distributions is not costless, coalitions tend to do so less when
the power of those posts is least—regardless of the type of coalition. The coalitions
governing assemblies consistently take majority advantage as they are more united
electorally, but reserve the weakest posts for relatively more opposition representation.

6.7 Conclusion

In this chapter, I argued that one element of the distribution of power in
legislatures—the size of the government share of legislative power—derives
fundamentally from the distinction between coalitions that are "pre-electoral" in origin
and those that derive from "post-electoral" bargaining. I argue that a governing
coalition’s propensity to dominate positions of agenda control – committees and directing
boards – derives from the degree of post-electoral bargaining among governing partners.
As the coalition's collective electoral identity becomes more important relative to the
individual electoral identities of its component parties, coalition members derive a greater
benefit from allowing the seizure a disproportionate share of power within the assembly.
Conversely, the more post-electoral bargaining necessary to form and maintain a
coalition, the less attractive is a majoritarian distribution.

Consistent with my main argument, I find that compared to governments that
form after the election, which allocate most proportionally, multiparty governments that
form before the election take on average a significant bonus. The strongest ‘pre-electoral
coalitions’, single party governments, take the greatest bonus. Each party within the
government also receives a greater payoff in posts *per seat* when in a pre-electorally negotiated coalition, compared to those in post-electoral coalitions. Finally, I examined the role of committee strength and determined that stronger committees are always subject to greater government dominance, owing to their importance to all forms of coalitions.
Chapter 7: Conclusions

7.1 Basic Findings

In the first part of this dissertation, I argued that parties in all democratic regimes always have an incentive to form an alliance aimed at collectively controlling the chief executive and legislature. The set of national government portfolios and other offices, I argued, provides an overarching goal to which many other strategic concerns are subordinate and intermediate. By this reasoning, a party not already capable of controlling government alone therefore always has strong reasons to form a pre-election alliance. Thus, the most widely discussed factor in electoral aggregation studies -- electoral coordination benefits (disproportionality) must be only part of the story: for portfolio-seeking parties, the ability to gain more seats per vote only adds to the utility of alliances. Thus, given these consistent advantages, the question becomes, “why not alliances?”

Chapter 2 began to answer this question by exploring the roles of electoral coordination benefits, reputation costs, party bargaining power and coalition bargaining power, concluding that the reputational effect on votes is the decisive factor in the decision to ally. Chapters 3 and 4 accordingly focused on exploring several reasons why allying is especially costly in some political systems compared others. Electoral cooperation among legislative parties is advantageous only to the extent it ensures consistent access to the control of government without severe costs to votes and seats. Since parties capable of costless alliances would have strong reasons to form a pre-
election coalition, I drew particular attention to institutions that exacerbate reputation costs by driving party competition away from local politics and toward national party reputations. The more important it is for parties to stake a consistent position on national policy issues the more sensitive their vote shares will be to the power-seeking pragmatism of alliance strategies. While idiosyncratic factors specific to a given election or party-system may also provide additional reasons to engage in or avoid alliances, I have suggested several systemic factors to explain why alliances may not be too costly to form—in particular, the localizing and personalizing effect of districting and nominal voting.

The second part of the thesis explored the non-seat payoffs that encourage pre-electoral coalitions. I made two basic claims regarding the distribution of offices: (1) the more “pre-electoral” a coalition, the more it is internally cooperative; and (2) the more “pre-electoral” a coalition, the less it is externally cooperative. Each empirical claim follows from a solution to the tension between individual and collective goals enabled by pre-electoral coalitions.

Chapter 5 pointed out that winning control of government is a collective good for a pre-election coalition, where member parties benefit regardless of their individual contribution to achieve it. In order for the alliance to be successful, they must collectively win the election (be able to form a government) but how much parties will work toward that goal depends on their individual incentives. I have focused here on incentives that can be created by the distribution of portfolios. If negotiations surrounding a governing coalition were entirely post-electoral, parties should receive
portfolios based in large part on their bargaining position. If a pre-electoral coalition allowed a partner’s payoff to depend only on post-electoral circumstances, there is no assurance that contributing more to the (costly) collective election effort by winning more seats will bring any marginal benefit. Thus, I argued that partners in pre-election alliances should agree *ex ante* to reward one another for their output – the seats they win. With this commitment, all partners have an incentive to maximize their own contribution to the coalition’s electoral effort, thereby enhancing the coalition’s probability of reaching its majority goal. As a result, portfolio allocations in pre-electoral coalitions should be more internally proportional compared to post-electoral coalitions, where parties will employ their bargaining weight unconstrained.

I showed empirically that the electoral origins of the governing coalitions mattered for the internal division of the spoils. In all regime types, the pivotalness (bargaining power) advantage is always present in post-electoral cases and, never present in a positive and significant form in coalitions arising from pre-electoral commitments. With the exception of premier-presidential regimes, the same is true for the supposed agenda-setting advantage held by the “formateur.”

These findings are significant for the literature on Gamson’s Law (Gamson 1961)—the principle that parties should win portfolios based on seats. Here I have isolated a set of circumstances (pre-electoral coalitions) where Gamson’s Law is extremely strong and bargaining power seemingly irrelevant. Further, the otherwise elusive empirical power the bargaining weight appears very strong in post-electoral coalitions, even controlling for seats.
The second claim was that the more pre-electoral a coalition, the more ‘majoritarian’ its behavior when organizing the legislature. In Chapter 6, I argued that one element of the distribution of power in legislatures—the incentive for the government to take a “bonus” in legislative posts—derives from whether the coalition is pre-electoral in origin or results from post-electoral bargaining. As the coalition's collective electoral identity becomes more important relative to the individual electoral identities of its component parties, coalition members can better trust one another, allowing the governing majority to take a disproportionate share of power within the assembly. Consistent with that argument, I found that compared to governments that form after the election, which allocate most proportionally to the opposition, multiparty governments that form before the election take on average a significant bonus. The strongest ‘pre-electoral coalitions’, single party governments, take the greatest bonus. These findings help illuminate why majority legislative coalitions, all with the numerical ability to take greater control over an assembly, differ in the extent to which they use that power.

7.2 The Cycle of Pre-electoral Bargaining and Post-electoral Benefits

These relationships just summarized relate to one another in a more dynamic fashion: the actions taken by coalitions feedback into the future electoral strategies chosen by parties seeking power. If pre-electoral coalitions form, they must reconcile the individual interests of the parties with their collective goal. Their likelihood of success depends upon their ability to institute an internal payment scheme that induces cooperation. If they are successful, and they follow through on promises made to members, they enhance
for members the value of maintaining the alliance and continuing their contribution. Further, if they are successful, and their joint electoral constraints allow members to cooperate again to organize government/majority dominance of the distribution of legislative posts, they further enhance the value of maintaining the alliance by increasing the value of their individual expected payoffs. The more majoritarian the post-electoral environment, the greater the imperative to seek pre-electoral majorities. Thus, success enhances both the credibility and value of further pre-electoral bargaining. Success may can also reduce the value of future independent competition: if the coalition is successful in organizing the legislature to reduce opposition influence, opportunities for differentiation among partners diminish as governing parties cannot as easily cooperate with the opposition.

We can speculate then that successful pre-election alliances are, over time, partly a result of the factors discussed in chapters 5 and 6, just as they are causes. Success itself increases the benefits of subsequent cooperation in pre-electoral alliances, increases the credibility of such agreements and decreases the opportunity costs. Figure 15 shows how such a cycle would work, filtered in each election through the contravening or compounding effects of the electoral system. Each arrow represents a probabilistic causal relationship: (1) between the formation of pre-electoral coalitions (Chapter 2) and the dominance of important legislative posts when successful in reaching a majority (Chapter 6) and (2) the reverse relationship, as parties coalesce to ensure they win a now more valuable majority. Success in each cycle depends both on sufficiently low costs in

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96 This logic is analogous to that put forth by Strøm (1990) that opposition influence can explain why parties might find government membership less crucial.
the electoral arena (Chapter 3-4) and agreements to allocate the spoils of office that encourage contribution to the coalition’s overall success (discussed in Chapter 5),

![Diagram of pre-electoral alliances as cause and consequence](image)

**Figure 15: Pre-electoral Alliances as Cause and Consequence**

This cycle also speaks to the question of whether multi-party pre-election coalitions are temporary phenomena. If they are not successful and do not improve expectations for future value of cooperation, they are less likely to continue as a strategy. If they *are* successful, there are strong reasons for pre-electoral coalitions to continue in order to regain the governing power that they have increased in importance. In either case, the consequences of electoral origins may feed back into electoral behavior, causing electoral strategy, bargaining patterns and legislative organization to equilibrate. In other
words, as pre-electoral coalitions can “institutionalize” rewards for winning electoral
majories and for contributing to them, they are likely to become modal strategies for
politicians seeking power.

In the study of electoral systems, this type of co-evolutionary relationship
between parties and rules is well established. Parties choose electoral systems (Boix
1999, Colomer 2004, Shugart 2001, 2006b) and rules in turn influence the behavior of
those very parties (Duverger 1954, Taagepera and Shugart 1989, Cox 1997). The same
can be said of legislative rules, though with greater weight on their endogeneity (McGann
2006). That is, parties choose legislative rules (Carroll, Cox and Pachon 2006) and are in
turn constrained and influenced by those rules (Cox 2000).

This co-evolution is related to the institutional clustering of majoritarian and
consensual “patterns” of democracy (Lijphart 1999). That is, features of political systems
that promote greater pre-electoral bargaining in the electoral arena, directly promote a
reduction in the influence of post-electoral bargaining in the legislative arena – both by
constraining partners’ bargaining positions and by limiting opposition influence.

My goal in this project was to examine, using behavior among parties, the
electoral origins of governing coalitions that give rise to the foundations to the traditional
distinctions between the single-party and multiparty governments highlighted by authors
such as Lijphart. I reconstructed this question using the more general concepts of pre-
electoral and post-electoral bargaining. With these concepts in hand, I have attempted to
explore key features of the distinction by examining differences among the electoral
origins of *multi-party* coalitions. In short, building a pre-electoral involves taking advantage of the electoral differences of component groups, providing selective incentives for partners to contribute to the electoral victory of the alliance, and using that victory to seize greater power. These incentives should apply as well to the internal organs of successful single party electoral coalitions, such as those in the US, as they do the multiparty electoral coalitions under study here.
Bibliography


