Title
Embodiments of Korean Mask Dance (T'alch'um) from the 1960s to the 1980s: Traversing National Identity, Subjectivity, Gender Binary

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A Dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

Critical Dance Studies

by

Sangwoo Ha

June 2015

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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION

Embodiments of Korean Mask Dance (T’alch’um) from the 1960s to the 1980s: Traversing National Identity, Subjectivity, Gender Binary

by

Sangwoo Ha

Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Critical Dance Studies
University of California, Riverside, June 2015
Dr. Linda J. Tomko, Chairperson

This study examines embodiments of the traditional Korean mask dance, t’alch’um, in the post-Korean War period. The military government and university student activists in South Korea utilized the t’alch’um as a pivotal vehicle for establishing “Korean” identity and subjectivity during a period of nation-building, from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, they each used different methods and pursued different goals. The government established the Cultural Heritage Protection System in 1962 with the goal of safeguarding the original form of the mask dance. One impact of the government’s system was to consolidate the power of the dictatorship. In contrast, university student activists recognized the necessity of preserving tradition and establishing an identity and subjectivity for the public. They created their own theater, called madanggūk, by connecting the principle of satire from the mask dance with socio-political and economic issues that resulted from the dictatorship’s oppressive policies. Through madanggūks, the
activists sought to promote “Koreanness” that originated from minjung (common people) and one important outcome was their expression of resistance against the dictatorship. Assessing these two reconstituting activities in the post-war era, the main purpose of this dissertation is to shine a critical spotlight on how the reconstitutions of dances past were differently appropriated and the impacts they exerted on national identity and subjectivity.

Although one of the goals of some developing reconstitutions of the mask dance was to challenge previous conservative and hierarchical ideologies, vestiges of 19th-century Korean Confucian patriarchy remained active in social and cultural conventions. This study analyzes how gender binaries in hierarchical relationships were circulated in reconstitutions of the t’alch’um. I examine how patriarchal family structures, sexual division of labor, and stereotyped images of women are depicted in androcentric storylines of the mask dance and madanggūk. I also analyze how vestiges of Korean Confucian patriarchy influenced relationships between men and women in performing groups.

This project employed several methodologies: oral interviews; analysis and interpretation of archival materials and secondary literature; and movement analysis of the t’alch’um and madanggūk as captured in photographs. While in South Korea from 2011 to 2013, I gathered written and visual documents and conducted interviews with professional dancers and scholars. Few moving image records exist for period reconstitutions of the mask dance and madanggūk. Limited numbers of still pictures are available for t’alch’um and madanggūk productions in this period. However, using photos, I studied various performing factors: what body parts performers primarily utilized, how
performance environments appeared, how performers located themselves in relation to spectators, and what costumes performers wore.

These methods enable me to argue that neither the Korean government reconstitutions nor university student performances of madanggūk escaped from the reach of Confucian philosophy, sovereign-centered system, and hierarchy, even though they each pursued democratic revolution from the 1960s to the 1980s. This study approaches the two reconstitutions with perspectives gleaned from several disciplines as it addresses cultural production in connection with politics, industrialization, and gender role issues.
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Editorial Practices

Translation and transcription

All translations are by Sangwoo Ha unless otherwise specified.

Korean-language texts, including song texts (lyrics) and dialogue (from playscripts, and published books) are translated into English within chapters of this dissertation. Such texts and dialogue are Romanized (put into Hangeul) and presented in accompanying Endnotes, together with their Moeum Jaeum (Korean-language symbols).

Quotations from Interviews that Sangwoo Ha conducted in the Korean language are translated by Ms. Ha into English for inclusion in chapters of this dissertation.

Terminology

Mask Dance

Many scholars translate t’alch’um as the mask dance drama because the Cultural Heritage Protection System has classified the t’alch’um as the folk theater field since 1962. However, I do not want to read the t’alch’um as more than or not only a theatre form; it is a composite art, including dance, song, and dialogue. Thus, I literally translate the t’alch’um in English. For Translation of the term t’alch’um, in my dissertation, T’al means a mask, and Ch’um means a dance. Based on these translations, I utilize the term “mask dance”
instead of the mask dance drama.

_Madanggūk_ This term refers to the university student activists’ creative performance form. I italicize this term because it is a Korean word.
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INTRODUCTION:
SPIRITUAL RESONANCE FROM KOREAN MASK DANCE T’ALCH’UM

*T’alch’um* was prosperous from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century during the last Korean dynasty, *Joseon*. The mask dance was classified as folk culture because most participants, including performers and spectators, came from the lower classes. The mask dance occurred not on the stage, but in the naturally occurring outdoors. For example, the foot of a mountain was a performance place for the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance, as Du-Hyeon Lee and Ok-Geun Han note (Lee 206; Han 151; 152). The *Bongsan* and *Tongyeong Ogwangdae* mask dances happened on the market ground – a vacant place in a village – as Ok-Geun Han puts it (Han 151; 152). In these mask dances, audiences surrounded the performance space on three sides. The mask dances did not have any curtains or stage backgrounds. They just utilized a bonfire as the stage lighting (151; 152). These environmental characteristics show that *t’alch’ums* in the past had no restrictions on setting up a performance place because the dance did not need any stage setting and décor (153). The curved line on which spectators sat became the boundary of performance space. There were also no formalities between performers and audiences. The mask dance held the door open for performers and spectators to meet each other and to have fun together (Cho 348).

Because the *t’alch’um* functioned as a space for grassroots conversations, it was more commonly performed during the agricultural off-season and during certain events such as *Dano, Chilseok, Chuseok*, and *Jeongwol Daeboreum*.¹ During those times, the lower classes, who worked as tenant farmers, gave thanks to their ancestors for the year’s harvest and prayed for a good harvest next year. They also needed to
recuperate from their fatigue caused by hard muscular labor and mentally by absolute obedience to the upper classes. These humble lives induced the common people to have a lot of grief-stricken resentment. Scholars agree that, for the lower classes, 19th-century mask dances functioned as effective ways to vent their built-up resentments in that the dances contained satirical content that manifested the lower classes’ feelings of disempowerment and resistance against an inequitable social hierarchy and patriarchal ideologies (S.-J. Kim 17; K.-S. Kim 109; Kang 207).

An interesting example of the dances’ ability to relieve can be found in the similarity with the Salpuri-Chum (exorcism dance). The shaman in the Salpuri-Chum was moved by a dead person’s sorrow and guided the spirit into a spiritualized peace and excitement. In a similar vein, performers of the t’alch’um were affected by the lower classes’ physical and mental labors. On behalf of the lower class spectators, performers utilized the mask dance’s characters to caricature and criticize the upper classes who wielded unconditional power in the 19th-century social system. Viewing the mask dance’s characters, audiences derived pleasure from the process of criticizing the governing classes and a seemingly unchangeable social system. They also temporarily enjoyed a sense of freedom from oppression even though they could not change the discriminatory class structure in which they lived, as Jin-Woo Kang notes (Kang 193). While identifying with performers and their movements in the t’alch’um, the more audiences relieved agonies in their lives, the more they were thought to reach a spiritual climax, called Sinmyung (excitement) (192).

Movements, which imitated various motions of the common people’s livelihood, helped the lower classes to understand the t’alch’um. According to Ok-Geun Han, movements of the mask dance can be classified into two types:
Geodeureum-Chum (slow dance); and Kkaekki-Chum (fast dance). Han notes that the movement styles of the mask dance were different according to area of origin. Mask dances of southern areas, like the Yangju Byulsanadae, mainly consisted of slow dances, whereas mask dances of northern areas, like the Bongsan, were composed of fast dances (Han 153). In “The Ecological Comparison of Northern and Southern Dances Appearing in Mask Dance,” Byoung-Ok Lee and Byoung-Gu So suggest that since northern areas of Korea had rugged, mountainous terrain, people in those regions lived by hunting and gathering. On the other hand, people in southern areas mostly engaged in agriculture because this area consisted of flatlands (Lee and So 272). In their view, these different environmental features had a decisive effect on movement styles of the mask dance. For example, the Bongsan, from the rough northern terrain, consisted of fast, aggressive, and straightforward movements like Doyak Kkaekkichum (high jumping movement) and Hansam Ppurimchum (movement to bend and throw arms and long sleeves). Lee and Son argue that mask dances of northern areas reminded spectators of their hunting acts in rugged mountains (269). By contrast, they characterize mask dances of southern areas, like the Yangju Byulsanadae and Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dances, as nature-friendly. These dances were composed of slow walking and gently swaying movements like Dwikkumchi Didim-chum (movement to step on the ground by starting from the heel to the whole foot). These movements were analogous to farming actions in fields; for example, sowing seeds and stepping on soil (269; 273). These scholars argue that performers applied aspects of the everyday labor of the lower classes to their mask dances and, therefore, these mask dances were affected by the lower classes’ practical and spiritual hardships.
Thus, the *t’alch’um* in the nineteenth century is thought by scholars to have highlighted the great weight of sorrow inside the common people’s spirits and helped to lighten this heavy feeling by sublimating it in the laughter of the mask dance. This spiritual resonance stopped during Japanese colonization (1910-1945) and the Korean War (1950-1953) because *t’alch’ums* were prohibited during this period. After these events, sorrow against exclusion from national sovereignty and domestic dissension smoldered in Korean people’s hearts. This sadness incurred by collective shock and grief became the national sentiment – “Han” – of South Korean population even though these events had already terminated in the early 1950s. Korean scholar Jin-Taek Lim defines “Han” as Korea’s unique emotional condensation; when Korean people are frustrated by any external and internal obstacles, but they cannot solve these frustrations, they gradually accumulate deep grudges. These complex grudges are named the “Han” (Lim 267). According to Lim, Korean people were not terrified of these two historical events themselves. Rather, they were fearful of deep scars left by these events – deep scars that interrupted the persistence of Korean history and caused the absence of Korean identity. In my view, Korean people’s bodies became political agents to share the spiritual agony after turbulent events, Japanese colonialism and Korean War.

The period from the 1960s to the 1980s was a time of economic, political, and ideological rebuilding of South Korea, which had been devastated during the periods of turbulence. The military government and university student activists did not leave alone the spiritual and mental wounds within Korean people. Both the government and student activists returned to Korean tradition that had been popularized before the national convulsions. They both selected the *t’alch’um* to be reconstituted, and it is
the case that the mask dance’s ability to alleviate and sublimate aguish into Sinmyung (excitement) was an intrinsic method used by earlier generations of Koreans for self-healing as Dong-Il Cho puts it (Cho 315).

The military government and university student activists each preserved Korean tradition and utilized the t’alch’um as a pivotal vehicle for establishing “Korean” identity and subjectivity during periods of nation-building. However, they used each methodology differently and each pursued different goals. The government took the approach to safeguard the original form of the mask dance in the Cultural Heritage Protection System. One impact of the government’s system was to consolidate the power of the dictatorship. By contrast, the university student activists created their own theater, called madanggŭk, by connecting the principle of satire from the mask dance with socio-political and economic issues that resulted from the dictatorship’s oppressive policies. Through madanggŭks, the activists sought to promote “Koreanness” that originated from the common people, and one important outcome was their expression of resistance against the autocracy. Assessing these two reconstituting activities in the post-war era, the main purpose of this dissertation is to shine a critical spotlight on Korean post-war culture by examining how the reconstitutions of dance past were differently appropriated and the impact they exerted on national identity and subjectivity.

In addition to issues about national identity and subjectivity, my dissertation appraises gender binaries in hierarchical relationships as these circulated in reconstitutions of the t’alch’um. Vestiges of 19th-century Korean Confucian patriarchy remain active in 21st-century Korean social and cultural conventions, such as father-centered family structures, an idea of preferring sons to daughters, subordination of
women to their husbands’ family line, and emphasis on women’s virginity before marriage. I examine how patriarchal family structures, sexual division of labor, and stereotyped images of women are depicted in androcentric storylines of the mask dance and madanggūk. I also point out how vestiges of Korean Confucian patriarchy infused relationships between men and women in performing groups.

CHAPTERS

Chapter 1 unfolds the sociopolitical background after the collapse of the last Korean dynasty, Joseon, in 1910 until the fall of the South Korean military government in 1988. While examining three governments – the Syngman Rhee, Chung-Hee Park and Doo-Hwan Chun regimes – from the 1950s to the 1980s, I elucidate what democracy meant to South Korea and what conflicts existed between democracy’s meanings and goals that the military government claimed to idealize but were not reflected in the military regimes’ governing practices. I also scrutinize how national identity and subjectivity interlocked with “Korean” democracy. In addition, I trace the periods from the 1950s to the early 1960s during which South Korea increasingly paid attention to tradition. This examination provides information about procedures of the Cultural Heritage Protection System during its developmental stages. Lastly, I present scholarly views about the origins and functions of Korean Confucianism in the nineteenth century. I also explore how these Confucian ideas were prolonged in South Korean society from the 1960s to the 1980s, through family systems, educational systems, and workplaces. Scholars include the prolongation of Confucian philosophies among the factors that motivated the emergence of Korean feminism in the 1980s.
Chapter 2 focuses on t’alch’ums that were reconstituted by South Korea’s military government and first offers an examination of detailed processes with which the military government – Chung-Hee Park’s regime – launched the Cultural Heritage Protection System; this system remains in effect to this day. While preserving traditional culture in the cultural system, the military government endeavored to foster national security and industrialization on a national scale, especially in regional capitals. I discuss how the government from the 1950s to the 1980s simultaneously activated old and new things. I also look into the reconstituting methodologies of the Cultural Heritage Protection System, discussing the survey methods of the government-affiliated scholars, and the impacts of the participation of professional dancers in t’alch’um preservation societies. On these bases, I argue that the military government fixed characteristics of each mask dance and stored standardized dance forms in textual and visual documents. I also inspect how the military government operated the Cultural Heritage Protection System in bureaucratic approaches and how these approaches caused hierarchical power relations among the government, the government-affiliated scholars, and the preservation societies’ professional dancers. In the last section, I examine how the military government utilized reconstitutions of the mask dance in alignment with its economic-political purposes such as capitalist industrialization, pro-Americanism, and anti-Communism.

Chapter 3 gives an account of the university student resistant performance, madanggûk, and interprets the advent of university students as protest activists and their movement activities against the military government and its policies. Refusing western culture and ideas, university students instead proliferated Korea’s own tradition, especially the t’alch’um, on campuses after the 1950s. They even began
producing their own dance theater madanggŭk from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, based on the t’alch’ŭm. They expanded their madanggŭk activities in farming and industrial areas in order to receive direct responses from poor laborers. I discuss processes of the emergence of the madanggŭk among university students, and I also analyze how university students drew theatrical conventions from the mask dance and applied them to their own performances. I foreground relationships between university students’ resistant performances and the formation of national identity and subjectivity for the common people. For this issue, I draw on historians’ work about intentions of university student activists who produced and performed the madanggŭk; I analyze in what substantial impacts their activities resulted.

In Chapter 2 and 3, I thus theorize how dances past were differently appropriated by different reconstitutions as they attempted to influence national identity and subjectivity in the complicated socio-political and industrial contexts during South Korea’s transition period to democracy. In Chapter 4, I raise the subject of gender binaries in relations to t’alch’ŭms and madanggŭks. I closely inspect how female characters in stories of both mask dances and madanggŭks were trapped in Confucian patriarchal relationships and how scripts typically imagined them from androcentric perspectives. I argue that gender binaries supported by the male-centered patriarchy happened in two kinds of performing groups – professional dancers in preservation societies and university student performers in university mask dance clubs. To demonstrate male and female unequal relationships in the performing groups, I examine procedures for getting a promotion among professional dancers in the t’alch’ŭm preservation societies. I also consider female student participants’ limited roles within activities of the mask dance clubs. Based on these analyses, I
argue that the male-centered patriarchal structures in the stories and among
performers of performance groups re-affirmed male authority and re-called an idea of
gender binary in South Korean contemporary society.

METHODOLOGIES

Before visiting South Korea to conduct research, I could find several
publications about the madanggŭk such as Nam-Hee Lee’s The Making of Minjung:
Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea, Jin-Taek Lim’s review
book Creativity of Popular Entertainment, and Ji-Chang Jeong’s essays collection
Epic Theater, Madanggŭk, Nationalist Theater. These books contain detailed
discussions of the madanggŭk as performances, but I wish to consider some other
dimensions. I realized that it would be very important to accumulate oral evidence
from people who closely relate to the Cultural Heritage Protection System and
madanggŭk productions. In these circumstances, I also realized the necessity of
gathering various kinds of archival sources, such as governmental data, newspapers,
and magazines. Thus, I set up three methodologies: interviews, use of written archives,
and analysis of movements of the t’alch’um and madanggŭk in photographs.

While in South Korea from March 2011 to February 2013, I interviewed
fourteen people and gathered written and visual documents. I investigated related
archives about the mask dance and madanggŭk in Gukhoe Doseogwan (National
Assembly Library), Gukrip Munhwajae Yeonguso (National Research Institute of
Cultural Heritage), Munhwajaecheong Doseogwan (Cultural Heritage Administration
Library), and Ewha Women’s University Library. I discovered textual materials
relating to t’alch’ums and madanggŭks from diverse fields such as history, literature,
sociology, ethnography, folklore, dance, and theatrical studies. In the introduction of *Fictions of Feminist Ethnography* (1994), Kamala Visweswaran obliterates distinct boundaries between ethnographic and literary genres. She argues for converging practices between ethnographic writings and literature genres because ethnographic writings tell stories, make pictures, concoct symbolisms and even deploy tropes as literary genres do. Just as in Visweswaran’s approach, I locate the *t’alch’um* and *madanggŭk* studies in various genres. This approach allowed me to ask how reconstitutions of the mask dance may be influenced by and connected to sociopolitical, economic, cultural, and intellectual circumstances.

I conducted interviews with seven professional dancers in five mask dance preservation societies and seven scholars who had learned the mask dance on their campuses and participated in *madanggŭk* activities, or who are still working as experts on mask dances and *madagguks*.

In "American Fever" (2002), Ji-Yeon Yuh presents oral evidence from interviews of Korean military brides living in the U.S. Yuh does not locate interviewees in the boundary of limited questions. Instead, she leads interviewees to liberally narrate vivid lives and feeling that they have remembered. She pays attention to recollections that interviewees have thought most important instead of inducing interviewees to give answers that meet interviewers’ expectation. Similarly, I tried to lead an informal atmosphere and ask open ended questions. In the case of the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance, I first participated in regular dance practices for society members over three months, from December 2012 to February 2013, with permission from human cultural asset Gun-Hwa-Seon Lee. After understanding dance practice environments, I held interviews with Lee. The fourteen interviewees’ ages ranged from forties and to seventies, and I had opportunities to
understand how scholars’ and professional dancers’ perspectives about the *t’alch’um* and *madanggŭk* may have changed over time. These fourteen interviews allowed me to gather my own data and to use and suggest these data as support for my arguments.

For the third research methodology, I analyzed movements of the *t’alch’um* and *madanggŭk* in photographs. In “Embodying Difference: Issues in Dance and Cultural Studies” (1997), Jane C. Desmond criticizes the fact that dance practices and scholarships are marginalized within the academy while cultural and historical studies focus on text-based methodologies and verbal products rather than using kinesthetic actions. I emphasize the need for analyses through bodies and their actions as an important methodology in historical and cultural studies because physical and mental expressions by dance are both symptomatic and constitutive of social relations. Just as Desmond’s notion, I had wanted to analyze VHSs and DVDs about both the mask dance and *madanggŭk*. During the research periods, my biggest challenge was to determine whether moving image records existed for reconstitutions of the mask dance and *madanggŭk*. There are already books and governmental publications about the mask dance and scholarly books about the *madanggŭk*. These publications include a few photos, but they do not devote much description to bodily expressions. The situation was relatively better for reconstitutions of the *t’alch’um* because I could find several photographs from the official website of Cultural Heritage Administration and each mask dance preservation society. In the case of the *madanggŭk*, it was not easy to find visual materials because student performers did not leave many traces; they tried to evade the government’s censor, and they had few funds if any for documentation. I found only twelve photographs from an online website and three newspapers – the *Dong-A, Kyunghyang*, and *Hankyoreh Daily Newspapers*. Thus, I
analyzed pictures coming from governmental websites and newspapers. Due to the limited numbers of pictures available, I could not interpret the whole performance of each *t’alch’um* and *madanggük*. However, I studied various performing factors: what body parts performers mostly utilized, how performance environments seemed, how performers located themselves in relation to spectators, and what costumes performers wore.
Endnotes

1 The *Dano* is the fifth day of the fifth month of the year according to the lunar calendar). The *Chilseok* is the seventh day of the seventh month of the lunar calendar). The *Chuseok* is Korean Thanksgiving Day, and the *Jeongwol Daeboreum* is the day of the first full moon of the lunar year.

2 *Salpuri-Chum* was derived from a traditional shamanic dance in the southern provinces of Korea, and it was an impromptu dance, called *Heoteun-Chum*, performed at the end of an exorcism. As the final part of the ceremony, the shaman took off his/her shamanistic costume and instead wore white mourning clothes. S/he then performed the *Salpuri-Chum* with a long white towel that symbolized the spirit of a dead person. S/he prayed for the repose of the soul of the dead through the *Salpuri-Chum*. The word *Salpuri* literally means to resolve the spirit’s deep sorrow – “Han.” As the shaman reached the dance’s climax, S/he enabled the spirit to achieve catharsis and find peace. That is to say, through the *Salpuri-Chum*, the shaman expressed despair and sorrow in death on behalf of the spirit of the deceased and concurrently sublimated them.

3 Sang-Woon Park in the Bongsan, Sang-Ho Lee in the Hahoe, Sun-Ok Kim and Sun-Hong Kim in the Yangju Byulsandaes, Hong-Jong Kim in the Tongyeong Ogwangdaes, and Gun-Hwa-Seon and Seon-Yun Gang in the Bukcheong Saja mask dance

4 Hui-Wan Ch’ae, In-Suk Kwon, Yang-Myung Han, Suk-Man Kim, Ae-Ju Lee, Gi-Sung Nam, and Jae-Oh Son
CHAPTER 1

KOREAN SOCIOPOLITICAL SITUATIONS FROM THE 1910S TO THE 1980S

This dissertation focuses on three subjects, national identity, subjectivity and gender binary, analyzing reconstitutions of Korean mask dance i’alch’um. The three topics were traversing from the sociopolitical and economic conditions from the 1960s to the 1980s. I speculate that these subjects were crucial outcomes that were enormously influenced from the sociopolitical circumstances after the fall of Korean last dynasty Joseon. In next paragraphs, I open up to examining 35 years of Korea overwhelmed by Japan. I sequentially investigate sociopolitical situations of South Korea after liberation of 1945 to the 1980s.

Korea is the nearest neighboring country in relation to Japan, yet the historical relationship of these two nations is complicated indeed. The most stigmatic history of Korea was Japanese colonialism that began on August 29, 1910 and came to the end on August 15, 1945. Japan established a united nation in the Emperor system through the Meiji Restoration, and its prior national task was to expand the territory by invasion. Joséon (last Korean dynast) was a proper target for Japanese national interest, and Japan specifically made a long-term plan to keep control of Joseon by force after the Gang-Hwa treaty of 1876. After winning at the Russo-Japanese war, Japan compulsorily concluded the Korea-Japan annexation in 1910. This treaty publicly proclaimed that Joseon became a tributary to Japan. In order to completely conquer Joseon, the rulers established the Japanese Government-General of Korea and instituted the colonial policy,
called *Minjok Malsal Jeongchaek*. The policy was vicious by stages in order to obliterate the national identity and communal unification of *Joseon*.

Korean Historian Chang-II Kang specifically divides the policy of Japanese ruling in three stages⁶: the primary period was from 1910 to the March 1ˢᵗ Independence Movement in 1919,⁷ the second period was from 1919 to the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937,⁸ and the last period was from 1937 to the liberation in 1945. In the primary period, the rulers began to lay the foundation of the forced ruling under the guise of modernizing *Joseon*. They compelled them to use the Japanese alphabet instead. The rulers even banned all kinds of public activities such as traditional holidays, village festivals and dances, and guts [exorcisms]. A large number of Korean youth went to study abroad in Japan under the auspices of encouraging *Joseon* youth to learn a new culture. Yet, Japan intentionally cultivated pro-Japanese collaborators among Korean young intellectuals, providing them with the Japanese educational system.

The Japanese rulers recognized the limits of their ruling method, so they further strengthened the ruling policy in the second period of colonialism on a national scale. After the March 1ˢᵗ Independence Movement of 1919 on a national scale, the rulers needed to pacify the indignant sentiment of the *Joseon* public against the colonial policy. They gave *Joseon* intellectuals permission to publish newspapers in the Korean language, which was censored before publication. The *Joseon* press could not fulfill its function at that time. The rulers also allowed two Japanese and three Korean folklorists to launch *Joseon Minsok Hakhoe* [The Joseon Folklore Society] in 1932.⁹ While the rulers placed Korean scholars at the head of the society, they gained an opportunity to have a thorough
knowledge of Korean traditional custom and culture. With the friendly attitude, Japan pretended to be a supporter to modernize Joseon and to develop its tradition. In a Machiavellian manner, Japan had acquired the friendship of Joseon’s elite leaders and, by extension, it had aimed that the assimilated Joseon’s leaders controlled the public of Joseon. In addition, Japanese people, who were living in Joseon, were given the position of the governing class in the local self-governing system in order to use them as the support base for managing the local economy all around Joseon.

During the last period, it was the absolute priority of the rulers to completely dissolve the blood-centered social structure of Joseon, which sustained family bonding, a patriarchal system, and class and gender hierarchy under Confucianism. The rulers demanded worship at the Japanese war shrine to break down the dominant Confucian ideology of Joseon. They even applied their Family Registration Act to Joseon, eliminating the traditional classification of class based on Confucianism. This act had a purpose to supervise individuals of Joseon in depth. The rulers accessed the mixed-blood policy to encourage Joseon men to marry Japanese women, thereby they contrived a stratagem to accomplish the biological domination (Kang 148). After suffering the deconstruction policy for thirty five years, Joseon eventually broke away from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. Nevertheless, the jubilation of liberation from Japanese colonial rule disappeared in a fleeting moment. New ruling powers were waiting for Joseon instead.

While Joseon people were socio-politically, culturally, religiously, and educationally assimilated into the colonial policies, they were un/consciously Japan-ized.
As a consequence, Japanese colonialism became the ultimate cause of destroying the *Joseon* state and even its national peculiarities. I argue that the loss of national characteristics incited Korean nationalists to desire for an independent nation, and Japanese colonialism became the initial point to form Korean nationhood with nationalists as the central figures.

**Ideological Conflict and Korean War**

Immediately after liberation on August 15, 1945, various political and social organizations were established by *Joseon* nationalists. The nationalists were ideologically divided in two factions, conservative nationalists and communist nationalists (Choi 16). Even though each group pursued fundamentally differing ideologies, both groups were in consensus with the need to set up an independent nation-state and to eliminate all vestiges of colonial rule in Korea. While political factions among the nationalists were reinforced, the Moscow conference of Foreign Ministers was held in December of 1945 at Moscow, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (the U.S.S.R.) to discuss the independence of *Joseon*. The Big-3 Foreign Nations - the United States (the U.S.), the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom - played key roles in managing this meeting. They supported the 4-Power trusteeship with China. After the Second World War, the power struggle between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. grew more and more heated. Their political intervention was separately reinforced in *Joseon*; the U.S. supported conservative rightists, whereas the U.S.S.R. aided Communist leftists.
According to political scientists Tŏk-Kyu Chin\textsuperscript{13} and Hak-Chun Kim,\textsuperscript{14} after US forces arrived in the southern half of Korea, the U.S. allied itself with conservative rightists and former Japanese collaborators. It continuously adopted colonial policies of Japan and even branded Communist leftists as traitors in that the leftists opposed the trusteeship of the U.S. and actively cooperated with the U.S.S.R. instead. The separate assistance from the competing two powers aggravated the ideological struggle among Joseon nationalists. Two differing governments were established in the nation in 1948: conservative nationalists launched the First Republic of Korea (ROK) with the backing of the U.S. in August and, on the other hand, communist nationalists founded the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK) under the official approval of the U.S.S.R. in September. When ROK was established, the name of the nation was changed from Joseon to Daehanminguk or Hanguk [Both mean Korea]. With accelerating the ideological struggle and the separate intervention of the two powers, the Korean War occurred on June 25, 1950 and was terminated by a truce agreement on July 27, 1953.

According to Bruce Cumings, a specialist on the Korean War, “the initial situation of the Korean War was the liberation in 1945” (Cumings 9). Korean historian Dong-Chun Kim also points out that the Korean War was not only the result of the persistent ideological struggle among nationalists, but also the starting point for democratic politics of South Korea (T. -C. Kim 49). The ideological conflicts led to establish two different nations, South Korea and North Korea, and they formed the basis of two different politics. Both Cumings and Kim argue persuasively that the war was gigantically influenced from the ideological conflict of Korean nationalists. Along with
the inner disputes among the nationalists, it is important to remember the rivalry of the World Powers as a contributing cause to the onset of the war. As Cumings indicates, the war was a moment in the making and remaking of hegemony for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (Cumings 761).

The aftermath of the war propelled outward hegemony, and inward state-making (Cumings 761). The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. separately defended South and North territory respectively. The Communist leader of DPRK, Il-Sung Kim, not only received a great deal of assistance from the U.S.S.R., but also continuously negotiated with another substantial director, China, to consolidate the foundation of Communism. By contrast, the first president of ROK, Syng-Man Rhee, constructed the military and economic foundation, allowing US forces to be stationed in South Korea and receiving financial aid. Even though the First Republic claimed to advocate democracy under the auspices of the U.S., it was unconditionally obedient to the U.S. and lacked in democratic awareness. I perceive that the loss of national attribute, which had occurred under Japanese colonialism, continued unchanged.

ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT NATION AND ASPIRATION
FOR DEMOCRACY, 1953 – 1988

In *Encyclopedia of Political Thought*, “democratic government is the favored type of government in the MODERN period, and other forms of rule (such as MONARCHY – rule of one – or ARISTOCRACY – rule of a few) are considered illegitimate or inherently unjust. Almost all states in the 20th century world (even
COMMUNIST and FASCIST) claimed to be democratic or a REPUBLIC” (Sheldon, Encyclopedia of Political Thought 80; capitalization as in original). An alternative name for South Korea is “Republic of Korea” in English. This name includes a meaning that South Korea is “Republic,” a democratic nation. Here, I turn to democracy in South Korea sixty years ago and scrutinize it.

Democracy in South Korea

South Korea, before the First Republic, did not have any experience in gaining democracy by itself. The First Republic was merely a newcomer in establishing democracy, and Korean people had no idea to politically and cognitively understand democracy. In spite of these inadequate conditions, the First Republic attempted to establish a constitutional democracy by emulating Western democratic form and functions. As expected, the initial democracy of South Korea was unstable and did not function at either the state or individual levels. To comprehend the initial democracy, it is significant to gain an insight into American democracy first because the initial form of Korean democracy was affected by the democratic form of the U.S. The U.S., as an aid giving country, also exerted its influence on politics and economy of the First Republic. It is also needed to navigate what democracy meant for the U.S. and what aspects of Korean democracy were un/successfully deployed in comparison to American democracy.

Sociologist John Berry Biesanz defines American democracy as public political participation: “democracy may be defined as a political system that holds the government responsible to the governed through free and frequent elections offering a genuine choice
of candidates for office, and that allows free discussion and a chance for the opposition to replace those in office” (Biesanz 478). As defined by Biesanz, democracy is a political dispensation that gives the public rights to elect governmental representatives and express resistant ideas against the existing government. The initial democracy of South Korea did not reflect this American value as outlined by this definition. The First Republic superficially enfranchised Korean people, but practically manipulated their rights and opinions in the manner of autocracy.

While suffering difficulties, such as the collapse of the last dynasty, the intervention of world powers, and the territorial and ideological division, South Korea reformed its politics half-willingly and half not. Because of opposition to communism in North Korea, the Rhee regime named South Korea as Republic of Korea [ROK], advocated democracy and established congress in the constitutional law of 1948. However, it did not run the congress as a practical institution for democracy, but as a good-looking ornament under the interference of the U.S. The U.S. exercised its right to speak to the Korean government and appointed a pro-Japanese group to the Korean congress. The Rhee regime entirely agreed with the U.S. and merely put more energy into maintaining the authoritarian and bureaucratic form of leadership. As Korean Journalist Kŏn-Ho Song argues, the U.S. military government helped the First Republic perfunctorily introduce democracy and keep vestiges of Japanese colonialism (Song, “The National Awareness about Liberation” 29). Since the suspension of the war in 1953, Korea has not been part of the peace treaty and, technically, remains at war. The quasi-state of war placed South Korea in the situation of protecting itself from North Korea,
and vice versa. In this situation, as quoted from historian Jang-Jip Choi, “the Rhee regime could invoke anti-Communism, or national security, to shore up its legitimacy, and thereby nationalism became transformed into a statism that privileged anti-Communism over unification” (Choi 23). The enforced anti-Communism made the public of South Korea assume a hostile attitude against North Korea and feel that the territorial and ideological unification of Korea had turned into impossibility. In this regard, the First Republic merely clung to specious democracy in that it enhanced its authority under the pretense of national defense, inculcating the uniformed idea against North Korea into the public.

The undiscerning dependence and instability in policy, and the faded possibility of unification led intellectuals, especially university students, to cast doubt on democratic policies of the state. Intellectuals’ suspicion increasingly turned into rage with the rigged election of the Rhee regime on March 15, 1960. The regime’s fraudulent act to serve consecutive terms prompted intellectuals to recognize that the state superficially enfranchised the public, yet still stole their sovereignty to elect representatives. As a result, the April 19 Student Uprising occurred in 1960 to deny the reappointment of President Rhee. The uprising resulted in his stepping down from the presidential position and deconstructing the superficial democracy. Historian Nam-Hee Lee argues that “the April 19 Student Uprising in 1960 was South Korea’s first massive and bottom-up expression of the desire and willingness to fight for democracy. As one participant put it, blood was spilled not for national survival but for individual freedom and democratic rights” (N.-H. Lee 26). The resistant action at the 4.19 apparently exposed the political
conflict between autocracy and democracy in South Korea. It even became a wake-up call to have consciousness of democracy for the public. University students became important leaders in ending the authoritarian and bureaucratic regime, yet they did not expand upon their revolutionary actions. As Lee argues, students “may have given rise to a revolutionary setting, but they themselves were not revolutionary agents with the power to carry out revolutionary tasks” (N.-H. Lee 26). In other words, the 4.19 was not a revolutionary incident to completely overthrow the existing political system. Yet, it became a crucial signal flare to express university students’ resistant opinions against the undemocratic regime.

Following the Second Republic, Chung-Hee Park began a military coup on May 16, 1961. Using this opportunity to gain more power, Park ruled over South Korea during the Third Republic (from 1961 to 1972) and Forth Republic (from 1972 to 1979). As the Rhee regime did, the Park regime recognized the public’s deep desire for reunification. Park took advantage of this desire to extend his autocratic policy. Along with advocating anti-Communism, the Park regime created a capitalistic project by supporting the export-oriented economic structure. After Park’s assassination in 1979, Doo-Hwan Chun led another military coup in 1980 and then became President of the Fifth Republic in 1981. Chun adopted authoritarian policies similar to those of the Park regime. These two regimes did not completely meet the requirements of democracy for the public. Biesanz suggests that all democratic nations have basic norms based on similar principles or values:
First, in a democracy the welfare of the individual has priority over the interests of the state. Second, democratic government is limited in scope; it cannot try to assert total control over persons and institutions. Third, the right to participate in the political process is not denied any person or group on arbitrary or irrelevant grounds. This characteristic of democracy is a flexible one. Fourth, citizens are given equal rights under law, and each person’s vote is supposed to count as much as anyone else’s. Fifth, the rights of minorities as well as of individuals are protected. Those who oppose a policy of the incumbent government, as well as those who support it, have free access to the press, can speak and assemble freely, and can advocate alternative policies by non-violent means. Even if they wish to change the entire system, they can express and champion their views as long as they do so according to democratic procedures. Thus every minority has a chance of becoming the majority. (Biesanz 478–479)

Biesanz argues that a democratic nation respects the right of individual citizens and is public-centered. When considered alongside Biesanz’s broad definition of democracy, the book Encyclopedia of Political Thought clearly accounts for the purpose of governing in American democracy. American democracy should “prevent dictatorship or tyranny, promote social and moral well-being, and advance economic wealth and military power” (Sheldon, Encyclopedia of Political Thought 81). As Sheldon points out in the encyclopedia, Alexis de Tocqueville, a French political thinker and historian, argues that three following principal qualities maintain a democratic republic in the U.S.:

The first is the Federal form that Americans have adopted and that permits the Union to enjoy the power of a large republic and the security of a small one.

I find the second in the municipal institutions which, in tempering the despotism of the majority, give the people at the same time the taste for liberty and the art of being free.

The third is found in the constitutions of the judicial power. I have shown to what extent the courts serve to correct the excesses of democracy and how, without ever being able to arrest the movements of the majority, it succeeds in slowing them down and giving them direction. (Tocqueville 128)
Tocqueville says that when all of democratic rationales suggested above are fulfilled, democracy provides a valid form of government.

Korea’s two dictatorships, the Park and Chun regimes, were inconsistent with the above outline of conditions for democracy. Rather, they customized “democracy” in ways that used the name of this system only to rationalize oppressive governments. South Korea enacted the Local Government Act in 1949, yet the Park regime – the Third and Fourth Republic – dispersed local assemblies and suspended the Act. This exploitative situation continued on into the Chun regime, the Fifth Republic. In addition, while the two dictatorships industrialized South Korea, they violated basic human rights and welfare of the public, especially workers. They deployed policies that appeased capitalists in the upper-middle classes causing the social and economic gaps to increase. As sociologist Hagen Koo explains, “the autocratic policies alienated the working class from sociopolitical and economic systems and restrained development of civil society and democracy for the entire public” (Hagen Koo 138; 139). Also, while the military governments intensified national security, they kept infusing anti-Communist sentiment into the public as the First Republic did. Both the Park and Chun regimes inculcated the belief that anti-Communism and industrialism were necessary and required aspects for democracy. In this way, South Korea accomplished stable and imperfect democracy with the military governments.

South Korea went through a period of transition from the 1950s to the 1980s, attempting to emulate American Democracy in the beginning and, later, gradually
developing Korean democracy in its own way. I argue that the initial government, which lacked practical experience with true democracy, was incapable of achieving democracy even if it operated the congress in a plausible way. US aid also enabled the Korean government to be parasitic on a world power. The two dictatorships, which were much influenced from the military and economic interference of the U.S., maneuvered policies for the profits of the autocracy. South Korea, during the postwar period from the 1950s to the 1980s, seemed to superficially aim for democracy, but rejected it in reality.

**National Identity and Subjectivity in South Korea**

In addition to concerns about democracy across South Korea, national identity and subjectivity became important issues for both the state and the public after the 1960s. According to Korean political scientist Tong-Sŏng Kim, democracy is a dynamic thing, and it is maintained by the state and a civil society. Kim uses two terms, “openness” and “non-fixed form” of democracy, and attempts to present how nationalists propagate nationalism in a democratic situation along with freedom (T.-S. Kim 34); the sentiment of national dignity can be developed with democracy, he suggests. In Chapter 2 and 3, I discuss both national identity and subjectivity, concentrating on reconstitutions of Korean mask dance *t’alch’um*. Prior to debating national identity and subjectivity in earnest, it is important to comprehend some dominant meanings of nationalism in South Korea.

Korean national sentiment, as indicated by James B. Palais, scholar of Korean history, emerged in the end of the nineteenth century while Western and Japanese aggression threatened the *Joseon* dynasty and Korean people in the 1860s. However, this
sentiment was not for preserving Korean nationhood, even though the *Joseon* state strongly and defiantly reacted against the West. Rather, the sentiment tended to concentrate on the defense of Confucian ideology (Palais 218). From Palais’s argument, I perceive that the *Joseon* dynasty relied largely on the weight of tradition to perpetuate Confucianism, which functioned as an important ideology and principle in *Joseon* society, propping up the appropriateness of social hierarchy. This suggests that *Joseon* was not nation-oriented, but ideology-centric. After the turn of the century, nationalism was moot because of the intense tensions from Japanese occupation and the Korean War. As Korean journalist Kŏn-Ho Song argues, the First Republic caused the breakdown of achieving sentimental nationalism and trampled on the initial democracy of South Korea, conspiring with a foreign power (Song, “Korean Nationalism after 8.15” 206). Song states that nationalism existed during the First Republic, yet I argue the government actually hindered nationalism through the intrigue with the U.S. These complex situations delayed the appearance of nationalism, in Kŏn-Ho Song’s view.

Cultural anthropologist Richard Handler in 1988 and social anthropologist Ernest Gellner in 1983 define nationalism respectively:

“Nationalism is an ideology about individuated being….In principle the individuated being of a nation – its life, its reality – is defined by boundedness, continuity, and homogeneity encompassing diversity. In principle a nation is bounded – that is, precisely delimited – in space and time: in space, by the inviolability of its borders and the exclusive allegiance of its members; in time, by its birth or beginning in history. In principle the national entity is continuous: in time, by virtue of the uninterruptedness of its history; in space, by the integrity of the national territory. In principle national being is defined by a homogeneity which encompasses diversity: however, individual members of the nation may differ, they share essential attributes that constitute their national identity; sameness overrides difference.” (Handler 6)
“Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent….There is a variety of ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated. The political boundary of a given state can fail to include all the members of the appropriate nation; or it can include them all but also include some foreigners; or it can fail in both these ways at once, not incorporating all the nationals and yet also including some non-nationals. Or again, a nation may live, unmixed with foreigners, in a multiplicity of states, so that no single state can claim to be the national one” (Gellner 1).

With these two definitions, I am aware that Handler and Gellner approach nationalism differently, but they share something in common. Handler does not directly mention relevance of politics to nationalism; however, in my opinion, he holds political perspective as well as cultural viewpoint. Handler’s argument, if I attempt to look at it the other way around, denotes that the individuated being of a nation cannot be fulfilled if the nation does not have indigenous history or its zone is not separated from others. Each territory tends to be separated, based on the past in which political possession of domain could be changed by socio-political upheavals such as war. Both Handler and Gellner indicate that when cultural uniqueness and territorial separation are preconditioned as political factors, nationalism can emerge. Further, as acknowledged by both Handler and Gellner, even when people share national sentiment, a nation cannot be only regarded as a single, homogeneous community because ethnic and racial diversity are bound to be present in each nation.

Showing some similarities to the models voiced by Handler and Gellner, South Korea gradually fostered nationalism while it began to recover cultural value of tradition and cement the territorial division between South and North Koreans. According to Korean scholar Tong-Sŏng Kim, nationalism was a generic term for three ideologies –
national unification, independence, and economic development – that played important past in achieving Korean nationalism from the 1960s to the 1980s. However, I do not want to simply demonstrate Korean nationalism with these ideologies because each ideology was paired with its opposite. For instance, while South Korea desired territorial and ideological unification with North Korea, South Korea intensified anti-Communism. South Korea hoped itself to be an independent nation, yet it kept implementing pro-American policy to gain the strongest supporter. South Korea propagated economic development as a necessary condition for the public’s stability and national power, but it did not guarantee better welfare for public workers. These directly-opposed ideas and situations prevented South Korea from enacting a single meaning of nationalism. Yun-Kyung Min supports this idea in her thesis on Korean sociology; in her view, Korean nationalism can be divided in two ideals – state nationalism and social nationalism (Min 20). The state nationalism was formed by Korean military regimes, whereas the social nationalism became known as minjung [common people] nationalism. I agree with Tong-Sŏng Kim’s argument that Korean nationalism was based on three ideologies such as national unification, independence, and economic development. Yet, I argue that these ideologies’ meanings were differently decided and interpreted according to the main bodies who executed nationalism: by the state or by the public, as Min proposes.

I detect that there was close relationship between Korean nationalism and traditional culture. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the preservation of traditional culture became conversation topic as well. Starting with the open-door policy of the last dynasty at the end of nineteenth century, Korea rapidly accepted Western civilization, although it
suffered the Japanese occupation and the war. Western culture was especially emphasized by the pro-American policies of the Park regime even though the regime ironically sought a means to protect tradition. At the same period of time, university student activists were concerned that what they saw as excessive openness, particularly to American culture, would cause cultural neocolonialism, and that such openness would even damage the Korean awareness of minjung (common people) (Ch’ae 170). Student activists began asking questions about Korean nationalism: who is the “best” Korean? What are Korean traditions? They selectively learned about and performed traditional arts on campuses because they believed the Korean performing tradition could incite the public to remember the Korean historical legacy and generate a clear national identity in Korea (170). In this regard, Korean nationalism became entwined with an imagined Korean traditional culture. Nationalism’s relationship to tradition continued as Korea, a dependant country, turned into an independent nation with wealth and power. From the 1960s to the 1980s, while the government attempted to establish state-centered nationalism, the public’s consciousness about nationalism rapidly grew, and so did student activists, as social nationalism. I refer to concepts of state and public nationalism in the following chapters.

This awakening of subjectivity in modern Korean history was interlocked with national identity from the 1960s to the 1980s. Historian and political scientist Nick Mansfield in Subjectivity: Theories of the Self from Freud to Haraway offers insight into four types of “subjects.” I am especially interested in his definition about the politico-
legal subject among them as it is useful for analyzing Korean subjectivity in relation to socio-political contexts.

The laws and constitutions that define the limits of our social interaction, and ostensibly embody our most respectable values, understand us as recipients of, and actors within, fixed codes and powers; we are subject of and to the monarch, the State and the law. In theory, in liberal democratic societies at least, this sort of subjectivity demands our honest citizenship and respects our individual rights. (Mansfield 4)

Mansfield’s description makes clear that obtaining citizenship from some nation means that the nation legally accepts a person as one of the nation’s members and allows a person to act as a subject of the democratic nation and to establish his/her subjectivity. South Korea puts pressure on this definition because even if the Korean government claimed to advocate democracy after the 1950s, it did not consider nationals as main agents who could establish and reinforce a democratic nation. Individuals who had their own subjectivity could become chief obstacles to the dictatorship’s policies, thus the Korean dictatorships endeavored to standardize ideology and mobilize immediately to maintain their power. As a matter of fact, in the 1950s, Korean people did not recognize the lack of subjectivity and the importance of recovering individual subjectivity. The industry-centered policy of the government continued the serious absence of subjectivity after the 1960s. As scholar of Korean history Nam-Hee Lee indicates, “Korean people were not the subjects of their own history” (N.-H. Lee 2). She goes on to state that, “the crisis of historical subjectivity emerged from the 1960s but intensified in the 1970s with rapid industrialization and Park Chung Hee’s Yusin regime” (5). Sociologist Misook Kim
Cho and Michael W. Apple refer to the government’s political intention in their joint paper:

The [Korean] state increasingly sought to enhance its political power through an ideological system which was not overtly repressive….In essence, the state discursively separated individuals from social relations, individualized them as ‘responsible’ citizens, and unified them under the ‘national’. In this process, the state selected part of the nation and attempted to transform them into certain subjects (manual laborers) demanded by industries. (Cho and Apple 270)

Cho and Apple suggest that the subjectivity of Korean nationals was established not by themselves, but by the government, to hold Korean people, especially workers, responsible for accelerating industrialization. The public did not recognize themselves as pillars of industry, rather, the government compelled subjects to serve its economic policy. In this respect, I argue that Korean people were seized by illusions of subjectivity the government invented. Though intellectuals, especially university student activists, had aspirations to build a true democracy, they began to recognize the necessity of recovering historical subjectivity. Student activists attempted to not only place Koreans themselves in the center of major events in Korean history, but also rouse them to have the sense of subjectivity (Ch’ae 170).

The state and the public began recognizing the deficiency of national identity and subjectivity and also began focusing on democracy after the 1950s. However, the purpose and outcome of national identity and subjectivity were determined differently depending on who achieved them. In Chapter 2 and 3, I analyze how national identity was constructed, and who made national identity different, and I interpret who became
subjects or objects of Korean subjectivity, via the reconstitutions of Korean mask dance, *t’alch’um*.

**GROWING ATTENTION TO TRADITION FROM THE 1950S TO THE 1960S**

Traditional culture not only related to national identity and subjectivity, but also played an important role in achieving them. South Korea began paying attention to tradition in the 1950s, yet it did not have a methodical system for documenting and studying tradition until it enacted the Cultural Properties Protection Law in the early 1960s. I examine how and why the Korean government launched the Cultural Heritage Protection System in Chapter 2 to analyze a connection among national identity, subjectivity, and traditional culture, especially *t’alch’um*. Prior to my discussion of the cultural protection system, it is necessary to understand two aspects of Korean folklore: who enabled Korean tradition, especially folklore, to stay alive; and by what method folklore was maintained before inauguration of the protection system.

Korea historically had diverse folklores. I follow the notion articulated in *Folklore: An Encyclopedia of Beliefs, Customs, Tales, Music, and Art*, which defines folklore as a powerful vehicle through which “people can examine or critique the lives they lead, and it can be invoked to hold communities together or cruelly separate them from one another” (Green, *Folklore* 334; 335). In the case of Korea, people of each village organized a group and transmitted village folklore. There are insufficient scholarly data to clearly verify in what period Korean folklore groups first appeared, yet their importance as transmission vehicles is clearly evident from three interviews I
conducted with professional dancers who have been registered as a human cultural asset, an initiator, and a follower in the cultural system. The interviewees, Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, Sun-Hong Kim, and Sun-Ok Kim, were able to articulate unexamined history about the mask dance:

I was born in 1925….Before I was born, town men performed it….When I was four….Ye….[It is her unique sound and similar to ‘Um’ sound for her.]. The Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance was performed in my village. My older brother joined in this performance by playing a role of Yangban [an aristocrat]. I followed my brother, and then took part in too. I played a character of Mudong [a boy or girl dancer]. A title Mudong [a boy or girl dancer] is currently used, but it was called Sandae before in our town. We called it Sangdaechum [chum means dance]. I began to dance this role. After I grew up, I played diverse roles such as Geosa, Sadang, and etc. I was a multirole dancer of the Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance in my town. (G.-H.-S. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

When I was about six years old, I watched the mask dance first at my village….I just watched old men who practiced the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance. I think that dancing would be a part of their life. If they were bored, they often brought and played Janggu, double-headed drum with a narrow waist in the middle, and danced the mask dance. While a man played Janggu, the others danced the mask dance. Old men did not hold any official performance and have stage costumes because they could not afford of those. Instead, they put on everyday dresses of white color….They enjoyed their time by dancing the mask dance. A young girl, I very concentrated on their dances. Sometimes I did not recognize whether or not the sun sets while I looked at them….We (my older sister Soonok Kim and me) started to learn the mask dance in 1962. (Kim and Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

When I looked on old men’s dance, my sister Soonhong followed me and could often see it. I firstly watched Sungdae Kim’s dance. Kim already died. He played a role of Waejangnyo [an old gisaeng] in a fifth scene of the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance and practiced it at a floor of his house, called Bongdang. When Kim practiced the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance, he did not put on stage costume, but clothes for everyday wear, such as white, dark brown or gray shirt and pants. I could remember Kim’s dance and appearance. (Kim and Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)
These conversations prompt me to speculate that there were some village folklore groups, including mask dance groups, long before 1925. These groups were not officially managed by the national provision, but, rather, developed separately in each village unit. By the colonial period, some groups disappeared, and some survived through selective support of the *Joseon* Folklore Society [*Joseon-Minsokhakhoe*]. Korean scholar Geun-Woo Nam indicates that the *Bongsan* mask dance was selected by the *Joseon* Folklore Society as an outstanding entertainment, so a village folklore group performed the mask dance at the first *Joseon Hyangto Muyong Minyo Daehoe* [the Contest for *Joseon* Folk Dance and Song] on May 17, 1937 (Nam 29). The mask dance folklore groups started to receive attention from the government at the beginning of the 1960s. Under the Korean Cultural Properties Protection Law, dancers of each folklore group were nominated for human cultural assets, and each folklore group received an official title, mask dance preservation society, in 1982.

What is known about the initial period of Korean folklore groups comes from oral testimonies of professional mask dance performers. The three women quoted above bear witness to the existence of the mask dance folklore groups around the 1920s. Since then, groups’ activities not only were kinds of village entertainment, but also unintentionally helped the Korean mask dance to become preserved.

**How Folklore Groups Imagined Their Methodology**

Since 1962, when the Cultural Properties Protection Law began to operate, dancers of the mask dance folklore groups have been individually designated as human
cultural assets of each mask dance. With the selected assets as central figures, mask dances were standardized and drew on performers’ memories of tradition. This work continued after the title of the folklore groups was changed to the preservation societies in 1982. To learn the transmitting procedures, I interviewed performers who had been members of the folklore groups before the 1960s. Though many dancers had already died, I had an opportunity to speak with Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee. Lee is currently a human cultural asset, and she has danced the Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance since the 1930s. She testified about her dancing experience when she lived in North Korea before the Korean War of 1950:

Sangwoo Ha: When you participated in the Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance in North Korea, who taught you?

Lee: I merely learned and danced by myself.

Ha: What does that mean? Did you join in the Bukcheong Saja mask dance and just follow other dancers’ dances?

Lee: Yes. We just got together to dance. I could not say that I learned mask dance from someone….Not professional dancers. There were not any places to learn dance in the past. People, who were interested in dance, came to Seodang or Docheong: town young people came and study together in Seodang and town old people normally came to Docheong to spend time together. They rehearsed Bukcheong Saja mask dance, and made lion masks there. (G.-H.-S. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Lee’s statement reveals that the folklore group in the Bukcheong area was not a professional dance troupe and did not have systematic methodology for transmitting the mask dance from one dancer to another. Rather, village people, who wanted to participate in dancing the mask dance, flocked together at a gathering place and enjoyed to dance by
emulating each other. According to Lee, “When I was young [she was born in 1924 and began dancing at age of 4], there were festivals such as Gunminhoe or Myeonminhoe. Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance was performed in these festivals” (G.-H.-S. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Gun means a district, Myeon means a subdivision of a Gun, and Minhoe means comitia in Korean. Festivals were held by people of the whole district or its subdivision, and those people formed a township society. In order to participate in these festivals, village people shared their dances, which had come down from their ancestors, with neighbors. If necessary, they partially “invented” their mask dances because their dances were not fixed, but flexible depending upon the situation. The participants in the village became “inventors” – my term – to transmit and transform the mask dance through the annual festivals.

At this point, it is appropriate to make clear that pre-1960s folklore groups’ activities were different from post-1962 government-sponsored activities that emphasized repetition and standard by the Cultural Heritage Protection System. In Chapter 2, I analyze the Cultural Heritage Protection System’s methodologies for transmitting knowledge of the dance and examine how the South Korean government utilized the folklore groups. Before moving to the next chapter, I turn briefly to the model the Korean government used to make the Cultural Properties Protection Law.
How Korean Government Applied Japanese Cultural Preservation Laws to the Korean Cultural Heritage Protection System

The Cultural Properties Protection Law of South Korea was rooted in Japan’s cultural law. When the government introduced the law, it referred to the Japanese law as a precedent. Japan began paying attention to Japanese cultural heritage in 1871 to establish the authority of the Japanese emperor. It eventually enacted the cultural protection law in 1950 and then amended it in 1954. Japan classified cultural heritage in five ways: tangible properties, intangible properties, historical sites, places of scenic beauty, and natural monuments. After the revision in 1954, Japan specifically divided a category of intangible cultural properties into two parts: Jongmok Jijeong Jaedo (Designation System) and Seontaek Jaedo (Selection System). The former system included designated possessors, whereas the latter system did not contain possessors. Instead, the selection system was merely selected for folklore data. In my view, Japan was not merely centered in valuing the existence of possessors.

My understanding is that the Korean government generally emulated the structure of the Japanese cultural protection system, yet it did not follow the classification method of intangible cultural properties. The Korean government copied Japan’s cultural system in the beginning because the government’s previous experience was limited to preserving treasure of the Korean royal family.

I need to make clear how I am differently using two terms – property and asset – in this and the next chapters. Scholar Judy Van Zile uses the word “asset” to refer to both tangible and intangible objects that were designated as cultural properties by the South
Korean government: “tangible cultural assets contained such things as temple areas, mountains, and flora and fauna, whereas intangible cultural assets included such things as handicrafts, drama, music, and dance” (Van Zile 53). While designating Korean properties, the Korean government named tangible objects *Yuhyeong Munhwajae*, intangible objects *Muhyeong Munhwajae*, and a person who is recognized as a human cultural asset *Ingan Munhwajae*. In all of these designations, the term *Munhwajae* technically translates as “property” or “asset” in English. However, the English version of the official website for the Cultural Heritage Administration of Korea (CHA) translates *Yuhyeong* or *Muhyeong Munhwajae* as a tangible or intangible “property.” Moreover, this site translates *Ingan Munhwajae* as human cultural “asset.”

In my dissertation, I follow the English terms used by CHA not only because I believe that these terms are less confusing to readers, but also because I want to specifically acknowledge cultural assets’ humanity, their personhood.

**CONFUCIANISM AND FEMINISM IN KOREAN SOCIETY**

Confucianism, which had been a predominant ideology in the *Joseon* dynasty, remains important even today in Korean society. Confucian authority quietly appears in a wide range of socioeconomic issues, including marriage and divorce, inheritance and distribution of wealth, labor and wages, and education. While South Korea was gradually modernized and industrialized after the 1950s, Confucianism superficially died down in Korean social consciousness. However, as anthropologist Kwang-Ok Kim indicates, “Confucianism still works as one of the basic elements of the Korean social structure and
its cultural system” (K.-O. Kim 204). In Chapter 4, I analyze the storylines of the reconstituted mask dance *t'alch'ums*. I also scrutinize transmitters of the *t'alch'um* performing groups, relating them to contemporary interpretations of Confucian ideas.

Prior to these discussions, I briefly articulate the origin of Korean Confucianism and describe how Confucianism operated in the *Joseon* period. Then, I suggest the ways Confucian ideologies were prolonged during the period of transition to democracy.

As a system of Chinese philosophy, Confucianism was founded by the Chinese Philosopher Confucius (551~479 B.C). This philosophy influenced the establishment of Korean Confucianism. According to Korean scholar Won Park, Confucianism was introduced long ago in that the social institution similar to Confucian system already existed in *Goguryeo*.\(^{20}\) Korean Confucianism fully bloomed in the study of *Seongrihak* in the middle of the *Joseon* dynasty, while, at the same time, an anti-Buddhist movement arose among the *Seongrihak* scholars (Park 86).\(^{21}\) Confucianism was developed as a predominant doctrine of the ruling class, *Yangban*.\(^{22}\) As Korean sociologist Yŏng-Ch'an Lee describes, Confucianism functioned as a fundamental part of *Joseon* society to shape the moral system, way of life, and social relations between old and young people, and between the higher and the lower classes.\(^{23}\) *Yangbans* generalized Confucian ideas concerning social status, educational, and family systems. For example, *Yangbans* divided society according to four rankings: *Yangban*, *Jungin*,\(^{24}\) *Sangmin*,\(^ {25}\) and *Cheonmin*.\(^ {26}\) They established state examinations for the ruling group and published diverse guides about Confucianism. They also strengthened the use of memorial services for their ancestors. Applying Confucian ideas to diverse aspects of cultural production,
the governing classes seemed to establish social systems externally for stable management of the last dynasty Joseon, but internally for justifying their hegemony and enjoying the exclusive prerogatives of the ruling class. The systems centralized for the governing classes continued even as Joseon gradually became modernized by the open-door policy it adopted between the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. During the Japanese colonial period, all systems of Joseon were abolished. In their place, Japanese law and systems were forcibly imposed upon Korean society, and Confucianism faded away during Japanese occupation.

**Prolonged Confucian Ideology in Korean Society from the 1960s to the 1980s**

The sequence of major national events like the colonial occupation by Japan and the war drove South Korea to be socio-politically, economically, and even ideologically paralyzed. After going through a period of transition to democracy in the 1950s, the Park regime attempted to change South Korea from a developing country into an advanced one by introducing the technology of modern industrial countries and rationalizing anti-Communism for national protection. Even if the South Korean dictatorship dreamed of a born-again nation, it did not foreclose upon the old-fashioned ideologies of Confucianism. According to anthropologist Kwang-Ok Kim (1996), “Confucian cultural heritage is deeply rooted in [Korean] people’s everyday lives, and it is now being renovated or reproduced” (K.-O. Kim 203; 204). In the next section, I demonstrate how South Korea partially accepted Confucian ideology through the Korean family, educational systems, and workplaces from the 1960s to the 1980s. I draw connections between the vestiges of
Confucianism in Korean life and Confucian ideas revealed in the storylines of Korean mask dance and promotion issued in the mask dance preservation society performing groups.

Family System

The government enacted a Korean family law in 1957 and amended it three times. After 1957, Hojuje [戸主制] served as the main family registry system for South Korea. All information concerning family members, such as birth, death, marriage, and divorce, was recorded in this system. This system gave all married men status as family heads, and each head could set up his branch family away from his parents and grandparents. By the Hojuje, the government introduced a nuclear family system against a large family system that was fossilized by Confucianism and mostly operated for the ruling class of Joseon. Yet, Confucian ideas still existed within the family system in that Korean women were not allowed to officially head families (H.-S. Kim 250). In a Joseon view, a woman was not an independent human being, but merely a partner of a man. Women were educated at home in order to be well-prepared for a good marriage. Home study taught young girls “family manners” and ways to exercise self-discipline and to make food and clothes, while boys went to village schools to study. After marriage, a woman was expected to live in the center of her husband’s family, taking care of household affairs and family members, such as parents-in-law, her husband and children. Women were also required to bear sons and heirs. Confucian ideas blocked women from public activities and defined them as secondary people in society. Similarly, the Hojuje
institutionally placed women in the limited family space. It still enabled women to be subjugated by their husbands and not to consider themselves as social individuals. This system was revoked in 2008, and women are now allowed to be house heads if necessary. However, people still tend to perceive the patriarchal family structure as natural in Korea.

**Educational System**

Since the First Republic of Korea (ROK) enacted the Education law in 1949, the educational system has been one of the important institutions in South Korea. Pushing forward economic development and maintaining the dictatorship, the Park regime directed its efforts to revising the educational system in the beginning of the 1960s. Next, the Chun regime continued with only a slight variation. Interestingly, in the educational system that was revised by these two dictatorships, Confucian ideas reigned supreme. For instance, many middle and high schools regulated uniforms and hairstyles from the 1960s to the 1980s: the schools ignored teenagers’ individualism through its use of uniforms and school norms standardized students’ appearances (C.-M. Kim 146). Even if the stereotyped appearance taught students to be united in a group, it definitely prompted students to become separated from teachers, the leaders of school structure. Thereby, while the government supported the schools regarding uniforms and hairstyles, it reinforced the hierarchical relationship between subordinates and superiors, which was influenced by Confucianism. Further, all students studied the same subjects in the high school curriculum; however, subjects were differently specialized for male and female students. Male students had to attend gyeo-ryeon class (a military drill class), while
female students had to take *ga-sa* class (a housework class) to learn to sew, make traditional clothes, and cook (C.-M. Kim 148). The curricular split defined the gender roles of men and women and reinforced Confucian gender expectations for masculinity and femininity.

**Workplaces**

The gender binary prompted by Confucianism was prevalent in workplaces as well as in the family and educational systems. Korea achieved rapid economic development through the leadership of the government after the 1950s, and Confucian ideology was adopted in this area too economic activity (K.-O. Kim 219). Asian studies scholar Seungsook Moon points out the continuation of patriarchy and hierarchy, using the case of Poongsan Metal Company, one of the top thirty enterprises in South Korea. When Poongsan made an alliance with the government, this company preferred to recruit male workers who previously had been conscripted for state military service. The company was convinced that men, who became more masculine by participating in the military service, would be skilled workers and even have greater moral strength against the struggle of life rather than women (Moon 58). Like Moon, anthropologist Kwang-Ok Kim argues that “heads of economic institutions and organizations have exercised Confucian patriarchal authority and privilege in their actual business management” (K.-O. Kim 219). Kim offers examples: heads of big companies, such as Samsung, Hyundai, and Daewoo, were spatially segregated from general employees by using a private office, rest room, and elevator even if they worked at the same buildings. As heirs of their
companies, their children also learned the idea and manner about hierarchic relationships (220). In this sense, the company management style was completely analogous with Confucian ways. Like the relation between a father and his family members in Confucianism, companies implemented “a vertical relationship” (220) that separated high-ranking leaders from low-ranking workers. Inheritance of property was also followed in the paternal line.

APPEARANCE OF KOREAN FEMINISTS AND THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT

During the colonial period, there were many independence movements against the Japanese rulers. Many Korean women began to consider participation in the movements as “a way to attain equality with men” (H.-S. Kim 248). As feminist scholar Heisook Kim argues, Korean feminism intersected with nationalism in that the resistant movements for freedom induced women to do something meaningful for their nation and family, and themselves (248). Yet, while women continued to be the mother under the Confucian value system, they did not have enough space to think of themselves as social subjects and even to seriously discuss their feminist philosophy until the late 1980s.

When the Park regime carried out modernization and economic development projects in the 1970s, it claimed to advocate equal opportunity of employment regardless of gender and ancestry. It labeled low-ranking male and female factory workers as “industrial soldiers” (Moon 55). As a consequence, work opportunities for women increased, and female laborers as male workers produced crucial economic contributions. Most companies continued to prefer hiring male laborers, and female workers were
marginalized by various recruiting opportunities for higher-level positions. After marriage, especially, women hardly looked for work, so “they returned to work in factories at the worst jobs for the lowest pay, often as temporary workers” (Louie 126). The continuity of female laborers’ struggles in harsh working conditions instigated the factory girls’ movements throughout the 1970s on a small scale. Later, in 1987, the Korean Women Workers Association (KWWA) was launched. Northern California activist Miriam Ching Yoon Louie argues, the “Korean women’s movement developed in tandem with the broader minjung movement. Minjung movement origins are deeply rooted in the suffering of young women factory workers, whose super-exploited labor in expert-oriented industries produced the precious start-up capital for South Korea’s much touted economic miracle” (Louie 121). Here, I recognize that labor movements of female factory workers, a kind of the minjung movement, occupied a big part of Korean feminist movements. Female laborers’ activities served as a foundation to problematize unequal circumstances of women and to expand women’s rights in a Korean society.

The Korean Association of Women’s Studies (KAWS) was the first women’s studies program in Korea and was organized in October 1984.32 However, “feminist philosophy, as indicated by Heisook Kim, was not seriously discussed in Korea until 1993” (H.-S. Kim 247). In other words, even though there were women organizations, such as KWWA and KAWS, in the 1980s, social authority of women was out of Korean public’s eye. Since the Korean Association of Feminists Philosophy (KAEP) was organized in 1993, Korean feminists have brought up subjects such as “the male-oriented atmosphere in academia” and the existing patriarchal culture in Korean society (247).
Although Korean feminism after the 1990s lies outside the scope of my dissertation, I briefly introduce Korean feminism to give a picture of the Korean context on gender. I am convinced that it is worth mentioning here because a carry-over from Confucianism, from the 1960s to the 1980s, became a motivational factor to establish Korean feminism.

I argue that Confucian ideological strands came into play in post war Korean society, especially in family and educational structures, and workplace experiences. These vestiges of Confucian ideology also helped give particular shape to Korean government’s promotion of a cultural heritage program, continuously producing the power imbalance between the designators and the designated and the gender inequality between male and female performers in contemporary preservation societies and in period madanggŭk groups.
Endnotes

1 Joseon was the last dynasty of Korea that was established by Taejo Seong-Gye Lee. The Lee family continuously ruled Joseon from July 1392 to August 1910. Joseon entered into the Gang-Hwa treaty with Japan in 1876. Since then, Joseon have begun to adopt the Western culture and have modernized. After the last crown prince of Joseon, Go-Jong, ascended the throne, the name of the country was changed from Joseon to the Daehan Empire in 1897 to re-enhance national prestige. The name of the Daehan Empire disappeared, and the title of Joseon was reinstituted by Japanese rulers.

2 The Meiji Restoration was a chain of events that restored imperial rule to Japan from 1868 to 1912 under Emperor Meiji. Through the restoration, Japan established capitalism, became a constitutional monarchy, and was modernized in the early twentieth century.

3 The Gang-Hwa treaty was superficially a commercial treaty between Joseon [Korea] and Japan in 1876. However, this was the unequal treaty forced by Japan and was a first step to officially occupy Joseon.

4 The Russo-Japanese war occurred from February 8, 1904 to September 5, 1905. It was provoked by rival imperial ambitions between the Russian Empire and the Empire of Japan over Manchuria and Korea. Japan was victorious in the war and eventually secured exclusive rule over Joseon.

5 The Korea-Japan annexation was an unequal treaty between Joseon and Japan. After the treaty took effect on August 29, 1910, Joseon was officially colonized by Japan.


7 The March 1st Independence Movement was the earliest demonstration of Koreans occurred on March 1st, 1919 and expressed Korean resistant voice against the Japanese occupation. This is often referred as Samil or Manseo Undong [movement].

8 The Second Sino-Japanese War was the biggest War in Asia of the twentieth century and a military conflict between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China from 1937 to 1941 (The First Sino-Japanese War occurred from 1894 to 1895). In order to secure
raw materials and natural resources in China, Japan attempted to politically and militarily dominate China under attack.

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10 Japan’s Family Registry system serves to record and certify an individual’s identity and family relationships on the basis of family law. This principle items recorded and certified in a family register are (1) an individual’s full name; (2) gender; (3) birth date and birthplace; (4) parental relations (names of parents, relations to them, etc.); (5) spousal relations (name of spouse, date of marriage, date of divorce, etc.); (6) date related to the death of an individual (date, time, place of death); (7) name of legal custodian or legal guardian; and (8) date related to inheritance, such as the disinherence of presumed heir. The information recorded in each family register is based on formal declarations made by citizens to their local government (municipality) at the time of a child’s birth, marriage, etc. Such registers are maintained only for Japanese citizens; as they are not established for foreigners, they also serve to certify Japanese citizenship.

11 Social and Political Organizations such as “Konjun” [Joseon konguk chunbi wiwonhoe; Committee for the Preparation of Korean Independence] and “Ingong” [Joseon inmin konghwaguk; Korean People’s Republic] (Choi 15)

12 The 4-Power trusteeship – the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and China – agreed upon by three powers. The trusteeship was in force in operation for five years. Here is the decision written by 3-Power ministries; 1. With a view to the re-establishment of Korea as an independent state, the creation of conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea, there shall be set up a provisional Korean democratic government which shall take all the necessary steps for developing the industry, transport and agriculture of Korea and the national culture of the Korean people; 2. In order to assist the formation of a provisional Korean government and with a view- to the preliminary elaboration of the appropriate measures, there shall be established a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea. In preparing their proposals the Commission shall consult with the Korean democratic parties and social organizations. The recommendations worked out by the Commission shall be presented for the consideration of the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, the United Kingdom and the United States prior to final decision by the
two Governments represented on the Joint Commission; 3. It shall be the task of the Joint Commission, with the participation of the provisional Korean democratic government and of the Korean democratic organizations to work out measures also for helping and assisting (trusteeship) the political, economic and social progress of the Korean people, the development of democratic self-government and the establishment of the national independence of Korea. The proposals of the Joint Commission shall be submitted, following consultation with the provisional Korean Government for the joint consideration of the Governments of the United States, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom and China for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period of up to five years; and 4. For the consideration of urgent problems affecting both southern and northern Korea and for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative-economic matters between the United States command in southern Korea and the Soviet command in northern Korea, a conference of the representatives of the United States and Soviet commands in Korea shall be convened within a period of two weeks.


15 Statism is the belief that the state controls both economic and social policy. In this logic, Choi indicates that South Korean government manipulated all policies by using anti-Communism.

16 The April 19 Student Uprising was the popular revolution on April 19, 1960. Labor and student groups were centered in the movement to overthrow the autocratic First Republic of South Korea under Syngman Rhee. It led Rhee to resign and to transform into the Second Republic.

Goguryeo (37 B.C. – 668 A.D.) was one of the Three Kingdoms of Korea, Goguryeo, Silla, and Baekje. It was one of the longest sustained dynasties in Asian history. After the age of these three Kingdoms, Goryeo dynasty was established from 918 to 1392, and then it passed to the next dynasty, Joseon, from 1392 to 1910.

Seongrihak was the most representative Korean interpretation of Confucian thought that offered to Korea the practical humanistic teaching of Confucius united with a philosophy of the nature of the universe.

Yangban were part of the traditional ruling class or nobles of dynastic Korea during the Joseon Dynasty. The Yangban were either landed or unlanded aristocracy who comprised the Korean Confucian idea of “a scholarly official.”


Jungin were people who performed administrative work in technical post.

Most of Joseon population was Sangmin. They mainly participated in agriculture, business and manual industry, and were taken to do forced labor.

Cheonmin were people such as entertainers, shamans, prostitutes, butchers, and slaves. They were treated with contempt the most in Joseon.

The family law was revised in 1961, 1977, and 1989.

Hoju means the head of family, and Hojuje [戶主制] is the head of family system.

Gyeo-Ryeon class [a military drill class] was very similar with one of the military.


32 Online website: http://www.kaws.or.kr/
CHAPTER 2
KOREAN MASK DANCE T’ALCH’UM AS INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE

The South Korean government, under the military regime of Chung-Hee Park, passed the Cultural Properties Protection Law in December, 1961 and then promulgated it in January 1962. The Cultural Heritage Protection System of South Korea was officially born during this time period. In Korean Cultural Properties, which Munhwa Gongbobu (the Ministry of Culture and Public Information) published in 1972, the government defines cultural properties as follows: traditional properties not only have cultural values, but also are creative products. According to this governmental publication, the properties could be considered the state’s economic wealth, yet what the government seems to emphasize was properties’ historical status and connection to tradition (Minister of Culture and Public Information 23). The government suggests that cultural properties naturally occur as Koreans lead social and historical lives. The properties become historical creations and valuable parts of the Korean community because, according to the government at this time, they are representatives of national traditions. As the definition of cultural properties in the official government publication suggests, the state sees itself as being devoted to serving the purpose of protecting Korean traditional culture. Did not the state have another purpose as well? This chapter examines this question from socio-political and economic perspectives, using examples of reconstitutions of the Korean mask dance t’alch’um to explore the government’s many goals in cultural policy and some of the results or impacts of the policies’ implementation.
THE KOREAN CULTURAL HERITAGE PROTECTION SYSTEM SINCE 1962

Since 1962, the South Korean government under Park has supported the Cultural Heritage Protection System. Munhwajecheong (the Cultural Heritage Administration, CHA) is currently operated as a government-affiliated organization under Munhwa Cheyuk Gwangwangbu (the Ministry of Culture, Sports, and Tourism) and continuously modifies what it sees as cultural protection laws.¹ According to the CHA’s official website, “CHA contributes to the advancement of national culture through conservation and by creating values from cultural heritage. By creatively harnessing and preserving cultural heritage, the CHA will illuminate our future as the world’s leading cultural nation.”² The CHA’s mission statement suggests that it, as an organization affiliated with the government, is in charge of preserving tradition on behalf of the government. This is to say that the government indirectly supervises the preservation of cultural heritage by allowing the CHA to directly manage the cultural system, even if the CHA technically belongs to the government.

Interestingly, the affiliated organization was not attached to the South Korean government during the initial stages of Korea’s cultural system. Rather, it started and was supervised by the U.S. government. Before Korea established the First Republic in 1948, the U.S. founded an interim government in South Korea to support Korea’s political and economic base and selectivity recruited South Korean scholars from a variety of fields to revise Korea’s educational and cultural infrastructure. The U.S. government, for example, gave selected Korean intellectual elites jobs in which they compiled Korean language and history textbooks for both middle and high schools. The intellectual elites I discuss here
refer to researchers who both received university education and were recognized as experts on *Joseon* culture during the Japanese colonial period. Korea did not have an authorized university established by Koreans before Japan established Gyeongseong Jeguk Daehak (Keijo Imperial University) in Gyeongseong (currently Seoul, Korea) in 1924. This university originally entailed a two-year preparatory course and a four-year undergraduate program. To enter the undergraduate program, students were required to complete the preparatory course. At this time, the Korean youth who wanted to receive higher education did not have as many educational options as Korean students do today. At the beginning of the twentieth century, specifically, Korean students who had access to higher education had to either attend Keijo Imperial University or study abroad in Japan. According to the official website for the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS), 200 Koreans and 497 Japanese were registered as students in the preparatory course at Keijo Imperial University. The site also notes that 335 Koreans and 444 Japanese enrolled as students in the university’s undergraduate programs from 1924 to 1943. This census makes clear that, out of the approximately 25,120,174 Koreans in Korea from 1940 to 1944, fewer than 550 received a university education. In this context in which university-educated Koreans were rare, people with higher education were regarded as intellectual elites.

The U.S. even encouraged these intellectual elites to be the cultural organization committees. After the liberation from Japan, the intellectual elites often acted as historians and folklorists and joined academic and cultural associations such as *Jindan Hakhoe* (the Organization of Korean Historians), *Joseon Inryu Hakhoe* (the Organization
of Joseon Anthropologists), and *Joseon Sanakhoe* (the Joseon Alpine Club). *Jindan Hakhoe* and *Joseon Sanakhoe* were registered as Korean academic and cultural associations during the period of the U.S. government’s oversight (C.-W. Kim 298). The U.S. launched the first cultural organization in South Korea, called *Gu Hwangsil Samucheong* (the Office of Former Royal Family), on November of 1945 and supported the Korean scholars functioning as important members of its overseeing committee to protect Korean royal family’s properties that the U.S. was interested in. Then, in 1954, Syng-Man Rhee, the first president of the South Korean Republic, enacted *Gu Hwangsil Jaesan Cheoribeop* (the Law to Protect the Former Royal Properties). Rhee also changed the name of the organization to *Gu Hwangsil Jaesan Samuchongguk* (the Former Royal Property Administration Office) in 1955. The name change is significant because it reflected a change of institutional administrator. Rhee had a strong sense of political rivalry against King Young-Chin, known as Un Yi, who was the last crown prince of *Joseon*. When Rhee established the First Republic in 1948, South Koreans considered Yi the heir apparent to the throne. Yi still had justification for holding royal sway. Rhee felt, however, that his position as president would be threatened by Yi’s existence. Completely undermining the last dynasty’s force, he officially nationalized the extant former royal properties of *Joseon*. Rhee succeeded in holding his place as the first president from 1948 to 1960. It seems now as if Rhee attempted to establish his own South Korean cultural organization. Yet, the Rhee regime still clung to the U.S.’s forces within the entwined Koran cultural, political and economic systems because it was still finding its own path for managing a nation. Even though it made cultural-focused laws
and changed the organization’s name, the cultural system of the First Republic did not break away from the U.S.’s cultural institution before the Park regime enacted the cultural properties protection law.

The supervisory institution for the cultural organization changed from the U.S. to the Korean government after 1961. The Park regime, the Third Republic of South Korea, did not merely stick to its former purpose. Rather, the regime created a new cultural organization named *Munhwaja Gwanriguk* (the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau) and aligned this organization with the Ministry of Education in October of 1961 (Van Zile 53). Through *Munhwaja Bohobeop* (the Cultural Heritage Protection Law) passed in 1962, the regime conducted an official task to preserve and promote Korea’s cultural heritage. It also established *Munhwaja Yeongusil* (the Cultural Properties Research Institute) as an affiliated agency of *Munhwaja Gwanriguk* in August 1969 to further accelerate investigations of cultural heritage that reflect Korean nationalism’s symbology.

The Park regime’s 1961 name change of the cultural organization from *Gu Hwangsil Jaesan Samuchongguk* to *Munhwaja Gwanriguk* is significant. The word *Hwangsil* means “royal family” in Korean, whereas the word *Munhwaja* means “cultural property.” The latter phrase suggests the culture of common people rather than the royal monarchs. The name change signifies that the range of objects requiring protection was expanded during the 1960s. In the Cultural Heritage Protection System since 1962, properties are classified based on whether or not they are tangible or intangible. Korean folklorist Tong-Gwŏn Lim specifies the classification of the properties, concentrating on the process used to form each property and groups of property to perform and transmit
According to this logic, tangible properties can be historical sites, castles, buildings, and art works. They include symbols of power associated with the monarchy or the upper classes. Intangible properties involve the performing arts, such as *t’alch’um* and *nongak* (traditional music). This latter category includes cultural practices performed by the lower classes (23). Lim verifies that since the Park regime inaugurated the Cultural Heritage Protection System in 1962, common culture began to be acknowledged as part of Korean cultural heritage as much as the royal family culture.

The Korean government operated the protection system after the 1940s, yet it did not depart from the U.S. focus before the 1960s. After the Park regime launched the Cultural Heritage Protection System in 1962, South Korea began to take an independent route for cultural protection and eventually halted the U.S.’s cultural intervention. By the 1990s, a fair number of in/tangible properties were designated and, in the view of scholars Soo-Jin Jung (2004) and Jae-Phil Lee (2011), the Cultural Heritage Protection System concentrated on efficient management plans rather than designation of cultural properties. The name of the government’s cultural organization was changed once again to *Munhwajaechong* (CHA) in accordance with the National Government Organization Act of May 1999. Since then, the government has used the name CHA. CHA plays an important role in protecting cultural properties in Korea and continues to update the protection law.
THE COEXISTENCE OF “OLD” AND “NEW”:

RESTORING TRADITION AND CONSTRUCTING NEW CITIES

Analyzing the Cultural Heritage Protection System’s goals and procedures is as important as examining the origin of the system itself. To explain why the system aimed to protect traditions, it is first necessary to understand the state’s investments in cultural and economic tasks from the 1960s to the 1980s. The South Korean government focused on not only renovating regions in the economic development project, but also reconstituting old traditions in the cultural protection project. In this respect, the state activated new and old things as national tasks during Korea’s rapid growth.

The First Republic of South Korea under Rhee began to lay the economic foundation in 1954 and got on track for economic reconstruction by managing inflation from 1956 to 1957. However, it did not achieve notable success. The Park regime, the Third Republic of South Korea, hit its stride in industrialization from the 1960s to the 1980s. Park brought about a revolution and came into political power by overthrowing the short-lived Second Republic in 1961, and his regime formulated innovative policies that attracted public attention and relieved the public from worry about the sudden appearance of the armed military government. As one of the policies, the Park regime’s military government practiced the Five-Year Economic Development Plan, called Gyeongje Gaebal 5gaenyeon Gyehoek. The regime existed from the first plan in 1962 until the fourth plan when Park was killed in 1979. As the regime put the plan into practice, it concentrated on strengthening the heavy chemical industry and increasing the number of exports. This industrialization caused a rapid increase of the urban population
around Seoul, capital of South Korea. The government promoted city planning to accommodate the increasing population in certain areas by expanding housing site preparation, building new roads and freeways, and constructing high-rise apartments and skyscrapers (Sŏ 118). During its gradual industry-driven urbanization in metropolitan areas, Korea underwent a complete transfiguration: it built novel city structures and new architectures. The government’s plans for economic growth enabled the poorest nation to look brand-new in a short period of time.

The new program of industrialization also exerted impact on Korea’s mass media. The South Koreans used only limited media, like newspapers and radio, until the middle of the 1960s. Sang-Ho Lee, a cultural force in the Hahoe Byulsinguk mask dance and a free-lance comedian in the Korean Broadcasting Corporation, whom I interviewed for this project, shed some light on pre-television media:

TBC (Tongyang Broadcasting Corporation) was founded in 1965 in Seoul. There were a few programs like a program Radio Show Show Show. Not television station, but radio station. All broadcasting company in Korea beamed their radio programs to listeners. When TBC was founded, I made my debut as a show talent at TBC. (S.-H. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Lee’s testimony that reveals the pervasive mass media was radio broadcasting, not television. Since the major South Korean company Gumsung (LG in the 2010s) launched the first black-and-white television in 1966, Korea’s private culture producers began to use mass media like television to cement the relationship to the public through new trendy mass media, much as it used industrialization for urban development.
The South Korean government also demonstrated a commitment to save the vestiges of traditional Korean culture by reconstituting cultural properties like *t’alch’um* in the Cultural Heritage Protection System. As Korean historian Hoon-Sang Lee indicates, the protection system in the beginning began to preserve and transmit Korean properties that were endangered by Japanese colonialism and Korean War. In his view, the preserving and transmitting process enabled the public to connect with Korea’s present and past, imagine a national community and find solace from the tension in post-colonial, post-war Korea (H.-S. Lee 32). As argued by Lee, the South Korean government attempted to recover Korea’s damaged national character by restoring destroyed tradition. In my view, the government excited nostalgia through reconstituting tradition, a kind of reconstituting meant to foster the public’s national sympathy for Korean history. In *The Future of Nostalgia* (2001), theorist Svetlana Boym explores how people create imaginary pasts through nostalgia. She reflects on nostalgia’s relationships to both the past and the present using Eastern Europe and Russia as case studies. She theorizes that “[n]ostalgia inevitably reappears as a defense mechanism in a time of accelerated rhythms of life and historical upheavals.” She then goes on to note that nostalgia is essentially “history without guilt. Heritage is something that suffuses us with pride rather than with shame.”8 Boym does not merely regard nostalgia as a regression to the past. Rather, she insists that nostalgia goes beyond an imagined past and puts different temporal realms into conversation with each other. Specifically, she explores two different types of nostalgia: restorative nostalgia and reflective nostalgia. Boym defines these different types as such: “restorative nostalgia manifests itself in total
reconstructions of monuments of the past, while reflective nostalgia lingers on ruins, the patina of time and history, in the dreams of another place and another time” (Boym 41). The former has a purpose to protect the absolute truth of history by patching together collective memories and evoking a national past that creates what Boym calls a “conspiratorial” vision (43). By contrast, the latter is shaped by needs of the present looking back on an imagined past and directly affects visions of the future (Boym xiv).

Her critical discussion about restorative nostalgia provides a lens for interpreting the South Korean government’s actions as attempts the necessity to create a sense of shared national sentiment that reminded the public of a familiar cultural reference point: Korean tradition. In related vein, theorist Eric Hobsbawm draws attention to how invented traditions are utilized for the construction of politically instituted and planned ceremonial occasions, establishing new trends. He gives insight into how “existing customary traditional practices [are] modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the new national purposes” (Hobsbawm 6). While South Korean policy edits, which I have found, never state it this way, Hobsbawm’s theory offers perspective on how the South Korean government’s institutionalized program offered a way to restore traditional culture and claim continuity with the historic past. I suggest that, for the government, returning to the past functioned as a “defense mechanism”, as Boym puts it, in the period of accelerating economic development (Boym xiv).

The South Korean government managed a two-pronged policy: newly renovating and industrializing regions and mass media on one hand, and returning to and maintaining traditional culture on the other. The new and the old came together in South
Korea from the 1960s to the 1980s. In the following paragraphs, I discuss impacts for the government’s highly political investments in tradition while it exploited the traditional mask dance, *t’alch’um*. I also analyze the methodologies the Park and Chun regimes used for restoring *t’alch’um*. It is important to understand how, as part of the latter, village folklore groups were turned into the government-affiliated preservation societies as part of the Cultural Properties Heritage System.

PRESERVATION SOCIETIES OF KOREAN MASK DANCE T’ALCH’UM

South Korea has preservation societies for fifty-seven kinds of intangible cultural properties from both South and North Korea – properties including traditional dance, music, theater, plays, and specific rituals. It was not easy for the South Korean government to collect information about these properties from both South and North Korea mainly because, after the Korean War, travel between the two territories was not allowed. What made collecting this information easier, though, was the fact that some intangible properties’ performers from the North stayed in South Korea after the end of the war. Through the help of these performers, quite a few preservation societies in the South were able to collect and protect properties from the North (Jang 20). In 2014, these fifty-seven societies are regarded as the government-affiliated groups in the Cultural Heritage Protection System, and they are fully responsible for annually performing and continuously transmitting the designated intangible properties with financial support of the government. When the Park regime, the South Korean government, designated the first intangible cultural properties at the beginning of the protection system in 1964,
today’s preservation societies did not exist. Prior to organizing the societies, the government launched *Hanguk Minsok Jonghap Josa* (the Korean National Total Investigation) in 1968. Through the investigation project, South Korean folklorists began to research villages and groups whose people continued performing traditional arts as village activities. From 1968 to 1980, the folklorists visited the villages directly to gather information about activities within each village group. Based on these investigations, this project decided whether or not the village folklore groups were performing intangible properties. The government-headed project also decided whether or not professional dancers were still active in the groups (Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University 18). The government launched the preservation societies system on December 31, 1982. In 1986, the government began appointing some village folklore groups as cultural gate keepers and officially made the groups preservation societies. The government continued supporting this project, in its second phase, through 2009. In contrast with the first phase of regional investigations from 1968 to 1980, during the later investigations that began in 1981, the government focused its energies on classifying specific traditions (Jang 22).

The South Korean government appointed preservation societies for, among other forms, thirteen kinds of *t’alch’um* all on November 1, 1986. These *t’alch’ums* had garnered the title of intangible cultural properties before 1986. However, the *t’alch’ums* before 1986 were maintained not by the preservation societies, but by other “unofficial” groups or people without government ties. Based on more than one version of certain *t’alch’ums* circulated were available for viewing information gathered during my
interviews and research into scholarly archives on t’alch’ums, I argue that each of those unofficial t’alch’ums changed when the preservation society took it under their supervision. For this project, I have examined five t’alch’ums: Yangju Byulsandae, Tongyeong Ogwangdae, Bukcheong Saja, Bongsan, and Hahoe Byulsingut. For these five t’alch’ums, I conducted interviews from 2012 to 2013 with seven professional dancers. T’alch’ums registered by the South Korean government as intangible cultural properties now total thirteen. The thirteen originated from five provinces: Hamgyeongnamdo and Hwanghaedo in North Korea, and Kyungkido, Gyeongsangbukdo, and Gyeongsangnamdo in South Korea. I narrow my research scope by selecting a representative from each different province. I draw on five t’alch’ums from these five provinces to discuss methods of embodying dances past utilized by various interested parties. In the previous chapter, I discussed the period during which the village folklore groups of Yangju Byulsandae and Bukcheong Saja mask dances emerged and offered excerpts from interviews with Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, Sun-Hong Kim, and Sun-Ok Kim. In the next section of this chapter, I discuss how the folklore groups of these t’alch’ums appeared before the mid-1920s.

**South Korea’s Provinces**

Before the South Korean government appointed their preservation societies in 1986, village people maintained t’alch’ums as leisure activities, aspects of daily living, or festival performances within villages. Regarding the Hahoe Byulsingut and Tongyeong Ogwangdae, two mask dancers who eventually became human cultural assets testified in
their interviews with me about their experiences meeting villagers directly. Sang-Ho Lee stated his own experience and feedback he gained from Chang-Hui Lee:

Sang-Ho Lee: I also heard talks of town people as much as Han-Sang Ryu’s [a mask dance master] talks.

Sangwoo Ha: Town people? What town? Who were they? Did they dance the Hahoe mask dance?

Lee: They were just town people. They did not have any relation and experiences to dance….But, to directly watch performances of the Hahoe mask dance when they were young. They remembered performing movements and let me know how the Hahoe mask dance was performed.

The Hahoe mask dance was lastly performed in 1928. Chang-Hui Lee participated in the performance. Lee was registered as a human cultural asset in 1980. I found him. I asked him that a playbook I made was right or wrong. Lee said to me, “Even though you are not born in 1928, and you do not watch the performance in person, your playbook is very similar to dancing patterns of 1928’s performance.” “How do you make it? You are a rare person.” I also learned a way making stage props from Lee.

Chang-Hui Lee already passed away at about 85 years old. I think he died in peace. He cherished me rather than his kids, and I also respected him a lot. (S.-H. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Sang-Ho Lee returned to his hometown, Andong, after 1965 and met mask dance master Han-Sang Ryu. The master appreciated Lee’s talents and advised Lee to dance the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance. Sang-Ho Lee began to meet people of Hahoe village, one of the neighborhoods in Andong, to listen to their experiences and watch the mask dance performances. Drawing on people’s memories, he constructed what he saw as the original mask dance Chang-Hui Lee remarked, which was similar to the 1920s performances. Villagers who had experience watching and enjoying the mask dance in the 1920s survived until the middle of the 1960s. People’s memories helped Sang-Ho Lee piece
together a history of the mask dance. According to Du-Hyeon Lee, a Korean folklorist and an expert on the Korean traditional mask dance, young people in Andong attempted to restore and perform the mask dance in the 1970s. During this time, they found Chang-Hui Lee, a dancer in his last performance in 1928. As a dance participant, Chang-Hui Lee oversaw the performance restored by the younger generation (D.-H. Lee, Korea’s T’alch’um 237). Even if the mask dance group had already died out in Hahoe village around the 1920s, the young generation like Sang-Ho Lee began to revitalize the mask dance in the village in the 1960s to the 1970s. The South Korean government considered performers, including Sang-Ho Lee, village folklore group’s members of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance. After 1961, the boom to discover folklores was happening nationwide: many village groups wanted to participate in the National Folk Arts Contest (Jeonguk Minsok Yesul Gyeongyeon Daehoe). Sang-Ho Lee and young performers participated in the competition as a folklore group of Hahoe village at that time.

Hong-Jong Kim, a human cultural asset of the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, stated how he participated in the mask dance in Hapcheon village, Gyeongsangnam-do since 1975:

Hong-Jong Kim: I did not receive professional trainings. I was a music teacher at school. Even if the mask dance was designated as an intangible cultural property in the 1960s, human cultural assets were still treated with contempt. At that time, I thought that someone has to participate in the Tongyeong Ogwangdae Mask Dance to preserve, so I quit my job and joined in the mask dance in 1975….I began to investigate information first in 1975 in order to understand the mask dance.

While I travelled to search on the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, I met many professors and scholars studying the mask dance. They said, Gwangdae [one of roles in the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance] was
originated from Chogye [-myeon], Hapcheon [-gun], Gyeongsangnam-do. So, I went and stayed in there during fifteen days to search….When I went to Chogye, Hapcheon, Gyeongsangnam-do first, I did not find anything there….After that, I turned back to investigating the mask dance in Hapcheon. I was able to accumulate oral evidence from people who had seen costume or Malttugichum [servant’s dance] of the mask dance.

Sangwoo Ha: Did you make a material about the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, based on the memories of people in Hapcheon village?

Kim: Yes, yes. And I made masks. Since then, the mask dance has been protected well in Hapcheon. Current Hapcheon people would not know what I had done before for the mask dance. (H.-J. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Just as Sang-Ho Lee did in the 1960s to the 1970s, Hong-Jong Kim in the 1970s met directly with villagers who held on to their memories of the mask dance and reconstituted the mask dance. Kim’s statement does not reveal what year the folklore group appeared and performed in Hapcheon village. To recover evidence of this performance, I turned to writing from Korean folklorist Du-Hyeon Lee. Lee states that Jeonsu Hoegwan (a building for transmitting the mask dance) was established in 1974 at the foot of a Nammang mountain in Tongyeong, Gyeongsangnam-do (D.-H. Lee 205). I am aware that there was some group which devoted itself to pass down the mask dance and structured the building for the mask dance in Tongyeong city. However, Lee does not explain who funded and constructed the building. Hong-Jong Kim provided clues about this building’s origins during an interview with me:

There was the preservation association of Chungmu intangible cultural properties [it was established in 1970] when I researched on the mask dance. Chungmu was an old name of Tongyeong. The majority of intangible cultural properties existed in Chungmu, so Chungmu city handled its intangible cultural properties. I worked as an executive director in the preservation association of Chungmu intangible cultural properties….However, this local preservation society was
disbanded and instead the preservation societies for each property began being established under the auspice of the government in 1986. (H.-J. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

This quotation demonstrates how the Tongyeong Ogwangdae continued in a local area before being supported by the South Korean government. In the context of Kim’s and Lee’s respective discussions of the preservation society in Tongyeong region, it is important to note that Chungmu city (current Tongyeong city) launched a single local association in 1970 to handle all properties of the city. This association provided this city’s mask dance folklore group with a place where group members could continue to transmit the mask dance. In contrast with the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, a single local association supported the folklore group that performed the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance before its provincial support changed to national sponsorship when the government appointed the preservation society in 1986. The folklore group was officially turned over to the preservation society. For the Tongyeong Ogwangdae, this local support played an important role in sustaining the practice before the government researchers investigated Tongyeong area.

North Korea’s Provinces

The Bongsan mask dance originated in Hwanghae province, a region in North Korea. After territorial division in 1953, folklorists in South Korea never had the opportunity to visit North Korea to conduct fieldwork. According to Korean scholar Yong-Ho Heo, folklorists depended on literary investigations of the mask dance for North Korean cultural properties instead of on-site investigation. For example, scholars
visited several places where many displaced people lived in South Korea and then conducted surveys to gather information about performers’ experiences (Heo 242). Like the Bongsan, the Bukcheong Saja mask dance comes from Bukcheong village in North Korea. As human cultural asset Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee testified in her interview with me in 2012, “people of Leebuk 5 Docheong (the Committee for 5 North Korea Provinces, launched by the South Korean government) visited me [she did not remember what year they visited, but answered they did in the 1960s] and wanted to pick me up....Munhwajaeccheong (the Cultural Heritage Administration)....is different from Leebuk 5 Docheong. Scholars [of Leebuk 5 Docheong] requested me to dance the Bukcheong Saja mask dance again” (G.-H.-S. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Leebuk 5 Docheong took as its main work a census of the population who defected from North Korea. The interviewee’s statements lead me to speculate that administrative staffs in Leebuk 5 Docheong may have worked to find North Korean mask dance performers. Did their search help scholars meet and interview dancers in person? These interviews in this province were conducted by Ju-Gun Jang, Du-Hyun Lee, and Sang-Bok Han in 1978, as confirmed by Ju-Gun Jang (Jang 20). It is evident, through Lee’s testimony, that scholars sought displaced people who came from Bukcheong and had experience participating in the mask dance as either performers or audience members.

I found some evidence of another folklore group during an interview with Sang-Woon Park, an initiator (Junsu Gyooyuk Jogyo) of the Bongsan mask dance: “We [the preservation society] were in Youngchun village, Gyeongsangbuk-do before. The society moved to Siheung in Seoul because a learning center was established for intangible
cultural properties….The current learning center is located in Gangnam, Seoul….Maybe built in 1982. Since then, the society of the Bongsan mask dance is still at the same place” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Park explains where the folklore group was located before the government officially designated this group as the preservation society. Park’s statement convinces me that there was an earlier folklore group before the government turned this group into the preservation society. Yet, Park did not indicate what year the folklore group appeared and why the group was launched at Youngchun village.

Scholarly literature helps find established year of the folklore group’s founding. Ho-Sŏk Kim, a specialist in Korean traditional music, briefly discusses how Hanguk Bongsan Gamyeongeuk Yeonguhoes (the Korean Bongsan Mask Dance Research Society) was founded in August of 1958 by North Korean refugee dancers like Jin-Ok Kim (1894-1969), Cheon-Sik Min (1898-1967), and Geun-Seong Lee (1895-1978).13 Sang-Woon Park referred to these dancers in his interview: “I learned it [the Bongsan mask dance] from Jin-Ok Kim, Geun-Seong Lee, and um….someone. I did not remember the last person. The last played a role of Mabu (horseman) and already died” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Ho-Sŏk Kim confirms that after the government designated the mask dance as the ‘No. 5’ intangible property in 1967, this research society formed the basis for transmitting the mask dance (H.-S Kim 20). In 1986, the government gave the folklore group official approval to change to the preservation society. The research society Kim mention is the same one in Youngchun village that Park mentioned in his interview. I suggest that the village folklore group perpetuated the Bongsan mask dance before this group handed over the mask dance to the preservation society in 1986.
Each of five mask dances I select for study was perpetuated by a folklore group before the government took over their direction in the middle of the 1980s. The government approved the handover of each of the five village folklore groups to the preservation societies on the same day in 1986, yet the appointment process for each folklore group was different. Each mask dance existed in different conditions, such as restriction of development due to territorial division, local backing, and nature of individual transmission.

Discussion of T’alch’ums’ Bodily Movements

As briefly pointed out in Introduction, movement styles of t’alch’ums were influenced by environmental features and were classified in two types: mask dances originated in North regions are the Bongsan and Bukcheong Saja, whereas mask dances come from South regions are the Yangju Byulsanade, Tongyeong Ogwangdae, and Hahoe Byulsingut. To better understand movements of differently typed mask dances, it is important to inspect and compare how these two types of mask dances look different through figures. I discovered several photographs: ten figures from the official homepage of Cultural Heritage Administration and four figures from the playbook published by Tongyeong Ogwangdae preservation society. The website and playbook both specify what scenes were captured in each photo, but they do not record when these photographs were taken. For this reason, I just focus on analyzing what it is seen in each figure.
Figure 1.1. Lion Dance in the Bongsan

Figure 1.2. Eight Monks Dance in the Bongsan

Figure 1.3. Old Monk Dance in the Bongsan

Figure 1.4. Shoes Seller Dance in the Bongsan

Figure 1.5. Lion Dance in the Bukcheong Saja

Figure 1.6. Opening Dance in the Yangju Byulsandae

Figure 1.7. Shoes Seller Dance in the Yangju Byulsandae

Figure 1.8. Chwibari Dance in the Yangju Byulsandae
Figures 1.9 to 1.14 come from scenes of the *Bongsan* and *Bukcheong Saja* mask dances. These dances originated from North regions where many rugged mountains existed in the past. Because of these surroundings, the *Bongsan* and *Bukcheong Saja* are
composed of fast and high jumping movements. Performers in figures 1.1 and 1.2 were jumping up, raising one leg and arm in the same side. While jumping up, performers were also swinging their long sleeves to choreograph arm movements. That throwing directions of performers’ sleeves varied reveals that performers danced in group and carried out the same motion, but they fulfilled their movements in different time periods. The use of long sleeves makes eight monks’ movements look dynamic and energetic. In figures 1.3 and 1.4, a female performer wore traditional wedding clothes and covered her hands by long sleeves. Unlike eight monks’ clothes attaching long sleeves, her sleeves were separated from her costume. She raised a left hand in order to swing her sleeves, but she did not do a jumping motion, and she seemed like static. Figure 1.5 is a scene from another north mask dance Bukcheong Saja. In this figure, there were one female performer wearing a white color clothes and two lions. Each lion character needs two performers; a performer plays lion’s head and front legs, and the other performer plays lion’s tail and back legs (Gang, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). At that moment in figure 1.5, five performers were performing. Like monk characters in the Bongsan, a female performer in the Bukcheong Saja wore white clothes attaching long sleeves, and she were flying her sleeves. What is interesting is that female characters in figures 1.7 and 1.8 also put on long sleeves and they were dancing with those. In this respect, costumes with long sleeves existed in both North and South areas. Performers utilized sleeves as extensions of their fast and slow arm movements.

A shoes seller and monkey in figure 1.4 sat on by seeing each other. They did not have any prop like long sleeves, but they were focusing on their fingers’ movements.
Through this figure, it is hard to catch up what dialogue they were in, but they seemed to have a secrete talk so that an old monk and a young character standing behind would not be overheard. These detailed finger movements symbolize performers’ hidden intention. A performer in figure 1.12 bent his fingers. This finger movement signifies that a character was a disable person. In figure 1.11, a male performer did not bend his fingers, but he was dancing by raising a right leg and all arms in the same side. In compare with performers’ movements in figure 1.2, performers’ movement looks similar, yet a performer in figures 1.11 and 1.12 did not jump up. Instead, he deeply bent and stepped down his left foot on the ground. These movements recall agricultural motions to firm the ground after planning.

In figures 1.5, 1.9, 1.10, and 1.14, three or four musicians were standing up or sitting down by the side, playing their instruments like Janggu (double-headed drum with a narrow waist in the middle), Kkwaenggwari (small gong), Jing (gong), and Buk (drum). They did not dance together with performers and, instead, they concentrated on making musical harmony with performers’ movements. A leper character in figure 1.11 held Sogo (snare drum) even though he was not a musician. This scene shows that some performers dealt with instruments as props while dancing. In addition, except for figures 1.12 and 1.13, there were no spectators because other photographs, I guess, were not at performing moments. Performance places in figures 1.12 and 1.13 were not on the stage, but on the earthen floor. Audiences were freely standing up and sitting down, and performers let audiences to closely observe them from every direction.
These fourteen photographs help me recognize how performers used fingers, hands, arms, and legs for their choreographies. However, it is impossible to understand what dance compositions performers formed in each scene. Only thing I make sure is that mask dance performers danced similar movements, yet they afforded varieties by changing time, and space level and direction.

**Procedures and Impacts of Preservation Societies**

The South Korean government, which had previously concentrated on selecting and designating intangible cultural properties, amended the protection law on August 10, 1970. It began to designate professional performers as human cultural assets of the properties. Sixteen years later, in 1986, the government started to turn folklore groups into preservation societies. I am curious about reasons for the government’s official conversion of the folklore groups to the preservation societies. According to Article 12 in the Cultural Properties Protection Law (1982), a preservation society refers to a group that can retain and perform the original form of an intangible cultural property (Korean Cultural Heritage *Research* Laboratory at Chungang University 2). Article 12 also explains two situations in which an intangible cultural property can be given its own preservation society: 1. When a potential intangible cultural property is a group activity, and 2. When a group has several people who deserve the title of human cultural asset (18). The government had insight into intangible cultural properties of specific groups and recognized that these properties could not thrive with only the involvement of one or two individuals. This insight is revealed in *The Review about Management Plan of Important*
Intangible Cultural Properties (2011), which states that the tradition of groups performing art has been passed down by collective memory (Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University 4). If an intangible cultural property is restored only by one or two people, the Review states, the features of a group performance may not all be preserved. The Review expresses the view that gathering experiential memories from many performers in the groups was an important methodology for restoring intangible cultural properties like the t’alch’um. By appointing these groups to the preservation societies, the government encouraged and supported the folklore groups and their members, including human cultural assets, to directly transmit intangible cultural properties. I suggest that, by promoting conversion to preservation societies, the government created indirect management of intangible cultural properties like t’alch’um that were restored by a group activity.

Headed by human cultural assets, members of each t’alch’um preservation society collectively took responsibility for transmitting t’alch’um in various ways, such as annually performing and fostering the younger generation. Since 1986, performers in each preservation society, for example, performed t’alch’um and provided t’alch’um classes for no or low cost to people who are interested in tradition. The 1970s and 1980s, especially, were the remarkable period during which many university students received t’alch’um training from preservation societies’ members. In Chapter 3, I examine why university students in the 1970s and 1980s were so enthusiastic about learning t’alch’ums. Here, it is important to understand how the South Korean government during the Park and Chun regimes reconstituted the t’alch’um as a representative of Korean tradition and
incorporated Korean folklorists and preservation societies to do so. First, I explore the methodology of reconstitution that the government utilized in the Cultural Heritage Protection System. Then, I analyze the anticipated and actual outcomes of reconstituting t’alch’ums in socio-political and economic contexts.

KOREAN GOVERNMENT’S EMBODYING METHOD:
STANDARDIZATION OF DANCE FORMS

What is most interesting about the post-war traditional mask dance t’alch’um is the methodology the Park regime used for reconstituting t’alch’ums. Scholars and preservation societies’ dancers, no doubt, were significant players in the Cultural Heritage Protection System. I have been unable to locate any minutes or surviving records that detail discussion among the scholars, dancers, and government personnel who consulted together to create the Cultural Heritage Protection System. Was there a tacit relationship between the government and collaborators in which the scholars and dancers were supposed to fulfill their duties as defined by the government? Scrutiny of five t’alch’ums reveals some procedures and strategies the government deployed when working with the scholars and dancers to reconstitute t’alch’ums.

Terminology

“Reconstitution” is a term that is central to my discussion of embodying intangible cultural properties in this chapter. In previous chapters, I have used this word to refer to the South Korean government’s embodiment of t’alch’ums. According to the
February 29, 1968 account in *The Dong-A Daily News*, a conservative newspaper, the South Korean government implemented the standardization of intangible cultural properties such as the instrumental music of peasants, folk games, and mask dances. This newspaper report offers one kind of evidence that standardizing intangible properties was a noticeable part of the government’s cultural protection system.

Folklorists, as investigators, could not verify the precise origins and features of specific mask dances because *t’alch’ums* were popular arts that were fluid. *T’alch’um’s* performers, prior to state 1960s intervention, freely changed the mask dance as they saw fit as they responded to environmental conditions and audiences’ reactions. Seon-Yun Gang, an initiator (*Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo*) of the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance, articulated how these more variable mask dance performances functioned:

In the past [before the mask dance was designated], performers were based on the basic storyline, but they changed some part on all such occasions. For instance, Yangban and Kkoksoe always introduced Bukcheong in the beginning. They introduced like this. “Bukcheong has Daedeok mountain stretching toward Baekdu mountain.” If the Bukcheong performing group went to other area to perform, Yangban and Kkoksoe introduced features of the visiting district instead of original introduction about Bukcheong. This means that Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance could be partly changed according to where a performance occurred....Right. Yangban and Kkoksoe could change their dialogues according to festival’s purpose. If the district was introduced in Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance, this town people would become familiar with this performance, and even they would react actively to performers’ dialogues. All people could enjoy mask dance regardless of where audiences came from. That was a folk play. (Gang, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

As Gang further states, Seok-Jae Im, a committee in the cultural protection system, wrote an editorial in *The Dong-A Daily News* in 1962. This editorial suggests that the government-affiliated folklorists did not know of the mask dance’s original form because
dancers altered the performances’ dialogues and movements as they felt inclined. Statements from Gang and Im reflect how past t’alch’ums followed more changeable forms.

In this context, the South Korean government first determined that “authorized” t’alch’ums should be called as Wonhyeongs [原形] (the original forms) – even though these Wonhyeongs themselves had been constructed, the government said it was not changed, but updated which, in my perspective, it still changed. The government used reconstructing processes much like those that dance historians like Millicent Hodson would use in the 1970s and 1980s. These processes emphasize duplication of past sequences of movement, music rhythms, and garment designs that re-imagine performance’s past. In the following section, I analyze similarities between the Park regime’s standardization methods and Hodson’s reconstructing procedures. However, I recognize that I cannot merely apply the term “reconstruction” to the government’s mask dance standardization process. The Korean government did not simply endeavor to duplicate pre-existing premieres of the mask dances. Rather, the government created and then standardized mask dance performances.

I use the term, “reconstitution,” to acknowledge how the government created the mask dance’s typicality while also drawing from some kind of imagined past to re-imagine the performances’ raw materials. My use of this term departs from much Korean scholarship on folklore, especially regarding in/tangible cultural properties. As mentioned by Yeong-Il Lee, a curator in the Gochang Pansori [a kind of folksong play] Museum, Korean scholars have interchangeably used two terms, such as Bokwon (restoration) and
Jaehyun (reappearance), and applied them to both tangible and intangible cultural properties. Lee argues that tangible properties can be restored if they are part of some kind of imagined past, but that intangible properties can only be restored within present social contexts (Lee 54). Other terms – such as Jaeguhyun (rematerialization), Jaeguyo (restructure), Jaeguseong (reconstitution), and Jaetansang (rebirth) – have also been used in studies about in/tangible cultural properties. In his 2012 interview with me, Korean folklorist Yang-Myung Han mentioned the terms of in/tangible cultural properties as follows:

The intangible cultural properties could not be restored without changes and omissions. Could you dance identically? Could you identically dance movements that you did before? No, it is not possible. In contrast, the tangible cultural properties could be restored [if there are accurate evidences]. For example, could you restore the current atmosphere and mood of interview even if you record my voice? No, you could not. Thus, the intangible cultural properties such as the mask dance have no choice, but are always reenacted and reconstituted. The term Bokwon is not a right expression in the case of the intangible cultural properties. Wonhyung ui Bokwon [restoration of the original form] is also an improper expression. How could we recognize whether it is the original form or not? How could we make the original form of the intangible cultural property in the text/writing? ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

As Han suggests here, various terms have been utilized to discuss how past dances are embodied, and they have not applied to define both intangible and tangible cultural properties. Critical conversations among Korean scholars about various but unsorted terms of in/tangible cultural properties are not yet taking place on a widespread basis. My use of the term “reconstitution,” then, advocates for the use of a particular term to describe intangible cultural properties and to distinguish analysis of them from tangible
cultural properties. This use will be a stepping stone to use classified terms between tangible and intangible cultural properties.

**T’alch’ums Archived by Korean Scholars**

Attempts to keep historical continuity in folklore traditions existed during the Japanese colonial period. In his book *Joseon’s Folklore and Colonialism* (2008), Korean folklorist Geun-Woo Nam describes *Joseon* folklore in the context of Japanese colonialism. *Joseon Minsok Hakhoe* (the Joseon Folklore Society), which was established by both Korean and Japanese folklorists under the supervision of Japan in 1932, revived indigenous *Joseon* amusements (Nam 38). The society also hosted *Joseon Hyangto Muyong Minyo Daehoe* (the Contest for Joseon Folk Dance and Song), staring as early as 1937, to encourage folklore groups’ participation in the competition. The society’s scholars, for example, observed the *Bongsan* mask dance and invited its performing group to perform the mask dance at the 1973 competition it hosted. Through shaping and policing the society’s activities, Japan politically attempted to decrease Koreans’ hostility toward colonial occupation. Several of the almost-extinct Korean folklore practices were kept alive because of Japan’s colonial interaction with specific Korean folklorists, such as Seok-Ha Song and Jin-Tae Son. According to Korean folklorist Yang-Myeong Han, Jin-Tae Son used on-site surveys in the early 1930s to collect information about traditional *t’alch’ums*; he conducted his indirect research questions in a short period of time. In the same period, Seok-Ha Song used a methodology, based on participant observation and that pursued long-term research questions of how *t’alch’ums* were circulated in specific
regions. Yang-Myeong Han considers Song the first folklorist to investigate *t'alch'ums* in the 1930s using oral tradition (Y.-M. Han 65). Another folklorist, Gyeong-Uk Jeon, mentions Song’s research achievements: Song began recording the spoken and sung words to create textual playbooks for several *t'alch'ums*, such as the *Bongsan* and the *Gangryeong* mask dances, through his field work (Jeon, “Current Situation and Prospect of Study on Folk Drama” 380). A playbook is a textual document and consists of descriptions of performers’ dialogues, motions, lyrics, stage directions, and musical accompaniment, including musical rhythms and tempos. It may be that Song’s utilization of fieldwork-based methodology to archive the playbooks of *t'alch'ums* before the liberation of 1945 provided one of the precursors to field-based investigation of the mask dance in the 1960s to the 1980s.

Notwithstanding the changes of the times and environmental conditions, the South Korean government maintained interactions with folklorists, and it used similar research methodologies from the 1960s to the 1980s. At the protection system’s start in 1962, the government expanded and reorganized *Gongbobu* (the Ministry of Public Information), which had been in charge of national advertisements regarding socio-political and economic policies (Jung 189). The government selected both *Gongbobu* and *Munkyobu* (the Ministry of Education) as the main cultural administrators and gave them jurisdiction over cultural practices. *Munhwajae Gwanriguk* was the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau that belonged to *Munkyobu* in 1961. After integrating *Munkyobu* with *Gongbobu*, the government named these two organizations *Munhwa Gongbobu* (the Ministry of Culture and Public Information) and relocated *Munhwajae Gwanriguk* under
Munhwa Gongbobu in 1968. The head or parent organization of Munhwajae Gwanriguk kept changing, thus Munhwajae Gwanriguk belonged to different organizations over time, including Munhwabu (the Ministry of Culture) in 1989, Munhwajae Cheyukbu (The Ministry of Culture and Sports) in 1993, and Munhwajae Gwangwangbu (The Ministry of Culture and Tourism) in 1998. In 1999, the government under President Dae-Jung Kim abolished Munhwajae Gwanriguk and, instead, established Munhwajaecheong (CHA) as the stand-alone organization for culture. Strengthening the cultural administrative agency, the Park regime also promulgated the rules created by the cultural properties committee of the System of Intangible Cultural Properties and appointed Korean scholars as the system’s committees in March of 1962. The government also assigned some scholars as cultural properties specialists for each field – theater, music, dance, handicraft, folk amusement, folk religion, folk rite, and so on – in May of the same year (Jung 204; 205). These selected committees and specialists conducted research on cultural properties’ current conditions in October 1962. By February 1964, they began designating the studied properties as intangible cultural properties. T’alch’ums were classified as the folk theater field in the protection system. The work on folk theatres conducted both by committees and specialists interested in folk theaters, such as Du-Hyeon Lee and Seok-Jae Im, identified thirteen t’alch’ums at that time (Jung 204; 205). These scholars’ discoveries became fundamental sources to register the mask dances as intangible cultural properties. After the investigation of 1964, the Yangju Byulsandae was officially designated on December 7, 1964, the Tongyeong Ogwangdae on December 24, 1964, the Bukcheong Saja on March 31, 1967, the Bongsan on June 16, 1967, and the
Yet, the designation dates and numbers of designated *t’alch’ums* in the cultural system do not signify chronology. Expert on Korean folklore aesthetics, Hui-Wan Ch’ae, explained the registered dates and numbers in his 2012 interview with me: “each number of [intangible] properties was arbitrarily assigned by the government. Even though some property was discovered long ago, it could be registered later” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). The Park regime did not put specific meaning on numbering and dating each intangible cultural property.

Most of the cultural properties committees and specialists were folklorists who came from the Korean Society for Cultural Anthropology which was established in 1958, as described by Korean sociologist Soo-Jin Jung (Jung 200). The Park regime employed folklorists as administrative committee members and field specialists in the protection system. The government gave them authority to administratively and academically select and manage intangible cultural properties under its direction. The folklorists were involved in and significantly influenced the system of intangible cultural properties and they extended the government’s authority as preservers of traditional culture.

**Folklorists’ Observation of Performances by T’alch’um Folklore Groups**

While the Park regime encouraged folklorists to participate in the administrative work of preserving traditional culture in 1962, it also began hosting *Jeonguk Minsok Yesul Gyeongyeon Daehoe* (the National Folk Arts Contest), a competition held every October for three days. The folklorists who worked as administrative committees or
specialists served on the main panels of judges in the contest. The panels’ commentary on each performance not only set the standard to select qualified intangible cultural properties, but also prescribed the range of what Korean traditional culture is. In other words, the panels played important roles of gate-keeper in the Cultural Heritage Protection System (Jung 203).

The first contest in 1958 was held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of establishing the South Korean government. Three years later, the government changed this event to be an annual competition for intangible cultural properties, such as traditional theater, dance, and music. The government hosted this event from 1961 to 1973 and designated more than fifty kinds of intangible cultural properties, including thirteen t’alch’ums. An interview with a human cultural asset and information I gathered from scholarly archives indicate that some mask dance folklore groups participated in the national folklore competition. Korean folklorist Gi-Tae Lee suggests that the government aimed not only to protect folklore, but also increase the public’s concern for the properties through the contest. In addition to participating in the contest, local residents and groups focused on discovering and promoting their endemic folklore (G.-T. Lee 35). Interviewee Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee stated, “a folklore group for the Bukcheong Saja mask dance was made by Leebuk 5 Docheong [the Committee for the Five Northern Korean Provinces] in South Korea [in 1960]….Our group competed in the National Folk Arts Contest in every October with the support of Leebuk 5 Docheong” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). Although the Bukcheong Saja mask dance originated from North Korea, Lee’s group participation in the competition served as a momentum to keep the
North Korean mask dance alive in South Korea. Korean folklorist Du-Hyeon Lee gives another example of group participation. He indicates that the Bongsan mask dance was transmitted among dancers who came from Hwanghae-do in North Korea during their participation in the National Folk Arts Contest in 1958 (D.-H. Lee, Korea’s T’alch’um 183). According to the playbook unofficially published by the Hahoe Byulsingut preservation society, folklorists recorded the mask dance when the Hahoe Byulsingut folklore group joined in the National Folk Arts Contest in 1978 (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 9). As these examples show, regional participation in the National Folk Arts Contest lasted from the late 1950s to the 1970s helped folklorists gather data about choreography, dialogues, stage directions, musical rhythms, props, and costumes. This participation also helped folklorists to better understand both who performed t’alch’ums and where these performers came from. The folklore groups’ participation in the contest allowed the folklorists to observe and gather information about t’alch’ums in a short amount of time.

As folklorists like Seok-Ha Song and Jin-Tae Son did in the 1930s, creating and archiving playbooks was as one of main methodologies the Park regime advocated in its cultural policies. Before the 1960s, there were some written documents about t’alch’ums, called playbooks, which were based on performers’ oral statements. Yet, these playbooks were not professionally catalogued, and some parts began to disappear during Japanese colonial period (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 84). The Park regime, after 1962, created official and approved t’alch’um playbooks after they commissioned specific folklorists to record the mask dance in writing. To begin creating and archiving the
playbooks, the folklorists referred to and re-arranged the existing documents. They also both observed mask dance performances by various regional folklore groups in the contest and gathered verbal accounts from a couple of performers, who participated in the contest or shared their memories with researchers doing field work at the time.

**Yangju Byeulsandaes.** The first playbook of the *Yangju Byeulsandaes* mask dance was recorded by Ji-Yeon Kim in 1937. Jae-Cheol Kim and Takahashi Toru recorded a playbook in 1933 and 1931, respectively. Scholars like Akiba Takashi in 1954 and Tong-II Cho in 1957 also made their playbooks. Except for Tong-II Cho, all these scholars completed playbooks based on the oral statement of Jong-Sun Jo, who was a performer from the 1910s to the 1920s in Yangju, Gyeonggi-do, which is currently a part of South Korea. Jo was the only person to perform all scenes of the *Yangju Byeulsandaes* until the end of the 1920s (Jeon, *Korean Mask Theater and Its Surrounding Culture* 44; 45).

Scholars continued to individually record playbooks until 1957. Thereafter, the Park regime supported folklorists Du-Hyun Lee and Seok-Jae Im to create an official playbook. To create this playbook, the two scholars observed the competition of 1958 and recorded the full details of the *Yangju Byeulsandaes*. They also referred to oral testimonies of two performers, Jun-Seop Park and Seong-Tae Kim. The playbook of the *Yangju Byeulsandaes* was published as an official government document in 1964 (Cho, *History and Principle of T’alch’um* 489). In her 2012 interview with me, Sun-Ok Kim, *Isuja* (follower) of the *Yangju Byeulsandaes*, provided insight into the official playbook: “the version of 1964 was based on Seong-Tae Kim’s performance….When we [her sister Sun-Hong Kim and I] were young, Kim taught the mask dance to us. Jae-Young Rho [He is still alive, but does
not participate in performances because he is old and feeble) and other assets, who already passed away, learned the mask dance from Kim too” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). In this situation, folklorists Lee and Im wrote down dialogues and movements while observing the competition of 1958. Yet, they felt that the playbook they recorded in 1958 was inadequate, so they attempted to gather personal experiences from professional dancer Seong-Tae Kim and then revised the playbook. The preservation society’s dancers in the 2010s still use the 1964 playbook because of its status as a formally designated book ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).

Tongyeong Ogwangdae. According to the official playbook re-published in the 2000s by the Tongyeong Ogwangdae preservation society, the mask dance began around 1900 and was revived again after the government invited a folklore group to the National Folk Arts Contest in 1960 (Tongyeong Ogwangdae Preservation Society 8). Mask dance playbooks circulated prior to December 24, 1964, when the mask dance received a title of intangible cultural property. Mun-Gi Lee created a playbook in 1960 and Sang-Su Choi in 1963. Folklorist Choi also recorded other playbooks of different mask dances from 1959 to 1967 as well as a playbook of the Tongyeong Ogwangdae. I could not find out whether Choi worked as a committee member or specialist in the protection system during this time period. Du-Hyun Lee also completed a playbook in September of 1964. In 1969, the Park regime included Lee’s playbook in the Korean mask dance drama Hanguk Gamyeonguk as an official playbook. It has been re-printed several times since as the standard for the Korean traditional mask dance for this one type. To create the playbook, Lee not only observed the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dances performed in
the 1964 competition, but also consulted dancers Jae-Bong Jang and Jeong-Du Oh. Jang and Oh worked as main dance leaders in Chogye, Hapcheon, Gyeongsangnam-do in the 1920s and devoted themselves to transmitting the mask dance with colleagues like Young-Gu Gang, Gi-Suk Lee, and Dong-Ju Yu. Moreover, Hong-Jong Kim, a human cultural asset, mentioned this list of dancers during his 2012 interview with me:

Some scholar recorded that Jae-Bong Jang is the best professional dancer in the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance. Nobody is able to judge his dance.

Young-Gu Gang….He was a great dancer and singer….His main character was Yangbanchum (dance of the upper class Yangban). Gi-Suk Lee was also good at Yangbanchum. Dong-Ju Yu was as talented as Lee, and he was an expert on Jagumaemichum [dance of a young concubine]. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Interviewee Hong-Jong Kim did not indicate which scholar observed Jang. I speculate that the observer could be one of folklorists I list above and could be one who recorded the playbook before Jae-Bong Jang’s death of 1966.

_Hahoe Byulsingut_. The folklore group of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance was re-organized by the younger generation, including Sang-Ho Lee, who became that dance’s central figure from the 1960s to the 1970s in Hahoe area. The group members used the playbook that was recorded by scholarly researcher and performer Han-Sang Ryu in 1959. In the same year, folklorist Sang-Su Choi also completed his playbook. However, many folklore group members found that it was not easy to reconstitute the mask dance using Ryu’s playbook. They felt that it lacked data about the Hahoe Byulsingut and its history (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 85). Despite the critiques of his playbook, Ryu was seen as an important figure in the Hahoe Byulsingut
mask dance both as a performer and as a creator of the written playbook. According to Sang-Ho Lee, a human cultural asset, Ryu “was a complete master of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance….I just heard about the mask dance from him” (S.-H. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). From 1974 to 1975, folklorists, including Du-Hyun Lee, researched various aspects of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, such as its storyline, composition, stage order, costumes, props, and dialogue. Based on folklorists’ collective data, the folklore group performed the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance from 1976 to 1977 (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 85). In 1978, Du-Hyun Lee observed the folklore group’s performance in the National Folk Arts contest (9). Lee revised the existing playbook by Ryu and included additional facts in it that he gained from human cultural assets such as Chang-Hui Lee (a dancer of the last performance in 1928), Sang-Ho Lee, Chun-Taek Kim, and Hyeong-Gyu Im (9). When the Hahoe Byulsingut was designated as an intangible cultural property in 1980, Du-Hyun Lee collected data and documented the official playbook of the Hahoe Byulsingut with Woo-Seong Sim, a specialist in the cultural system, under the auspices of the Park regime.17

Bongsan. The three mask dances I discussed above came from South Korea. However, the Bongsan and the Bukcheong Saja mask dances originated in North Korea. Even though Korea was divided after the Korean War, South Korean folklorists conducted studies about these two mask dances. In case of the Bongsan mask dance, Jong-Seop Oh, called Oh-Cheong, recorded a playbook in Japanese while observing the mask dance performed in Sariwon, Hwanghae province, which would become a North Korean region, on August 31, 1936 (Seo 96). Japanese scholars kept Oh-Cheong’s
playbook, and they transferred it to Yeon-Ho Seo, a South Korean scholar of Korean literature, in 2001. As stated by Seo, Oh-Cheong’s playbook is considered to be the first and original playbook of the Bongsan mask dance because any record prior to Oh-Cheong’s has not been found. Seok-Ha Song and Seok-Jae Im also observed the 1936 performance and released their playbooks in 1940 and 1957, respectively (Seo 98). In 1958, North Korean folklorist Il-Chul Kim published *Korean Folklore Dancing*, which included his *Bongsan* playbook. Kim’s book was re-released in 2009 in South Korea by editor Dong-Heun Sin. According to Sin, North Korean academic researchers published several books about Korean mask dances in the 1950s, while South Korean scholars were disinterested in the mask dance until the beginning of the 1960s (I.-C. Kim 6). However, after the middle of the 1960s, North Korea stopped transmitting information about the mask dance (Jeon, *Korean Mask Dance Drama* 64). Prior to designating the Bongsan mask dance in 1967, the South Korean government supported Du-Hyun Lee to create the official playbook for Hwanghae province, a part of North Korea. Lee recorded a playbook in August of 1965 by observing the competition performance and interviewing dancers who had defected from North Korea, such as Jin-Ok Kim and Geun-Seong Lee.

*Bukcheong Saja*. The *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance was performed by villagers living in Bukcheong area. During the 1930s, villages in this region held competition festivals and selected the best *Saja* (lion) mask dance. While competing with other *Saja* mask dances from various villages, small folk groups gradually disappeared and, instead, the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance survived as Bukcheong area’s representative of the mask dance (D.-H. Lee 237). Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, a human cultural asset, offered some
evidence that the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance took part in festivals, and that the folklore group in a village performed dance around the end of 1920s.\textsuperscript{18} Even though the folklore groups actively performed the mask dance, no one recorded it into a kind of playbook until Du-Hyun Lee in 1966 recorded data and interviewed performers, such as Yeong-Chun Yun (role for a lion’s head) and Hui-Sun Ma (dancer for a sword dance). Du-Hyun Lee included a brief playbook he created for the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance in the *Korean Mask Dance Drama*, which was officially published in 1969. Lee’s 1969 playbook was the first to describe the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance under the auspices of the Park regime. However, his playbook was not complete, and it differed from the playbook the preservation society is currently using as a standard textbook. The current textbook – unofficially printed by the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance preservation society – still uses the 1979 playbook version of the dance as the original record. Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, a human cultural asset stated that this mask dance playbook was created by the preservation society’s members at the end of 1970s:

[We, I and my colleagues] recorded the playbook that described what we did in the Bukcheong Saja mask dance….Made it [the playbook], drawing on what we remembered at that moment….So, I can say that the current Bukcheong Saja mask dance includes what we originally performed in the past” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.).

Seon-Yun Gang, an initiator (*Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo*) also stated that this mask dance playbook was created by the preservation society’s members at the end of 1970s:

The script we are using was made by Gyu-Hui Jo in the late of the 1970s. Jo was a head director of the preservation society of Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance. When Jo made the script….There was a group for people who came from
Bukcheong of North Korea. This group is still continued….Gyu-Hui Jo made the script with (society) members. Drawing on oral statements, Jo would rearrange a story of Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance. When Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance was registered as an intangible cultural asset, there was not its script. Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance was orally transmitted in the beginning, coming together in a few districts like Sokcho, Gangwon-do and Cheongryangri, Seoul….As far as I know, a playbook of the Bukcheong Saja mask dance was made in the 1970s. The playbook we have currently used is the same with one that was officially published at that time. Based on this playbook, Gyeong-Uk Jeon, a professor of Korean University, re-wrote a playbook as a textbook later ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).

As the two performers testified, the society members created their full version a decade later than folklorist Du-Hyun Lee. Korean scholar Gyeong-Uk Jeon officially re-published the full version playbook in 1984. This 1984 edition is significant because it is still used by this preservation society and marks the final version of this society’s reconstitution of the Bukcheong Saja mask dance.

Through laying out the processes of how the five official t’alch’um playbooks were published, I offer insights into how very early playbooks were created after the beginning of the 1930s. Of course, these individually produced early playbooks did not gain recognition as official documents. While enacting the Cultural Properties Protection Law in 1961, South Korea’s Park regime demanded that government-affiliated folklorists publish official playbooks and secure convincing evidence of the mask dance’s history. To gather such proof, the regime began hosting the National Folk Arts Contest in 1961 so that folklorists could directly observe mask dance performances. Folklorists supplemented information gathered at these contests with oral testimonies from t’alch’um participants.
Among the affiliated folklorists, Du-Hyun Lee was one of the most influential researchers to compile information about the mask dance. Lee compiled information regarding five out of the thirteen designated t’alch’ums into a book, Korean Mask Dance Drama, which the Park regime officially published in 1969. Korean folklorists in the 2010s consider Lee’s book to be one of the most comprehensive collections about the mask dance. His book describes the origins, distinct characteristics of each t’alch’um, mask appearances, and the mask dances’ participants. It also includes four playbooks, excluding one for the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, because Du-Hyun Lee directly observed the Hahoe Byulsingut in the 1978 contest and added it in 1980. Lee completed this playbook through the contest observation by request of the Park regime (Jeon, Korean Mask Dance Drama 381). Lee published three more books about t’alch’ums by 1981. Following Lee’s lead, folklorists like Dong-Il Cho, Bang-Ok Kim, Woo-Seong Sim, and Se-Jung Kim began studying t’alch’ums in the 1970s. Later, in the 1980s, Yeon-Ho Seo, Jae-Hae Im, Gyeong-Uk Jeon, Jin-Sil Sa, and Byeong-Ok Lee began their own studies of the dances.

Seeking and Collecting Vestiges: Folklore Groups’ Performers, Spectators, and Their Memories

Headed by the government-affiliated folklorists, the Park regime in 1968 conducted Hanguk Minsok Jonghap Josa (the Korean National Total Investigation). Folklorist Ju-Geun Jang describes his leadership and experience in the investigation in his 2011 article “Plan and Process for National Folk Arts Contest.” Jang began designing
plans for the investigation in 1966 (Jang 10). And, he launched it in 1968 with other researchers, including folklorists Du-Hyun Lee, Seok-Jae Im, Jeong-Hak Kim, and Dong-Uk Kim. The project methodology used on on-the-spot regional investigation to explore both where and how many vestiges of intangible cultural properties remained in each area. The government required the researchers to make films and photographs, conduct questionnaire-based surveys, and interview related people if needed. After the fieldwork, the folklorists submitted their investigation reports to Munhwajaе Gwanriguk (the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau). The researchers’ reports were influential sources for the officially-published Korean Folklore Investigation Reports from 1969 to 1981.

In 1968, the government-affiliated researchers began to scrutinize cultural properties in Honam area (Jeolla province, including South and North Jeollas), establishing a pattern that would subsequently obtain for other regions. They launched the research group Honam Munwha Yeonguso at Chonnam National University in February of the same year. They first selected five or six villages for the sample survey. To understand the general conditions of the chosen villages, they sent the heads of each village five or six page questionnaires. From July to August, folklorists visited each village to conduct research. Then, they individually did complementary investigations of the area (Jang 15). They issued the Korean Folklore Investigation Reports Volume 1: Jeollanam-do (South Jeolla) in 1969 and Volume 2: Jeollabuk-do (North Jeolla) in 1971. Folklorists then began focusing on other provinces (G.-T. Lee 37). The five t’alch’ums were especially specified as regional dances in Volume 3, 4, 9, 11, and 12.
Folklorists who conducted these regional investigations from 1968 to 1980 received annual research funds of 3,000,000 won ($2,800) from the government. As described by Ju-Gun Jang, the funds remained constant for the duration of the thirteen-year investigation (Jang 22). The budgetary allocations suggest that the government had a sustained interest in resourcing and creating official documentations of Korean tradition. Some may regard the government’s steady funding for the arts as a means to create cultural and economic stability for each province. However, the amount of funds allotted for this kind of investment never actually changed and did not account for the inflation that began taking place in the 1970s. In other words, on the surface, the Park regime invested in cultural institutions. Yet, their investment was limited and was not concerned about folklorists’ working conditions and abilities to focus on research although the regime still required folklorists to carry out their duty.

How T’alch’ums were Fixed in Governmental Archives

Folklorists modified their official playbooks in response to findings of the national total investigation. They acknowledged that a single observation of the competition and oral testimonies from a couple of performers were not sufficient for creating the official playbooks. They conceded that some folklore groups that participated in the annual folklore contest often made small changes to the choreography to win competitions against other teams and mobilized unpracticed participants to fill vacancies during performances (J.-H. Lim 373). These changes and unskillful performers’ appearance made folklorists doubt whether or not performances in the competitions were
original. This kind of changeable choreography often shaped how interviewees gave testimonies regarding their experiences in the mask dance. Because of the participants’ different experiences in mask dance performances, folklorists continued to gather existing fragments of t’alch’ums as often as possible. With these additional findings, they were able to supplement testimonies and often re-sequence dance fragments in ways that were similar to how t’alch’ums were previously passed down through generations.

I find parallels between folklorists’ methodologies for reconstituting t’alch’ums and Millicent Hodson’s methodology for reconstructing scores of the original choreography for Vaslay Nijinsky’s ballet Le Sacre du Printemps (1996). Several revisions of Nijinsky’s Sacre, as well as new choreographies for Sacre, were invented from the end of the 1980s to the 1990s. Hodson especially discussed the Joffrey Ballet’s reconstruction premiere in 1987. According to Hodson, the human body was an important instrument for discovery for Nijinsky. However, newly reconstructed versions of Nijinsky’s Sacre failed to take into account for Nijinsky’s radical choreographic style and method. Hodson gathered the surviving fragments from Nijinsky’s Sacre.

Her purpose in reconstructing the Nijinsky’s original choreography was to end the further dissolution of the masterpiece of Le Sacre du Printemps. To reconstruct choreographic sequences and musical scores from the premiere, Hodson patched together the recovered original pieces according to musical scores and pictorial evidences left by Igor Stravinsky and Valentine Gross-Hugo. Hodson’s method prioritized making links or connections between the remaining fragments. Through this strategy, she attempted to reduce the gap between the premiere and the reconstruction. Thus, Hodson studied the
original performance as if it was completely removed from the past. She is an agent who endeavors to enable the changed and faded premiere to re-appear in the present. Dance scholar Mark Franko argues in “Epilogue” of Dance As Text (1987) that the reconstruction of historical dance current at that time tended to be achieved by inscribing dance’s past as fixed and unchangeable while repeatedly replicating choreographic patterns, feet steps, arms movements, music scores, and garment designs of an original dance (Franko 135). Hodson fits the model Franko describes when she re-figures the whole of Nijinsky’s masterpiece by putting each lost picture and musical score together.

Her reconstruction eventually rejuvenates the entire masterpiece from one point of view.

Much like Hodson’s procedure for reconstitution of Nijinsky’s Sacre, South Korean folklorists gathered sources through remembrances of villagers’ experience about t’alch’ums. Hong-Jong Kim, a human cultural asset of the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, testified that Kim handed over his research’s findings to the government-affiliated folklorists: “I wrote what I saw and felt on my note [while conducting an individual investigation], yet scholars [folkloirsts] took everything away. I do not have [anything] now.” He goes on to state that, “[I recorded] village people’s words [on tape]. People from the Cultural Heritage Administration visited me and copied my materials. Some of my evidences were recorded on documents of the Cultural Heritage Administration without changes” (H.-J. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). His testimony shows that both an individual dancer and folklorists regarded villagers’ retrospective memories as significant attestations for reconstituting t’alch’ums. Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, a professional dancer on the Bukcheong Saja mask dance remarked:
We [colleagues and I] made it [the playbook], drawing on what we remembered at that moment. So, I can say that the currently used playbook of the Bukcheong Saja mask dance includes what we originally performed in the past.

Munhwajaecheong [the Cultural Heritage Administration] recommends us to continue Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance that was recorded in 1967. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

As evidenced by these two interviewees, the government-affiliated folklorists collected pre-inspected sources and fragments sought by a non-scholar for folklorists’ scholarly reports. These procedures helped folklorists repair damaged parts and reconstituted many parts of *t’alch’ums*, such as dialogues, stage directions, bodily movements, music scores, costume styles, and mask appearances: some of these are “parts” that can be sequenced, but not all. Much like Hodson, Korean folklorists from the 1960s to the 1970s emulated past works, sought to minimize changes, and filled in omissions using their own reconstitution standards. They attempted to maintain traditional versions of *t’alch’ums* and, in so doing, reconstituted them. These reconstitutions, though, were both created through the government’s lens of nationalism and standardization and offered as part of the cultural protection system’s mission to re-establish a coherent Korean national identity. This is to say that folklorists shaped the conventions of the typical mask dances, or *Wonhyeongs* [原形] (the original forms), in the name of Korean nationality.

The South Korean government’s reconstitution hinged upon gathering and rearranging the remaining fragments of the *t’alch’ums*. The reconstitution process by the government was in clear contrast to that by university student activists who used principles from *t’alch’ums* to invent new creations instead of recovering the original
piece of *t’alch’um*. In Chapter 3, I discuss how the student activists embodied *t’alch’ums* in different ways at the same period.

**T’alch’ums by Performers in Preservation Societies**

For the South Korean government, depicting *t’alch’ums* in visual materials was an important project after 1964. These visual materials consisted primarily of official playbooks. To produce official visual archives, the government hired professional performers who could similarly play characters in each *t’alch’um*. Most of participants who produced the visual materials were members of *t’alch’ums’* preservation societies. Prior to my discussion of performers and their dances as they are archived in visual materials, it is significant to note what system the government used to select performers to designate them as human cultural assets and initiators. It is also important to note the way in which the government supported performers, and what the government required of the chosen performers in the Cultural Heritage Protection System in order to understand why performers should participate in creating visual archives. I examine this system of support in the following section.

**Korean Government’s Selection System of Human Cultural Assets**

The South Korean government’s cultural system sought and designated as human cultural assets who could perfectly perform *t’alch’ums’* original forms. While conducting participant observations at the folklore competition in 1961 and during the regional investigations from 1968 to 1980, the government affiliated folklorists encountered
folklore groups’ participants and local villagers, and had chances to recognize who the most knowledgeable performers of t’alch’ums were among them. On the basis of the folklorists’ findings, the government began designating skillful performers as human cultural assets, called In’gan Mun-Hwa-Jae or Yeneung Boyouja. The government also sought people whom human cultural assets in each t’alch’um preservation society could train as potential successors. Among those who were trained, the committees and specialists selected individual successors of each t’alch’um and then named them as Junsuja or Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo – initiators – and Isuja – followers. As explained by Judy Van Zile, “Junsuja is instructed in or initiated,” whereas “Isuja is completed a course of study” (Van Zile 54). Under the rank of Isuja, there is a position called Junsu (Janghak)saeng (an apprentice). The government did not select these students. Rather, each preservation society accepted students who wanted to learn an intangible cultural property like the t’alch’um. In this respect, the government constructed performers’ ranks. Moreover, the affiliated researchers’ investigations and views profoundly affected the final selection process for human cultural assets, initiators, and followers. As leaders within each preservation society, human cultural assets had much agency over the cultural production despite government oversight because they directly trained candidates for positions as initiators or followers. They also had the authority to accept some beginners as apprentices who could eventually become candidates for higher positions if they finished the training period that the government assigned.

According to Seon-Yun Gang, an initiator (Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo) of the Bukcheong Saja mask dance, “Junsu (Janghak)saeng (an apprentice) should learn the
mask dance at least for five years. Then, Isuja (a follower) needs to spend 5 more years” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Isuja of the Yangju Byulsanďae mask dance, Sun-Ok Kim also stated in her 2012 interview with me that “if a dancer [an apprentice] learns the mask dance for five years, Cultural Heritage Administration gives him/ her [a chance to take a test to] a position of Isuja (follower)” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). After beginners in a preservation society studied for at least five years, they could then become qualified for an Isuja candidacy. Furthermore, after ten years of study, they could work as an initiator (Junsuja or Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo). Both the government and preservation societies played important roles in labeling different titles under the Cultural Heritage Protection System. Of course, the preservation societies’ roles had limits within this relationship and larger government context, as their leaders were powerless outside the government’s regulations in that they could not change any aspect of the cultural system. By deeming the preservation societies as sub-organizations, then, the government imposed a hierarchical structure to all intangible cultural properties, including the t’alch’um. In this hierarchical arrangement, dancers in the preservation societies performed their official duties to transmit t’alch’um, such as annually performing the mask dance, participating in making official films of the mask dance, and giving interview to folklorists if needed.

The situation is similar with the South t’alchums I’ve studied for this dissertation. In the case of the Yangju Byulsanďae mask dance, the government designated seven performers as human cultural assets in 1964. According to Sun-Hong and Sun-Ok Kim, my interviewees about the Yangju Byulsanďae mask dance, most of the first generation of assets has already died, except for Jae-Yeong Rho. Even though Rho still has the title of
human cultural asset, he does not actively participate in the society in 2014 because of his health problems. Another still-living human cultural asset, Sun-Hui Kim, is too old to participate in the society’s activities. So, seven initiators in the 2010s manage the preservation society on behalf of the two human cultural assets.

When the Tongyeong Ongwangdae mask dance was registered as an intangible cultural property in 1964, the government designated eight dancers as human cultural assets. Only Yeong-Gu Gang, Yeon-Ho Gang, and Gi-Suk Lee are alive. Two more performers, Yeong-Ok Gu and Ok-Yeon Kim, were designated in 2000. The current president of the preservation society, Hong-Jong Kim, was designated in 2012. There are currently six human cultural assets in the Tongyeong Ongwangdae mask dance who, along with four initiators, operate the preservation society.

The government designated the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance as an intangible cultural property in 1980 and simultaneously registered Chang-Hui Lee as a human cultural asset. After Lee died in 1995, Sang-Ho Lee was designated in 1993, and two more performers, Chun-Taek Kim and Hyeong-Gyu Im, were registered later. These three human cultural assets and four initiators currently work for the preservation society.

For the Bukcheong Saja mask dance, eight dancers were designated as human cultural assets in 1967. These performers were refugees from North Korea and became main members of the Bukcheong Saja folklore group, which was set up under the auspices of Leebuk 5 Docheong (the Committee for 5 North Korea Provinces). Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee is the only member alive now.
In the case of the *Bongsan* mask dance, Jin-Ok Kim and Chun-Sik Min, who defected from North Korea, were the first northern performers of the mask dance in South Korea after liberation. These two were designated in 1967 along with dancers Geun-Seong Lee and So-Un Yang, but Min died on designation day and Kim died two years later in 1969. At the beginning of the 1970s, five performers were also registered. These later performers are now all dead. Ae-Seon Kim, a daughter of Jin-Ok Kim, was additionally designated in 1990. Ae-Seon Kim is currently the only one within the title of human cultural asset in the *Bongsan* mask dance. Kim works for the preservation society along with six initiators.

The South Korean government arbitrarily qualified all dancers as human cultural assets who were found by the folklorists at the time when the government began designating *t’alch’ums* as intangible cultural properties. The government would not register *t’alch’ums* as properties if it did not secure performers who similarly performed each *t’alch’um*. This designation process implied that the government regarded performers as prominent reconstitutioners who embody *Wonhyeong* (the original form) of *t’alch’ums* in the beginning years of the Cultural Heritage Protection System.

Since 1983, the government has enforced the performer assessment system, called *Isu-Pyeongga-Jedo*, which is a dance examination to choose additional assets and initiators. This test was and is still judged by the committee members and specialists in the governmental cultural system. Because candidates must spend many years rising through ranks, the system maintains the scarcity value of human cultural assets, while strictly regulating candidates’ qualifications for taking the dance examination. Whenever
the government-sponsored people won “highly competitive” ratings, their success brought prestige to the government’s cultural system. The success of these people acted to valorize the government’s investment in the cultural system. Performers designated as human cultural assets, initiators, or followers were eligible for monthly stipends from the government. To sum up data grounded from interviews with seven professional dancers in 2012, the government monthly gives each preservation society 3,000,000 won (approximately $2,800). It also offers 1,000,000 won ($930) to each human cultural asset (In’gan Mun-Hwa-Jae or Yeneung Boyouja) and 500,000 won ($465) to each initiator (Junsuja or Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo). It gave no wages for followers (Isuja) and apprentices (Junsu (Janghak)saeng). What is most interesting here is that all seven interviewees are dissatisfied with their monthly wages, even though the government had raised these amounts over time. Sang-Ho Lee argues that, “Korean minimum wage is 1,300,000 won ($1,200). I do not understand that the government does not offer enough money to us (human cultural assets) for basic living cost. I think this policy is wrong” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). According to Ministry of Employment and Labor in South Korea, a minimum wage in 2014 is 5,210 won per an hour. If a laborer has 40-hour work in a week, their average monthly earnings are 1,088,890 won ($ 1,048.00). However, it is obvious that the government has offered performers like human cultural assets and initiators less than the minimum wage. In case of preservation societies’ followers and apprentices, the government has not even given a wage. The government’s insufficient support caused the preservation societies’ performers to suffer
the disproportionate relationship between their responsibilities – which were viewed as
great – and their low salaries.

In my 2012 interviews, four interviewees, Seon-Yun Gang, Sun-Ok Kim, Sun-
Hong Kim, and Sang-Woon Park, noted that many performers in the mask dance
preservation societies worked two jobs to supplement their living expenses. They
describe these financial struggles as such:

I taught several students to transmit Kkopchuchum [kkopchu means hunchback,
and chum means dance]. Yet, they did not continue to dance it. Instead, they
wanted to have other jobs to cover their living….Many dancers have completely
different jobs….Their jobs relate to theater and dance works. Some takes general
office jobs….A rehearsal date and time of Bukcheong Saja [lion] mask dance is
at 6 pm on every Thursday. Performers attempt to join in the rehearsal after
finishing their works. They could not do it without a sense of duty. In fact, most
artists do not have enough financial support, especially traditional artists. Hence,
young artists are not able to continue art works. (Gang, "Interview Transcript,"
 n.p.)

This support is not enough for a living life, so professional dancers must have
another jobs. We try to practice the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance every
weekend. If we have performance, we need to make appointments to practice, yet
it is not easy. Dancers do not easily concentrate on practicing performances
because of their second jobs. Some performers have a problem with their family,
since they work during weekdays and join in training of the mask dance for
weekend. Performers’ family often complains that performers do not spend time
with family.(Kim and Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Today, if we prepare the mask dance performance, disciples just bring their
dance shoes and spend a couple of time to practice. That’s it. If I and other
bearers give them a scolding about unearned participation, they complain that we
must make money for living expenses although we want to spend long time for
practicing the mask dance….I think that young disciples do not want to adhere to
restrictive time in order to practice the mask dance. Moreover, disciples often ask
us, “How much do I receive a payment for a day if I join in the performance?”
The disciples pay attention to calculating their benefits first instead of
considering value of participation in the mask dance. They would not take part
in the performance if the payment does not reach their expectation. Although there
are about fifty members (dancers) in the society of the Bongsan mask dance, it is
not easy that most members flexibly make an appointment to practice and participate in the performance together….Other societies have similar problems like the society of the Bongsan mask dance. They do not also hold enough members who can participate in performances. I think we [the society of the Bongsan mask dance] are in a better situation because 95% of our members majored in Dance. Some of members majored in Theater. Most of members closely relate to Arts field by performing Dancing or Theatrical performances. This means that most dancers in our society are always ready for performances of the mask dance even though they do not easily put time into practices of the mask dance. (Park, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

As revealed by these interviewees’ testimonies, professional dancers in the preservation societies did not merely focus on learning and practicing the mask dance. Despite the government’s emphasis on the importance of teaching and preserving the mask dance, performers often worried about their livelihood and left the preservation societies to take other jobs that paid higher wages. Because of the low salaries, in other words, the dancers often eventually had to make participating in the mask dance a low priority in their lives because they had to focus on survival. Performers’ second careers varied considerably: some dancers had dance or theater teaching jobs, while others became company employees in private businesses. In the latter work situations, performers’ rehearsal time gradually decreased, and the performance quality during government-sponsored exhibitions went down. In short, the government’s monthly fund functioned as an important rubric for gauging their acknowledgement of performers’ artistic contributions.

Tracing Performers’ Memories and Dancers’ Bodies Fixed in Visual Materials

Why did the government continue financial support to t’alch’um preservation societies and their members after the 1960s? In the 2012 interview with me, Geun-Hwa-
Seon Lee, a human cultural asset, stated that societies’ members do not receive a monthly stipend, but a “transmission fund,” called *Jungseungbi* (G.-H.-S. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Lee attested that the government’s financial support was not an outright gift for professional dancers. Rather, the stipend reflected the government’s expectation to meet the needs for transmitting *t’alch’ums* as a form of cultural labor that they financially undervalued.

As pointed out by Judy Van Zile, the government transmitted *t’alch’ums* through the designated professional performers as well as research by folklorists on mask dances. To update the mask dances’ playbooks, the South Korean government directed folklorists to both meet and interview participants who the government designated as human cultural assets. Performers’ oral accounts of the mask dances in these interviews functioned as crucial fragments of evidence when the folklorists pieced together parts of each original *t’alch’um* to complete the government archives. The Korean folklorists’ approach to interviewing participants resembles the process of reconstruction deployed by Cecil James Sharp articulated in Georgina Boyes’s book, *The Imagined Village: Culture, Ideology, and the English Folk Revival* (1993). Like Sharp’s informants, I suggest the mask dance’s performers were objectified by the folklorists in the 1960s and the 1970s.

According to Boyes, Sharp focused on seeking the remaining pieces of English folksongs and matching each of their fragments to “formulate and promote the Revival’s concepts of traditional expressive culture” (Boyes 2). This piecing together is analogous in the same ways to the reconstruction method deployed by Millicent Hodson. To collect sources of folksongs, Sharp interviewed villagers of the lower classes, especially the
working class, to record experiences and memories about folksongs. Utilizing villagers’ oral accounts, Sharp devised compositions of folksongs and used them as educational resources in early twentieth-century England. After finding new folksongs whose popularity had faded, Sharp reconstructed folksongs and, therefore, revitalized them. Even though the main cultural form of England changed from folksong to folkdance, the English folkdance society was founded in 1924, and Sharp continuously executed research leadership in the folkdance society. Sharp made selections of folksong and dance for the English folksong and dance revivals and authorized his reconstruction as England’s tradition. Unlike Hodson, who reconstructed the entire premiere of Nijinsky’s *Sacre*, Sharp reconstructed several folk songs and dances by selectively weaving them together. While both Hodson and Sharp desired to embody the past, they did not use the same methodology nor reconstruct the same thing.

In the same way that Sharp collected information through interviewees’ accounts and standardized the folksong and dance reconstruction, folklorists under the control of the South Korean government interviewed and re-interpreted the interviewees’ accounts and memories. In this context, the folklorists helped the government extend their authoritative power by foregrounding the mask dance as a representation of “unchanged” – standardized – Korean tradition.

The government had another try to make a stake for *t’alch’ums*, demanding professional dancers to annually perform *t’alch’ums* and produce their official visual materials on the basis of the government-approved forms and contents. *Munhwajaе Gwanriguk* (the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau) began making 30 to 40 minute
long short films about intangible cultural properties in 1964 and released them to
government visual archives from 1965 to 1992. Munhwajae Gwanriguk took over
Munhwajae Yeongusil (the Cultural Properties Research Institute) from 1993 to 2004, and
since 1995, films for intangible cultural properties have been made in the form of DVDs
(National Research Institute of Cultural Heritage 40 Years: Connect between Yesterday
and Today and Open Tomorrow 154). According to Year Book of Cultural Heritage 2004
also describes that the government began producing its first films about t’alch’ums in
1967.33 Human cultural asset Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee testified that preservation societies’
dancers performed in the official films after their respective mask dances were designated
intangible cultural properties. Sun-Hong Kim, an initiator in the Yangju Byulsandae, also
attested the first generation dancers’ participation in detail:

Recording performances began after 1964. Teachers, who danced before 1964,
think that professional dancers have merely danced the fixed patterns of the mask
dance under the National Treasure system. They also feel sorry for it. When
teachers performed the mask dance, they did not have any rules of the mask
dance. Their movements were changeable according to their feeling of those
days. [When teachers taught tomorrow,] their dances would be different from
today. Teachers differently taught the mask dance every day because they did not
have rules of dance. Disciples had to understand the mask dance by rule of
thumb. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Sun-Hong Kim indicated here that dancers performed t’alch’um in variety of ways before
the government designated the Yangju Byulsandae as an intangible cultural property.
However, to create official films, the government required dancers to perform t’alch’ums
without changing storylines, dialogues, movements, music, and costumes which were set
out in the folklorists’ playbooks. The performers were not able to represent what they
wanted to dance if their personal knowledge about the mask dance was different from that recorded in the playbooks. Rather, they merely functioned as instruments of power in the official films manipulated by the government. The government also requested the societies’ performers to give an annual performance to the public. The material presented at this annual event was based on the folklorists’ playbooks. These annual performances and films align with an observation made by Ramsay Burt, “to believe that the choreographer is the only source of a work’s value is to run the danger of turning dancers into mindless puppets” (Burt 31). Burt argues that reconstruction of dance’s past cannot be based only on evidences from the premiere of choreography because dancers function as important agents who contribute their own “authenticity” (31) as well as instrumental roles in the reenactment process of the original choreography. The Korean government’s procedures of reconstituting t’alch’ums pursued “the authoritarian and patriarchal tendencies of the process of canonization,” undermining their agency as dancers (33).

The government was proud of reconstituting “original” forms of t’alch’ums and supporting professional dancers with national funds. It placed the dancers as prominent figures in mask dance performances in scholarly interviews, visual archives, and annual performance events about t’alch’ums. This pride, however, was always paired with a more negative attitude when the government considered t’alch’ums to be ephemeral traditional dances. The government reconstitution of t’alch’ums “fixed” them in visible, but unchangeable forms, rearranging their narrative contents. In this respect, both the folklorists and performers, as collaborators in the Cultural Heritage Protection System, were not necessarily voluntary reconstituters. Rather, they certainly fulfilled their
nationalistic duties as employees and followed the government’s regulations and therefore became implicated in the rendering of the government’s vision to reconstituting t’alch’ums.

Relative Power and Agency in Korean Cultural Heritage Protection System

Theorist Diana Taylor, in a 2008 report, points out that UNESCO’s bureaucratic approaches, from 1972 to 1997, to safeguard intangible cultural properties – functioned in the following way: “UNESCO defines safeguarding as adopting measures to ensure the viability of intangible cultural heritage” through textual and visual documentations (Taylor 2). Taylor criticizes that UNESCO tends to intentionally objectify and lock intangible cultural heritages in archives due to its conceptualization of the acts of “revitalization and transmission” as production of “archival objects” (2). She attributes this tendency to “top-down approaches” to institutionalization (5). Taylor argues that intangible cultural heritages cannot be fixed in archival works not only because of their often corporeal nature, but also because their meanings come from the context in which their actions take place. Practitioners repeat, quote, borrow, and transform corporeal acts, and these acts can only be transmitted though repeated enactment of bodies (3). Taylor’s argument emphasizes that dancing bodies become important subjective transmitters of intangible cultural properties. Taylor’s thought connects with Tomie Hahn’s idea about transmission via the senses. In Sensational Knowledge: Embodying Culture Through Japanese Dance (2007), Hahn illustrates both how movement is transmitted and how cultural knowledge is embodied through the Japanese dance nihon buyo. According to
Hahn, “practitioners’ attendance to certain sensoria (even particular qualities of sensory experience)” should be prioritized in culture’s transmission processes because “the transmission of sensory knowledge can shape dancers’ experiential orientation” (Hahn 5). Hahn argues that the transmission process through dancers’ direct training is important because “body’s actual form and actions embody the inner nature (or spirit) of the person [a dancer]” (43). In similar vein, Taylor considers the importance of spiritual senses in the dancers’ body energy as something to acknowledge as well as conveying somatic movements in transmission processes. These spiritual senses cannot be signaled in textual and visual archives.

Much like UNESCO’s approach to recording intangible cultural properties in textual documents, the South Korean government, the Park regime, pursued a top-down – bureaucratic – approach to recording *t’alch’ums* by appointing folklorists to create playbooks. These playbooks were based on both their direct observations of the folklore competitions and interviews with the preservation societies’ performers. Because the government allowed the societies’ dancers to directly perform the mask dances in the folklore competitions, it seems as if the government gave careful consideration to performers’ memories and how they shared the mask dances with other dancers. In other words, the government seemed to take seriously the *t’alch’ums*’ dancers, as emphasized by Taylor and Hahn, prior to documenting the mask dances as part of a national record. However, the government simultaneously set limitations on dancers’ performances and placed folklorists as observers in restrictive, confined performance spaces, not in the performing groups’ typical environment. These conditions made up a complex landscape
of government control in which those involved with re-constituting *t’alch’ums* were both revered and subject to abuses. The government’s procedures induced both dancers and folklorists in performances to perform and record the standardized *t’alch’ums* within government-regulated spaces. These bureaucratic orders made the mask dance performed by dancers to be objectified in playbooks and later in films.

When the folklorists created the playbooks using direct observations and interviewees’ oral testimonies, they wrote what year and month they watched each mask dance and which performers they interviewed; However, in these notes, they did not elucidate what part the folklorists brought from direct observations or performers’ oral evidence. They also did not explain what part the folklorists further modified. For example, when I compare folklorist Du-Hyeon Lee’s two books, *Korean Mask-Dance Drama* [published in 1969 and re-printed in 1994] and *Korea’s T’alch’um* [published in 1981], both include the *Yangju Byulsandae*’s playbook. However, although the 1994 version playbook was slightly updated, Du-Hyeon Lee did not mention that he updated and changed some sections of the later texts. This oversight indicates that the folklorists added to interviewees’ oral testimonies using their own professional, privileged ideological lenses. Thus, even though the folklorists collected historical facts about *t’alch’ums* by observing performers’ dances and interviewing performers about their past experiences, they exploited performers and interviewees, simply treating them as useful informers and not important cultural figures.

In this way, professional dancers in the mask dance preservation societies were subjugated to scholarly power. In their 2012 interviews with me, two interviewees,
human cultural asset Sang-Ho Lee and an initiator Sang-Woon Park, noted the
government-affiliated scholars’ tendency to disregard the mask dance performers and
their preservation societies:

In the beginning [the 1960s], the government arbitrarily handled the Cultural
Properties Protection Law and we just obeyed it. However, we would not just follow the law without our opinions. Do you know the Korean Cultural Heritage
Foundation [the affiliated organization under the Cultural Heritage
Administration]? This Foundation functions as a main institution to protect and
promote preservation societies of Korean mask dance, but it tries to dominate us
now. This is because the government takes a right to control over the Korean
Cultural Heritage Foundation. We [performers] have complained about it.
Moreover, when the government selected a person as a human cultural asset, it
gave young scholars a chance to evaluate and select [the society’s performers].
However, we [the preservation society’s members] did not accept it, and instead
wanted elder scholars who studied the mask dance for a long time. We thought
that elder scholars could well choose a qualified person as a human cultural asset.
The government tends to highly appreciate scholars and professors and their
academic works. I think it is social and political ill. In order to study about the
mask dance, the government needs to concentrate on professional dancers of
Korean mask dance. (Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

I think that the Cultural Heritage Administration tends not to respect opinions of
professional dancers in the societies of the mask dance. Instead, it merely follows
opinions of Korean scholars, and then often changes the Korean cultural policies
concentrated on these ideas. Even though professional dancers put every ounce
of their energy into the mask dance, their ideas are neglected. Professional
dancers in the societies of the mask dance complain their severe conditions to the
Cultural Heritage Administration. The Administration feels tired of accepting all
complains of dancers, so it threatens the societies with cutting off aid. I think that
the cultural Heritage Administration looks down upon us (professional dancers).
(Park, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

As these two interviewees revealed, the South Korean government did not regard the
performers’ opinions even though the performers were substantive practitioners and
witnesses of the mask dance. Rather, the government wholeheartedly trusted folklore
researchers’ scholarship and decisions to construct specific narratives about t’alch’ums
under its regulatory gaze. The two performers I interviewed showcased the government’s attitude toward professional dancers, revealing that the societies’ dancers are merely objects who receive the folklorists’ instructions microscopically and the government’s macroscopically. In this way, folklorists manipulated and misappropriated interviewees’ memories and experiences from their privileged perspectives, which simultaneously created and reinforced a hierarchical relationship between interviewers and interviewees. The government directed the folklorists’ research intention. Thus, the government constructed the Cultural Properties Heritage System as the leading figure for national identity through managing both folklorists and the performers with whom they interacted.

Through the national research investigation and under the auspices of the South Korean government, the government led folklorists to manipulate performing and interview situations by wielding the dictatorial power of folklore experts. The government, the folklorists, and professional dancers were hierarchically ranked: the government ordered the folklorists to archive t’alch’ums and place the preservation societies’ performers in a subordinate role while they conducted their research. The process of reconstituting t’alch’ums in the South Korean cultural system was shaped by the hierarchy between the government, researchers, and professional dancers.

NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN GOVERNMENT SPONSORED RECONSTITUTIONS OF T’ALCH’UMS

South Korea was completely devastated after the Korean War, which lasted from 1950 to 1953, and the public was run-down from poverty. In this period, the Korean
government, which desired a self-sustaining state, wanted economic as well as political stability. The public aspired to do away with poverty and be financially independent at the end of the 1950s (Sŏ 114). Because of the public’s wish, the South Korean military government, the Park’s regime, emphasized nation-building from the 1960s to the 1970s. This regime wanted to establish democracy and grow economy under centralized authoritarian rules. During this project, the regime induced Koreans to promote national identity that the public could recognize as a driving force in the imagined democratic nation and state economy. The regime made the root of national identity cultural practices from Korean traditions like t’alch’ums, and began reconstituting t’alch’ums as cultural properties after the early 1960s.

Yet, the Park regime achieved something else, a certain sense of national identity, while reconstituting t’alch’ums. In The Birth of Intangible Cultural Asset, Korean sociologist Soo-Jin Jung points out that while the state revealed its intentions to develop traditional culture and to foster national identity through officially reconstituting t’alch’ums, it utilized these reconstitutions as sociopolitical tools (Jung 188). Using these reconstitutions, the military regime laid a scheme to divert the public’s attention away from sociopolitical and economic consciousness that could stimulate the public to cultivate resistant ideologies, such as anti-government and anti-American sentiments.

After the end of the 1960s, university students began having a strong dissatisfaction with the government’s heavy dependence on the U.S. and its authoritarian power in political and economic structures. They eventually promoted student demonstrations to get workers to recognize the problems with government policies and extended their activities.
to labor movements. In Chapter 3, I discuss university students’ activities in detail. In the remainder of this Chapter, I suggest that state-supported *t’alch’um* reconstitutions functioned as blocking devices that manipulated public interests about socio-politics and personal subjectivity. The government drew public attention to valuable aspects of Korean cultural heritage, one result of which was retention of the state’s dictatorship that supported a conservative structure of social hierarchy.

**National Identity in Various Genres and Cultural Sites**

In the mid-1960s, the South Korean government gave a boost to a Korean folklore museum, *Hanguk Minsokgwan*. There was already the National Folk Museum of Korea which the U.S. military government opened on November 8, 1945. The government attached this museum to *Munhwajaes Gwanriguk* (the Cultural Property Preservation Bureau) and re-opened this museum in 1966. Since then, this museum has become a famous attraction in Seoul. The museum not only exhibits textual and visual archives about antecedents’ everyday life and traditional events, but also provides visitors with opportunities to view daily supplies of Koreans in the past. On October 13, 1974, the government also founded the Korean folklore village theme park, *Hanguk Minsokchon*, as a national policy project. Instead of displaying single items of household of Korean forefathers in the folklore museum, the government built a town of life-size replicas of the *Joseon* dynasty period in the folklore theme park. Workers in the theme park put on traditional Korean clothes, and they enacted past time like as if ancestors were alive. Visitors of the theme park were invited to feel as if they returned to the past in a time
machine. The government offered the attraction’s visitors a direct experience of the past communities’ local environments. The government’s official enhanced investment in the return to the past and tradition signifies that the government paid attention to draw Korean national identity through nostalgia for the past and tradition.

In-Kyeong Kim and Dong-Hyeon Kim, scholars of Korean literature, analyze that Korean novels in the 1970s highlighted ideological conflicts and sought for solution to overcome the ideological crisis. Emphasizing Korean ideology divided in South and North, a few novels in the 1970s call attention to a sense of national identity. In-Ho Choi’s *Land of Exile* (1971), for example, sheds light on the postwar situation in South Korea as the novel’s background. Choi reveals how much Koreans were hurt by the territorial and ideological division of Korea through depicting a hero as a victim and vagabond who was involuntarily sandwiched between two ideological conflicts – democracy and Communism. Another example of the depiction of the war, Heung-Gil Yun’s *The Rainy Spell in Summer* (1973) illustrates a first troubled and later re-harmonized family suffering during the war. This novel’s lamentation of severe conflicts among the family members implies that Koreans themselves did not intentionally cause the territorial and ideological segregation. Instead, they accepted their unavoidable doom that resulted from the struggles of two world powers, the United State and the Soviet Union (D.-H. Kim 200). These two novels suggest that the war in Korea influenced a sense of loss of national dignity and identity.

According to film scholars like Hyeon-Chan Ho, Jae-Seok Ahn, and Sang-Yong Lee, several films in the 1960s are about an aftermath of the Korean War. These films
manifest the trend of being conscious of national identity, such as Hyeo-Mok Yu’s *O-Bal-Tan* (An Aimless Bullet) (1961), Gi-Deok Kim’s *Nam-Ga-Buk* (The North and South) (1965), and Man-Hee Lee’s *Gunbeon Eopneun Yongsa* (A Hero without Serial Number) (1966). These three films are set either during the Korean War or during its immediate aftermath. *An Aimless Bullet* includes a story of family members whose lives were wholly destroyed by the war. Yu expresses that Koreans could not easily cure war wounds, like poverty and dispersed family identity, even though the nation already ceased the war. *The North and South* illustrates two military officers in the South and the North having a fierce battle over a woman. The film is a melodrama set during the war and casts light on the tragedy of territorial and ideological division. *A Hero without Serial Number* tells the story of the South Korean army, who fought for freedom against the Red Army. These three films depict Korea’s turmoil, and they ultimately foreground how the North’s ideology was completely different from the South’s and how this difference split a nation into two. The films incited Koreans to adopt an anticommunist ideology and develop a unique national identity only for South Korea.

The literary and filmic examples make clear that the Korean War was an unforgettable event that influenced South Korea from the 1960s to the 1970s. In fact, films and novels were under censorship during the Park regime. In the case of films, the military regime enacted a law of film in 1962, in the name of development of film industry. However, the regime reviewed all films before screening to check out whether films presented an anti-Communist ideology (M.-H. Kim 99). As Hyeon-Chan Ho points out, a main purpose of this law was to uniformly control public thoughts on an anti-
Communism (Ho 152). Ho’s statement suggests that the Park regime recognized that the
geographical division and the psychological damage from the war worsened South
Korean public sentiment toward North Korea. Through the law, the regime manipulated
films to support its anti-Communist policies and to promote a sense of national identity
contingent upon a united sense of belonging to the military regime. The regime
eventually made an excuse for governmental power, utilizing nationalist films that
foregrounded anti-Communism (M.-H. Kim 99).

State-centered National Projects from the 1960s to the 1980s

Three projects from the 1960s to the 1980s – capitalist industrialization, pro-
Americanism, and anti-Communism – accustomed the public to state-centered policies of
the government. These projects also ran concurrently with state-sponsored support of
traditional performing arts, including the t’alch’um. Prior to discussing nationalistic
integration by creating cultural policies for reconstitutions of the mask dance, it is
important to understand how the Park and Chun regimes endeavored to indoctrinate the
public in being participated in the state’s projects.

Capitalist Industrialization

Korean nationalism began making a mark again when the Park military regime
applied economic and political pressures to South Korea. Korean economist Byeong-
Cheon Lee uses the term Gaebal Dokjae (the developmental dictatorship) to discuss the
Park regime, which he defines as a political system in which restrictions of the public’s
participation in politics were justified for economic growth and political stability. This system basically followed an economic growth-first policy that focused on fostering a huge economy at the expense of workers (Lee 19). As Lee makes clear, the Park regime executed a developmental dictatorship. The autocracy argued that South Korea had not realized democracy, despite advocating for it since the 1950s, because Korea had not have a stable economy. The regime insisted that turning over a new leaf in the economy was more urgent than the establishment of democracy in Korea. Korea in the 1960s was still an agriculture-centered society. Under the pretense of democratic conditions, the regime began transforming what they saw as an industrial wasteland into an industrial society through prioritizing the rapid industrialization from the 1960s to the 1970s. The next regime, Doo-Hwan Chun’s regime, continued it in the 1980s. The process of its drive for industrialization induced the public to regard the economic growth as an inevitable condition for democracy. That is, it let them consider the state’s authoritarian orders “natural” (Koo, Hagen 16). The dictatorship, therefore, appealed to a widespread public desire for democracy by presenting rapid industrialization as the modus operandi of democratic countries (Choi, Jang-Jip 32; 39).

According to Paul Krugman in “The Myth of Asia's Miracle” (1994), an American economist writing in 1994, the Stalin regime, in particular, concentrated its energies on developing national industrial output through constructing new factories as the regime forced millions of male and female workers to move from farms to cities, pushing them into the labor force. Krugman suggests the following: “the newly industrializing countries of Asia, like the Soviet Union of the 1950s, have achieved rapid
growth….Asian growth, like that of the Soviet Union in its high-growth era, seems to be driven by extraordinary growth in inputs like labor and capital rather than by gains in efficiency” (70). He argues that Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet Union from the mid-1920s to 1953, transformed an agricultural nation into an industrial country through the mobilization of labor and capital, and regarded economic expansion as being more important than the quality of economic growth.

Supporting Krugman’s ideas, Korean economist Jeong-Woo Lee argues in “The Development Dictatorship and Chung-Hee Park's Regime” (2003) that the Park regime’s economic development plans were analogous to Stalin’s economic model in that both the models were undemocratic and bureaucratic, and they exploited workforce merely for national benefits (J.-W. Lee 219). The Park regime aroused enthusiasm to industrialize a nation by both establishing the export-led economic system and investing in the heavy chemical industry. To secure production for a short period of time, the military government relied on foreign countries, like the U.S. and Japan, and offered more support to large companies than to workers. President Park had insight into Korea’s cheap and abundant labor when he compared the amount of raw materials available to the technical skills. The regime began importing raw materials from the U.S. and machines from Japan to develop light industry and then re-exported textiles, groceries, and leather goods. The dictatorship fired the engines of economic growth while encouraging labor-intensive and export-led industries in the 1960s. The regime in the 1970s concentrated on consolidating heavy industries, such as shipbuilding, steel, automobile, and semiconductors (E.-S. Lee, Korean Institute for Labor Studies and Policies, n.p.). At the beginning of the 1980s, the
Fifth Republic under Doo-Hwan Chun’s regime was still an oppressive military regime with conditions similar to those under the Park regime (Choi, Jang-Jip 36). The Fifth Republic focused on heavy industry until Chun took a step back from the front lines in 1988. These economic policies gathered momentum as the two dictatorships entirely followed the U.S.

Pro-Americanism

During thirty years, the Park and Chun regimes achieved the onrush of industrialization, and they concentrated on externally increasing economic scale. They could not accomplish this growth without foreign countries’ backing, especially U.S. backing. To attract and retain direct investment and support of the U.S., the regimes looked to the U.S. for guidance. At the beginning of the 1960s, the U.S. formulated an integration plan for East Asian regions and made Japan the center of this plan. It demanded that the Park regime accepted the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty in which the restoration of diplomatic relations with Japan would accelerate Korea’s economic development. Because South Korea lacked know-how and capital, the regime took this suggestion with hesitation in 1965. Since then, the U.S.’s peremptory demand lasted for a while. Even while South Korea was busy ensuring national security against North Korea, the Park regime dispatched Korean military forces to the Vietnam War from 1964 to 1966 at the request of the U.S. In “The Developmental Dictatorship and Chung-Hee Park’s Regime: The Origin of Korean Political Economy” (2003), Hong-Gu Han, a scholar on contemporary history of Korea, argues that the primary reason the regime
decided to take part in the Vietnam War was because South Korea was being pressured by the American government (Hong-Gu Han 291). Han points out that the deployment of Korean armed forces in Vietnam was unavoidable as long as the regime received assistance from the U.S. As compensation for Korea’s entry into Vietnam, the U.S. further expanded financial aid and helped South Korea play a central role in the East Asian international trade market. The country made a significant breakthrough into oversea exports, and South Korea was upgraded to a tactical partner that could assist the U.S. (B.-C. Lee 53; Han 301).

The dictatorship’s pro-American policy hindered South Korea from becoming an independent country that had its own self-constructed national identity. Korea was economically developed by high-speed industrialization and US aid from the 1960s to the 1980s. As the dictatorship mediated the two policies – industrialism and pro-Americanism, the Park and Chun regimes stirred the public to imagine a community with one main purpose: accomplishing economic growth. This community, it is important to note, was innately undemocratic, bureaucratic, and its operation solidified the state’s hegemony.

Anti-Communism

The Park regime made anti-Communism a main theme in its discourse of nationhood. As the dictatorship enforced an industrialized community, it advocated Bangong (anti-Communism) as the ideological motto. In fact, South Korea included many people whose families were separated after the war and yearned to see each other
during the possible unification of South and North Korea. Under this circumstance, a communist-friendly attitude was seen as a sentiment that could encourage the public to develop strong aspirations for unification and harbor doubts about the military government that turned a vigilant eye toward North Korea. The regime took several steps to cope with this situation instead of bluntly requiring the public to rebuff Communism.

In the early 1960s, the Park regime began including anti-Communist education in the nation’s curriculum. Since promulgating a written policy of Korean education curriculum in 1955, the curriculum has been continuously revised by the government. In 1963, the dictatorship required anti-Communist education in sociology classes in Korea’s schools from elementary to high schools for an hour a week. A decade later, the regime augmented the required number of classes to two hours a week. In addition, the dictatorship encouraged many schools to conduct anti-Communist oratorical and poster-drawing contests. Through these educational processes, the regime targeted younger students and relentlessly promoted the superiority of South Korea’s supposedly democratic system. Korean Historian Nam-Hee Lee offers an example typical of anti-Communist education in *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (2007):

The culture of enmity promoted by anticommunist education is seen most emblematically and dramatically in the case of Yi Sungbok, an eight-year-old boy who is said to have shouted, “I don’t like communists” before he was allegedly killed by North Korean armed guerrillas in 1968. Nationwide exaltation of the boy – in textbooks, in children’s speech contests, by putting his statue in every elementary school, and by showing children a feature film based on history – lasted well into the 1990s. (N.-H. Lee 85)
Lee’s reference to the case of Yi Sungbok reveals how the military regime used this horrific incident to buttress anti-Communism as an educational subject matter and target the younger generation. The dictatorship judged that the older generation could not be easily become anti-Communist because it hoped that two Koreas would be consolidated into one before long. The younger generation, who did not remember the war and heartbreaking grief of the partition, were open to anti-Communist sentiments. The dictatorship actively tried to shape young people’s negative feelings toward North Korea’s Communism and to secure its faithful supporters in the future.

Since 1972, the Park regime has regularly executed *Minbangong Daepi Hunryeon*, or civil defense training. At the beginning of this time period, the regime developed and then implemented this drill in the middle of each month. This drill was twenty minutes long, and the air raid siren sounded for the entire area of South Korea. All people were to put aside their unfinished work and participate in the training by taking close air raid shelter or going to a safe haven. The Park and Chun regimes forcibly required the public to be in the anti-Communist training and blocked off their all actions for a while as if the whole world stopped. Even after these autocracies ended, this drill continued, but its frequency decreased: the training occurred nine times a year in 1989, three times in 1992, and once in 1996. After 1997, the drill happened only in select areas.

These physical and mental restrictions imposed by both the civil defense drill and educational system embody Michel Foucault’s panoptic mechanism in *Discipline & Punish: the Birth of the Prison* (1995). Foucault mentions that social institutions, such as the hospital, the factory, the asylum, and the school, resemble the mechanism of
panopticon that is an architectural structure built by Jeremy Bentham in the eighteenth century. Instead of being deprived of light and hidden away in a dark dungeon, full light was allowed in a panoptic structure to help overseers police inmate behaviors. This structure blocked off each inmate confined in a cell to communicate with others, enabling prisoners to only see the tall pillar of the central tower. Inmates in these conditions could not recognize that they were permanently under observation by supervisors in the central tower. In this sense, prisoners were not “subject(s) in communication,” but “object(s) of information” in a mechanism of power (Foucault 200). This panoptic mechanism trained and corrected inmates, and changed their behaviors through supervisors’ constant inspections without corporal punishment. In other words, prisoners were disciplined by supervisors and therefore were subjugated to the panoptic power relationship.

The South Korean dictatorship similarly utilized the disciplinary mechanism of panopticon to monitor the public and their behaviors while conducting the civil defense drill and the anti-Communist education. While the autocracy consistently dispersed anti-Communist ideas through the national educational system, it trained and corrected the youth through its ideological infrastructure to prescribe North Korean Communists as latent destroyers of South Korea’s democratic development. The young people were trained to imagine themselves as unified against the Communist menace, and to have a sense of unity that strengthened their sense of responsibility toward national security. The young people were involuntarily subordinated by the dictatorship’s regulations of anti-Communist ideology much like the panopticon’s prisoners who were controlled by the central tower’s supervisors. Providing the persistent and repeated presence of the drill,
the dictatorship created an environment in which all Koreans were to robotically respond to the air raid siren by wedging themselves in the dormant state. The government trained the public to accept its centralist control and intervention without questions and, therefore, the public involuntarily consented to the dictatorship’s powers.

According to Korean historian Byeong-Ju Hwang, the Park regime voiced “Jeongsin Hyeokmyeong” (mental revolution) as a significant slogan (Hwang 471). Hwang’s statement further fuels my argument about how the dictatorship exploited the civil defense drill and anti-Communist education to manipulate public consciousness. In the context of Korea’s geographical division, the repeated education about anti-Communism allowed and encouraged the public to consider these ideological projects as mundane undertakings in daily life. In this way, the dictatorship excused itself from the charge of executing autocratic schemes, even though it ironically had won power by the military coup. It also positioned itself as the guardian that could protect the public from North Korean Communists. This image prompted the public to appreciate the national defense from Communism as the best way to preserve Korea’s newborn democracy. In part through adopting anti-Communism, the dictatorship maintained its authority as an absolute despot and led South Korea to be a totalitarian state.

Critical Viewpoint on Past Inequality and Guided Public Integration

The Korean military government insisted that inequality was not only a vestige of the old-fashioned feudal society of the Joseon dynasty in the 19th-century, but would cause a national split in South Korea (Hwang 476). The emphasis on equality served to
distinguish the military government from the past governments that had preceded it, and which had been marked by class-based inequalities. By criticizing inequality, the government, especially the Park regime, highlighted the necessity of equally integrating the public into capitalist economy and politics. The regime, under a pretense of equal opportunities, constructed ideological integration among the public while guiding people’s participation in economic projects and regulating their socio-political activities.

Ideological Consolidation Managed in Economic Context

In *Decade of Success: Korea’s Saemaeul Movement* (1980), H. Edward Kim articulates how the “Saemaeul Movement (new community movement) is the means and the process through which Korea is attaining modernization. The process is unending as long as people desire to build a better society for themselves and the generation to follow” (H. Kim 35). As Kim states, the movement was a part of approaches to the modernization of South Korean government. Historian Byeong-Ju Hwang also added a new layer of meaning to *Saemaeul* when he began publishing a monthly magazine in June of 1972. This magazine supported the Park regime and advertised new community leaders in each rural area. These leaders were written about on the same basis as the governmental leaders of Korean society (Hwang 491). As both Kim and Hwang make clear that the Park regime through this new movement tried to raise the status and importance of rural people’s integrated contributions at a time when city residents and government officials played pivotal roles in rapid industrialization. The regime offered all Korean people the image that the regime was not only on the public’s side, but also saw
all citizens as active performers in the state economy. The regime also emphasized a kind of equality among Koreans that could create integrated social relationships rather than individual relationships. For the regime, the *Saemaeul Undong* (the new community movement) was an effective tool to consolidate the legitimacy of state economic policies among the public while discouraging those people to express personal views about the state’s industrialization (Koo, Hagen 144). Hence, while the regime emphasized collective subjectivity for “state-centered national integration,” Korean people remained docile citizens to the regime’s economic orders (I.-Y. Kim 30).

**Ideological Consolidation Regulated in Socio-political Context**

The Park regime proclaimed that they were upholding a liberal democracy during their reign. However, it was far from being such a democracy. For instance, the regime watched over the public’s daily life, created a restrictive night curfew, and forbade men from having long hair and women wearing short skirts (N.-H. Lee 151). The regime’s extreme censorship on the press and election made the public blind to socio-political restrictions of the military government (Hwang 475; N.-H. Lee 151). The regime outright suppressed not only negative reports about state policies and public hardship, but also supportive news about student protests (Newspaper *Pressian*, n.p.). Also, the Park regime intentionally established the indirect election system in 1972. Instead of the public, members of *Tongil Juche Gukmin Heoui* (the National Council for Unification) were empowered to elect president. By buying off these members, Chung-Hee Park was appointed for consecutive terms in a row (Online Newspaper *OhmyNews*, n.p.). These
social and political regulations make clear that South Korea did not meet the conditions for a liberal democracy unlike most liberal democracies in which the public have their right to elect governmental representatives and express resistant ideas against the existing government.

Of course, I cannot say that Korea people positively felt torn about the military regime’s constraints on individual rights. Many kinds of student and labor protests from the 1960s to the 1980s become examples to show that all Koreans did not adapt themselves to the autocracy. Rather, these examples, which are suggested above, demonstrate that while putting the development of national economy as a top priority, the military government imposed the public on top-down mobilization and integration as bolsters to democracy (B.-C. Lee 21; 22). As Cho and Apple mention in “Schooling, Work and Subjectivity” (1998), “under the rationalization of overcoming national crisis and continuing national growth, the state asserted that all people as responsible citizens should ‘share the sacrifice’ for national economic development and a stable democratic society” (Cho and Apple 270). As Cho and Apple suggest, the military government drove Korean people to tolerate controls from above for fulfillment of the collective identity and subjectivity. The military government from the 1960s to the 1980s, in my view, reinforced its own position as the undisputed, totalitarian-style force behind South Korea’s nationalist vision.
Collective Identity and Subjectivity as Imagined through T’alch’um Reconstitutions

When the military government, especially the Park regime, suggested that public integration is important to form economy and socio-politics of a newborn democracy, the regime also implicated the root of Koreans into Korean traditional culture like the t’alch’um. By selecting and inventing traditional properties in the Cultural Heritage Protection System, the regime foregrounded the necessity of historical continuity to detect collectively shared sentiment “Koreanness” (Jeong, The Kyunghyang Shinmun, n.p.). That is, through commitments to reconstituting the then-dying t’alch’ums, in particular, the Park regime shaped Korean history by its own lens and introduced a re-defined past as a cultural agency to establish collective identity among the public pursuing democratic advancement (Im, Online Magazine LARA, n.p.). Here, I wonder that the collective sentiment, which the military government regarded as Korean national identity, was identical to an identity Korean people wanted to hold.

Korean national identity appeared, in earnest, alongside the rise in popular print-capitalism. During the intense physical and cultural oppression of Japan’s colonial period from 1910 to 1945, Japanese brutality prompted Korean nationalists and intellectuals to raise the public’s national consciousness in an effort to undermine Japanese colonists. Korean nationalists and intellectuals began teaching the Korean language to agrarians and laborers who were educationally marginalized and stripped of their sociopolitical rights by Japan. They even cultivated a print culture through publishing novels, poems, newspapers, and magazines. In The Korean Modern Novel & the History of Cognition in Realities (2002), scholar Mun-Gyu Yang recounts that several novels were published in
the early twentieth century that rallied for a greater sense of Korean nationalism, such as In-Jik Lee’s *Hyol-ui Nu* (1906), Kwang-Su Lee’s *Mujong* (1917), and Sang Lee’s *Wings* (1936). These novels emphasize the importance of cultivating a spirit of Korean independence, making education accessible, embracing modernization, and recognizing Koreans themselves as political subjects in an independent nation-state.

Korean national identity was actively disseminated and constructed through the process of cultural productions under capitalism. Even though Japanese colonists restricted the public’s cultural activities, many nationalists and intellectuals instilled a sense of national consciousness in which Koreans shared historical continuity with the *Joseon* dynasty. Through this dynastic continuity, they envisaged a spiritual community that even the colonists could not destroy. Yet, this imagined community eventually collapsed under the territorial division created by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. For Koreans, the national division between South and North meant an ideological conflict. Because of this split, South Koreans no longer imagined a consolidated community — spiritual or otherwise — that upheld Korea’s national characteristics with a continuous history. This cultivated sense of Korean national identity eventually perished with the close of the war in 1953. Ultimately, then, South Korea did not hold a national identity at least until the early 1960s.

Advocating a newborn democracy, the Park regime inaugurated the Cultural Heritage Protection System in 1962. Through this system, the regime began reconstituting *t’alch’ums* in order to protect traditional cultural properties in the state level. Some scholars like Myeong-Seok Oh and Soo-Jin Jung review that the Park regime
founded this protection system with its political purpose. Oh points out that cultural protection policies from the 1960s to the 1970s aimed to stay in power and [ideologically] mobilize masses (Oh 123). Another scholar Jung indicates that for the military government, the Cultural Heritage Protection System was a tool to receive consent from intellectuals, in particular, who sometimes criticized the regime’s unlawful seizure of political and economic power (Jung 188). These scholars’ statements give more weight to my speculation that launching the protection system closely aligned with nationalist political schemes of the military government – schemes like demonstrating the regime’s authenticity and overcoming the public’s distrust of the regime’s legitimacy. However, I could not confirm this speculation because I encountered a difficult situation to gather detailed evidence about the regime’s hidden purposes, except for these two scholars’ brief remarks. Official records about the cultural system and its procedures, which I have found, did not include any proof even if the military government managed the system for their political benefits under despotic ideologies. Also, the protection system has operated as a typical cultural policy of South Korea in the 2010s, so most of scholars may be reluctant to sharply criticize a well-run policy despite happenings in the initial stage. Instead, the scholars tend to focus on discussing improvement on the cultural system in their researches.

What was clear is that the Park regime imposed restrictions on private ownership and instead applied the concept of public ownership to the Cultural Heritage Protection System (Oh 125). For example, while selecting and designating t’alch’ums as national properties, the regime officially renounced that mask dances could no longer come into
individual hands. Rather, the regime nominated all South Koreans as communal owners of t’alch’ums (125). This public ownership in the cultural system resembled how the Park regime exploited the Saemaeul Undong (the new community movement) to induce the public to follow the centralized authoritarian rules. As the Park regime rejected class inequality the Joseon dynasty pursued, it also denied the dynasty’s ownership system in which all cultural assets had belonged to kings. Instead of the individual’s possession in the old dynasty system, the Park regime emphasized empowering all Koreans as communal owners of cultural properties like mask dances.

My examination about institutionalized t’alch’ums is inspired by Eric Hobsbawm, who explores how “tradition” can be manipulated and institutionalized for national purposes. In The Invention of Tradition (1992), Hobsbawm, a British Marxist historian of the rise of industrial capitalism, socialism, and nationalism, explores the invented, constructed, and formally instituted traditions of Europe. Through examining cases of large-scale historical movements and ceremonies – such as the Boy Scouts, Nazi symbolism, and the Nuremberg party rallies –, Hobsbawm provides insight into how invented traditions are utilized as construction of politically instituted and planned ceremonial occasions in a new trend. He argues that “[e]xisting customary traditional practices [are often] modified, ritualized and institutionalized for the new national purposes” (Hobsbawm 6). He also points out that, historically, the “invented traditions reintroduced superior and inferior into a world of legal equals” (10). He goes on to suggest that the “invented traditions might foster the corporate sense of superiority of elites rather than by inculcating a sense of obedience in inferiors” (10). Hobsbawm
argues that the invented traditions are generally factitious products of modern civilization in that they uphold the illusion of continuity of an historic past even as they respond to new diverse social, political, cultural, and intellectual contexts in referencing the past.

Despite a different theoretical background, Hobsbawm’s ideas about the invented traditions parallel what effects South Korea military government exerted in relationships with the public through reconstituting t’alch’ums. While launching the Cultural Heritage Protection System, the Park regime put purposes to help the public understand the roots of their tradition and foster collective enthusiasm for historical continuity (Oh 127). For the regime, this collective sentiment was the same with a basis of national identity that Korean people in a state-centered democracy had to hold. For the lower classes, 19th-century mask dance became a provisional venue and time to communicate and harmonize with others. There was no ownership concept in mask dances at that time. But, traditional mask dances were defined as performing arts for everyone because they orally passed down from person to person, and all people became participants without division between performers and spectators. These fundamental attributes in the performing moment – open opportunity to join in and concord in mask dances – well corresponded to the Park regime’s aim to promote a communal ownership.

The collective identity and public ownership, which were invented by institutionalizing t’alch’ums, were outcomes that the military government pursued. However, in my view, there was a disparity between what the regime asserted in words and what the regime did in actions. According to an amended version of the statutes for the Cultural Properties Protection Law, cultural properties must be selected, designated
and canceled, if need be, by cultural properties committees who the state appoint (12; 15). The Chapter 1, Section 8 of the statutes also stipulates that committees must be chosen among people who are at least associate professor in culture and folklore studies and who are engaged in works and activities about traditional culture at least over ten years (5). These clauses demonstrate that the state controlled the range of direct participants in selecting, preserving, and managing cultural properties. This is to say that the military government did not reflect public opinions about what Koreans regarded as representatives of traditional culture, and the government did not allow the public to take part in those procedures of reconstituting t’alch’ums.

How could the public in this uninvolved condition perceive themselves as owners of mask dances? The Park regime’s institutional control over public participations is analogous to a restriction on possession of land during the Joseon dynasty. Joseon was an agrarian society, so the income distribution at that time depended on landholdings (J.-H. Kim, The Korea Economic Daily Magazine, n.p.). Kings in the mid-Joseon period gave lands to governmental officials, known as Yangban (the upper classes), instead of monthly wage. However, the kings did not transfer landownership to the officials and, instead, the officials were only granted permission to gather in crops harvested in given lands (Sin and Lee 196; J.-H. Kim, The Korea Economic Daily Magazine, n.p.). The upper classes employed tenant farmers as subordinated workers, and these workers cultivated lands to increase their masters’ wealth from crops. These circumstances demonstrate that even though the upper classes had the authority to cultivate lands, they could not exercise their private rights to sell and buy those lands. Through this limitation
on landholding, kings still held the position of unrivaled authority and staked out a claim to all properties of Joseon.

Differing from Joseon kings, the Park regime did not insist that reconstituted *i’alch’ums* were its own properties. However, the regime’s way to limitedly yield possession to the public parallels that of 19th-century kings. As the kings had empowered the higher classes to manage the state-owned lands, the Park regime only made connections with handful government-affiliated professions to select, preserve, and manage mask dances. What is most interesting is that as if the kings had kept land ownership, the military government played a role of actual power in relation to the affiliated researchers of the cultural system. The researchers carried out projects that were only organized by the government: *Jeonguk Minsok Yesul Gyeongyeon Daehoe* (the National Folk Arts Contest) and *Hanguk Minsok Jonghap Josa* (the Korean National Total Investigation). In this respect, the researchers in the cultural system were nothing more than hired informants and managers. While the military government established the top-down relationships between a policy commander (the regime) and recipients (researchers) in the cultural system, the regime did not also open the gates to the government-centered management of cultural system for the general public. Even though the regime claimed that mask dances are public properties and all Koreans become communal owners of these dances, Korean people could not be spontaneous participants in actual institutionalizing processes of *t’alch’ums* because of the regime’s institutional restrictions.
The Park did not break away from the king-centered ownership system of the Joseon dynasty because the regime premised that t’alch’um reconstituting projects must be supervised under the regime’s decision-making. Such prerequisite for the regime’s authority continued for the next decade by new political and military power – the Chun regime from 1981 to 1988 – after Park was assassinated in 1979. I argue that the military government’s cultural system from the 1960s to the 1980s conformed to hierarchical structures of the past dynasty. The government’s authority in the decision-making processes of the cultural system exerted effects on strengthening top-down relationships between the regime and the public. This authority also supported the government’s guided democracy which more emphasized a collective identity and group subjectivity than an individual subjectivity and ideology. Thus, there were the flipsides of the coin: while respecting for historical continuity by reconstituting t’alch’ums, the military government regarded the Cultural Heritage Protection System as an institutional strategy, along with the government’s predominant policies such as capital industrialism, pro-Americanism, and anti-Communism.
Endnotes


3 Japan modeled Gyeongseong Jeguk Daehak (Keijo Imperial University) on University of Tokyo that was/is the best university in Japan. The name, Gyeongseong Jeguk Daehak, was changed to Gyeongseong Daehak (Keijo University) after the 1945 independence from Japan. In July of 1946, the U.S. government officially closed Keijo University and carried forward setting up Korean national university (current Seoul National University). While establishing the national university, the U.S. utilized facilities of Keijo University. Seoul National University was founded by the U.S. in August of 1946.

4 http://kosis.kr/statisticsList/statisticsList_01List.jsp?vwcd=MT_CHOSUN_TITLE&parmtabid=M_01_03_01#SubCont


6 The first modern newspaper, Hansung Sinmun, appeared in 1883, and the first radio broadcasting began in 1927

7 http://www.nipa.kr/cyber/historySub.it?value=history_1945_7


9 The first designated intangible cultural properties were ‘Jongmyo Jeryeak [royal ancestral rites music],’ ‘Yangju Byulsandae mask dance’ and ‘Kkokdugaksinooleum [traditional marionette show] in 1964.’

10 Seven interviewees: Sunok Kim and Sunhong Kim in Yangju Byulsandae mask dance, Hongjong Kim in Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, Gunhwasun Lee and Sunyoun
Kang in *Bukcheong Saja* [lion] mask dance, Sangwoon Park in *Bongsan* mask dance, and Sangho Lee in *Hahoe Byulsingut* mask dance.

11 Andong is a city in Gyeongsangbuk-do Province, South Korea. This city is known as a center of culture and folk traditions like Hahoe Byulsinguk mask dance. Hahoe is one of villages in Andong.

12 In my interview, Sang-Hoo Lee did not mention why the 1928 performance was Chang-Hui Lee’s last one. I surmise a reason from historical fact. Japanese occupation in Korea started in 1910 to 1945. Since then, Japan forbade Koreans from performing cultural activities. For this reason, Chang-Hui Lee might stop performing t’alch’um in 1928.


14 Seok-Jae Im, Cheon-Heung Kim, Ju-Seon Seok, Gyeong-Rin Seong, Ye-Yong Lee, Hye-Gu Lee, and Heon-Bong Park worked from 1962 to 1965; Seok-Jae Im, Cheon-Heung Kim, Ju-Seon Seok, Gyeong-Rin Seong, Ye-Yong Lee, Hye-Gu Lee, Heon-Bong Park, Dong-Gwon Im, and Hyeon-Sik Hong from 1966 to 1968; and Seok-Jae Im, Cheon-Heung Kim, Ju-Seon Seok, Gyeong-Rin Seong, Ye-Yong Lee, Heon-Bong Park, Sun-Geun Lee, Gi-Seok Kim, Jae-Yeon Yang, and Dong-Gwon Im from 1969 to 1971.


16 The Committee for the Five Northern Korean Provinces is a hypothetical civilian administrative organization of the Government of South Korea. The Governors of the five provinces would be appointed by the South Korean government.

17 Chung Hee Park was assassinated in 1979, and then Doo-Hwan Chun seized power in 1981. In spite of Park’s death, the Cultural Heritage Protection System was established by Park, and supports from the system were continued in the next Republic, the Chun regime.
18 See Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee’s testimony on page 22-23 in Chapter 1.


22 Hahoe is one of villages in Andong.


24 The government first designated performers as *In’gan Mun-Hwa-Jae* in the top level; performers labeled as Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo are in the next level; Isuja’s level is lower than Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo’s one; and apprentices, Junsu (Janghak)saeng, are placed in the last level.

25 Gyeong-Seong Yu, Sun-Bong Sin, Myeong-Dal Go, Sang-Yong Kim, Jae-Yeong No, Byeong-Gwon Lee, and Geo-Eok Seok

26 Jae-Bong Jang, Jeong-Du Oh, Sam-Seong Kim, Dong-Ju Yu, Yeong-Su Go, Yeong-Gu Gang, Yeon-Ho Gang, and Gi-Suk Lee
Hong-Jong Kim stated in his 2012 interview with me, “My age was already adequate to receive a title of a human cultural asset [He thinks that he received a title very late.]. My juniors [juniors in the other preservation societies] received the title of a human cultural asset before me. I had often told people, “I like the Tongyeong Ogwangdae Mask Dance, so I join in its preservation society.” “I do not aim to receive a title of a human cultural asset.” “I might be a human cultural asset when it comes to take a title far later.” A few Korean scholars visited the preservation society 11…or 15 years ago to evaluate and select a new human cultural asset. I also told them the same words. After they returned, one professor called me, “Thank you, Kim.” “I have not seen a person like you while I have judged professional dancers.” [Other professional dancers make no concession, and instead make an endeavor to receive a title faster than anyone else.] At this time, Ong-Nyeon Kim received a title [instead of me]” (Kim 15).

Yeong-Chun Yun, Su-Seok Kim, Yeong-Ho Byeon, Seong-Yeong Dong, Jae-Seong Yeo, Jung-Sik Jeon, Gwang-Seok Jeon, and Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee

Yong-Ik Kim, Gyeong-Myeong Choi, Myeong-Ok Oh, Sun-Bong Kim, and Ok Yun

To take the examination, dancers should be nominated by the judges and human cultural assets. When they pass the test, they can rise in ranks and receive an official certification issued by the government (Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University 12).

I interviewed seven dancers, Sun-Hong Kim, Sun-Ok Kim, Sang-Woon Park, Sang-Ho Lee, Hong-Jong Kim, Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, Seon-Yun Gang, in 2012.

In fact, at the beginning of the 1960s, the government paid much less: 600,000 won ($555), as a stipend for each asset and for each preservation society. The government’s fund was increased to 800,000 won in the 1980s, as testified by Sang-Ho Lee. Stipends were increased again in 2000, as stated by Sun-Hong and Sun-Ok Kim. The government also provides human cultural assets with a medical insurance, yet it is not well managed because “although the assets are about 223 in the present, only less than 100 assets are taking it” (S.-H. Lee 2).


According to Soo-Jin Jung in her book *The Birth of Intangible Cultural Asset* that was published in 2008, she focuses on intangible cultural asset to articulate close relationships between culture and politics. She describes traditional culture as a political tool by which the public’s perception is able to be consolidated and managed.

CHAPTER 3

RESISTANT PERFORMANCE “MADANGGŬK”:
RE-CONTEXTUALIZED KOREAN MASK DANCE T’ALCH’UM

Korea has experienced huge national protests like the 1919 independence movement. Most Koreans – regardless of class, sex, and age – participated in this movement to oppose Japanese colonialism. Students, in particular, voluntarily played key roles in the movement. Yoo Gwan-Sun is a remarkable example. She was a student in Ewha Hakdang, which was established in 1886 as one of the first higher educational institutions for Korean women. Ewha Hakdang later became Ewha Women’s University. Yoo became the lead in the movement and was consigned to prison. Japanese colonizers inflicted cruel treatment on her, and she died in the end on September 28, 1920. Koreans today refer to her as a typical fighter for independence. Even though Korea was gradually modernized in the early twentieth century, it was still a Confucian nation in which women downplayed the value of their personal opinion, and a small number of women had the benefit of an education. Such a period, it was exceptional that Yoo as a young female student came to the front for national independence. Yoo’s case clearly suggests that at least some students offered resistant voices in the process of reclaiming the lost nation. Students’ cries of resistance did not end after the 1945 liberation from Japan. What changed about these cries, way that student protesters, after the 1950s, became critical of South Korea’s government. Namely, they transferred their attention to socio-political and economic issues within the South Korean context.
Outcry of University Student Activists on Behalf of the Public

After establishing the Republic of Korea (ROK), Ho-Sang Ahn, the first Minister of Education, formed *Hakdo Hogukdan* (The Student National Defense Corps) under President Syngman Rhee’s command. The corps was created in each middle school, high school, and university by February 1949. The government of the ROK was composed of the conservatives.¹ Their political leaders continued to block out Communist agitation until Korea was ideologically and territorially separated into two in 1953. ROK’s organization endeavored not only to eliminate the possibility for the young people to be exposed to Communist ideologies and indoctrinated by their activities, but also to bolster the younger generation’s anti-Communist sentiments. The Rhee regime also used the corps to mobilize students in various government-manufactured rallies, such as the 1954 demonstration against the withdrawal of US forces and the 1955 rally against troop reductions (*History of Korean Pro-democracy Movement, Volume I* 215). By and large, the newborn student groups were led in top-down fashion even though the Rhee regime partially attempted to gather opinions of students’ autonomous decision making. After the collapse of the Rhee regime, the Second Republic – an interim government from 1960 to 1961 – disbanded the *Hakdo Hogukdan* in May 1960 and stopped the compulsory mobilizations of students. Each university, instead, created student councils that were entirely composed of students. The management and conditions of the councils were changed (216). University student groups since the 1960s became student-centered, self-regulating, and voluntary rather than organized as top-down parties.
Korean historian Chung-Sŏk Sŏ offers insight into why university students played pivotal roles in social, civil, and Cultural Movements from the 1960s to the 1980s. After the division of South and North Korea, the South Korean government considered radicals to be pro-North Korean leftist forces and restricted their activities. Many who some were radicals performed underground activities to escape the government’s vigilant watch over Communist activists. To avoid being mistaken as radicals, many of intellectual people in the country pretended to be conservative although they did not have ill feeling toward North Korea’s ideology (H.-K. Kim, *Basis of Ideology of Korean Intellectuals: Conservatism*, n.p.). With passage of the Anticommunist Law in 1961, the Chung-Hee Park regime referred to many radicals as “commies” and arrested them. It also applied *Yeonjwaje* – collective punishment, or a form of retaliation to accuse offenders’ family and relatives of the same crime – to hinder economic and social activities of radicals’ family (Sŏ, "Characteristics and Contributions of Student Movements after the 1960s” 21). This work to remove radical politicians persisted through the Doo-Hwan Chun regime – the new military government from 1981 to 1988. While radicals among intellectual people were unable to be active under the Park regime’s extreme anti-Communist policy, university students in the 1970s did not face the government’s extreme restrictions and began working against the government’s political direction (23).

Throughout Korean history, students have been a group given preferential treatment. Kings in the *Joseon* dynasty treated well the *Yusang* – Confucian student scholars who mostly came from noble families – in *Seonggyungwan*, the foremost
education institution in Korea. Even though the Joseon dynasty strengthened the absolute
authority of the king, the government met student intellectuals’ demands because the king
regarded intellectuals as future bureaucrats and cultivated their talent (*Monthly Magazine
Love Seoul*, n.p.). At the beginning of the twentieth century, university students were
called elites in Korea because only a very small number of people attended universities
(Sŏ, "Characteristics and Contributions of Student Movements after the 1960s" 24). This
social tendency to give preferential treatment to students was maintained in the 1970s.
The Park regime did not regard university students as targets of suppression, but
emblematic intellectuals. Students in the 1970s were free from the government’s political
sanctions. In this context, they could easily embark on resistive movements against the
military government, the Park regime.

Nam-Hee Lee, an expert on Korean history, argues that the “process [of the
university student movement] involved a practice that was embedded in the traditional
role of intellectuals, a long tradition of providing social criticism” (N.-H. Lee 152).
Student scholars in the Joseon dynasty, the Yusang, were not only interested in national
policies, but also often entered the government service through passing the imperial
examination. When the government employed venal officials and imposed taxes on the
lower classes, student scholars held meetings to assert their opinions and adjust injustices.
They resorted to force by boycotting classes and going on a hunger strike (*Monthly
Magazine Love Seoul*, n.p.). As like past intellectuals who opposed the king, university
students, as the 1970s intellectuals, lifted their resistant voices as “the privileged speaking
for the presumed voiceless voices [the public]” (N. Lee 14).
According to Korean historian Chung-Sŏk Sŏ, students and soldiers in the era of the military government tended to be homogeneous and act collectively (Sŏ, "Characteristics and Contributions of Student Movements after the 1960s" 24). University students under the 1970s ruling junta gathered in a homogeneous group that possessed strong intellectual curiosity and preferred group activities against the autocracy. In a 2012 interview with me, Hui-Wan Ch’ae, who was a student activist during the 1970s to the early 1980s and is currently a widely recognized expert on madanggŭk aesthetics, offered confirmation of this pattern. He stated that the “intellectual society was established in [South Korea’s] universities [in the 1960s]” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). He continued: “Intellectuals [university students] did not stress individual tendency” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Three factors – freedom from political sanctions, intellectual prerogative, and homogeneous and collective formations under the military government – characterized university student’s activity in groups that resisted the government.

The April Revolution on April 19, 1960 was what set off the university student movements, which overthrew the first government of South Korea, the Rhee regime. This revolution contributed to student-led movements like the 1979 Buma Minjung Hangjang – a pro-democratic resistance movement that occurred in Busan and Masan provinces in South Korea – and the 1980 Gwangju Uprising.

The Rhee regime received aid from the U.S. and followed America’s criticism of pro-Communists; this prompted students’ uprising (N.-H. Lee 115). Students observed that the Rhee regime not only failed to pursue peaceful reunification, but also
manipulated elections to maintain a prolonged, one-man ruled power set-up. Starting with the April Uprising, students expressed their dissenting opinions about the reappointment of President Rhee. These opinions stirred people to be involved. What is significant here is that the uprising was the first time the government was toppled in South Korea by people’s resistance. University students ignited their collective interest about individual freedom and democratic rights in a “parliamentary democracy” that was modeled after a U.S. democracy (N.-H. Lee 1).

Unlike the April Uprising, the Buma Minjung Hangjiang did not directly lead to the collapse of the existing government in 1979. This protest began with 4,000 students from Pusan National University on October 16. Student activists created a slogan calling for to abolition of the Yusin constitution – the revitalizing reform of the Park regime – and to bring the dictatorial government down. Soon after this activity, students of Dong-A University and low-income urban groups, such as factory and service workers, merchants, and even high school students, joined in the movement. The protest spread to the Masan area within a few days and gained nearly fifty to seventy thousand participants. People’s spontaneous participation drove the protest according to Chung-Sŏk Sŏ. Protesters burned and damaged public buildings like the police station, the government-press, and the province government (Sŏ, Chung-Sŏk, Korean Contemporary History during 60 Years 147). Their behaviors were the symbolic gestures to oppose the Park regime’s policies. Jae-Gyu Kim, a head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the 1970s, revealed that the Buma Minjung Hangjiang was not instigated by political power (Gyu-Han Han, Current Workers’ Solidarity, n.p.). This protest was wholly popular
because, he asserted, it was an uprising from below. If it succeeded, it threw the Park regime into confusion. President Chung-Hee Park and radical politician Ji-Cheol Cha held to a hard-line policy to confront the popular revolt. Meanwhile, Jae-Gyu Kim, who became aware of the Park regime’s coercive governing style, shot Park on October 16, 1979. Kim in 1980 retrospectively explained his attempt to kill Park: I wondered what would happen if the Park regime repressively quelled the *Buma Minjung Hangjang* (*Current Workers’ Solidarity*, n.p.). As in the April Uprising, during the *Buma Minjung Hangjang*, not only were the government and the public engaged in a fierce battle, but also a number of people became victims of this struggle (*Current Workers' Solidarity*, n.p.). Kim was somewhat moderate and opposed Park’s strong-arm tactic in that moment, he says, because he recognized that public power would become hands-on attacks. He was eventually determined to terminate the Park regime with his own hands before the public defeated it, like they did during the April Uprising. His reflection on his assassination offers one confirmation that the Park regime clearly perceived that public power gradually increased, and that the *Buma Minjung Hangjang* had enough clout to overthrow the regime.

By the 1980s, the advent of the Doo-Hwan Chun regime shocked Koreans because the public believed that the collapse of the dictatorship with Park’s death marked a shift to a democratic government in South Korea (N.-H. Lee 44). The Chun regime was, however, worse than the Park regime. The Park regime, despite being oppressive, laid the groundwork for economic development, whereas the Chun regime prioritized consolidation of power through extreme socio-political oppression (H.-G. Jeong 85). The
1980 Gwangju Uprising is often remembered as a protest against the Chun regime’s atrocities and acts of genocide. It is important to mention here that *Seoulyeok Hoegun* (Seoul Station Retreat) was an impetus for the Gwangju Uprising. Chun, who dominated the South Korean military through a Coup d’état in December 1979, doubled as a security commander and an acting director of the Central Intelligence Agency in April 1980 and even proclaimed martial law. Chun ruthlessly governed South Korea. Student activists set their sights on eradicating remnants of the *Yusin* constitution and establishing a democratic government (H.-G. Jeong, H.-J. Kim, and S.-H. Jeong 31).

On May 13, 1980, some university students sporadically marched down the street to request a lift on martial law. Two days later, 100,000 students assembled at the Seoul railroad station on a national scale. Together with the students, the public also began partaking in the *Seoulyeok Hoegun*. The protest grew to around 300,000, which surpassed the April Uprising’s size. On the same day, student presidents from eighteen universities provoked a heated discussion about whether or not they showed withdrawal the uprising. The dean of Seoul National University persuaded presidents to stop the protest. The presidents’ group eventually decided to call off the rally at the station after the government assurance to them of student participants’ safe return. After the disbandment, the Chun regime expanded martial law on May 17. The military police, under the supervision of Chun, attacked and apprehended the presidents’ group, which had assembled in Ewha Women’s University to discuss their next plan for student upheaval. This brutal action toward student activists outraged the public, especially people living in the Gwangju area (one of areas in Jeollanam-do, South Korea) because the appearance of
the Chun regime dampened public expectations for liberal democracy (M.-Y. Kim 91). On May 18, the Gwangju Uprising, called the 5.18 Minjung Haksal (mass murder), began.

These three uprisings suggest that university students after the 1950s initiated a number of political struggles against the existing governments. Their activities wielded influence on the public’s understandings of political repression. In other words, university students’ actions during the movements offered people of various kinds – farmers, laborers, religious leaders, and dismissed opposition party and intellectuals – visions of active political demonstrations and democratic possibility (H.-G. Jeong, H.-J. Kim, and S.-H. Jeong 29). Thus, university students in South Korea could be seen as the leadership of socio-political protests from the 1960s to the 1980s.

T’alch’ums Proliferate on University Campus: Denial of Cultural Neo-Colonialism

While the South Korean government began reconstituting the t’alch’um in the early 1960s under the Cultural Heritage Protection System, university students also started to become interested in the mask dance. They hit their stride in recognizing the mask dance as a theatrical concept in their politicized creative theaters – the Madanggŭk – in the 1970s. I examine the 1960s students’ interest in t’alch’ums to draw attention to how these early actions became the basis of theaters for political voices. The 1960s were an important germinal stage in the proliferation of madanggŭk from the 1970s to the 1980s (Y.-M. Lee 45).

The South Koreans, in the 1960s, had a heightened sense of foreign powers and their political influence because it was only 15 years earlier that Korea was liberated from
Japanese colonialism and 7 years before that Korea was ideologically and territorially divided by the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (N.-H. Lee 114). In this context, the next President, Chung-Hee Park, maintained friendly relations with the U.S. for, as he made clear, national security reasons. Specifically, he continued these ties to oppose North Korea. More serious anti-communist sentiments prompted university students to bolster their anti-foreign rhetoric, especially anti-American rhetoric. In the early 1960s, students in Seoul National University gradually began to exclude Western theaters (Y.-M. Lee 44). This exclusion expressed their anti-foreign sentiments. South Korea’s theatrical trend in the 1960s, in fact, was that theatrical people and university theater clubs’ members only translated western classics, like Shakespeare’s *Hamlet*, and preferred to perform them on the stage. Some students still continued to perform Western theaters on campuses, but other students like SNU students explored a new form. That is, pursuing and avoiding Western theaters coexisted in the 1960s. This tendency was maintained until the 1970s. During a 2012 interview with me, Suk-Man Kim, a member in a theater club of Seoul National University, elaborated on his experience in the theater club:

The western theaters were very popular among theatrical people and university students at that time [around 1974] even though they did not completely understand them. When people [theatrical people and university students] performed Western theaters, they did not use Korean intonation. They thought that they should follow English intonation although they used Korean, not English, in a play….Yes, [they wore a yellow hair wig]. Sometimes performers died their hair yellow. When I watched a play like this, I was deeply ashamed of myself. We [members of the theater club] did not exactly know what is right and what is wrong, yet we were able to recognize that these kinds of performance are not realistic theaters. So, we disliked and rejected the existing theater styles. There were no experts about the Western theaters at that time. Nobody showed us [his colleagues and Kim] the Western theaters such as Greek theaters and Shakespeare theaters in proper ways. Also, people who major in theater were rare.
at that time. This means that there were no people by which we could be deeply moved. (S.-M. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Kim’s statement offers insight into people’s concern about Western-style performances on the South Korean stage and the lack of experts.

A few university students who supported anti-foreign sentiments sought a way to maintain Korean tradition like the t’alch’um. According to Hui-Wan Ch’ae, an expert on mask dance aesthetics, there was T’alch’um Yeonguhwei [Research Society of the Mask Dance] at Seoul National University in the 1960s. In his 2012 interview with me, he noted that students – such as Ji-Ha Kim, Dong-Il Cho, and Sul Heo – established this organization, which is also known as Malttugi Hui. This student group’s motto was “let’s revive ours.” These group members searched for the mask dances as Korean traditional gestures; yet they merely studied the mask dance without performing (Ch’ae, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). In my perspective, students’ interest in the mask dance made a beginning of perceiving Korean tradition’s importance at the individual level. In addition to being concerned about the mask dance, students, including Kim and Cho, produced Korean-style creative theaters, called Daehakgeuk,2 such as “Wongwi Madangsoe” in 1963, “Hyangtouisik Chohongut” in 1964, and “Nokdujanggun Jinhonpuri” in 1965 (H.-M. Kim 20; 21). Taken as a whole, such efforts offered one route by which to push back against western culture – cultural neo-colonialism. The 1960s students not only found “Koreanness” in the mask dance, but also began creating the “Korean-style” theater form distinguishable from Western classic theaters (20).
The Invention of New Dance Theater Form: Madanggŭk

Many university students in the 1970s continued to carry forward some of 60s’ interests and concerns as well as established new productions. For example, Ji-Ha Kim and Dong-Il Cho, who had been student activists in the 1960s, were significant figures in 1970s madanggŭks. After graduation from Seoul National University in the mid-1960s, they participated in madanggŭks as directors. The most influential days of the madanggŭk were from the mid-1970s to the 1980s and coincided with both the Park regime’s Yusin constitution – which lasted from 1972 to 1979 – and the Chun regime’s political reign – which lasted from 1980 to 1988 (Y.-M. Lee 45).

Like student creative theater productions of the 1960s, known as daehakgeuk, the madanggŭk was also interested in critiquing the influences of Japanese colonial culture and American culture (J.-C. Jeong 86). And much like the t’alch’um’s satire, the madanggŭk dealt with socio-political criticism of the Korean government. The madanggŭk maintained the “anti-colonial cultural concept” of the daehakgeuk to undermine Japanese and American influences in Korean culture (S.-U. Choi 15; Ch'ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 170). In this respect, the madanggŭk was a vehicle for demolishing cultural neo-colonialism. Ultimately, even though their starting points were different, the daehakgeuk and madanggŭk were similar in that university students used uniquely Korean cultural production to produce political critiques.
Discussion of Madanggûks’ Bodily Movements

Student performers had to frequently change stories and sporadically perform madanggûks because of the censorship of the state and universities. Madanggûks operated outside state-sanctioned structures. To strictly censor student performers’ activities, the military government from the 1970s to the 1980s placed policemen on campuses (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). The Education Division of each university inspected madanggûk scripts. To deal with these challenges, student performers sent fake scripts to the Division and then performed what they wanted (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Madanggûks were also unable to secure steady financial support so student performers had to fund their own endeavors. Student performers often did not have enough money to publicize and document their performances in visual materials like photographs, videos, and DVDs (Suk-Man Kim; Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.).

For these reasons, published books and articles rarely include photographs of the madanggûk performed by university students. Despite these restrictive conditions, I obtained several figures from three newspapers – the Dong-A, Kyunghyang, and Hankyoreh Daily Newspapers. Most of the photographs from these three newspapers were single shots of madanggûks that were performed by professional theatrical troupes. These troupes consisted of people who had previous performing experience from their university days. Another source of figures was the Online Culture Portal Site Yesulro which has single cuts of untitled madanggûks from the 1970s and the 1980s. Collectively, these resources yielded only twelve photographs, not enough to fully understand the whole bodily movements and chorographic strategies of each madanggûk. However, they
are enough to grasp the atmospheres encountered by student performers, how the
performers looked, and if the performers did solo or group movements.

In figure 2.1, student performers play their piece outside. The audience in figure 2.1 is small and sits in a group around the performers. In the background, some people are also approaching the performance from behind the audience. This figure shows that pedestrians could freely watch productions of madanggūks by the students. In figure 2.2, a number of spectators are gathered together at night. They are also viewing the performance outdoors. Both figures show that madanggūk performers in the 1970s played at different times and allowed spectators to sit close to and observe them from every direction.

The performers’ costumes are also interesting. Performers in figure 2.1 wear paper masks, and a female performer in figure 16 wears a white costume that seems like Korean traditional clothes, called hanbok. Putting on a mask and hanbok suggests that student performers in the 1970s imitated costume styles of the t’alch’um at least in part.

As in the 1970s, student performers in the 1980s performed madanggūks outside (figures 2.3 and 2.4). For example, the performance space in figure 2.3 looks like a university ground. Figures 2.3 and 2.4 also indicate that a sharp boundary line between performers and spectators did not exist in the 1980s. Both sitting down and standing up, audiences are paying attention to the madanggūk. Figure 2.3 includes a traditional drum, known as Buk, which was utilized in 19th-century t’alch’ums. A female performer in figure 18 is dressed in traditional Korean clothing for women. These two photographs
demonstrate that student performers in the 1980s created madanggûks that were informed by the conventions of the traditional mask dance. Through these four figures, I am not able to determine what dance movements student performers choreographed and conducted. I can see that madanggûks contained both solo dances and group dances, and student performers did not care about turning their backs towards spectators. Such behavior implies that the performers did a wide range of activities while moving and dancing in various directions.
Figure 2.5. An unidentified madanggûk from the Kyunghyang Daily News on January 28, 1988

Figure 2.6. An unidentified madanggûk performed by Noripae Simmyeong from the Hankyoreh Daily News on November 06, 1991

Figure 2.7. University students’ marching group from the Dong-A Daily News on October 27, 1989

Figure 2.8. An unidentified madanggûk performed by Noripae Ugeumchi from the Hankyoreh Daily News on November 06, 1991

Figure 2.9. “Nodong ui Saehyeok” [The Dawn of Labor] performed by Geukdan Hyeonjang from the Kyunghyang Daily News on October 21, 1988

Figure 2.10. “Kkeopdegireul Beotgoseo” [Case the Shell] performed by Geukdan Hyeonjang from the Dong-A Daily News on December 08, 1988
The next group of photographs features moments from madanggŭk performances from 1988 to 1991, which were played by professional theater troupes such as Sinmyeong, Ugeumchi, Hyeonjang, Yeonwoo Mudaeh, and Handure. These figures captured performers’ dynamic movements. Performers in figures 2.5, 2.7, and 2.8 wear white traditional clothes. Figures 2.6 and 2.8 include traditional instruments like buk and janggu. However, the musicians in figure 2.6 are sitting to one side and watching the performers while playing music, whereas the performers in figure 2.8 directly play instruments while dancing in the center of the performance space. These two photographs demonstrate two performing composition of madanggŭks: some pieces separated performers from musicians while others did not segregate performers and musicians. From figures 2.5, 2.6, and 2.8, I can tell that performers used bent-leg stances and bed-arm movements. Also, several performers in figures 2.5 and 2.8 are gathering around the center of the performance spaces, yet their grouping pattern does not look uniform because the dancers’ movements are heterogeneous. By contrast, even though four
performers in figure 2.6 are posed in the same position, three people are lined up diagonally while one performer stands before them, a more uniform look. These four photographs show that madanggûk performers used a variety of choreographic compositions. Figure 2.7 is not from a performance; it shows that madanggûk performers marched on the street before performances. This parallels Gilnori [pre-opening performance] of the t’alch’um, which I discuss later in more detail.

Figures 2.9, 2.10, 2.11, and 2.12 confirm that professional theater troupes performed their pieces on stage utilizing stage lighting and props like a desk and chairs (figures 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11). Performers in figures 2.9 and 2.11 wore ordinary clothes of poor families, whereas in figures 2.10 and 2.12 the performers have put on factory working clothes. The performers’ clothing styles show that storylines of madanggûks were about low-income workers. In terms of bodily movements, most of the performers in these photographs posed with outspread hands, arms and legs. However, their arms stretch in different directions using straight and diagonal lines, even though most dancers are looking towards the front while moving in grounds, the individuals’ movements showed some variation (figures 2.11 and 2.12). Performers also used a variety of vertical levels; in figure 2.9 some performers are standing up and the others are sitting on their knees.

These twelve photographs enable me to gain some, though limited, insight into how performers choreographed madanggûks by employing various moving lines and directions. They actively utilized at least hands, arms, and legs for their choreographies.
The performers also regarded the conventions of the t’alch’um as important factors of their pieces because they wore traditional costumes and played traditional instruments.

Before the Term Madanggûk

“Jinogui Gut” was a very early form of madanggûk that was different from the daehakgeuk (Lim 319; H.-M. Kim 23; Min 24). According to professional theater director Ji-Ha Kim’s memoirs on the political news website Pressian, the “Jinogui Gut” dramatized the t’alch’um’s form in 1973 and encouraged democratization and cooperation in rural areas.⁵ Hui-Wan Ch’ae in a 2012 interview with me attested that Ch’ae was a main member of the mask dance club at that time and played a role of choreographer for the “Jinogui Gut” under leadership of Ji-Ha Kim ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). He went on to say that “the performance took two hours and half. University students [participants in the Jinogui Gut] aimed to perform it [this work] to enlighten the farmers” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). The students’ interest in the famers’ well-being suggests that the “Jinogui Gut,” which was based on the mask dance, shared madanggûk’s main goal – criticism of problems that occurred in rural areas. To support rural famers, director Ji-Ha Kim worked together with Hui-Wan Ch’ae who attended Seoul National University at that time, in 1973. Ji-Ha Kim’s cooperation with a student prompts me to ask: who were the main performers of the “Jinogui Gut”? According to scholarship on minjung dance theater, the “Jinogui Gut” was a result of the first joint work effort on the part of members in the theater and mask dance clubs at SNU (Lim 319; Ch’ae and Lim 69).⁶ Jae-Oh Son, who acts as a madanggûk performer in the present,
suggests that Hui-Wan Ch’ae, Jin-Taek Lim, Suk-Man Kim, and Ae-Ju Lee were members in the mask dance and theater clubs at SNU. Son does not refer to this group as the first generation of the madanggŭk ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).

Hui-Wan Ch’ae, a leader among the first generation of the madanggŭk, established the theater group Handure after his graduation from SNU in 1974. Technically, this group was not a university club, yet it was composed of practitioners of the “Jinogui Gut,” student members in the mask dance and theater clubs at SNU.

According to current director of the Handure Gi-Sung Nam in a 2013 interview with me, this group’s members taught mask dances to their juniors and helped them create a new cultural form ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Nam confirmed that the Handure was a relevant group of student protesters in the mid 1970s.

This group produced a dance theater piece called “Sorigut Agu” in 1974. Suk-Man Kim mentioned in a 2012 interview with me that “Sorigut Agu was their first trial. There were no theater styles like Sorigut Agu before that time” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). He further noted that “even though we [participants] did not exactly know what term is right, we were just called Sorigut….When we made Sorigut Agu, we did not use the term madanggŭk. The term madanggŭk began to be used around 1975” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). What I understand here is that madanggŭk’s notion was still not defined among the earliest performers. Hui-Wan Ch’ae recalled his memories about the “Sorigut Agu” in a 2012 interview with me: “Soriguk Agu utilized Muckjung Gwajang [scene of an old monk] of Namsadang [travelling entertainers] that was the same with Nojang Gwajang [scene of an old monk] of several mask dances….It [Soriguk Agu]
would be named Changjak T’alch’um [the creative mask dance]” (“Interview Transcript," n.p.). Ch’ae’s remarks suggest that the Handure’s members produced the “Sorigut Agu” by utilizing the mask dance form. At the same time, that production introduced a severe 70s situation that was not included in the mask dance (Ch’ae and Lim 49).

In March of 1975, Chong Yeongeukhoe (Seoul National University’s general theater club) performed “Jindonga Gut” at the square in front of the university’s library (J.-C. Jeong 48). SNU students founded the Chong Yeongeukhoe in 1947, but this group’s activity was not institutionalized until the early 1970s. The Chong Yeongeukhoe, led by In-Ryeol Ryu in 1975, became active and functioned as a central organization for all theater and mask dance clubs from SNU’s sixteen colleges. After Ryu became the group’s leader, the “Jindonga Gut” was the group’s first piece. What is distinct about this performance when compared to previous works is that the “Jinogui Gut” and “Sorigut Agu” were based on creative scripts, whereas the “Jindonga Gut” was based on a real event. This event involved the Dong-A Daily News journalists crying for freedom of the press in October 1974. The Park regime responded to their cries: by instigating the newspaper owner to dismiss 150 employees (Ch’ae and Lim 273; J.-C. Jeong 48). From this incident, SNU student performers realized the seriousness of press control by the military government; they also sympathized with journalists’ political views. Through the “Jindonga Gut,” they articulated their beliefs about freedom of information. In this way, SNU student performers drew on their political beliefs to inaugurate the creative dance theater – the creative dance theater refers to the theatrical performance along with dance movements. They eventually traveled to several universities like Ewha Women’s
University to put on the “Jindonga Gut” in 1975 (Ch’ae and Lim 273). This activity and a few performances show that students at other universities welcomed performances that addressed similar political sentiments.

The term madanggŭk did not exist until 1975. Yet, previously created works, the “Jindonga Gut” and “Sorigut Agu” were performed again in the 1980s. By performing again previous dances, the Cultural Movement activities in the 1980s carried forward some of the impulses of the 1970 cultural activism. As these three dance forms all make clear, main performers could be apparently classified as two types: student performers and professional actor-dancers. Each type belonged to a different organization: student performers in university clubs and professional actor-dancers to commercial theater groups. However, I suggest here that these performers cannot be thought of as completely separate.

Professional theater groups’ members played an important role in mentoring various universities’ mask dance and theater clubs, and taught the mask dance to their junior, student performers. Gi-Sung Nam and Jae-Oh Son recalled their direct experience with learning the t’alch’um from Hui-Wan Ch’ae, a madanggŭk performer representative of those professionals mentoring students. According to Nam, specifically, “my colleagues and I intensively learned the Bongsan mask dance from preservation society dancers during six months. After that time, we [the mask dance club members in Chungang University] learned it again from school seniors and Hui-Wan Ch’ae” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). Son echoed Nam’s sentiments; “some seniors learned the mask dance from other. For instance, Hui-Wan Ch’ae taught the [Bongsan] mask
dance to student performers in the Gwangju area, and these students transmitted it to people in the Mokpo area ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).\textsuperscript{11} As these oral testimonies make clear, senior professional performers not only passed on what they had knew about the mask dance, but also helped student performers cultivate mask dance technical skills. They also performed madanggŭk pieces on university campuses as well as in off-campus public performance arenas, which I discuss later. While performing on campuses, these performers had a large student following and induced them to pay attention to socio-political and economic problems caused by the military government. For such reasons, it does not seem accurate to separate theatrical people from student performers. Rather, I suggest that both student performers and theatrical people should be recognized as “madanggŭk performers.”

After the Term Madanggŭk

Even though the three creative dance theaters mentioned above are considered the roots and origins of madanggŭk, it is important to clarify when the term madanggŭk emerged because it indicates performers’ interest in distinguishing their madanggŭks from other Western-style genres. Korean scholars Ji-Chang Jeong and Hui-Wan Ch'ae point out that “Heosaengjeon” [Story of Heosaeng] was an artistic form, only subsequently labeled “madanggŭk” when student activists borrowed the storyline for their street theater (Ch'ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 186; 187; J.-C. Jeong 11).\textsuperscript{12} “Heosaengjeon” performed in the fall of 1976 was the second piece produced by Chong Yeongeukhoe [the general theater club of SNU]. According to the online version
of the Korean progressive magazine Newsmaker, In-Ryeol Ryu, head of this group, planned this performance with SNU mask dance club member Seon-Bok Lee. They requested for Sang-Woo Lee – more senior and a commercial theater director in Geukdan Yeonwoo Mudaes – to be the director of “Heosaengjeon” (Sin, Newsmaker; Weekly Kyunghyang 2005). Suk-Man Kim noted the following about Ryu: “he was a student majoring in Korean Literature….I remembered that he used the term madanggŭk first, and later this term was widely known…. [It was] popularized among university students” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). These recollections place much emphasis on the fact that Ryu was both a creative force in “Heosaengjeon” and a pioneer in applying the term madanggŭk to this performance type. “Heosaengjeon” referred to social problems at the end of the nineteen century – the Joseon dynasty (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 212). Thus, it differed from other madanggūks in that it did not focus on socio-political issues within a specific contemporary moment. After 1976, madanggŭk themes varied; the performers began approaching very serious practical issues through their works. Korean scholar Ji-Chang Jeong classifies the themes and variations as follows: 1) problems in farm areas, 2) anti-foreign sentiment and the division of Korea into north and south, 3) women’s rights, free speech, and environmental problems like pollution, 4) minjung hangjang, or the common people’s fight for democratization, and 5) labor and low-income people’s problems (J.-C. Jeong 88).

Like the “Jinogui Gut” (1973), “Hampyeong Goguma” (1978) and “Dwaeji Puri” (1980) dealt with agricultural problems in rural areas. The “Hampyeong Goguma” gave an account of an actual incident of farming people demanding compensation for all losses
they sustained a result of the government’s policy for purchasing agricultural products. Noripae *Gwangdae* performed it at the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) gymnasium in Gwangju, Jeollanam-do. And, it depicted how the price of pigs dropped sharply because of a livestock farming policy. This group also performed “Dwaeji Puri” at the YMCA Mujingwan (a mujin building) in Gwangju. The needs of farmers from the 1960s to the 1970s were downplayed and even excluded from the industrial-centered society of the Park regime (J.-C. Jeong 97). Madanggŭk movement performers, through their dances, exposed these issues and difficulties on behalf of the isolated farm people. Their works emphasized the need for political resistance and the importance of cooperation among farmers.

Madanggŭk performers were concerned about anti-foreign sentiment and Korea’s territorial and ideological division. Performances that embodied these concerns were Noripae *Handure’s* “Sorigut Agu” (1974) and Geukdan *Yeonwoo Mudaes’s* “Hanssi Yeondaegi” (1985). If the first performance illustrated Korea-Japan hierarchical relations, the latter depicted how Korea’s division resulted from the intervention of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. The “Hanssi Yeondaegi” also included criticism of first President Syngman Rhee’s dictatorship. The madanggŭk captured key elements of the public’s feelings of animosity toward foreign influences. Through their performances, they endeavored to make room for political critique in which South Koreans could vent their anger about unfair relationships with Japan and America. Scholar Ji-Chang Jeong points out that these performances revealed a will to resist foreign powers. He goes on to say that performers, however, merely prompted an emotional reaction in Japan and America (J.-C. Jeong 93).
Jeong’s critical insight here suggests that performers did not posit a more practical way to deal with diplomatic questions and a matter of reunion. In other words, instead of guiding the public which way to go to the next, the performers were absorbed in the sound of their own voice.

Madangŭk performers were interested in liberating speech, and solving environmental problems like pollution and women’s rights. While “Jindonga Gut” (1975) criticized the suppression and control of speech, “Mass Game” (1978) debunked exaggerated media reports on social issues related to workers and workers’ rights, or what it considered “irresponsible sensation” in the mass media (J.-C. Jeong 103). The “Mass Game” was based on the script of Dae-Seong Yun’s play “Chulse-Gi” [Story for a Successful Career] (1974) and was inspired by a real story about a coal miner named Chang-Seon Yang. A theater club in the college of Liberal Arts and Sciences at Ewha Women’s University created and performed the “Mass Game” at the university field. A very active group that existed alongside the mask dance and theater clubs at SNU – the EWU theater club – was launched in 1960. After the mid-1970s, it began recognizing the necessity of creative plays based on Korean tradition and devoted itself to producing madanggŭks. In addition to the “Jindonga Gut” and “Mass Game,” Noripae Handure produced “Miyal” in 1978. This piece illustrated a miserable situation and end of a woman named Miyal. Miyal, the performance’s heroine, was a factory worker who was fired because she opposed a vicious entrepreneur. She entered into prostitution and was abused by her pimp. She eventually gave birth to an illegitimate child and died from a venereal disease. Through this performance, the performers highlighted factory workers’
poor working conditions and the absence of female workers’ rights. Noripae Handure kept producing madanggūks in the 1980s and began paying attention to environmental pollution problems. In “Cheongsanri Byeokpyesu” (1982), performers depicted a story of local residents living around an industrial complex in Yeocheon, Jeollanam-do. The residents, who lost their pollution-damaged crops and, therefore, lost their livelihood, raised a lawsuit against the Chinhae Chemical Company. While the court system put off brining justice for seven years, these residents incurred a huge debt. As a result of their bankruptcy, many either fled by night to other towns or committed suicide. This work was a very first madanggūk to shed light upon environmental pollution problems and played an important role in the creation of an “antipollution campaign” in the 1980s (J.-C. Jeong 101). Handure performed this piece behind closed doors at the town hall of Heungsadan. This performance setting suggests that madanggūk activities were sometimes policed, a kind of policing I discuss in detail later.

themselves from the military government’s repression – a kind of rescue embodied, as they saw it, by Jesus’s return to earth. Also, much like the “Mass Game,” the EWU theater club dramatized Dae-Seong Yun’s play by the title “Nobi Munseo” and held it at the university field in 1979. This piece illustrated how slaves in the Koryo dynasty attempted to remove their official documents to liberate their subordinated identity. The “Nobi Munseo” did not touch on contemporary issues, but, rather, instructed how minjung could regain their lost sovereignty like lower-class people in the past. These pieces not only maximized minjung’s emphasis on persisting through wretched circumstances, but also urged democratization that could allow people to have free speech and freedom of the press, and hold elections. These performances were fictional, whereas the rest of examples I explain in following were based on real events. No one recorded the “Owel-Mu.” Also, this work was of unknown authorship. Ji-Chang Jeong’s book states that this piece was a realistic description of Gwangju Uprising (May 1980) and performed at Chonnam National University in the Gwangju in 1983. From Jeong’s evidence, I suggest that this piece was created, at least in the past, by CNU students. The “Geumhuiui Owol” largely consisted of realistic scenes that centered on Jeong-Yeon Lee female university students’ experience in the Gwangju Uprising (Bang-Ok Kim 20; "Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory," n.p.). Noripae Tobagi, which mainly worked around the Gwangju area, created and performed this piece at the art theater Mirinae in 1988. Hyo-Seon Park, a founding member of Noripae Tobagi, had worked as a citizen militia director in the Gwangju Uprising ("Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory," n.p.). Park’s example raises the possibility that some
protesters in the Gwangju Uprising became madanggŭk participants to keep the spirit of resistance alive in their dance theaters. In the same year, Noripae Sinmyeong – another madanggŭk troupe in the Gwangju area – created the “Ileoseoneun Saramdeul” and premiered it during the first Minjokguk Hanmadang (the Korea People’s Theater Festival). 21 This work was performed again several times from 1988 to 2000; the culture portal site Yesulro asserts that it was repeated because it captured popular sentiments about how people should accept and digest the Gwangju Uprising instead of clarifying the past (“Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory,” n.p.). The three pieces associated with the Gwangju Uprising give examples of madanggŭk performers who supported protesters’ resistant spirits and interest in democracy.

Madanggŭk performers helped bring about increases in low minimum wages paid to workers and an important social issue in the minjung movement. The best known works that explore this topic are “Deoksangol Iyagi” (Story of Deoksan Valley) and “Duaejiggum” (Dream about Pigs) (J.-C. Jeong 101). Jin-Taek Lim, who was part of the first generation of madanggŭks, dramatized Seok-Yeong Hwang’s novel titled “Duaejiggum” for the dance theater. Under Lim’s command, theater club members at Seoul Women’s University performed this piece at the foot of a hill behind the school in September 1977. This performance portrayed an impoverished group living in a suburb of Seoul and spoke about issues related to the rural exodus and urban low-income. Noripae Handure also created the “Deoksangol Iyagi” in 1978, a performance based on a real incident referred to as “Mudeungsan Tarzan Sageon” (Tarzan’s Story in Mudeung Mountain). When the Park regime designated Mudeung Mountain as a provincial park in
May 1972, it demolished unlicensed structures to clean up the area around it. Heung-Suk Park, who lived in an illegal shack near the mountain, got kicked out, leaving him and his family homeless. In this desperate situation, Park murdered four members of wrecking crews because of his uncontrollable anger about the unfair treatment. Noripae Handure depicted the wretched life of the urban poor through “Gongjang ui Bulbit” (Light of a Factory). Like the “Deoksangol Iyagi,” performers addressed a real event – “Dongilbangjik Sageon” (An incident in the Dong-Il Textile Factory) – and performed at the Seoul Jeil church in February 1979. In the textile industry, the number of female workers was larger than male workers. Despite there being more women in the factories, the labor union in the work places not only was organized around a core group of male workers, but also became a company-dominated union that was more interested in benefitting the factories themselves. Female workers voiced their disapproval of the discriminatory treatment they received and struggled to improve their positions and conditions. The “Gongjang ui Bulbit” was a vivid portrayal of this reality for the women factory workers. The last two pieces I examined here make clear performers sometimes depicted real incidents relating to poor workers. The performers attempted to say that dire situations facing various Koreans were related to the actions of the military government.

Madanggûks did not suddenly appear. Rather, the 1960s students’ interests in the continuity of traditional cultural forms like the t’alch’um enabled the next generations of student performer to maintain by borrowing and adopting traditional forms while engaging with socio-political and economic problems. The 1960s students showed persistent commitment to madanggûks by participating in individual theatrical groups.
Student performers in the 1970s played a part in deepening madanggük’s themes. In this respect, madanggük are ideological constructs that rely on cultural-historically specific understandings of collectivity and resistant consciousness.

**Madanggük Expanded Through Farming and Industrial Areas**

After the 1980 bloody Gwangju Uprising ended with massacre, the Doo-Hwan Chun regime continued to rule with an iron fist. In the context of these conditions, the general public, including student and intellectual protesters, felt a growing sense of unease about the new military regime. They worried it would be as oppressive as the Park regime. This anxiety inflamed not only pro-democracy activists, but also madanggük movement performers. For the Chun regime, pacifying the irate crowd and constructing a narrative about how it was different from the Park regime were urgent priorities. The Chun regime implemented appeasement policies in 1984 by lifting curfew and working on a price stabilization policy. The Chun also invigorated the sport industry by hosting the Asian Games in 1986 and by preparing the Olympic Games in 1988. The Chun regime tried to ease up on supervision over economy and culture-sports according to socio-political scientists, Jun-Man Kang and Yun-Seop Lee.

The Chun regime’s lighter vigilance allowed the protesters to promote greater democratization, and the protesters entered a new phase in their political efforts as their demonstrations became larger and more involved. In September 1983, university students organized *Minjuhwa Undong Cheongnyeon Yeonhap* (Youth Union for Democratization Movement), also called *Min-Cheong-Ryeon*. With the inauguration of *Min-Cheong-
Ryeon as a momentum, student movements occurred and grew in intensity in the 1980s. Among new groups formed in 1984, Minjung Munwha Undong Hyeopuihoe [Cultural Movement Association] was tied to the madanggŭk movement. Artists in various fields – from the t’alch’um and theater to film, pansori (traditional song), drawing, and cartoon – launched a new council in April 1984. In 1987, this organization changed its name to Minjung Munwha Undong Yeonhaphoe [Cultural Movement Alliance] and, later, became Hanguk Minjok Yesulin Danch’a Chongyeonhaphoe [The Korean People’s Artist Federation]. Some theatrical people participated in the council. While taking part in the council, they further developed madanggŭks as one of dynamic forces for the student movement (S. -M. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.).

According to Jin-Su Jeong, madanggŭk performers in the 1980s recognized that madanggŭks were not products only for the intelligentsia (J.-S. Jeong, “Truth and Falsity of Minjungguk” 140). Rather, they argued that madanggŭks, which revolved around minjung lives, should have deeper ties to minjung (common people) (I.-B. Park, "Minjokguk Movement in Minjung Perspective" 152). This is to say that minjung, as principal “characters” in plots of the madanggŭk, should have opportunities to directly participate in madanggŭks. While seeking a practical way to provide madanggŭks to the common people, the performers extended their appearance into agricultural and industrial areas and began inviting farming and factory laborers as their main spectators. They performed their pieces and encouraged workers to participate in madanggŭks. In his 2012 interview with me, Hui-Wan Ch’ae testified, “we [the SNU mask dance club’s members] performed the mask dance in rural, industrial, and slum areas” (“Interview Transcript,"
n.p.). Visiting low-income workers, student performers only performed the *t’alch’um*. They propagated ideas about the importance of continuing the mask dance tradition at places where low-income workers lived. However, students’ performances in the 1970s did not forge a bond of sympathy with the workers. By contrast, the performers in the 1980s devoted themselves to introducing *madanggūks* rather than the *t’alch’um* in agricultural and industrial working spaces. They believed that, through both direct and indirect engagement with *madanggūks*, spectators could better understand their dire conditions and have a forum for voicing their frustrations (J.-S. Jeong, “Truth and Falsity of Minjungguk” 140).

One example of how the *madanggūk* functioned for the working poor is “Saenareul Yeoneun Saramdeul” [People Who Opens a New Day] (1987). This piece’s storyline focuses on hopeless mine workers in Gangwon-do, South Korea. *Minjung Munwha Undong Yeonhaphoe* [Cultural Movement Alliance] performed this work at a memorial ceremony event for labor activist Tae-II Jeon, which occurred at Korea University Auditorium from November 13 to 15 (“Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory,” n.p.). After the premiere, performers put on this piece in different places – from Seoul to In-Cheon and Gangwon areas. As a second example of students presenting pieces for worker audiences, “Soetmulcheoreom” [Like Rusty Water] (1987) is a dramatic version of Hwa-Jin Jeong’s novel. Geukdan *Cheonjiyeon* performed this piece to depict laborers’ harsh reality and optimism. This group toured around the industrial complex in Daerim-dong, Seoul to perform at laborers’ small scale cultural rallies (I.-B. Park, "Minjokguk Movement in Minjung Perspective” 157).
Furthermore, there were Geukdan *Hyeonjang’s madanggŭks* in 1988 – “Hwaetbul” [Torch] and “Nodong ui Saebyeok” [The Dawn of Labor]. The *Hyeonjang* was a creative theater troupe founded by people from university theater and mask dance clubs like In-Bae Park. This group had persistent interests in labor problems. The “Hwaetbul” argued that non-union workers must struggle to raise their wages, whereas the “Nodong ui Saebyeok” was based on No-Hae Park’s original poem (1984) to depict workers’ consciousness. The *Hyeonjang* performed the “Hwaetbul” over 100 times at universities and various workplaces from 1988 to 1992. The “Nodong ui Saebyeok,” performance occurred in September 1988. After that, the performing troupe visited local industrial areas and workers’ assemblies in In-Cheon and An-Yang, Gyeonggi-do and Po-Hang and Ul-San, Gyeongsang-do. Noripae *Ilteo*’s “Heutteojimyeon Jukneunda” [Divided We Fall] (1989) is an example of performances given for laborers. The *Ilteo*, which launched in November 1987, established a base in Busan and traveled throughout the Gyeongsang areas. This group visited the Changwon Sesin industry to meet laborers who struggled for higher wages. They performed the “Heutteojimyeon Jukneunda” in order to support workers in their efforts ("Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory," n.p.). “Makjangeul Ganda” [Go to the Mine] (1987) and “Kkeopdegireul Beotgoseo” [Cast the Shell] (1988) offered different strategies. Unlike other examples in which laborers were invited to be spectators, these performances were presented by a non-*madanggŭk* group, *Hanguk Yeoseong Nodongjahoe* (Korean Women Workers Association). This association cooperated with the established *madanggŭk* troupes such as Noripae *Handure*, Geukdan *Hyeonjang*, and Geukdan *Saettugi* in these pieces. These
performances both took place in factories or farming communities and laborers participated in them as audience members, showing that the madanggŭk was not limited to the educated elites at that time. Rather, it was available to anyone who wanted to participate in it or view it. What is unique about the “Makjangeul Ganda” and “Kkeopdegereul Beotgoseo” is that they concentrated on female workers and their discriminated living conditions. As stated in Chapter 1, feminist philosophies against the male-oriented atmosphere and the existing patriarchal culture were not seriously discussed in South Korea until 1993. Thus, bringing up issues about social authority of female workers in the 1980s madanggŭks is an interesting phenomenon.

As I have hoped to make clear in this section, all madanggŭk performances after the mid 1980s began inviting working-class populations to be their performances’ spectators. They formed an image of the madanggŭk as “labor dance theaters,” which mingled with movements of the mask dance (I.-B. Park, "Prospects for Minjokguk Movement" 54). The madanggŭk became an effective medium for criticizing minjung’s socio-economic realities. It also endeavored to promote the maturation of minjung’s critical consciousness regarding South Korea’s politics.

MOVEMENT ACTIVISTS’ EMBODYING METHOD:
T’ALCH’UM’S CONVENTIONS

Korean scholars are interested in theatrically analyzing madanggŭks’ form as well as socio-politically symbolizing madanggŭks as intellectuals’ voices that spoke for the people’s resistances in improper situations. Scholars like Ji-Chang Jeong regard the
**madanggük as epic theater** and apply the concept of Bertolt Brecht’s “alienation effect” to it. According to Jeong, Brecht’s epic theater prompts spectators not to feel empathy and identify themselves with the performance’s main characters (J.-C. Jeong 309). The theater induces audiences to watch one step away from the characters and then objectively observe them and their relationships with social realities (196). In this process, spectators eventually dispel false awareness and ideology which dominators established for keeping control and, by extension, they promote their critical consciousness (202).

To better understand Jeong’s analysis, it is important to examine Augusto Boal’s analysis of epic theater in *Theater of the Oppressed* (1993). By comparing with G. W. Friedrich Hegel’s meaning of “epic,” Boal explains characteristics of Bertolt Brecht’s epic theater. In Hegel’s view, “all that happens arises from spiritual powers – sometimes divine, sometimes human – and from the exterior obstacles which react, retarding their movement. That is, the spirit of a god or of a man initiates an action which encounters difficulties in the exterior world” (Boal 86). For Hegel, the character in epic poetry is “the absolute subject of his actions” because his exterior actions all come from his free spirit and sense of moral value (88). By contrast, Brecht does not consider epic theater’s character an absolute subject, but, rather, as an “object of economic or social forces to which he responds and in virtue of which he acts” (92). In other words, the characters do not have immanent characteristics as they do in Hegel’s view. Rather, the characters determine their actions depending on what economic and social relations they have. Brecht views the character as a “spokesman for economic and social forces” (93). He goes on to insist that the character’s action “develops through the contradiction of social
needs” – needs almost always informed from capitalism (101). Boal also points out that Brecht wants to prevent spectators from binding themselves to a character and also from producing emotional sympathy for the character. Instead of experiencing grief over the character’s immutable destiny, the audience is supposed to understand the contradictions of socio-political and economic forces around the character and cry out against these inconsistencies. Another characteristic of Brecht’s epic theater is that “each scene does or does not determine, causally, the next scene” (94). By arranging many independent scenes, Brecht produces scenes of transformation, showing the audience “how the world can be transformed” (103). The feeling of alienation produced by this narrative structure is supposed to make spectators keep their distance from the storyline and, therefore, observe the theater from an objective viewpoint.

Augusto Boal and Ji-Chang Jeong write about the theater in the same critical vein. Jeaong argues that characteristics in Brecht’s epic theater can also be found in South Korea’s madanggũks such as “Jinogui Gut” (1973), “Mass Game” (1978), and “Deoksangol Iyagi” (1978). For example, a narrator emerges in “Jinogui Gut” and “Mass Game” to explain the progress of the play and throw questions to audiences. In the case of “Jinogui Gut,” especially, a narrator recites pansori, a form of Korean folk music, called a dramatic song (J.-C. Jeong 309). Jeong argues that the appearance of narrators creates a sense of alienation in these two pieces in that the narrator’s intervention between scenes hinders the spectators from developing empathy with the actual characters (308). The “Mass Game” is composed of twenty-six scenes that quickly shift from one to the next. Jeong contends that this structure resembles Brecht’s transition
technique. The quick change of scenes interrupts audiences to arouse their curiosity about unfolding events in the next scene (308). That is, the spectators retain a sense of distance and objectivity toward the madanggük. Like the “Mass Game,” the “Deoksangol Iyagi” which dramatizes a real murder case proceeds with several independent scenes. Jeong argues that this piece concentrates on investigating the behind-the-scenes story of the incident through a socio-political and economic lens focused on the main character (310). In other words, this production makes clear that the character’s act of murder in the madanggük is determined not by the character’s nature, but by environmental factors.

In her 2004 thesis, Yun-Kyung Min also argues that madanggüks follow the structure of epic theater as Brecht conceptualizes it. Presenting “Jinogui Gut” (1973) and “Hampyeong Goguma” (1978) as examples, Min suggests that many madanggüks were not a character-centered theater, but, rather, they aimed to show spectators the development of situation around the character (Min 35). In other words, madanggüks concentrated on socio-political and economic relationship with the characters rather than the character’s own nature and fate. Instead of empathy with the character, spectators understood the broader contexts in which the character moved (37).

Jeong and Min analyze madanggüks using a theatrical theory, even though their dances and songs are as important as their dialogues and acting. This critical tendency parallels how the South Korean government categorized the t’alch’um into a theater field when it began designating the mask dance as the intangible cultural property in 1962. Since the early 1960s, Korean scholars have tended to deem the madanggük influenced by the mask dance as theater. Dance scholars often analyze the t’alch’um, not the
*madanggûk*, from a dance-centered angle. Although there are dance studies about the mask dance, these studies typically focus on movement analysis. Dance scholars have not applied critical dance theories to the mask dance. This pattern of attention to the *t’alch’um* can be expanded. I do not want to subvert the established theoretic analyses by Jeong and Min do. Rather, I suggest that the *madanggûks* could be scrutinized from a variety of perspectives. In the following section, I examine how the *madanggûks* are methodologically analogous to the *t’alch’um*, and also explore how they are scrutinized into various angles. To launch this, I examine the channels through which university students acquired the *t’alch’um* and what *madanggûk* performers pulled out from the mask dance for their own dance pieces.

**University Students’ Direct Actions: Establishing Mask Dance and Theater Clubs**

The 1970s student frontrunners in reinvigorating traditional practices were Seoul National University’s mask dance club members like Hui-Wan Ch’ae, In-Ryeol Yu, Jin-Taek Lim, Suk-Man Kim, and Ae-Ju Lee. They focused on traditions like *t’alch’ums*, cooperating with their seniors Ji-Ha Kim and Dong-II Cho. They put their interest in the mask dances into practice. They began founding mask dance clubs at each university to get hands-on experience of the mask dance. According to Hui-Wan Ch’ae during a 2012 interview with me, the first university mask dance club was *Jeontong Yaesul Yeonguhweyi* [Research Society of Traditional Art] in Busan National University. This club was established in 1970 by student Sang-Ryul Lee ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). During the following year, Ch’ae, a student at that time, launched a mask dance club in Seoul.
National University called *Minsok Gamyunguk Yeonguhwei* [Research Society of Folklore Mask Dance Drama]. After a club was established at Seoul National University, universities like Ewha Women’s, Sogang, and Yeonsei Universities launched clubs in 1973 (Ch’ae, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). In addition to these schools’ clubs, universities throughout South Korea established mask dance clubs (Ch’ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 206; 208).

Participating in the mask dance clubs, learning the *t’alch’um*, and recognizing this dance as a Korean tradition were important to many students on campuses from the beginning of the 1970s to the early 1980s. The mask dance clubs’ members expanded upon their opportunities to learn several kinds of mask dances. They invited visiting professional dancers from each preservation society to conduct specialized mask dance classes. I collected oral testimony of such invitations during my 2012-13 interviews with Sang-Woon Park, who has worked for the *Bongsan* mask dance since the 1970s and is currently an initiator [*Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo*] in the preservation society;

Teachers [intangible cultural assets] brought and utilized us [current initiators] as assistants. While they demonstrated movements of the mask dance, we directly showed them to university students….The classes were held in universities because intangible cultural assets were invited by students. For example, students in Seoul National University organized a club of the mask dance and then invited intangible cultural assets in the Bongsan mask dance. This club learned the Bongsan mask dance first among the Universities. Hui-Wan Ch’ae (a professor in Pusan National University) was one of first members in the club of the mask dance. (Park, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

The club Park mentions participated in a class called the *Minsok Gamyunguk Yeonguhwei*. Hui-Wan Ch’ae was a founder and member of this club in the early 1970s. Ch’ae’s
statement during a 2012 interview with me supports Park’s testimony: “Seoul National University students, including me, directly learned the *Bongsan* mask dance from intangible cultural assets who were alive at that time” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Ch’ae continued by suggesting that “students in Ewha Women’s University learned the *Bongsan* mask dance from the mask dance club’s members of Seoul National University” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Ch’ae’s second statement reveals that the mask dance clubs’ members disseminated what they directly learned from professional dancers to students from other schools. That is to say, university students in the 1970s did not merely find meaning in learning the *t’alch’um*, but also then sharing it with congenial others. They aimed to form their own conscious and collective character in a society of intellectuals, based on Korean tradition. This character eventually became an ideology of campus culture (Ch’ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 168; 169).

Three intangible cultural assets, during interviews with me, attested to having related experiences. They instructed university students at the preservation societies in the 1970s. Hong-Jong Kim stated that “[university] students visited the [Tongyeong Ogwangdae] preservation society every summer” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Sang-Ho Lee also stated that “many students came to the preservation society from Seoul to learn [the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance]” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). According to Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, “I went all around and students learned [Bukcheong Saja [lion]] mask dance from me. I taught students in Bosung middle and high schools and Youngdeungpo Gongeop high school too….They visited and learned it in here [the preservation society]. They did in Summer vacation” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Taken together, these
insights into teaching the mask dance make clear that the mask dance was both in vogue and not limited to student members in the university mask dance clubs. High school students and university students in other clubs also jumped on opportunities to take human cultural assets’ classes. For example, Suk-Man Kim, who is currently a drama scholar, stated during his 2012 interview with me that he and his colleagues in the 1970s wanted to make something new that was distinguishable from the translated western theater traditions. They had direct experience with the preservation society. At this time, Kim was interested in and learned the mask dance firsthand before joining a mask dance club. Subsequently, Kim joined in a mask dance club and began collaborating with Hui-Wan Ch’ae. At this juncture, he acquire the Bongsan mask dance to learn a scene that features monks, for example (S.-M. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). After Kim joined in the mask dance club and began collaborating with Hui-Wan Ch’ae, he acquired the Bongsan mask dance from Sun-Bong Kim, So-Woon Yang, and Gi-Su Kim and the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance from Kyeong-Sung Yu (S.-M. Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). What is clear here is that Kim was interested in and learned the mask dance firsthand before cooperating with the mask dance club.

Another example is Gi-Sung Nam who is currently a director and performer in theater group Handure. The Handure was established by Hui-Wan Ch’ae in 1974. Since then, this group has mainly performed madanggūks. In a 2013 interview with me, Nam told me that he actively took part in student movements and a mask dance club in Chungang University from 1981 to 1988. He started learning the mask dance when he was in a music and dance club at a high school from 1978 to 1980 ("Interview
According to Nam, his seniors in the club invited not only professional dancers from a mask dance preservation society, but also student members in the university mask dance club, as their dance teachers ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Nam’s case gives evidence that high school students during the 1970s were interested in the mask dance and learned it through the similar means as university students. High school students’ interest in the *t’alch’um* segued into activities in the university mask dance club.

University students continued to be interested in learning the mask dance throughout the 1980s, when anti-foreign sentiment continued during a new dictatorship – the Doo-Hwan Chun regime – that depended on America economically, militaristically, and diplomatically. Gi-Sung Nam, in a 2013 interview with me, recollected his experiences in the 1980s:

> The reason I participated in the mask dance group was that group members could have a chance to learn all scenes of Bongsan mask dance from intangible cultural assets. That is why I took part in the group when I was a freshman [in 1981]….I learned the mask dance from Ok Y’un and….She already died….I remembered….I learned three times in a week, and finally took six months to complete. We could not have vacation. She visited us with her teaching assistant….There was not the teaching methodology at that time. Just thoughtlessly taught and learned with endeavors. (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Sun-Hong Kim, an initiator of the the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance, also recollected her teaching experience from the 1980s to 1990:

> From the 1980s to the beginning of the 1990s. Sometimes students, who took part in student movements, visited the society in Yangju, and then were accused of conspiring against Korean government. So, it was blocked to visit societies of the mask dance. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)
These two interviewees offer clear evidence that the trend to learn t’alch’um continued from the 1980s to the early 1990s. They show that students were absorbed by the mask dance while they visited the preservation societies and invited professional teachers to campus to take dance classes.

Since the 1970s, university students seemed to have an easier time with contacting professional dancers. Through, I wonder how students maintained their relationships with professional dancers in the t’alch’um preservation societies. Did students create financial agreements, like charging tuition fees for dance classes? Or, did students have free classes? Pecuniary considerations might offer insight into how the professional dancers and university students interacted with each other. However, as I began to dig for evidence of possible financial transactions between students and dance teachers, I was unable to gain access to data regarding administrative workings of student organizations. It was due to the fact that no records were kept by the student organizations. During most of my interviews with students and dance teachers alike, I was unable to gather such information. However, Sun-Hong Kim and Gi-Sung Nam – interviewees during 2012-13 interviews with me – provided some clues that the 1980s students paid some amount of tuition for the mask dance classes in the 1980s. According to the Yangju Byulsan dae mask dance’s initiator Kim, “students remunerated teachers at that time [the 1980s]. We [Kim and her colleagues] do not currently receive teaching fee after 2000. That is to say, now students do not have to pay for instruction” (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). Gi-Sung Nam, who was a student member of the mask dance club in the 1980s, also mentioned, “I did not remember exactly how much it was…. In order to
learn the traditional mask dance from teachers of the preservation society, I paid…almost the half of school tuition for it [about two hundred dollars]” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). These two interviewees corroborate that university students in the 1980s paid some kind of tuition for t’alch’um classes.

In contrast to Kim and Nam, Sang-Ho Lee, an intangible cultural asset of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, mentioned during a 2012 interview with me that students attempted to learn the t’alch’um for free. The Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance was designated in November 1980, and Lee remembered the 1980s and students’ involvement with teachers:

University students, who belonged to a Nongak [traditional Korean music performed by farmers] club, a theater club, and a t’alch’um club, wanted us [professional dancers] to make an exchange between the Hahoe Byulsingut and the Bongsan mask dances. I refused their suggestion with a smile…I wondered if dancers [beginners] of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance could slide into bad habits of dancing movement because the Hahoe and Bongsan are organized in different style and movements. I did not want dancers of the Hahoe mask dance to transform their movements. (S.-H. Lee, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Lee’s statement does not make clear whether professional dancers wanted payments for classes instead of learning additional mask dances from university students. What is clear here is that the dancers discerned that the students’ dance skills were not professional even if they could perform all scenes in other mask dances. This is not to say that the dancers felt superior to the students. Rather, the dancers were anxious about the possibility that the students’ nonprofessional renditions could undermine the professional dancers’ reputations as dance experts, and, more importantly, influence the original dance
forms. In this regard, professional dancers actively shared the mask dance with university students only through direct teachings.

Professional dancers taught their *t’alch’ums* to university students without always earning regular payment, which may mean that they were pleased about the young generation’s interest in the mask dance. The dancers’ support of such learning extended into how often they lent students their costumes for performances. Hong-Jong Kim, in a 2012 interview with me, mentioned that he taught the *Tongyeong Ogwangdae* mask dance to students in Chonbuk and Chonnam National Universities. He also noted that he lent them masks and costumes during performances ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Another interviewee, Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, gave evidence that students asked teachers from the preservation society to borrow masks: she and her colleagues lent out the masks because the students requested ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Moreover, Suk-Man Kim and Gi-Sung Nam, who were students in the 1970s and the 1980s, stated: “we [students in the mask dance club of Seoul National University] borrowed costumes from the *Bongsan* preservation society….They [the *Bongsan* preservation society] actively did [supported us]” (Suk-Man Kim, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Nam noted that he and his colleagues “borrowed costumes and masks [from the preservation societies]” to perform on campus (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). These interviews make clear that professional dancers in the *t’alch’um* preservation societies helped university students as both teachers and suppliers. With help from professional supporters, students made cultural events on many university campuses from the 1970s to the 1980s.
Thus, professional dancers and university students shared concerns about how the dance’s past could be represented in the present. Both groups dedicated themselves to adhering to the t’alch’um’s conventions, yet they did not have the same exact goals. Unlike dancers, students did not aim to uncover the original mask dance’s authenticity. Rather, they aimed to channel the mask dance’s political potentials and use as a tool for social critique (N.-H. Lee 198). In this ways, the students appreciated dance professionals and their interests in authenticity. But, the students did not see themselves as resources of knowledge about the mask dance. In other words, the mask dance came as something fresh to the students who had grown up in an environment that emphasized adopting the Western culture and education. Further, the opportunities to learn modest movements and plebeian dialogues from the mask dance professionals were very extraordinary experiences for the students (Yeong-Mi Lee 47). Through the mask dance, the students not only engaged with Korean traditions, but also formulated their protests’ central message that national progress should be both democratic and uniquely Korean.

**Madanggūks Based on T’alch’um’s Conventions**

Specific aspects of the t’alch’um allowed university activists to maintain historical continuity. After the mid-1970s, university student performers worked with professional madanggūk troupes began drawing from the t’alch’um and creating a new dance theater genre: the madanggūk. Even though madanggūks valued holding onto the mask dance’s history, they were not regarded as substitutes for the mask dance. The new dance theater genre, madanggūk, did not concentrate on reconstituting t’alch’um’s origins
with minimal changes. Specifically, unlike the protection system’s reconsitutors who devoted themselves to emulate plots, choreographies, costumes, and music, madanggūk performers selectively used mask dance theatrical concepts as performance devices to maximize critical contents and performing mood.

Madanggūk’s methodology, from my perspective, reflects Mark Franko’s critical discussion of embodiment in *Dance as Text: Ideologies of Baroque Body* (1987). Franko argues that the significance of the past dances’ origins needs to be theorized. He regards both construction and deconstruction as forms of theorizing dance history. Franko argues that reflections encoded in the choreography play out through the construction and deconstruction processes of a past dance. That is, Franko advocates deriving the new from the old.

Franko articulates his dance work *Harmony of the Spheres* (1987) as an example of construction. To construct a geometrical dance, he draws from a kinetic theory from late Renaissance and early baroque court ballet in which amorous nymphs dance in geometrical spatial patterns. He choreographs dancers to visually and emotionally realize movements interrupted and suspended in chaotic patterns. According to Franko, “I was shaping a work that did not reconstruct dance of the Renaissance period per se. Rather, its composition could be experienced as the space of a dialogue” between Renaissance and baroque steps and attitudes (Franko 140). This quote shows that Franko accomplishes his dance construction through deriving a similar choreographic atmosphere from the historical dance instead of simply repeating choreography of the past unchanged.
Franko offers a second example of “construction” with Oskar Schlemmer, who presented stringless marionettes in his construction works *Triadic Ballet* (1922) and *Bauhaus Dance* (1926). He substituted human beings encased in costumes – dancers – for the marionette and swelled their body suits to decrease their range of movement. This decrease in range of movement made dancers’ movement look mechanical or non-human. Schlemmer depicts what he sees as close relationships among dancer’s spirit, body, and space created between a dancer’s body and a costume. He refutes Denis Diderot, Heinrich von Kleist, and Edward Gordon Craig’s respective depictions of the marionette. Schlemmer argues that the human body’s movements are motivated by a dancer even when the body is enclosed by costuming’s constructed shapes. Schlemmer re-uses the concept of the marionette in his construction works to produce a new concept as he perceived dancers’ – humans’ – consciousness within each encasing marionette figure and re-humanized dancers’ dematerialized bodies. With these examples, Franko in this 1993 “Epilogue” asserts that “repeatability is indeed the goal of much Western theatrical theory” and that “reconstruction also derives its underlying rationale from a similar need to render performance unchanging in some way stable and permanently present” (Franko 151). Instead of obsessing about repeatability that has been “at the core” of theatrical theory for many years, Franko demonstrates the multiple possibilities of theorizing dance history through what he calls “construction.”

Much like Franko’s approach, madanggūk performers, including student performers and professional actor-dancers, draw from the *t’alch’um*’s theatrical conventions to produce their own dance theater, the madanggūk. The mask dance’s
theatrical effects employed in madanggūks can be sorted into five concepts: 1) Gilnori [pre-opening performance] and Gosa [shamanistic ritual] 2) a narrator speaking, 3) monsters appearing in create a conflict plot, 4) character sets, and 5) coexisting laughing and crying.

First, Gilnori and Gosa are typical mask dance characteristics. When t’alch’ums like the Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandae, and Bukcheong Saja are first performed in rural areas before the Second World War, it always includes a scene of a shamanistic ritual ceremony to pray for abundance and well-being in each village (Choi, Yu, and Lee 29). The Gosa scene is seen as a very first scene in t’alch’ums like the Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandae, and Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance. Before provoking mirth through each story in the following scenes, the mask dance performers first seek out spectators and their village. The Gosa scene allows all participants in the t’alch’um to unite for common purposes. The greater number of the spectators, the better. The performers pass from house to house before starting this first scene to entice as many potential spectators as possible to attend performances. While spectators follow performers in this procession to performance spaces, they are increasingly excited, and they feel themselves as participants in the performance. This procession is why the Gilnori is called a pre-opening performance. The Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandae, and Bukcheong Saja mask dances all begin with the Gilnori. These two features are visible in “Mass Game” and “Nobi Munseo” [Slaves Document]. The first scene in “Mass Game,” for example, depicts a joint funeral for coal miners trapped by a collapsed tunnel ceiling. The performance’s depiction of this religious ceremony is much like the Gosa scene because
student performers of the “Mass Game” march around the school before entering a performance arena. Performers borrow the Gilnori’s concept to emphasize the mining workers’ tragic death through a funeral procession (Lim, Creativity of Popular Entertainment: Jin-Taek Lim’s Review Book 54). Their pre-marching functions as a device to arouse students’ and viewers’ curiosity about the performance and to heighten the sense of expectancy among spectators waiting for it. Likewise, in the case of “Nobi Munseo,” performers open their performance to depict two different processions. During this performance, characters who embody the privileged class walk in a straight line across the performing arena, whereas slaves walk around this arena, forming a curved path (54). These two contrasting processions are supposed to draw spectators into the performance.

Another structural characteristic of the traditional mask dance that madanggŭks utilized is the advent of narrators and monsters. In the first scene of the madanggŭk “Jinogui Gut,” a narrator appears to explain the harsh reality of rural areas through the musical lens of pansori, a Korean genre of music-focused storytelling, and remained in performance arena to lead the whole performance (H.-M. Kim 36). In the Bongsan mask dance, musicians, called Ak-Sa, play an important role in playing traditional instruments.35 One of these musicians functions as a main narrator in that he commented on performers’ movements to add to the amusement. In this performance setting, performers change in every scene because the mask dance uses an omnibus format – a format that consists not only of one story, but many different stories. Unlike the performers, however, the narrator like musicians is integral to the performances from
start to finish and continued exchanging dialogue with changing performers (Cho 112; Jeon 360). Musicians in the Bongsan importantly function as a director to lead the course of the play and create a festive atmosphere. Much like the narrator in the Bongsan, the narrator in the “Jinogui Gut” plays an important role in guiding spectators through the whole story. In this regard, the narrator in the “Jinogui Gut” plays a role similar to Bongsan’s musicians.

Another similarity between the t’alch’um and madanggŭk is that monsters appear in the plot involving conflict. The Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance includes the scene of feared imaginary creatures, called Chuji. Male and female Chujis dance together and playfully fight, and the female wins the tussle at the end. Their fighting act is to expel demons and evil spirits. The female’s victory signals a prayer for women’s fertility and a good harvest (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 17). The Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance, too, revolves around intense conflict. It includes a scene of the Korean legendary monstrous creature. This one is Yeongno, sometimes called Immogi. This scene depicts a fight between the Yeongno and a high-handed Yangban (nobleman). However, the Yangban dies a horrible death when attacked by the Yeongno (Tongyeong Ogwangdae Preservation Society 15). This result shows that God ruthlessly punishes a bad man, one from the depraved wealthier classes. These two t’alch’ums thus produce the conflict structure through actions around the monster, and suggest that powerless commoners can overcome difficulties after all (Choi, Yu, and Lee 38). As in the mask dances’ monster scenes, three monsters appear in the second scene of madanggŭk “Jinogui Gut.” These monsters signify natural disaster and social suppression. However,
farmers band together to throw the monsters out from their village, signaling the potential strength of the lower classes if they work together (Ch’ae and Lim 69). To emphasize the importance of cooperation and labor division, performers develop Jinogui Gut’s plot in a way very similar to the mask dance, using the advent of monsters, the conflict with them, and victory by the poor (H.-M. Kim 44). Such repetition in plot serves as a way of reinforcing the theme of criticizing the current regime’s suppressive policy to the agricultural population.

Some madanggûks set up characters that were analogous to roles in t’alch’ums. All thirteen mask dances contain a scene of Nojang (old monk). In this scene, a depraved monk, a young male servant, and a young woman are main characters. The servant opens this scene, fighting with the nobleman to take possession of the woman. While satirizing the noblemen’s deprivation, the servant wins the struggle and captures the woman’s heart. Hui-Wan Ch’ae testified in a 2012 interview with me that “bringing the simple storyline [of the mask dance], Soriguk Agu was performed; the madanggûk substitutes a Japanese factory owner for the old monk, a Korean young man for a young servant, and a female university student for a young woman” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). The madanggûk “Soriguk Agu” [Folk Song Agu] chooses main characters similar to those in the t’alch’um scene of an old monk. The establishment of similar characters led to a similar plot development, therefore indicating that degrading diplomatic relations between South Korea and Japan are still continued in the 1960s even though Korea was liberated from Japanese colonialism in 1945.
The satirical theater for the lower classes, these mechanisms not only promote a sense of affinity through humorous elements, but also heal spectators’ psychological wounds resulting from hierarchical ranks and unfair suppression (Son, *Laughter and Cry as Korean Aesthetic Category: Centering around Madanggŭk* 83). In his master’s thesis, Jae-Oh Son classifies the aspects of the mask dance that lead to laughter as twisted mask shapes and movements, a quip in dialect, and saucy jokes (82). He points out that an important way to cause the audience to cry is to display each character’s struggle with poverty and strife as part of the larger storyline (82). The *t’alch’um*’s characters – for example, an old woman character in an old married couple’s story – do not bitterly cry to express that they are suffering a wretched life. Instead, the pressure of poverty and the grief over a lost child become sublimated to superficial joke created by the dancers’ comic gestures. Such witticisms allow spectators to burst out laughing, yet at the same time, make audiences feel sad and a little bit bitter (56). As in the mask dance, factors causing laughter and crying coexisted in the *madanggŭk* “Ileoseoneun Saramdeul” [People Who Stood Up]. In this piece, two handicapped people, Gopchu and Gombaepari, are main characters, and they start the first scene with exciting dances and jokes. Their distorted facial expressions and uncomfortable movements caused by their disabilities lead spectators to laugh ("Culture Portal Site Yesulro: Art Knowledge Directory," n.p.). Yet, these deformed gestures signify as more than comical gestures. The performers sublimate South Korea’s problematic reality of class division and struggles among the poor as well as the people’s acceptance of such living conditions into the humorous
twisted gestures. One more sentence to really drive home the hidden significance of the
gestures. Through this scene, audiences intermix their smiles with tears on the lamentable
lives of common people.

*Madanggûk* performers thus selectively applied the mask dance’s theatrical
conventions to their plays while they created completely different productions. The
performers did not adhere to the South Korean government’s Cultural Heritage Protection
System where reconstitutors under the state’s patronage devoted themselves to interknit
the *t’alch’ums*’ vestiges to generate each official version. Hui-Wan Ch’ae, an expert on
the mask dance, quoted in a speech by a student performer at SNU\textsuperscript{38} mask dance club’s
*Bongsan* mask dance performance in May 1979:

> There is no way to find tradition that already became extinct. The reconstituted
traditions are not authentic folklores because they lose a capacity to autonomously transmit. [We, student performers] perform the *t’alch’um* in order
to reexamine it in the present age. (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the
1970s” 182)

As the passage demonstrates, student performers cast doubt on the mask dances
reconstituted by the government’s institutional implementation. They argue that
*t’alch’ums*, which the government reconstituted, are not genuine forms because they are
not replicated by autochthonous activities, as scholar Soo-Jin Jung, Jeong-Seok Lee, and
Gyeong-Sun Hwang put it, but were artificial activities. This government framework also
lets a small number of preservation societies’ dancers exclusively possess the mask
dances (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 189). *Madanggûk* performers
demonstrate that the government’s mask dance reconstitutions were for display.
The critical reviews received by madangūk performers have much in common with reviews by Marina Abramović that Rebecca Schneider critiques. In *Reenactment: Art and War in Times of Theatrical Reenactment* (2011), Schneider examines how reenactments are inter(in)animated in art and the U.S. Civil War, analyzing reenactments that occurred between 1998 and 2006. She also investigates what range of approaches artists used to achieve reenactments. According to Schneider, based on Carol Kino’s analysis, Abramović argues that performances need to be categorized according to “a set of moral rules for conservation” (Schneider 5). Schneider critiques the way that Abramović focuses on “charting a patrilineage of masters” for “the linear transmission” in reenactments of historical work (6). Contrary to Abramović, Schneider concentrates upon “a more porous approach to time and to art time as full of holes or gaps and art as capable of falling or crossing in and out of the spaces between live iterations” (6). She regards the liveness of the matter as a key across multiple styles or its inter(in)animation. That is, the past does not completely disappear and is not discrete from the present. She relates this to Elizabeth Freeman’s terms “mutually disruptive energy,” where performers are engaged in the historical process and challenge a timeless original form while re-doing a performance-based piece (15). The performers invite spectators to get the feel of historical authenticity, but not to actually return to the past.

In addition, Rebecca Schneider analyzes how a notion of futurity is revealed in battle reenactments, bringing in Allison Smith’s empirical argument about Virginia—the heartland of the U.S Civil War. Schneider points out that to “witness” and “participate” [in the official tourism website of the Commonwealth of Virginia] is to
attend a scene as it occurs, and thus the experience of Virginia’s history is offered in the future when one visits or makes a “return visit” – attending again and again” (Schneider 19). She goes on to say that “Lincoln’s 1863 Gettysburg Address is a speech that begins with the securing of a past, it is also a speech that remarks on memory’s place less as record offered for history than as ongoing performative act” (21). Schneider does not consider the reenactments of Civil War as simple activities to preserve the past. Rather, the reenactments are unfinished works and will be provided for repeat-visiters in the future. In this respect, Schneider argues that America’s past comes across among the living of the present, and it functions as a future direction of America.

In a similar vein to Schneider’s argument, madanggŭk performers refuse archiving and categorizing a single version of each full mask dance as a way of keeping the past alive. Rather, they acknowledge the spatial and temporal interval between the t’alch’um and contemporary people who could be potential spectators. They ponder over a way to bridge this gap between the past and present (J.-T. Lim, Creativity of Popular Entertainment: Jin-Taek Lim’s Review Book 288). According to Hui-Wan Ch’ae, performers connect the mask dance to the present problems in the madanggŭks (“The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 174; 183). The performers place their bodies in, as Ch’ae puts it, a way that engage with the gestural, structural, and conceptual features of the t’alch’ums while addressing hot-button issues in each of the madanggŭk. These issues are what student activists were currently interested in and what they wanted spectators to recognize as public deep-seated indignation against the South Korean dictatorship (J.-C. Jeong, “Resistant Movement and Madanggŭk in a Korean Society” 30). In my
understanding, madanggŭk productions show that the past was not over and discrete from the present and the future. Instead, the productions can be seen to have shown that the present is interlinked with the past and the future, and they are circulated in Freeman’s “mutually disruptive energy” (Schneider 15). Utilizing the t’alch’ums conventions, performers touch time and space in the traversing lived experience of the past dancers. This intermixing of time-space helps the performers foster the mutual energy needed to create a new cultural genre, called the madanggŭk. Understanding satirical functions in the mask dance, the performers approach socio-political and economic issues from multiple directions. In this respect, the connection between past culture and 1960s to 1980s urgent problems collapsed in madanggŭks (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 184). The performers invite spectators to the time-space intersection between the past and the present. The audiences are offered opportunities to engage in madanggŭk activities as ways of accessing what they felt in the mask dance and what they recognized in the performers’ bitter diatribe against South Korea’s reality.

Like Schneider argues, I read madanggŭks as not only ongoing performative acts of the mask dance, but also important venues for making critical responses to South Korea’s autocracy and envisioning the future through each character’s lifestyle. Their ongoing supply allows re-participants in madanggŭks to imagine the future differently. The madanggŭk thus serves as a beacon of the future to the spectators.

The reconstituted dances are disconnected from the public’s sight while the government reconstitutes t’alch’ums in the Cultural Heritage Protection System. That is, mask dances no longer serve as widely available amusements for the public. Designated
as exclusive properties, the *t’alch’ums* become untouchable objects for the public. *Madanggūks* return to the mask dance’s fundamental attribute – activities for everyone to enjoy – and to five characteristic principles of the *t’alch’um* and apply them to their performances. *Madanggūks* circulate the past and the present and as vehicle to imagine the future.

**NATIONAL IDENTITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN MADANGGŪKS**

University students in South Korea considered the *t’alch’um* the groundwork of “Koreanness” (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 172). Of particular interest here is why, out of the many kinds of Korean traditional art forms, students focused on the mask dance as *minjung*’s (common people’s) ideal outlet for nationalistic-focused politics and incorporated it in their subjective political practices on campuses through the *madanggūk*. Through what channels did the concept of *minjung* appear and why did this concept become a fundamental principle in the student movement?

**Emphasis on the Term “Minjung”**

The Park and Chun regimes were dogmatic, claiming to found a rich and powerful nation while ignoring the people’s rights. These regimes engaged in restrictive politics such as control of speech and regulation of labor unions. According to Korean historian Nam-Hee Lee, the Park regime rationalized repressive measures by focusing on the excuse of rapid economic growth. Lee goes on to say that this rationalization “gave rise to two overriding concerns among the critical intellectuals, along with growing
anxiety over South Korea’s perceived neocolonial status: overcoming a colonial mentality and recovering (or creating) historical subjectivity” (N.-H. Lee 5). As Lee shows, student activists, as an intellectual group, agreed with an emphatic denial on the regime’s political directions. They became apprehensive about the people’s slave-like status and subjugation to the government. They were also concerned about a growing gap between the haves and the have-nots in the process of introducing capitalism (S.-U. Choi 15). In other words, the military regime was continuing to abuse Korean people and reinforce the servile spirit that had resulted from Japanese occupation and American intervention. To break away from this dominant-subordinate relationship with the military government, student activists sought to demolish servile sentiments and to search for roots that could help them arm themselves mentally. They considered the public not as subjugated bodies, but as powerful bodies in a country with a long history of national identity (21). They began using the term “minjung” to describe a collective public body. This term suggests that the common people can be just as powerful as those subordinating them. The students believed minjung had roots in tradition created by historically disadvantaged and poor groups. They also believed that grass-roots traditions were central to Korean identity and that these traditions are the core of public consciousness (Ch’ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 175; J.-C. Jeong, "Resistant Movement and Madanggŭk in a Korean Society" 33). University students saw minjung as the basis for solidarity and community building. And, importantly, the students viewed minjung as a potential driving force to oppose political and economic policy and formulate public-centered politics. For these reasons and more, minjung
became student activists’ slogan in their movements from the 1960s. One major type of student demonstrations was called *Minjung Undong* (H.-J. Kim 174).

**Minjung Undong and Munhwa Undong**

Various university clubs played a role in history of the *Minjung Undong* since the 1950s. Many students participated in campus activism through engaging with the clubs. According to Nam-Hee Lee, such clubs typically attracted “politically conscious and eager minds in circles [clubs] and gradually transformed them into a nursery for movement activities” (N.-H. Lee 165).⁴⁰ Both underground and more public clubs existed on campuses. Some clubs offered seminars in which student members studied historical eras, democracy, capitalism, and world revolutionary movements (166). For university students, the clubs were significant places to share common interests and beliefs with colleagues and build networks for student protests. Student participants in the *Minjung Undong* tended to be sometimes aggressive. In-Suk Kwon in my 2012 interview recalled that the *Minjung Undong* showed a disposition towards violence at the time this interviewee participated in the movement:

Sometimes student movements were combatant. Molotov cocktails were not invented by university students before 1985. I heard that Molotov cocktails had first appeared at Jeolla region of South Korea. They would spread out after 1984. When I joined in student demonstrations before 1985, participants usually threw stones to the riot police….It was usual smell of Molotov cocktails at that time. I lived in a village that was not far from Seoul National University. I always smelled it. People were able to smell Molotov cocktails at most of streets of Seoul [Lots of demonstrations occurred in the 1980s]….[When I was a junior in college], I mainly advertised for student participants, played a role in mobilizing students and distributed printed materials. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)
Student participants, especially in the mid-1980s, committed threatening actions by stones and tear gas. Their offensive behaviors presented resistance to South Korea’s government on behalf of the public.

However, student club members did not merely begin and finish the Minjung Undong in armed struggles. Some clubs relating to literary, song, fine art, and t’alch’um devised a method for unarmed protest at the same period, from the 1970s to the 1980s (Hye-Ja Kim 174). These clubs helped form the Cultural Movement, known as the Munhwa Undong. The Cultural Movement had several modes: Munhak (literary), Misul (fine art), Norae (song), and Madanggūk Undong (bodily movement). Like the Minjung Undong, the Munhwa Undong made a commitment to pursue the concept of minjung and to promote collective power through cultural activities.

In the case of the Munhak Undong, writers already established in the 1970s were as active as people in university literary clubs. The writers published quarterly literature magazines such as Changbi and Moonji. Student members in the 1970s literary clubs passed these magazines around and understood minjung’s philosophy through public figures represented in the engagement literature. In the 1980s, university students and writers vitalized the Munhak Undong, conducting various writing campaigns in labor sites (J.-S. Lee 215). Through these campaigns, students and writers encouraged laborers to write about their own experience rather than only reading literatures. While directly writing about minjung’s severe lives, the laborers judged and problematized their unequal conditions. The students and writers positioned the workers – minjung – as a leading body of the Munhak Undong.
The Misul Undong was actively propelled among university students and artists like Bong-Jun Kim, Seong-Dam Hong, and Yun Oh (Kim et al. 15). These artists devoted themselves to produce engravings that captured figures of minjung protests and madanggūk performers (Lee et al. 319). In a 2013 interview, Jae-Oh Son, a madanggūk performer, testified why engraving was popular in the Misul Undong:

People, who were interested to minjung and majored in fine art, naturally began to pay attention to theater groups....Well, drawing and performing were crossed....Such as stage props, masks....in various sides. Our performing arts in the 1980s included people who joined in theater groups and in fine art groups....These groups cooperated with each other. At that time [the 1980s], engraving was the most popular....Because many copies could be made by engraving, and then these copies could be distributed....It was a kind of propaganda and agitation...Engraving was a part of student movements. The engraving artists made masks when our members (members of theater group Gaetdol) performed madanggūk. Activities of the theater groups effectively influenced other genres. In the past, they [performers and engraving artists] worked together ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).

When participants in the Misul Undong produced advertising materials for madanggūk performances, engraving was an effective way to increase production within a short period. The Misul Undong developed in interaction with and at the same time as the Madanggūk Undong.

When massive rallies and demonstrations were triggered at campus and labor sites, songs wafted from a group of protestors. Student protestors utilized singing more than chanting their slogans. During the student movement on campuses, they sang songs to strong drum beat, and they intermittently sang slow songs (H.-J. Kim 177). The songs were called tujang-gayo [struggle song], jeohang-gayo [resistance song], or demo-ga [demonstration song]. The songs’ strong rhythm depicted the activists’ powerful
solidarity while the slow-beat songs created a somber mood. Such actions to produce and use songs in various movements referred to the *Norae Undong* that revolved around university song clubs (Ju 291). Protest songs usually used existing songs like Korean pop music with changed lyrics. A small minority of students in the 1970s sang these kinds of songs. In the 1980s, the protest songs grew in number among student activists. Even though the activists’ protest songs were amateurish, they were able to generate wide appeal through using the familiar rhythms (J.-S. Lee 216; Ju 291). Student activists wanted to induce *minjung* – the common people – to be interested in and agree with what they were crying in the *Norae Undong*.

As revealed in these three movements, literary, fine art, and song, *mingjung* was an indispensable concept in the *Munhwa Undong*. Through cooperation with cultural activities, student protestors gave the public an impression of the *minjung* movement as approachable and helped them create a strong sense of collective identity that could oppose the dictatorship. For similar purposes, the mask dance clubs’ members developed the *Madanggŭk Undong* all over the nation at the beginning of the 1970s. Their activities – learning and performing the mask dances on campuses – triggered the *Munhwa Undong* (Cultural Movement) alongside the *Munhak, Misul, Norae Undongs*.

**Madanggŭk Undong: Ideal Reflections of T’alch’um on Madanggŭk**

In “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” (1982), Hui-Wan Ch’a’e remarks that the mask dance club members were central figures in the *Munhwa Undong*. Ch’a’e goes on to say that a fundamental ideology of students’ Cultural Movement coincided with the
mask dance because mask dances in the 19th-century occurred on the ground which was a living foundation of the lower classes (169). It not only depicted the common people’s productive activities in their everyday lives, but also articulated a combative attitude toward the tyranny of the ruling classes (169). For the 1970s club members, mask dance performances became way to harness political dissent and make it into a community-focused activity that concentrated on collectively criticizing institutionalized injustices.

I ask what characteristics of the traditional mask dance resonated with students interested in minjung as a form of political action. Hui-Wan Ch’ae, in his article “Preliminary Investigation into the People's Aesthetic Consciousness of the Traditional Korean Mask Dance Drama” (2009), explores some of these possible empowering features. The t’alch’um was historically part of patrimonial folk events in which Jipdanseong (collectivity) and Yeonhuiseong (playfulness) were central (1035). Scholar Nam-Hee Lee also mentions that the t’alch’um showed a festive entertaining propensity in which large groups of subjugated people created collective moments for voicing their agonies and concerns (N.-H. Lee 194). Lee points out that “the drama’s integrity did not depend on the linear development of a plot” (194). That is, the mask dance’s construction did not follow the Western narrative form. Rather, each scene delivered an impromptu speech about performing situations, and performers acted improvised based on the narrator’s accounts of the respective scene’s actions. Spectators were free to come and go during a performance, and they could even join in the middle of the performance. They did not need to be well-acquainted with the story of the previous scene, and they merely needed to follow what they were currently seeing. In this regard, both performers and
spectators in the t’alch’um approached their excitement – Yeonhuiseong (playfulness) – in an atmosphere of freedom.

As both performers and spectators participated in the t’alch’um, they formed their community in which they provisionally demolished oppressive social norms. Folklorist Jae-Hae Lim remarks that the t’alch’um was an outlet for Jipdanjeok Sinmyeongpuri (collective and enthusiastic spirit) through which participants explored social complications and revealed their victimized soul (J.-H. Lim, "New Understanding of Tradition and Beauty of Korean Mask Dance" 378). Here, Lim refers to both performers and spectators. Lim mentions that an important feature of the mask dance was the absence of a border between the participants (380). Lim suggests that spectators spontaneously participated in dance scenes of the mask dance as well as designated performers. They, as spectators and performers, then, enjoyed the mask dance in ways that allowed them as subjugated classes a critical and collective voice. Lim calls this participatory feature Daedong ui Mihak (aesthetic of solidarity) or Gongyu ui Mihak (aesthetic of sharing) (380).

These two features – collectivity and playfulness – in the t’alch’um invited the participants to rally around the idea of strengthening the humble classes. Student members in the 1970s university mask dance clubs were drawn to this kind of participation and critique and became convinced that the mask dance could become the root of “Koreanness” for those who were socio-politically and economically subjugated to the military regime’s policies. Through performing the mask dance, the club members wanted to not only highlight the importance of community solidarity, but also ascertain
possibilities to produce struggle-focused consciousness (J.-H. Kim, "To Set Direction Establishment of University Cultural Group's Activities" 213). These ideological similarities between the old mask dance concept and students’ concerns about minjung spirit prompted the 1970s university students to be interested in the mask dance and to integrate it to their Madangŭk Undong.

**Practical Impacts of Madangŭk on National Identity and Subjectivity**

Madangŭk activists began engaging in the Madangŭk Undong from the mid-1970s through the 1980s. Through the madangŭk, they tried to fill the gap between the past and present, which resulted from events like Japanese colonialism and the Korean War (Ch’ae, "The Cultural Movement in the 1970s" 174). For the performing activists, the madangŭk was much more than taking actions for historical continuity. Scholar Jin-Taek Lim, Ji-Chang Jeong, and Jeong-Seok Lee argues that the activists were certain that the madangŭk formed a channel, for spreading the possibility of revolutionary transformation of public perception regarding to the two autocracies’ strict and undemocratic politics. This change in perception of the people led a minjung-centered identity and subjectivity in public mind.

The performing activists projected minjung’s national identity and subjectivity over the madangŭk. National identity and subjectivity the madangŭk activists were seeking was a bottom-up model driven by the awareness of the common people, called minjung uisik. The performing activists often asked themselves; am I a minjung?; and how do we [madangŭk leaders] live well together with the minjung? ("Interview
Transcript," n.p.). Such questions demonstrate that madanggŭk activities, as the Munhwa Undong (Cultural Movement), resulted from the performing participants’ concern for minjung and their lives. The madanggŭk performers regarded the common people as the national hub and their attempt to comprehend the people’s perceptions of real-life problems aligned with directions pursued in the student movements, known as the Minjung Undong.

Student Activists and Elitism

According to In-Suk Kwon, who was a member of the SNU theater club, in a 2012 interview, “I worked in many factories [in the 1980s], about seven or eight, but I had to quit soon because I worked only for school vacation or I was fired by employers….I was employed under false pretenses….A lot of student activists tried to work at factories” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). As Kwon noted, many student activists, including madanggŭk performers, jumped into the workforce in order to directly experience minjung’s fatiguing lives and generate a collective sense of common ground with the people.

In “The Current Stage of Intellectuals’ Cultural Movement” (1986), and writing about Korea, Hyeon-Woo Park defines “elites” as people who are university-educated, and he points out that these elites are not considered the same as the working classes that contribute to economic productions in industrial areas. Rather, they can be seen as a group that participates in occupations that perform political and ideological functions (193). To be a member of the elite, an individual needed to be a university graduate, but
not everyone could attain high-ranking positions after they graduated. Only a few educated people could take powerful positions in the nation. A large number of university graduates pursued white-collar occupations rather than blue-collar jobs in South Korea during the 1970s and the 1980s (194; 195). These white-collar works had a high probability of being placed in situations where they could interact with both high- and low-ranking groups. Park argues that this in-between group of white-collar, college-educated workers was a kind of petite bourgeoisie. As defined by Karl Marx, the term “the petite bourgeoisie” refers to the semi-autonomous peasantry/farmers and small-scale merchants. Their ideological stances on politics and the economy are influenced by that of the high bourgeoisie. According to Park, the in-between group neutralized the polarization between the top and bottom groups and obtained mutual agreement from both groups on socio-political issues (193). Of course, university students cannot simply be equated to the university-educated elites because university students had yet to enter fully into the socio-economic system as part of the truly powerful elites or the petite bourgeois (J.-H. Kim 226). Rather, I want to voice how an elitist sensibility was circulated among university student activists, even though university students tried to distinguish themselves from the ideology of the elite.

The mediator role of the university-educated elites, as defined by Park, recalls the subject of Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s article “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1988). In her article, Spivak quotes Ranajit Guha’s words: “the making of the Indian nation and the development of nationalism are exclusively elite achievements” (Gayatri 283). In other words, colonialist elitism and bourgeois-nationalist elitism have dominated the
historiography of Indian nationalism. Based on this idea, Guha defines the social stratification of India during the British colonial period: 1) dominant foreign groups (elites), 2) dominant indigenous groups at the all-India level (elites), 3) dominant indigenous groups at the regional and local levels, and 4) the people who belong to subaltern classes (284). Guha considers the third group as an intermediary group between the two dominant elite groups and the subalterns. With support from Guha, Spivak points out that people in the third group are not homogeneous socially, economically, and ideologically. For example, even though some people are peasants, they are rich, while on the other hand, although some people possess land for farming, they are impoverished and no better off than the subaltern classes (284). Building on these heterogeneous examples, Spivak suggests the possibility of the existence of the “elite-subaltern” (285). People in the third group are socially similar to the subaltern groups because they do not usually have permission to speak for themselves about their own experiences, unlike the elite groups. However, some people who are economically affluent and whose ideological stance is affected by elite groups are able to occasionally take opportunities to speak out that are unavailable to subaltern groups (Knopf 49). While speaking out, members of the third group are no longer subalterns and instead become elite-subalterns that arbitrate between the governing elites (the first and second groups) and the “real” subalterns (the fourth group) who never speak out.

The social stratification of India during the British Raj (1858-1947) is not the same as that of South Korea in the 1970s through 1980s. Elites in colonial India included British colonizers and Indian intellectuals in the upper classes who had adjusted
themselves to colonial conditions. By contrast, Korean elites were determined by the standard of higher education. These well-educated people might remain in the middle class (petite bourgeoisies) but they also had the potential to climb to the high and middle socio-political and economic levels. However, there is a similarity in the range of the elite groups because both cases do not contain people with a low-level of education, like the poor workers of Korea, and the unskilled workers (sudras) and the subalterns (pariahs) of India. In both cases, members of the elite groups were completely separated from the common people who belonged to the uneducated lower strata.

On the surface, the university-educated people in Korea parallel the elite-subalterns in India because both groups, as in-between groups, spoke for and mediated relations between the top and bottom groups. Because the elite-subalterns of India branched off from the third group, including Indian local people or subalterns, they can be seen as people affiliated with non-elite groups. For this reason, their followers (the subalterns) would feel less at odds with their spokespeople (the elite-subalterns) in terms of at least class-consciousness. In contrast, members of the Korean mediating group were well-educated elites who belonged to petite bourgeois groups that reflected the ideological stances of the higher groups. That is, people playing a role of the intermediary in Korea occupy a higher social position than their followers (the low-income working classes). As long as this class differentiation between mediators (elites) and followers (low-income working classes) persisted, even when Korean elite leaders endeavored to speak out on behalf of their followers, their followers doubted that those remarks would address the exclusionary class hierarchy.
If this were the case, Korean university students would be relatively free from this concern because they could not be called petite bourgeoisies because they did not yet exert their influence on socio-economic activities, even though they had been considered as intellectual elites since the early twentieth century. According to In-Suk Kwon in a 2012 interview with me, university student activists at that time appreciated the petite bourgeoisies as the group that concentrated on satisfying their individual opinions and desires. For the activists who emphasized collective critical voices in student movements, expressions of individual desire in a group or society were disparate behaviors ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Student activists did not take steps to become the petite bourgeoisies and instead sought a way to integrate with low-income workers through direct participation in factory jobs.

The phenomenon of denying their status as petite bourgeoisies also occurred in the madanggŭk movement. Scholar Jin-Su Jeong points out that the main subjects for the madanggŭk were not a small number of intellectual elites, but the whole minjung because the main characters of the madanggŭk represented the common people and their lives (J.-S. Jeong, “Truth and Falsity of Minjungguk” 140). Another scholar, Jeong-Hyeon Kim, states that madanggŭk performers had to reject the tendency of class domination that was enmeshed in the elite ideology while intensifying direct participation in workers’ struggles (J.-H. Kim 227). These two scholars suggest that student performers overthrew their petite bourgeois ideological tendencies, sharing the madanggŭk with the common people in their workplaces. What is most interesting about these two scholars’ statements is that they both regard the madanggŭk as a “didactic” theatrical performance to give
minjung lessons about nationalistic-focused politics (J.-S. Jeong 140; Jeong-Hyeon Kim 227). Looking at it in another way, it becomes clear how madanggŭk performers regarded their leadership as an indispensable precondition for teaching common people, especially low-income factory workers, who were not spontaneously capable of having a sense of identity and critical consciousness. This is to say that student performers treated the workers as minjung who must be guided by the madanggŭk. Student performers, through the madanggŭk, continued to see themselves as leaders of minjung.

Scholar Jeong-Hyeon Kim indicates that a large number of student activists in the 1980s came from middle class families (227). In my view, however, Kim’s idea cannot be generalized to student activists’ family backgrounds in the 1980s. Based on magazine and newspaper reports, the middle class in 1960s South Korea was 20.5% of the whole population, and this figure doubled in two decades to 40.3% in the 1980s (Koreana: A Quarterly on Korean Culture & Art, n.p.). Korean parents from the 1970s to the 1980s tended to regard a university education as a shortcut to success. So, they began working to send their children to universities (Yeongnam Newspaper, n.p.). The parents’ generation, which had been born before the Korean War (1950-1953) and suffered war losses, tried to overcome problems of poverty in order to not leave their children in such poverty. No matter how rich or poor they were, many parents encouraged their children to enter universities. In this respect, it is impossible to conclude that most university students came from middle class families.

As journalist Dong-Hyeon Park points out, over half of factory workers, especially females, from the 1970s to the 1980s were less than 20 years old. Workers’
education level was also very low: over half of laborers had graduated from elementary school; 8% of them had graduated from middle school; only 3% had graduated from high school; and 20% of them were illiterate (D.-H. Park, *Briefing on Korean Policies*, n.p.). These statistics suggest that poor parents’ scanty livelihoods led them to push children out to work to supplement family income, instead of going to school. Thus, middle class parents were more likely to encourage their children to be university-educated than were poor parents. Nevertheless, I am not able to say that students from poor families did not enter universities. Another possibility existed from the 1970s to the 1980s. In a 2012 article from progressive newspaper *Radian*, journalist Han-Gi Woo writes that many university students privately tutored as a part-time job, and earned enough money to pay for university tuition and an inexpensive rented room. To become private tutors was a goal of intellectual students at that time who wanted to achieve financial independence (*Radian*, n.p.). This newspaper report suggests that in Korean society from the 1970s to the 1980s, parents’ economic capacity was not a deciding factor if students attended universities. If some students wanted to learn more in higher education, they could take an entrance examination and become part of the intellectual elite in the university system. Thus, universities in South Korea from the 1970s to the 1980s were not educational institutes for students who only came from petite bourgeois and middle class families.

In my view, student activists discerned universities as a pathway to better their socio-economical position and they admitted that they were in a better position than that of the low-income workers, called *minjung*. Thus, student activists’ elitist sense (elitism)
itself emerged while through their actions they tried to deny their differences from 

minjung.

Elitism, National Identity, and Subjectivity Circulated in Madanggûks

Student performers, as student activists in the Cultural Movement, did not give up their sense of elitism while still emphasizing national identity and subjectivity through the madanggûk. In a 2012 interview with me, scholar Hui-Wan Ch’ae noted that university students, including madanggûk performers, did not stress individual interests but instead focused on collective goals (Ch’ae, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Another interviewee, scholar, In-Suk Kwon, noted that university students had a strong aversion for individualism because they saw it as destructive a force as egoism and individual acts as based in petite bourgeoisie ideology. Instead, they began foregrounding group communalism, and students of the 1980s highlighted this group communalism more than students had in the 1970s. ⁴⁶

In my view, however, madanggûk performers contradicted themselves. They did not include “actual” minjung as “direct” and “main” participants in groups creating madanggûks even though they insisted that madanggûks were communal productions for the public, especially for low-income workers. In “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s,” Hui-Wan Ch’ae quotes several student performers who participated in madanggûk “Nobi Munseo” [Slaves Document], as members of mask dance club in Ewha Women’s University, in September 1979: “Gongdong Jakeop (collaborative work) means combining student participants’ opinions and setting directions of the madanggûks’
content based on those opinions” (Ch’ae, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). This quotation suggests that only university student performers discussed, directed, and created madanggūks. Here, student performers excluded minjung’s “actual” voices and opinions from madanggūks even though they regarded madanggūks as stories of minjung.

This paradoxical behavior of not listening to minjung recalls two leaders of English folk revivals in The Imagined Village: Culture, Ideology and the English Folk Revival (1993). Author Georgina Boyes concentrates on the English folk revival from the end of nineteen century to the early twentieth century by connecting class hierarchy and sociopolitical circumstances to method, process, and intention in the embodiment of folk dance and music. In dealing with class and gender issues, Boyes analyzes two prominent leaders, Cecil Sharp and Mary Neal. Building on this class differences between two leaders, Boyes simultaneously considers how they were influenced by sociopolitical and economic conditions. For instance, in order to deny the eroding authority of the upper and middle classes by industrialization, Sharp devoted himself to the revival of folk dance and music as a strategy to maintain the power of the upper and middle classes (Boyes 64; 66). Through promoting the folk revival by selecting folk songs and dances that reflected his position of privilege, Sharp collected and preserved past glories of the middle and upper classes. As opposed to Sharp, Mary Neal established a group to provide working girls with education and skills to better understand the folk dance and music revival emerging at the time in England. She expected that through joining the folk revival, female workers could recognize themselves as important members of society and as equal to people in the middle and upper classes. For Neal, the folk revival was a pathway to
initiate a reform, change existing class relations, and transmit folk culture by the folk themselves. Through these contrasts, Boyes points out the differing intentions and class prejudices involved in folk revivals.

Despite different scopes between English folk revivals and university students’ madanggûks, Boyes’s comparison of Sharp and Neal helps illuminate madanggûk performers’ paradoxical behavior of seeing themselves as leaders of the public while also seeing themselves as separate from minjung. Student performers created madanggûks to eliminate elitist privilege and build a collective engagement with minjung (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). However, student performers were outsiders, who lacked direct experience of the hardships of the minjung, yet they judged minjung’s issues.

Some might note that many students during the 1970s to the 1980s moved into industrial areas to experience the same conditions as factory workers and they served as staff members of various labor organizations to “educate workers about the need for trade unions” (N.-H. Lee 222). Yet, is it possible to say that university students as temporary workers and factory laborers were experiencing the same conditions? For instance, even though factory jobs had many disadvantages, average workers could not quit their jobs because their occupations were directly linked to their survival. By contrast, student workers could return to the title of university student whenever they wished. In a 2012 interview with me, In-Suk Kwon stated that she was suspended from her university in 1985 and was in prison for thirteen months after she took part in student movements. In 1993, she returned to school because universities began allowing students who had participated in student movements and were imprisoned, to return to school ("Interview
Transcript," n.p.). Many university-educated politicians in the 2010s had actively participated in students movements and were political prisoners when they were university students (Seung-Yeol Kim, *Weekly Kyunghyang*, n.p.). Examples such as these demonstrate how many university student activists regained opportunities to secure their previous positions even after they were branded as political offenders. Also, while dedicating themselves to fighting for improvement in working conditions through participation in labor organizations, student activists were still in a position to “offer” guidance to low-income workers (N.-H. Lee 222). In this respect, we need to carefully avoid mistaking the “actual” hardship of low-income workers as identical to the “temporary” experiences of student activists in industrial areas.

I argue that student performers’ decision-making and direction of productions without the direct involvement of the workers was an elitist way of thinking. *Madanggūks* created by students’ non-collaborative procedures could not be seen as vehicles to help *minjung* spontaneously hold a collective sense as a national identity.

Student performers continued to maintain that their *madanggūks* were supporting the common people, and *madanggūk* performers tried to foreground *Gongdong Soyu* (joint ownership) as much as *Gongdong Jakeop* (collaborative work). For student performers, the *madanggūk* was performed not on the commercial stage for people paying money for tickets, but on the accessible ground for people giving careful attention to critical voices raised in *madanggūks’* actions and dialogues. *Madanggūks’* open form was clearly inspired by the spaces where the *t’alch’um* had been performed for the lower classes in the 19th-century: yards with bare ground, which became pivotal spaces where
they met people in similar positions and chatted about their dissatisfaction at overly demanding jobs and discriminatory treatment by their masters. The t’alch’um attracted viewers and as completed by the lower classes’ spontaneous participation. Performing on the ground, madanggŭk activists, too, laid stress on the joint ownership. The unenclosed performing place of madanggŭk was open to anyone, especially potential spectators, minjung, to join the Cultural Movement along with student leaders.

Nam-Hee Lee argues that the “madanggŭk was not limited to university campuses” (N.-H. Lee 187). During the 1980s, student performers increasingly performed in places outside of university campuses such as factories, village squares, public halls, Protestant and Catholic churches, and outdoor markets. Student performers went wherever they were asked to perform in front of colleagues who agreed with their ideas and wherever they encountered minjung, especially workers. Of course, madanggŭk performers did not restrict who could be in their audiences. I could not find any evidential documents about minjung audiences in published books and articles. In my 2012-2013 interviews with Suk-Man Kim and Gi-Sung Nam, I found a tiny clue about spectators of madanggŭks. Sun-Man Kim, as a university student in the 1970s, noted that no one funded student performers, so they were not able to print many advertising posters for madanggŭks. They created a small quantity of posters by drawing them by hand. After Kim pointed this out, he rhetorically asked, “How many posters could we produce in such bad conditions?”…. [It was impossible to produce many quantities]….Audiences were mostly university students” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Kim’s statement suggests that madanggŭks may not have been well attended by the general public. Another
insight about the lack of *minjung* audiences comes from an interview with Gi-Sung Nam, who was a student performer in the 1980s:

I do not know whether or not the general audience watched our performances. I did not carefully see who the audiences were. Maybe mostly students….Um..It was a kind of university culture that firstly started in the 1970s. For example, if mask dance club members of Ewha Women’s University performed the traditional mask dance, students, who came from other colleges, visited the university in person and watched the performance. (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Nam’s statement about the 1980s shows parallels with the situation in the 1970s. Audiences of *madanggŭks* in the 1980s were, by and large, university students. This is not to suggest that *minjung* never took part in *madanggŭks*, but it is difficult to tell how often and in what numbers. Rather, I speculate that *Gongdong Soyu* (joint ownership) of *madanggŭks* reflected the elites’ utopian ideals rather than *minjung*’s ideals.

Some scholars like Jin-Taek Lim and Gi-Sung Nam argue that when some student performers “visited” agricultural and industrial areas to share *madanggŭks* with farming and factory workers, they “gave” those spectators opportunities to spontaneously ad-lib conversations and dance with performers (J.-T. Lim 83; Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). In that middle space student performers arranged, spectators’ reactions in *madanggŭks* enabled performers to feel the energy of the audiences, they argue. Through the impromptu and direct participation in performances, audiences learned methods for spontaneous participation and a sense of unity with performers, who came from outside of *minjung*’s life (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Student performers from the 1970s to the 1980s argued that these complex interactions in *madanggŭks* led
both performers and spectators to become not only the viewer but also the viewed. These interactions also let performers and audiences simultaneously view themselves as both subject and object. While hovering between these two visions, all participants generated communication spaces jointly owned by themselves and appreciated potential power to be gained from collectivity and autonomous participation. The student performers may have achieved their goals in such situations.

The madanggŭk activists’ ideas recall the theories of subjectivity discussed in Nick Mansfield’s analysis of the work of René Descartes and Immanuel Kant. Mansfield points out that while many theorists consider the Enlightenment a target of contemporary critical thought, “the self” remains an important issue for these thinkers. Some theorists in the 17th-18th century begin inquiring about the subject as a “free, autonomous and rational being (what we call the individual)” (Mansfield 13). According to Mansfield, in the famous formula, Cogito erogo sum (‘I think therefore I am’), Descartes regards the self as the base of all knowledge and experience in the world and emphasizes that the self is “conscious being,” so it exists (15). In a similar vein, Kant argues that a human being recognizes itself and this awareness leads the human being’s subjectivity (19). As in the notion from Descartes and Kant, madanggŭk performers believed that their spectators, minjung, were “self-cognitive” beings. With this premise, the performers theorized that if each minjung spectator spontaneously decided to participate in madanggŭks performed in a shared space, he/she would place himself/herself as a leading subject with his/her choice (J.-T. Lim, “For New Theater: Madanggŭk” 103).
However, did minjung indeed have a sense of the joint ownership and an individual right of spontaneous participation at the same time? Even though some spectators were directly brought onto the performing ground of each madanggûk, the number of them would be very limited because student performers could not invite all sitting audience members to become direct participants in their production. In this restrictive circumstance, how could student performers ensure that each minjung spectator was appreciating his/her voluntary right and even his/her subjectivity? In my view, madanggûk performers combined individual and collective subjectivities together. According to Korean scholar In-Bae Park, numerous spectators let out exclamations freely and together while watching madanggûks (“Prospects for Minjokguk Movement” 162). Another scholar Hui-Wan Ch’ae points out that student performers encouraged spectators to become excited by clapping their hands and following performers’ dance routines. The audiences’ reactions could cause collective excitement, and this excitement could be developed as a sense of “communal unity” (“The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 176). These two scholars’ statements suggest that madanggûk performers encouraged spectators to engage in their productions, but audiences’ reactions were more collective than individual.

Using concepts of Gongdong Soyu (joint ownership) and Gongdong Jakeop (collaborative work), university student performers from the 1970s to the 1980s tried to invite marginalized people, minjung, to madanggûks and encouraged the people to achieve collective integration that could help change the military government’s repressive policies (“Resistant Movement and Madanggûk in a Korean Society” 31). Whatever the
purposes of the student performers, madanggūks’ did not influence minjung in reality. This is because student performers created their productions while paying little attention to minjung’s participation and while taking it upon themselves to promote collective engagement as the basis of minjung’s identity and subjectivity. Madanggūk performers did not narrow the gap in participation between the elite and the low-income workers; it is hard to tell whether student performers shared a sense of national identity and subjectivity with minjung. The actions of student performers in madanggūks in this regard paralleled the paternalistic methods of the South Korean military government for wielding hegemonic power in socio-political, economic, and cultural contexts.
Endnotes

1 Minju Gukmindang (Democratic Nationalist Party), Minjudang (Democratic Party), Jayudang (Liberal Party), and Hanguk Doknipdang (Korean Resistance Party)

2 Student participants in the 1960s used non-Western theater forms, using masks and copying some movements of the mask dance.


4 This means that some performers held technical skill to play traditional instruments.


6 A quarterly literature magazine “Theatrical Arts Movements in the 1980s, Madanggŭk, Madanggut, and Minjokguk” (1990), and a book Korean Minjung Theater (1995)

7 In 1974, the Park regime put pressure on advertisers to cancel the whole of advertisements in the Dong-A Daily News. Against it, the press’s journalists produced all blank newspaper, and instead, they merely published words of encouragement from the public. However, a newspaper owner yielded to the regime’s threats and dismissed large numbers of journalists into a sit-in demonstration.

8 SNU juniors conducted the Jindonga Gut at SNU in April 1980. And the Sorigut Agu held the stage as the 10th commemorative performance at Aeogae Sogeukjang (Aeogae small theater) in May 1984, which was a hiding place for cultural movement activists during the 1980s.

9 In other words, even though the Jindonga Gut, the Sorigut Agu, and the Jinogui Gut occurred before the term madanggŭk was used, they were the early remnants of this political dance theater form, namely the outsets of madanggŭk.
Hui-Wan Ch’ae, as the first generation of the madanggŭk, actively participated in madanggŭks while he was in Seoul National University. After graduation, he continued to perform madanggŭks and teach school juniors the mask dance.

Gwangju and Mokpo both are included in Jeollanam-do province. However, Gwangju as a metropolitan city is bigger and more developed than Mokpo.

This work criticized a social problem during the Joseon Dynasty in the end of the nineteen century.


Noripae Gwangdae was established by Hyo-Seon Park in 1978. While Park was in the Chonnam National University in 1973, he participated in the mask dance and theater clubs. After graduation in 1979, Park launched Noripae Gwangdae to lead madanggŭk movement in Gwangju area.

Geukdan Gwangdae was different from Noripae Gwangdae even though they used the same group name and their area for activity was the same – Gwangju, Jeollanam-do province. People, who were members of the mask dance club in the Chosun University and of the theater club in the Chonnam National University, founded Geukdan Gwangdae on January 1980. This group turned out the first generation of madanggŭk in Gwangju, Jeollanam-do.

A coal miner Chang-Seon Yang was trapped by the collapse of the tunnel roof in 1967, but he was rescued in sixteen days. Naïve Yang became the center of attention through the mass media. As side effects of becoming famous, he turned away from the family and sought immediate gains by using his fame. After losing people’s interest in him, he went to wrack and ruin in the end.

Miyal is the same with old woman’s name in the Bongsan and Yangju Byulsandae mask dances.

Heungsadan is the Korean unification campaign headquarters in Seoul.
Koryo dynasty was from 918 to 1392. The dynasty was removed by the leader of Joseon dynasty.


21 The first *Minjokguk Hanmadang* (the Korea People’s Theater Festival) was held at the art theater Mirinae in Seoul from March 4 to April 30, 1988. This festival aimed to provide a venue for madanggŭks that were based on the characters of minjung (the common people) and Korean tradition. The festival is maintained up to now, and its headquarters is located in Jeju Island. This festival has been settled as a paragon of outdoor performing arts festival. This is an official website address: http://jejuhanmadang2013.tistory.com/

22 *Minjuhwa Undong Cheongnyeon Yeonhap* (Youth Union for Democratization Movement) was the semipublic group, but it did not foregather with all members. Instead, the union meetings were sub-divided by each grade in each university. This subdivided systematization helped the union overcome the Chun regime’s large-scale oppression on student protesters and be maintained until November 1992.

23 *Hanguk Nodongja Bokji Hyeopuihoe* (South Korean Worker Welfare Council), *Minjok Misul Hyeopuihoe* (National Art Council), *Minju Eonron Undong Hyeopuihoe* (Democratic Media Council), Hanguk Chulpan Undong (South Korean Publishing Movement), Minju Gyoyuk Undong Hyeopuihoe (Democratic Education Movement Council), and *Minjung Munwha Undong Hyeopuihoe* [Council for Cultural Movement]

24 *Hanguk Minjok Yesulin Danch’ae Chongyeonhaphoe* is currently operating. This organization establishes each branch office in 13 local areas and includes *Hanguk Minjokguk Undong Hyeopuihoe* (Korean Madanggŭk Movement Alliance). This is an official website: http://kpaf.kr/

25 Tae-Il Jeon was a factory worker and labor activist. In November 1970, he committed suicide by burning himself to death in protest of the poor working environments in South Korea’s factories. His death helped workers recognize the substandard labor conditions and form labor unions in each factory.
Performing places were the Chungang University, the Seoul National University, a catholic church in In-Cheon area, and the boundary line of Gwangwon-do.

After graduation from the Sogang University, Hwa-Jin Jeong not only participated in teaching factory workers at a night school, but also worked on the lathe in In-Cheon. Working at the factory, Jeong published Soetmulcheoreom [Like Rusty Water] in 1987. Jeong’s novel is well known as one of labor literatures.

In 1986, people, who had participated in university theater and mask dance clubs, organized Geukdan Cheonjiyeon. The group was progressive and focused on the isolated people’s lives in their performances.

In-Bae Park is a madanggûk dramatist and director. When Park was in the Seoul National University, he participated in various madanggûk performances such as “Jindonga Gu” and “Nokdo Kkot.”

Since the publication of No-Hae Park’s poem, the poem was already well-known to university students and workers. Some students influenced by the poem quitted schools and ran into the workforce to directly experience laborers’ difficulties.


Ji-Chang Jeong is a retired professor in German Language and Literature program at the Yeungnam University, and he is currently a chairman of Hanguk Minjok Yesuliin Danch’ae Chongyeonhaphoe [The Korean People Artist Federation].

Minsokguk Yeonguhwei in the Ewha Women’s University, Minsok Munwha Yeonguhwei in the Sogang University, and T’alch’umban in the Yeonsei University

Initiating a mask dance club was extended in approximately 47 universities over a nation. Seoul and Gyanggi-do Area: Sungkyunkwan University in 1972, Korean University, Seoul in 1973, Kyunghee University and Chungang University in 1974, Hanshin University and Hanyang University in 1975, Industrial University, Sookmyung Women’s University and University of Foreign Languages in 1976, Kookmin University, Dongduk Women’s University, Seoul Women’s University and Ajou University in 1977.
Konkook University, Dongkook University, Sejong University, and Sungshin Women’s University, Inchon Educational University and Korea Aerospace University in 1978. Sangmyung Women’s University, Seoul Educational University, Inha University and Hongik University in 1979, Dankook University, Seoul and Duksung Women’s University in 1980, and Soongeui Women’s College in 1981.


Honam Area: Chonnam National University and Chonbuk National University in 1978.


Gangwon and Jeju Area: Gangwon National University, Kwandong University, and Jeju National University had each mask dance club.

35 A gong, a drum, a double-headed drum, and bamboo flute.

36 Yeongno wanted to be a dragon, but it could not. It became a monstrous creature in the end and bothered living people.

37 All thirteen t’alch’ums involved an old married couple’s story that covered laughter and crying. An old woman lives a hard life alone because her husband elopes with his young mistress. Soon after, her husband turns to home, but with a young mistress. The old woman is not angry with her husband for consorting with a mistress. Instead, she expresses her delight in seeing her husband again. The old married couple lustfully demonstrates a figure of sexual intercourse. However, the husband begins to compare his wife with his young mistress, and then scolds his wife for her incompetence in producing a son. Because of a responsibility to lose her child in an earlier time, the old woman endures husband’s blame and is finally beaten to death by her husband.

38 Seoul National University

39 According to Allison Smith, “Virginia is a state that prides itself not only on its history of battle, but also on its ongoing battle with history in a lively culture of reenactment” (Schneider 19).
Here the circle was another name of a university club.

Nak-Cheong Baek, Hyeon Kim, Byeong-Ik Kim, Ju-Yeon Kim, and Chi-Su Kim

Changbi’s full name is Changjak Gwa Bipyeong (Creation and Criticism), and Moonji’s one is Moonhak Gwa Jiseong (Literature and Intelligence). According to a newspaper report in the Kyunghyang Shinmun, Changbi specifically published national literature and supported chamyeo munhak (engagement literature: the literature perused by minjung, including workers, namely the literature opened for below (H-J. Kim 176)). In contrast, Moonji published pure literature, but aimed to popularize it (W.-S. Jeong, the Kyungshyang Shinmun, n.p.). Moonji was on an apparently different line from Changbi. Yet, it attempted to change the established image of literature that was known, until the 1960s, as the exclusive activity only for a few elite people (J.-S. Lee 214).

A representative work of this literature is laborer and labor agitator No-Hae Park’s book of poetry, “The Dawn of Labor.”

Yun Oh graduated from SNU in 1970 and became a symbolic presence in the minjung misul in the 1980s. Seong-Dam Hong graduated from a university in 1979. Bong-Jun Kim did not major in fine art in a university, yet he participated in a mask dance club and began engraving after graduation in 1980s.

Examples are Oh’s Gwangju Owel Hangjangdo [Uprising in May at Gwangju] and Hong’s Mudeungsan Hamangohaewonsin Simingun [Citizen Militia in Mudeung mountain].

To pursue group activities, student activists joined in student movements and madanggûks together (Kwon, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Both interviewees state that student activists’ preference for group communalism was a result of the rejection of the individualism inherent in petite bourgeoisie ideology. Taking part in movements together, student activists aimed to encourage a sense of collectivity in the public that could help achieve democratization with free speech, press, and elections.

Madanggûk activities especially epitomized group communalism among student performers, as In-Suk Kwon notes ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Because the madanggûk was based on the well-known traditional group activity, “t’alch’um,” for and by the lower
classes, student performers regarded the madanggŭk as the performing arts for the minjung (Ch’ae, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). For example, like 19th-century t’alch’ums portrayed communal problems of the lower classes such as class and gender hierarchies. Student performers from the 1970s to the 1980s grafted low-income workers’ harsh lives under the socio-political and economic policies of the dictatorship onto their madanggŭks (J.-T. Lim, Creativity of Popular Entertainment: Jin-Taek Lim’s Review Book 30). To show the minjung’s difficulties as public problems and to seek solutions communally, student performers gathered together and produced madanggŭks as a group (30). In a 2013 interview with me, Gi-Sung Nam noted that performance participants mostly created productions together (Nam, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Much like anonymous people from the lower classes in 19th-century created t’alch’ums together, university student performers pursued Gongdong Changjak (collaborative creation) in madanggŭks (Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 187; J.-T. Lim, Creativity of Popular Entertainment: Jin-Taek Lim’s Review Book 30). In this respect, many scholars like Jin-Taek Lim, Hui-Wan Ch’ae, Ji-Chang Jeong, and In-Bae Park argue that university student performers utilized madanggŭks to serve as a vital method to communicate with the minjung by focusing on issues related to the minjung. As the result of group collaboration, madanggŭks helped the minjung foster communal spirit as the core of national identity (J.-T. Lim, “For New Theater: Madanggŭk” 102; Ch’ae, “The Cultural Movement in the 1970s” 187; J.-C. Jeong, “Resistant Movement and Madanggŭk in a Korean Society” 29; I.-B. Park 153).
CHAPTER 4
GENDER BINARY IN T’ALCH’UM AND MADANGGŬK

This chapter’s fundamental premise is that hierarchical relationships between men and women, which were deeply rooted in 19th-century Korean Confucianism, are manifested in the t’alch’um’s reconstitutions by both Korean government and university student activists. While paying attention to these two different reconstitutions – the mask dance under the cultural heritage protection system and the madanggŭk in the cultural movement – from the 1960s to the 1980s, I detect the family-oriented structures that appear in plots of t’alch’um reconstitutions as well as in some relationships between men and women in performing groups. In Chapter 1, I sketched an account of Korean Confucianism. I also briefly explored how the family-oriented structures, as vestiges of Confucian patriarchy, have been deeply rooted in social and cultural conventions in South Korean family and educational institutions and workplaces since the 1950s. The androcentrism persisting in these institutional conventions encouraged the 20th-century public to adhere to traditional patriarchal systems and reconfirm the sexual division of labor in social and domestic spaces. I propose that the family-oriented structures affected by the gender binary of Confucian patriarchy can be found in the t’alch’um’s reconstitutions and that they play instrumental roles in preserving Korean traditional performing arts and establishing national identity. Using critical feminist theories, I examine how male-centric narratives in the mask dance’s reconstitutions portray women as dependent beings who are isolated from social activities outside the home and depicted as sexual objects in male characters’ perspectives. I also scrutinize how women,
especially females in performing groups of the mask dance and madanggük, were still tied to traditional feminine support roles when they collaborated with male participants. While analyzing these subjects, I utilize terms like “androcentric,” “male-centric,” “male-centered,” and “male-dominated” without distinction of meaning.

**Scholarly Discourses about Sexuality and Gender in Embodiments of T’alch’um**

When Korean feminists after the late 1980s began addressing women’s problems in South Korean society, some cultural scholars and folklorists started examining the i’alch’um’s discourses with regard to sexuality and gender. All thirteen mask dances plots call for both male and female characters. These characters’ erotic expressions and dialogues about sexual intercourse satirically depicted Confucian patriarchy and male-centered perspectives. Scholars like Jae-Hae Lim, Gi-Sung Nam, Yong-Ho Heo, and Jae-Oh Son became increasingly curious about the connotations of these sexual aspects of the mask dance.

In a 1993 journal article, “Folk Cognition and Revolutionary Features of “Sex” Expressed in the Korean Traditional Mask Play,” folklorist Jae-Hae Lim categorizes meanings of erotic expressions in three mask dances – Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandaes, and Hahoe Byulsingut. Lim considers that “sex” is humankind’s lifestyle. Through acts related to sex, people in the nineteenth century were able to feel liberty and equality about human love (Lim, "Folk Cognition and Revolutionary Features of "Sex" Expressed in the Korean Traditional Mask Play” 38). This is to say that because all people instinctuall
identify with the higher classes at least in terms of sexual desire. From Lim’s perspective, lower class people’s sexual desires were able to be expressed through the performance and characters of the mask dance. However, 19th-century Korea’s institutions were based on Confucianism. Confucian ideology morally precluded people from openly expressing their interests in sex because sex was regarded as something embarrassing that should be hidden (40). Under these circumstances, erotic expressions in the t’alch’um did not conform to conventional Confucian philosophy.

According to Gi-Sung Nam in “On the Sexual Expression of T’alch’um: Focusing on the Function of “Tal,” a Mask,” one reason for the development of explicit sexual expressions in the t’alch’um was masks’ concealment of performers’ identities (101). Wearing a mask, performers gained the freedom from social and ideological regulations (106). That is, wearing masks let the performers momentarily enter into an intersection between reality and imagination, something like what Victor Turner terms “liminality.” While covering their faces and acting as characters in the mask dance, the performers did not need to feel a sense of shame for depicting erotic acts. When spectators watched performers’ sexual expressions, they did not need to feel disgrace when gazing at the mask dance. Nam argues that masks are imperative devices that freed both performers and audiences from social norms and induced them to express latent but instinctive desire for physical pleasure (106).

Unlike Nam, Lim does not point out the mask as a useful device to “cover” inner desires. Yet, he argues in a similar vein that sexual expressions in the mask dance served as important mediums of expression for people. Even though the higher classes
dominated in reality, the mask dances demonstrated that everyone aspired toward sex no matter what social rank. The humble classes could locate themselves, but only temporarily, in a category of equal human beings through observing the explicit sexual scenes in the mask dance (Lim, "Folk Cognition and Revolutionary Features of "Sex" Expressed in the Korean Traditional Mask Play" 49).

For example, the lower classes recognized that they had an equal ability to give birth to offspring like the upper classes (55). The humble classes’ reproductive potential and their strong will to leave and care for offspring suggested a hope to survive in spite of social pressures. Also, the lower classes directly connected their energetic ability to give birth to the possibility of a good harvest. These conditions are fundamental pictures of minjung’s (common people’s) lives according to Dong-Il Cho (History and Principle of T’alch’um 196). In this respect, sexual acts between male and female characters in the mask dance functioned as positive signals for bright future of the lower classes suffering social inhibition. Simultaneously, sexual expressions criticized the high classes’ depraved behaviors. At the moment of perceiving sexual desire as equal for everyone, the humble classes could temporarily feel that the social class hierarchy was unimportant, and that this hierarchy was not related to satisfying sexual desires (Lim, "Folk Cognition and Revolutionary Features of "Sex" Expressed in the Korean Traditional Mask Play" 57). These sexual expressions mocked the upper classes’ empty formalities and vanities that gave undue value to personal prestige. Hence, Lim focuses on functions of sexual expressions by which people cognitively subvert class hierarchy, not gender hierarchy.
Scholar Yong-Ho Heo pays attention to female characters of the *Bongsan* mask dance in “Women in Bongsan Mask Dance: Male-centric Notions Addressed through Symmetric Female Characters” (1997). Heo examines how androcentric points of view are revealed in the mask dance through his comparison of symmetrical female characters. He focuses on the ways they appear and exit, active or passive reactions, and beautiful or ugly appearance. For example, Heo analyzes four female characters in the *Bongsan* – Sangjwa (young female monk) in act 1, Sadang (young woman) in act 3, and Miyal (old wife) and Deolmeorijip (old husband’s young concubine) in act 7. To analyze these female characters, Heo takes as his basis stage directions of the 1957 script that folklorist Seok-Jae Lim recorded by direct observation. The first act, “Sasangjwa-chum,” is a ceremonial opening dance. Four young female monks appear and pray not only that the performance goes well, but also that spectators live in peace and good health. To enter into the performance space, the four female monks are carried one by one by Mokjung (male monk). In act 3, another female character, Sadang, emerges riding on the back of Kosa, a male character. Act 7, “Miyal Halmi Yeonggam-chum,” includes two female characters Deolmeorijip and Miyal, along with an old man. Like the four monks and Sadang, the old man forces Deolmeorijip into the performance and into an intimate relationship with him. Heo points out here that these female characters do not step up to the stage by themselves. That is, their method of appearing on the performance space is passive. In contrast, Miyal frivolously and noisily appears by herself. Heo detects polarity – active and passive entering – among female characters in the mask dance.
Heo argues that the female characters’ appearance reveals another symmetrical characteristic. Sadang and Deolmeorijip, who passively enter, are depicted as beautiful women because their masks have white skin color, red lips, a sharp nose, and a small mouth. On the other hand, Miyal, who actively enters, wears shabby attire and has an ugly face. The mask dance even contains a scene in which the old husband laughs at her ugly face. Heo also relates the females’ contrasting looks to their actions. Sadang and Deolmeorijip keep silent and respond to male characters only with coy and coquettish movements. By contrast, ugly Miyal is talkative and aggressive, so she overwhelms her husband with words in the scene.

Through analysis of these symmetrical characteristics, Heo argues that during the evolution of the plot, male characters clearly favor passive, beautiful, and silent female characters and devote themselves to seducing such women (Y.-H. Heo 525). The male characters merely employ these females as objects for attention and consideration (526). However, the male characters do not treat well Miyal (528). In fact, she is beaten to death at the end of story. Her passive death and the males’ poor treatment of her reveal that men who conform to patriarchal ideologies view active and talkative women as ugly and undesirable. What is most interesting in Heo’s analyses is that when the passive, beautiful, and silent female characters exit the performance space, they leave alone. The male characters do not care if the females leave the stage at the end. According to Heo, the females’ exits go unobserved because the male characters treat the females as “erotic objects” (530). Passive and beautiful female characters are no more than the males’ mistresses and concubines who are sexually harassed (530). The females’ fates are not
important factors in unfolding the male-centered stories. In this regard, Heo argues that females’ images in the mask dance are depicted from a male-centered angle, and they become the “male fantasy of the dream-woman as dumb” (532).

In addition to the analyses of Lim and Heo, Tae-Hyo Kwon and Jin-Shil Sa take on some sexual issues in journal articles published in 2001 and 2008, respectively. Kwon concentrates on analyzing the relations between types of masks and personalities of characters. For instance, Chwibari is a young servant in act 4, “Nojang-chum” (an old monk’s dance), of the Bongsan mask dance, and plays an important role in harshly criticizing the depraved old monk. Chwibari’s forehead on the mask is deeply furrowed and has several large gold dots in a row in the middle. Kwon examines the mask’s shape to point out that the forehead furrows and dots not only are reminiscent of male sex organs, phallus, but also symbolize Chwibari’s strong virility (T.-H. Kwon 60). Sa does not explore the shapes of the characters’ masks. Rather, she focuses on the factors that elicit laughs from audiences in the Bongsan. She considers erotic caress and seductive actions as important elements to create laughter, giving examples such as an old monk’s sexual harassment of Somu (young woman) in act 4 of the Bongsan and a funny depiction of sexual intercourse between an old couple (Miyal and her husband) in act 7 (Sa 199; 205).

Jae-Oh Son states that characters’ dialogue about sex and sexual behaviors functions as important elements to create laughter both in the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance and the madanggūk like “Ileoseoneun Saramdeul” [People Who Stood Up] (1988) in his master’s thesis.¹ This consideration comprises a very small part of his
analysis. Outside of Son’s work, discussions of sexual expressions in the madanggŭk are rare.

After Lim and Heo in the 1990s opened a discourse about sexuality through analyzing a few t’alch’ums, Kwon, Sa, and Son followed this train of thought during the 2000s. These scholars do not apply any feminist theories to their arguments; rather they scrutinize how class differences and discrimination are overcome through erotic relationships between male and female characters. They do not investigate the root cause of why male characters are so absorbed in erotic relationships with female characters and why female characters’ destinies are determined by male characters. I argue that the fundamental cause is that storylines of the mask dance and madanggŭk build on gender binary and hierarchy in patriarchal relationships that are consolidated under Confucian family structures.

GENDER BINARY AND HIERARCHY ARE MANIFESTED IN STORIES OF T’ALCH’UM AND MADANGGŬK

While the scholars discussed above address some dialogues between male and female characters when they analyze sexual behaviors in a few scenes, they do not describe the whole story of each scene on which they focus. In most mask dance, one act is equal to one scene, but in the Yangju Byulsandae and the Bongsan mask dances, one act can contain several stories; each story is a separated scene with different characters. To give general readers a better understanding of what sexual expressions are projected onto female characters in the Korean mask dance, I briefly explain acts or scenes’ full
story to prepare my analyses of gender binary and hierarchy. I want to note that storylines in the following paragraphs are selected from written scripts of Du-Hyeon Lee, which were recorded from the end of the 1950s to the 1960s. For the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, I utilize the script that the preservation society published in 2007. The mask dance does not consist of a single story but several independent acts. Each act displays a different and unrelated story and female characters do not appear in all acts. Thus, I choose specific acts from three t’alch’ums and focus on the particular scenes in which female characters appear and are involved in erotic relationships with male characters.  

**T’alch’ums’ Scenes with Appearance of Female Characters**

The Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandae, and Hahoe Byulsingut mask dances commonly include two acts about an old monk and an old couple. The old monk act condemns a depraved Buddhist monk while the old couple act problematizes the husband’s unfair violence towards his wife. These acts in four t’alch’ums follow a similar format to criticize certain people, especially male characters, and their behaviors in relation to women. However, characters’ names and development of detailed content in each mask dance are not exactly the same across the versions.

**Stories of Old Monk Act**

The old monk act of the Bongsan consists of three scenes: “Nojang-chum” (old monk’s dance), “Sinjangsu-chum” (shoe-seller’s dance), and “Chwibari-chum” (old bachelor’s dance) (Lee, Du-Hyeon 306-314). In the first scene, eight Sangjwas – monks
who are first in line to succeed their master – and their master Nojang – an old monk – appear as the scene starts. While Nojang stands by the side, the eight monks start looking for Nojang. After finding Nojang, they sing a couple of taryeong, traditional Korean ballads, for him. However, they see the old monk lying on the ground as if dead. They begin chanting a Buddhist prayer for the rehabilitation of their master, and Nojang eventually rises from the dead. The eight monks exit and then return to the stage, carrying the young woman Somu on an open palanquin. They leave again with the chair after setting down the female character. After the monks’ exit, Somu and Nojang start dancing. There is no dialogue between these two people. They just express their intentions through dances and actions. They keep dancing to seduce each other, but Somu plays hard to get. Somu receives a Buddhist rosary from Nojang and succumbs to his temptation.

The main characters in the second scene are Nojang, Somu, Sinjangsu, and a monkey. To purchase shoes for Somu, the old monk dickers with a shoe-seller. The monkey suddenly appears and imitates Sinjangsu’s behaviors. The seller demands that the monkey get the money for the shoes from Nojang. The monkey goes behind Somu and then simulates having sexual intercourse with her. Seeing the monkey’s lascivious behavior with Somu, the seller scolds the monkey for fooling around with a woman and not getting money from the monk. The seller puts the monkey face down and then simulates having sexual intercourse with the monkey. While the seller and monkey exit, Nojang and Somu dance together. With the arrival of Chwibari, the last scene begins. Chwibari reproaches Nojang for the corrupt relationship with Somu. He challenges the old monk to a dance competition in order to take Somu. The old monk loses the
competition and Chwibari kicks him out of the stage. Chwibari wins Somu’s favor with money, and then they dance together. He pretends to reach under her skirt and pull her hair. Somu starts having stomach trouble and eventually gives birth to a baby boy. Chwibari names his son Madang and teaches the child the cheonjamun, the Thousand-Character Classic, or Chinese characters. He then dances away, carrying his son.

Like the Bongsan, the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance is composed of three scenes (Lee, Du-Hyeon 260-265). The first scene is about Nojang, Somu, and Sangjwas. In contrast to the previous example, two Somus and four Sangjwas appear in this scene. In addition to them, new male characters Wanbo and Om take part in this scene. They both are monks, yet Om’s appearance looks peculiar because of a rash on his face. Nojang, Sangjwas, Om, and Wanbo enter the stage together. Wanbo first starts talking by mocking Om’s odd looks. Wanbo, Om, and Sangjwas sing taryeong (traditional Korean ballad) for the old monk and then exit together. After the monks’ exit, Nojang and two Somus dance for a while and then leave together. The second and third scenes are almost similar to those of the Bongsan mask dance. The same characters appear: Nojang, shoes-seller, monkey and two Somus in the second scene; and Chwibari, Nojang and Somu in the third scene. Conflicts in the content of the two scenes also develop similarly.

The Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance’s old monk act consists of one scene (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 27-35). This act also includes new characters such as Jung (old monk), Bune (yangban’s or high-class person’s concubine), Choraengi (yangban’s servant), and Imae (classical scholar’s servant). There are not scenes about Sangjwas and a shoes-seller. Instead, the act directly addresses the corrupted relationship
between Jung and Bune. Right after their entrance, Bune finds a spot to urinate while the monk walks around in a pompous manner. The monk sees her urinating and then runs to the spot to smell her urine on the ground. Bune’s sexualized behavior arouses Jung’s sexual desire even though sexual relationships of any kind are taboo for Buddhist monks. Bune does not utter a word and just continues to exaggerate her come-hither look, and arm and hip gestures toward the monk. The monk ultimately succumbs to lustful Bune’s temptation. While they dance together, Choraengi and Imae appear and laugh at the unusual sight of a monk dancing with a secular woman. Ashamed at being caught, Jung and Bune disappear from the stage. After their exit, Choraengi and Imae mock them for a while, imitating their dances. The act finishes with the Imae’s exit, while Choraengi stays for the next scene.

**Stories of Old Couple**

Both the *Bongsan* and *Yangju Byulsandaes* mask dances place an old couple story as the last act. They are act 7, “Miyal Halmi Yeonggam-chum,” and act 8, “Sinhalabeoji wa Miyal Halmi.” In the *Bongsan*, this scene begins with dialogue between a musician and an old woman, called Miyal (Lee, Du-Hyeon 319-324). As a narrator, the musician asks Miyal about personal matters: where she comes from and why she currently lives alone without her husband. Through these questions, the narrator induces the old woman to describe the hardships she has been through. When the narrator calls for Yeonggam (old man and Miyal’s husband), Miyal leaves the stage. The narrator talks with Yeonggam for a moment and then calls Miyal back to throw them together. In fact, Miyal
had not expected her husband’s return home, since she had concluded that her husband is either with his mistress or had already died. When meeting Yeonggam again, she is not angry with him for consorting with a young concubine, named Deolmeorijip. Instead, she expresses her delight in seeing her husband again. The old married couple lustfully simulates sexual intercourse. However, Yeonggam compares his wife unfavorably with Deolmeorijip and then scolds her failure to produce a son. In the end, the husband finally beats Miyal to death. Yeonggam sexually flirts with his concubine, and they exit together.

The old couple in the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance develops a different story (Lee, Du-Hyeon 270-274). Yeonggam is re-named Sinhalabeoji (Sinhalabeoji also means an old man). Instead of a young concubine, the old couple’s son and daughter – Dokki and Nui (sister) – emerge with the old couple. These four characters open the act together, but the old woman dies right after the opening song. Sinhalabeoji does not notice his wife’s death and begins searching for her. While looking for her, the old man meets Dokki. They grieve together over Miyal’s death and then the conversation turns to another subject, Nui. Dokki seeks his sister, who has lived alone, without a husband, for three years. Dokki eventually finds his sister and notifies her of their mother’s death. After recognizing the absence of his brother-in-law, Dokki jokes he should “take care” (e.g. have sex) with Nui, but she grumbles at his joke. They go to the parents’ house to see dead Miyal. Dokki, who hears his sister, answers readily that Nui’s bottom (or, sexual organ) is still alive even though she has been alone for a while without her husband. He then suggests that the father have sex with Nui if he wants. Sinhalabeoji blames his son
and tells his daughter to stay away from Dokki. These three finish the act, holding a
funeral for Miyal.

The Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance does not contain an old couple act, but instead
features an old widow act, known as “Halmi madang” (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation
Society 24; 25; 26). This act’s main character is an old widow, and this scene moves
forward by dialogue between Halmi and a narrator who stays on the stage as a musician.
The sole character, Halmi, grumbles about how poor she is and how hard it is living with
her in-laws. From her complaints, audiences learn that she was widowed just three days
after her wedding. After dialogue with the narrator, the old widow approaches spectators
to beg for coins and then leaves the stage while dancing.

Women and Determinative Gender Role in Confucian Patriarchy

The old monk and old couple acts from three t’alch’ums show the manner by
which male and female characters in those acts are depicted within family-centered
structures. These structures highlight Korean Confucian patriarchal conditions such as a
conjugal relationship between a man and woman, toleration of concubinage, and
woman’s work limited within domestic spaces (woman’s procreative capacity and
responsibility for child rearing).

In “Introduction” to Melodrama and Asian Cinema (1993), Wimal Dissanayake
mentions three important aspects of Western melodramas in relation to film studies from
the 1980s to the 1990s. First, melodramas tend to highlight women’s emotions and
activities, so they compose certain moments where female characters’ consciousness is
developed. Second, melodramas are antirealistic because they move forward characters’ strong action, emotional intensities, and rhetorical excesses. Third, melodramas elucidate various cultural structures. Dissanayake especially pays attention to the last aspect and gives a warning that characteristics of Western melodramas do not directly apply to melodramas in Asian cultures because melodramas are fundamentally based on Western myth, ritual, religious practices, and ceremonies (3). Dissanayake argues that discourses for Asian melodrama need to be separated from those of the Western melodrama. A conspicuous difference he points out is that the family figures prominently appear in both Western and Asian melodramas. However, family in Asian melodrama importantly functions as a unit, whereas individuals in the context of the family is central in Western melodrama (4). In other words, Western melodrama explores an individual self in relationship to family while Asian melodrama concentrates on family structure as more important than individual concerns.

I discover some similarities and differences between Korean mask dance and Western melodrama. Like Western melodrama, characters in the t’alch’um and the madanggŭk exaggerate their appearance and dialogues. For example, all characters in the mask dance wear masks, and these masks take quite strange shapes such as eyes, a mouth, a nose and furrows larger than the real size, a twisted mouth or nose, and asymmetrical eyes (Lim, Korean Folklore and Culture 102). These distortions on masks mingle with characters’ conversations. Employing heavy dialect, and abusive and sexually explicit language, characters make a caricature of main subject matters such as the monk’s depravity and the old husband’s affair (Jeon, Korean Mask Theater and Its Surrounding
These exaggerated mask appearances and dialogues align the *t'alch'um* with an antirealistic orientation, like Western melodrama. By contrast, some characters in *madanggūks* utilized masks in their performance, but masks were not required props. The exaggeration by masks’ twisted appearance does not apply to all *madanggūks*. Also, some *madanggūks* are based on non-fiction stories so they are not antirealistic (Lee, *Principles and Characteristics of Madanggūk* 50). In this respect, *madanggūks* seem not to have something in common with Western melodrama. Yet, the *madanggūk*’s manner of criticizing objects or incidents by exaggerating gestures and jokes is analogous to that of the mask dance (Son 25). In similar vein to Western melodrama, the exaggerated appearances, gestures, and words function as important devices to help the *t'alch'um* and *madanggūk* reach a climax.

Despite some similarities to Western melodrama, I discern that *t'alch'ums* and *madanggūks* do not completely accord with Western melodrama as a genre in similar vein to Dissanayake. Rather, I suggest that Asian melodrama’s family-centered characteristics resemble mask dances’ dramatic conflict structures in which female characters are restricted within patriarchal family orders. In the following section, I explore what Confucian patriarchal relationships are exposed in the old monk and couple acts. I also examine how these patriarchal relationships in the acts discriminate against female characters and in favor of male characters.
Female Characters Trapped in Patriarchal Relationships

To articulate Confucian patriarchal structure continued in the t’alch’um and madanggūk, I take inspiration from Judith Butler’s theory. In *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (2006), Butler criticizes the fundamental structure of 1980s North American feminist discourses because they reproduce an implicit gender hierarchy, namely the dialectic of master and slave. She indicates that while feminists continue to utilize gender binary frames, women are fixed as stable subjects in a gender category. She argues that gender has the possibility of changing by the “repeated stylization of the body” and a “set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame,” and she names gender “performative” (Butler 45).

Evelyn Nakano Glenn, a scholar of gender and women’s studies, criticizes the underlying trend that historians, funtionalists, and interactionists in the 1980s took toward gender relationships in society. In “Gender and the Family” (1987), Glenn points out that some scholars regard the family as the primary institution when scholars analyze gender relationships. The scholars assert that “the sexual division of labor, the regulation of sexuality, and the social construction and reproduction of gender are rooted” in the family (348). In opposition to this notion, Glenn argues that feminists need to take account of women’s experience to recognize gender in basic family structures instead of seeing women as integral to the family. That is, women have to be seen as “actors in a variety of settings” rather than in relation to the family (349).

Butler and Glenn seem to criticize scholars in different field. However, these two scholars both point out that discussions about gender in the 1980s were still confined to a
dichotomous way of thinking and that feminists still had not broken this mindset of gender binary. Background of these two scholars’ analyses is completely different from South Korean culture and situations, but the high value Koreans placed on family helps to promote male domination and female subordination. Hye-Suk Lee, Korean sociologist and women’s studies scholar, agrees with Butler’s idea and relates a dichotomous view of gender to Koreans’ marriage relationships. Lee points out gender binaries contribute to aggravating feminine stereotypes which lay undue emphasis upon women’s roles in the domestic sphere – a wife as a male breadwinner’s supporter and a mother as a person who provides childcare. Lee argues that gender binaries provide a foundation for strengthening Korean patriarchal family structures (H.-S. Lee, “Gender Identity and Feminism” 120).

The South Korean government had enforced *Hojuje* [戸主制] as the main family registry system from 1957 to 2008 (See Chapter 1). This system’s goal was to record all information concerning family members like birth, death, marriage, and divorce. Through this system, the government allowed only married men to have status as family heads and to set up a nuclear family away from their parents and grandparents. Since 2008, the government has allowed women to become house heads if necessary, but people have still tended to recognize that the patriarchal family structure is natural in Korea even though the registry system was already revoked. In this respect, South Korea institutionally conformed to the Korean Confucian patriarchal system which had emphasized conjugal relations, and sexual and familial division of labor, and drove women to become home laborers and peripheral persons in the male-centered family.
These situations demonstrate that even though Korean feminists began discussing women’s rights and social advance in the late 1980s, their activities did not make effective changes in a dichotomous view of gender and patriarchal family structures until the late 2000s. In my view, the old couple and old widow acts in the t’alch’um expose this typical discriminatory treatment that Korean women experienced in familial relationships with men.

“Halmi madang” in the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance revolves around old widow Halmi’s grumble about her misfortune. This act is somewhat short, yet demonstrates that woman’s life is tied to man’s fate. The old widow begins singing a song. I extract here some song lyrics from the preservation society’s playbook that has been utilized as a teaching material for bearers since 2007:

What happened when I had been married in only three days. If I had known I would be widowed at the age of 15, I would not have gotten married….I led a hard married life at my parents-in-law. I felt heavy with my ill-fated destiny….Ah~ah~-, please don’t ask about it. A pink skirt, which I wore at my wedding day, became a handkerchief to dry my tears, and a red skirt became a dishtowel. My husband’s family enslaved me who had been a third-generation only daughter…While living alone, the days go so quickly. (phew~) (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 25)

Through these lyrics, the female character shows spectators the epitome of women’s life under Confucian patriarchy. The old woman is already set up as a widow, and she comes to the stage by walking with hips swaying. In my view, the set-up of this character with the exaggerated movements makes the old woman look unusual. This funny and uncommon image insinuates that marital relations are normal and, on the other hand, the old woman is abnormal because she no longer belongs to the archetypal conjugal
relations. According to historian Kwang-Kyu Lee in “Confucian Tradition in the Contemporary Korean Family” (1998), the family under Confucian teaching functions as the basic unit in society, which demonstrates a view Evelyn Nakano Glenn critiques (K.-K. Lee 250). And the traditional Korean family is a typical patriarchy for which a heterosexual marriage is a precondition (252). In these situations, the old widow does not meet the fundamental requirements of the Confucian family structure. Her failure to satisfy the demands directly causes her lack of success in life. In other words, the female character judges herself in terms of her success or failure in marriage.

The old widow’s lyrics encourage audiences to imagine that the female character previously had been in a conjugal relationship. On the other hand, the old couple act of both the Bongsan and Yangju Byulsandae mask dances directly shows Confucian marital relationships through struggles between male and female characters. In the story of the Yangju Byulsandae, the old wife follows her husband to watch a performance that occurred in her village, but the husband discovers her soon. He looks at her in a disapproving glance and begins blaming her; “Honey, wife. Why do you chase me….Having a runny nose and carrying a cane, why do you follow me? However, why didn’t you have an improvised fire shovel and spoon?” (D.-H. Lee, Korean Mask-Dance Drama 271). Right after these lines, the old husband forces his wife to die, and then the old wife commits suicide without hesitation. The old husband’s speech does not use any abusive languages or actions against his wife. He just asks for her kitchen tools’ whereabouts. However, the next behavior of the old couple could be an important clue that the husband’s simple question circuitously condemns his wife for pushing aside her
responsibility for housework and, instead, playing outside. The wife is depicted as passive in fact that she meekly obeys her husband’s implied demand to kill herself. Her passive attitude suggests that the male character has decisive authority over his woman’s destiny, whereas the female character surrenders herself to fate determined by her man. Such situating of a wife and her destiny under her husband’s authority parallels a Confucian patriarchal structure in which a married woman belongs to her husband microscopically and the husband’s family macroscopically.

In Confucian philosophy, men are permitted to control their family members. Korean historian Kwang-Kyu Lee mentions three major rights of Korean fathers [men]; “representing the family in society, supervising family members, and controlling family property” (252). These three rights demonstrate that men’s specific status is a much greater and more important in Korean Confucian family structure. With regard to male prerogative in a conjugal relationship, while a husband with given rights becomes the number one person in the home, a wife is located as a secondary member. That is, a wife is defined as a person who must be commanded by her husband as a familial representative. In this logic, although the old wife in the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance dies by her own hand, her death cannot seem to be active. At that moment to decide to die, the old wife who has been attached to her husband does not have any authority to deny the familial representative’s demand. The old wife’s lack of resistance confirms her unequal status in the domestic sphere. In this regard, the old couple act articulates male and female hierarchy based on Confucian patriarchal structures.
It is important to consider why Korean women under Confucian patriarchy do not gain the authority men do. According to Chin-Myŏng Kim in *Korean Subculture* (2001), in the *Joseon* dynasty, “Confucian nation,” people used to think that a married daughter was no longer a member of their own family. After marriage, a woman was excluded from her family and was assigned to her husband’s family (198). Woman’s subjugation to her husband’s family line still continues in 2015. Even though *Hojuje* [戸主制], the main family registry system, was abrogated in 2008, a woman after marriage has to remove her name from the family register and instead re-register her name in a new family register under her husband’s name. In the new family register, a husband has preferential status as a family head unless the wife’s name is registered as a breadwinner. By contrast, a married man does not need to remove his name from the family register because he is a son and will continue the family line. Despite belonging to her husband’s family on paper, however, a woman who comes over from a different lineage cannot be completely incorporated as a member of her family-in-law because she cannot technically change her original ancestry, which is different from her husband’s lineage. This stranger’s position drives women to be inferior in any group (199).

Kim’s statement gives me insight into the lack of Korean women’s authority. Since the old wife in the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance is not affiliated with her family anymore, she should stay with family-in-law until she gets divorced. Divorce was possible in the 19th-century *Joseon* period, but only when a man abandoned or sold his wife, beat his parents-in-law, or committed adultery with his mother-in-law, as Seong-Hee Jeong, researcher at the Academy of Korean Studies, puts it (Jeong, *OhmyNews*)
Online Newspaper, n.p.). Thus, women were not authorized to claim a divorce at that time. Furthermore, most people did not approve of divorce. Rather, they thought that a married couple getting old together was a moral virtue (OhmyNews Online Newspaper, n.p.). These circumstances more or less make women dependent upon and trapped in family-in-law. The old widow’s lyrics of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance expose that she stays in her husband’s family and serves her parents-in-law although the husband had already died. According to the 19th-century divorce system, bereavement could not justify separation from a dead husband and his family. Because the old widow has no choice, she contributes her devotion to family-in-law as a matter of course, consistent with Confucian patriarchal ideas.

Another old couple act in the Bongsan mask dance raises interesting issues about need for a son to carry on a patrilineal family line, a concubine, and female fertility. When an old husband who ran away from home returns, he brings with his young concubine named Deolmeorijip. Sharing with the old wife for a very short time the joy of reuniting, the old husband asks after his son, Mun-Yeol. The old wife answers that Mun-Yeol was killed by a tiger. The old husband blames her for failing to take of the son and compels her to leave him. He says, “what[?], we have nothing to do, and we need to be separated forever because our son died….I don’t feel any interest in living with you” (D.-H. Lee, Korean Mask-Dance Drama 322). Here, the absence of the son and the mother’s negligence damaged the continuation of a conjugal relationship. Such manners resemble Confucian patriarchal ways to signify a first-born son and women’s mothering role in a father-centered family.

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As women’s studies scholar Eon-Soon Kim explains, women’s life in *Joseon* period revolved around family-in-law, and their primary duties were to serve parents-in-law and husband and to produce and educate offspring (E.-S. Kim 221). To hold her place as a member of husband’s family, a married woman had to give birth to a son who carried on the paternal family. While laying emphasis on blood, the idea that men were superior to women was prevalent in the nineteen century. If women did not produce and take care of a male heir, they would be despised by husbands and their parents as incompetents (223). According to this logic, losing the old husband’s heir, Mun-Yeol, was inexcusable behavior. The old husband also recognized that the old wife no longer had the ability to reproduce. Finding fault with the wife, the husband justifies his demand for separation.

The husband’s demand also shows hidden intention to rationalize his wish to keep a concubine. Koreans in the *Joseon* period practiced monogamy, but many men, especially from the upper classes, kept concubines. They tended to regard having a concubine as their masculine capacity for ruling several women, as Seong-Im Lee states (S.-I. Lee 14; 17). Viewed in this light, the old husband’s extramarital relation with a young concubine in the mask dance is not immoral, even though the old wife complains about it. What is most interesting is toward whom the old wife grumbles. The wife says, “old man, you hate me because you have a good-looking girl….You bitch, you become my sworn enemy, and how do you make the old man crazy about you? It is the end for both of us (stage direction: attacking the young woman)” (D.-H. Lee, *Korean Mask-Dance Drama* 322). In these lines, the old wife displays jealousy of the young concubine...
and blames her husband’s infidelity on the mistress instead of the husband. Because the old woman admits her irresponsibility and incompetence, she is supposed to regretfully accept the husband’s concubine. While wrangling with each other, the husband collapses on the ground. The wife thinks he is dead and then loudly speaks that she will find a tall bachelor with a big nose, to live together. However, the husband awakens to the wife’s speech and kills the wife for trying to fool around with another man. Without a guilty conscience about the murder, he and his young concubine play for a while and leave together.

In accord with Confucian patriarchal ideas, the main story of this old couple act stipulates women’s role as only a mother who bears and raises a child, especially a first-born son, who becomes a lineal successor of the husband’s family. It highlights that her husband would be justified to abuse her if she abdicated most of her maternal responsibilities. This story also articulates that a wife may take up with only one man and, on the other hand, that husband may have connections with another woman. In other words, the story guarantees the husband’s sexual desire and severely limits the female character’s sexual desire.

PARTRIARCHTY AND MADANGGŬK

Unlike contents of t’alch’ums, madanggŭks rarely have stock scenes because each madanggŭk responds to different socio-political issues from the 1970s through the 1980s, no two are alike. I select a few madaggukks and bring scripts from Korean Minjung Theater (1995) that was co-written by Hui-Wan Ch’ae and Jin-Taek Lim. I also utilize a
script “Nodong ui Saebyeok” [The Dawn of Labor] that was written by labor activist No-Hae Park and adapted by madanggūk director In-Bae Park (1988). Analyzing these selected scripts, I discuss how family-focused circumstances are prominently featured in madanggūks’ stories and how their stories articulate gender binaries and hierarchies.

As in the old couple and widow acts of the t’alch’um, some stories of the madanggūk articulate Confucian patriarchal relationships. To understand how the madanggūk revolves around these relationships, I adduce two madanggūks as examples; “Duaejiggum” [Dream about Pigs] performed in 1977 and “Nodong ui Saebyeok” [The Dawn of Labor] first performed in 1988. In considering these storylines, it is important to recognize that mask dances concentrate on 19th-century Confucian patriarchal structures based on a large family, whereas madanggūks focus on patriarchal relationships in the nuclear family and the workplace. Historian Kwang-Kyu Lee explains that the outward form of Koreans’ family changed greatly from a large family to a nuclear family, after World War II (K.-K. Lee 257). From the 1950s, the younger generation wanted to be better educated and make more money than their parents, who lived in rural areas and did farming (255). These changes of mind enabled the younger generation to move to urban areas, participate in various industries, and raise their own family. Lee goes on to mention that “unlike rural homes, in these new situations, there is no authority space for the family head, nor is there a separate room for the wife. Given those conditions, it is extremely difficult to recreate the traditional way of living” (256). Thus, post World War II urban families in South Korea tended to be a nuclear family.
Moreover, radical industrialization and urbanization from the 1960s to the 1980s led fathers/husbands to spend most of their time outside the house and to be exhausted in economic competition. Referring to Barbara J. Berg’s idea in *The Remembered Gate: Origins of American Feminism* (1978), Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues that with retard to American circumstances “industrialization and urbanization increased men’s insecurity; the concept of the family as a domestic haven arose to satisfy their cravings for control and security” (Glenn 362). That is, while men felt secure within the house and acknowledged in their authority as the father and husband, they generated an image of family as opposed to that of the outside world. Glenn contends that this image of family unity enabled men to misapprehend that the husband/father’s interest and goal are analogous to the family’s interest (362). In related vein, men during South Korea’s industrialization acknowledged that their authority resided in their roles as father and husband, and they still functioned as a breadwinner despite reduced family size. This adjustment sustained the continuity of patrilineal family as an important principle in the Korean nuclear family system from the 1960s to the 1980s. *Madanggūks* show this father-centered family structure.

“Duaejiggum” [Dream about Pigs] includes characters from Kang’s family (Mr. Kang, his wife, his son Geun-Ho, and his daughter Mi-Sun), Deok-Bae and his wife, wrecking crews and their leader Wang-Cho, and female workers in a factory in an unnamed shanty town (Ch’ae and Lim 199). After opening by Wang-Cho and his crews, the scene turns to a conversation between Mr. Kang’s wife and Geun-Ho. Through their dialogue, spectators can recognize some facts: father Kang is financially incompetent; his
wife is a housewife; a son Geun-Ho works at a factory to take care of their family; and a daughter Mi-Sun runs away with a man. Kang’s wife and son keep discussing about their concerns about where Mi-Sun is and when their town might be demolished by wrecking crews in the near future. In the next scene, Deok-Bae and his wife with their cart appear, and they see pregnant Mi-Sun coming back the town with her uncle. On the opposite side at the same time, an unexpected accident happens in a factory, where Geun-Ho’s fingers are cut by the machine. The next scene shows that Geun-Ho gets paid damages from the factory, but he does not recognize whether it is inadequate recompense for a wounded worker. He tries to overcome his physical pain by drinking and gives the compensation money to his mother. He and his mother start blaming Mi-Sun for her pregnancy as an unmarried woman. One day, old bachelor Wang-Cho, who already knows Mi-Sun’s situation, visits Kang’s family, and asks to marry Mi-Sun and adopt her baby as his child. In the end, they get married, and all characters celebrate their marriage.

Like “Duaejiggum,” “Nodong ui Saebyeok” [The Dawn of Labor] focuses on poor family and their tough life as factory workers. Myeong-Jun and Sun-Ok are depicted as a young married couple working together to make a living. Myeong-Jun and his coworkers struggle for better working conditions. However, they are dismissed for instigating workers to go out on strike. Sun-Ok devotes herself to earning a livelihood. Instead of uttering any complaints about his incapacity, she respects and supports him as her husband and family head. Myeong-Jun joins a local labor union and takes an important position in that group. The government recognizes this union as an organization accommodating communism so it plans to make arrests of union participants,
including Myeong-Jun. Many people attempt to persuade Sun-Ok to make her husband surrender to the police. However, she supports the husband’s activity and helps him escape.

These two madanggŭk stories both condemn problematic workplaces, particularly factory circumstances. At the same time, however, progression in relationships between male and female characters re-inscribes Confucian patriarchal ideas on those pieces. As a first example, in “Duaejiggum,” the breadwinner is Kang’s son, Geun-Ho, and in “Nodong ui Saebyeok,” Myeong-Jun’s wife, Sun-Ok, functions as a head of household. Given that the father is not set up as family head, these stories could be seen as depicting Confucian patriarchy. However, in the father-centered family, the eldest son played a pivotal role in carrying on the male family line, performing the ritual services for the ancestors, and being given the authority to inherit property. The first-born son carried more responsibility than his siblings to support his parents, as sociologist Mi-Hae Park and Kwang-Kyu Lee mention (K.-K. Lee 253; Park 246). In 19th-century Korea, filial duty well demonstrated would earn the eldest son recognition as an honorable man, and also enhance family honor (K.-K. Lee 251). This oldest son’s responsibility began when parents were infirm with age and lost their financial ability.

Viewed from this angle, Geun-Ho’s father – Mr. Kang – shows marginal ability to support his family, and his mother is sick and dependent on the son’s economic power. Parents’ incompetence drives Geun-Ho to become a breadwinner. Conversations between Geun-Ho and his mother reveal that the eldest son’s role continues to be emphasized in madanggŭks such as “Duaejiggum”:  

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Geun-Ho: (Looking back his mother who is following) aw, I told you that you just stay in home. Why are you following me?....I will purchase medicine for you on the way back, so you just rest at home. Well, I might receive the delayed salary....I am very tired from working for a factory. I hope to fly somewhere. 8

Kang’s wife: For what? That is the stupidest idea. Even though you work hard, your family still struggles to make ends meet. 9

Geun-Ho: Phew, okay okay, please stop nagging. Sigh, I am very lucky that I was born as a first-born son at this family [sarcastic]...(Ch’ae and Lim 202; 203; 204). 10

These conversations clarify that Kang’s family is unable to make a living without Geun-Ho’s income. Even though Geun-Ho himself is hard pressed to play the role of breadwinner, he perceives that he cannot escape the first-born son’s fate that has been determined since he is born. The young male character’s felt obligation to support his parents parallels the burden imposed on the oldest son in 19th-century Confucian patriarchal structures. In this respect, despite other resistive features, the madanggûk’s characters still articulate the eldest son’s traditional role in familial relations in the 1970s.

In comparison with Geun-Ho, Sun-Ok occupies a different position. She in “Nodong ui Saebyeok” is depicted as Myeong-Jun’s wife and a factory worker. Entering the workforce and earning income on behalf of the husband, she is far away from the typical female under patriarchy – females who labor as mothers and secondary supporters. What is most interesting is that the story of “Nodong ui Saebyeok” does not explain why Sun-Ok takes a factory job. Does she have a job to build her career? Is she satisfied with playing a role of breadwinner in her family? Answers to these questions, based on this
madanggŭk’s whole story, are “no.” Sun-Ok’s lines in act 3 could offer clues to reveal how the female character considers her situation:

Sun-Ok: Look what you’ve done. You don’t know about what’s been going on here [home], and you just drink every night…What a loser a man must be to cause his family to starve!! You always told me that you would organize a labor union and a related meeting, but you have not yet. Have you ever negotiated a wage increase? You just get drunk and fat-mouth. (Turning around) If you did not pursue your activities, you would get certificated to increase a pay step like your coworkers rather than participating in labor movements…. (bawling at Myeong-Jun furiously) We are going to starve to death. What is a benefit from taking part in the movement? (N.-H. Park 7; 8).

For Sun-Ok, the factory work offers a means of living. Sun-Ok is proud of Myeong-Jun’s activities for workers’ better life but, on the other hand, she accuses him of failing to succeed in breadwinner’s role. Sun-Ok’s entry into the paid labor force is not by her own intention but rather owing to circumstances beyond her control. Sun-Ok is portrayed as a supporter for Myeong-Jun who is fighting for a great cause to insure that Korea’s factory workers are well treated. Despite her harsh words, quoted above, she sympathizes and conforms to a purpose of her husband’s activities, as seen in other scenes.

This equation of husband’s interest with wife’s interest is comparable to the myth of family unity against which Evelyn Nakano Glenn argues with respect to American history. Glenn argues that “this fiction of a unitary family interest disguises not only conflict but also male dominance, and legitimates the primacy of husband/ father’s interest over those of other members” (Glenn 362; 363). In an analogous vein, men were likened to “Sky” in Korean Confucianism, whereas women were compared to “Earth” (C.-M. Kim 199). Because women in this doctrinal hierarchy accepted their husband’s
interest and status as divine messages from sky, they could not disobey their superior. In “Nodong ui Saebyeok,” Sun-Ok, in fact, is never forced to reach an agreement with her husband’s purpose. Yet, that she sacrifices herself for her husband clearly results from a view of womanhood informed by Confucian patriarchy.

The typical female in Confucian patriarchy is seen in the female character of “Duaejiggum” (Mi-Sun), Geun-Ho’s younger sister. In the beginning of story, Mi-Sun is depicted as a problematic daughter in that she runs away from home and even with a man. When her family discovers that she is near the end of her pregnancy, they consider that a daughter who is a single mother is a disgrace to their family. They urge her to marry an old bachelor, Wang-Cho. What is most interesting is Mi-Sun’s attitude when Wang-Cho proposes to her as a matter of form. Mi-Sun said, “a woman like me is disqualified from a marriage with you. If you really want to marry me, please ask father’s permission”(Ch’ae and Lim 236).

Here, Mi-Sun reveals she is as ashamed of herself as much as her family. This way of thinking about a single woman’s pregnancy and being a single mother is similar to a sense of virtue propounded in Confucianism. There is a famous Confucian saying, Namnyeo Chilse Budongseok, which means that a boy and a girl should not sit together after they have reached the age of seven. These words suggest that a woman should not socialize with any man, including her relatives, when she is no longer a child. A daughter, especially in the higher classes, was separated completely from men and defended her sexual purity for her future husband, so that she and her family would not suffer the
shame of a dissolute life. Women’s voluntary love was controlled by their parents pursuing Korean Confucian patriarchy, as Sung-Hee Ryu puts (Ryu 28).

Showing similarities to points Ryu voices, Mi-Sun’s parents and older brother treat her as a vulnerable person with a weak sense of virtue who needs to be protected from a man’s irresponsibility. Mi-Sun herself is ashamed of her pregnancy. In this regard, Kang’s family still applies a typical female figure of Confucianism to their daughter. Furthermore, to get married with Mi-Sun, she required the old bachelor to obtain permission from her father. Her demand shows that Mi-Sun, as a single woman, still belongs to the family head even though her father is an incompetent wage earner. Hence, this madanggŭk emphasizes not only a father’s authority over a daughter and her life decisions, but also that a single woman’s pregnancy was an inappropriate behavior.

These analyses of several stories in both the mask dance and madanggŭk reveal that certain acts arguably draw on Confucian patriarchal ideas that underline heterosexual family structures and unequal sexual division of labor in post World War II Korea. Storylines of both the mask dance and madanggŭk reproduce gender binarism and convey it to spectators. Consequently, I assert that patriarchal family structures and ideologies as repeated in the storylines continued to encourage 1970s to 1980s public to re-affirm the male privilege and authority of gender binarism in South Korea.

Female Characters Addressed from Androcentric Perspectives

The t’alch’um and madanggŭk articulate androcentric perspectives as well as Confucian patriarchal family structures. I concentrate on the manner in which female
characters in storylines of both the t'alch'um and madanggŭk function as passive and erotic objects rather than equal subjects with male characters because their bodily expressions are sexually stereotyped from male-centered perspectives. That is, female characters judged by the male-dominated viewpoints are degraded and sustained in a secondary role.

In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses” (1970), Louis Althusser distinguishes the state apparatuses depending on which function – repression or ideology – is predominant. According to Althusser, the classes with the most social authority not only possess the most state power, but also shape the state’s ideology. Through ideological institutions like schools, the state dominates people, prompting them to feel a sense of belonging to a nation-state that disciplines them in the name of national unification. As Althusser suggests, “No class can hold state power over a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the State Ideological Apparatuses” (Althusser 146). This statement foregrounds how the ideological controls appear alongside the state’s repressive domination in institutional structures such as the army and national policy.

Differing from Althusser’s idea, I cannot confirm whether Korean government and student activists exploited the t'alch'um and madanggŭk as institutional devices to dominate the public. However, the government and student activists both treated t'alch'ums as if they supplied the root of Korean identity. Reconstituting mask dances and madanggŭks, they both placed the importance of tradition at the core of public consciousness (J.-C. Jeong 33; W.-S. Jeong, The Kyunghyang Shinmun, n.p.). The
reconstituted mask dances and madanggūks functioned as ideological apparatuses to encourage the public to feel a sense of belonging to a nation-state continuing tradition. In this respect, I argue that these sexual and passive images of female characters in the mask dance and madanggūk, as the ideological apparatuses, encouraged viewers to think in a certain way. So speculating, I analyze male-focused perspectives and manners, exploring stage directions for the female characters and texts that include corporeal expressions.

To analyze how female characters are viewed and defined by the male-centered viewpoints, I pay attention to Laura Mulvey’s feminist film theory that focuses on classical Hollywood cinema from the 1950s to the 1960s. In “Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema” (1999), Mulvey criticizes that even though narrative fiction film is as a device that offers pleasure in looking, narrative conventions and conditions of screening in traditional narrative cinema stimulates male spectators to produce eroticized phantasmagoria. Mulvey also proposes that a film heroine is passively and erotically imaged by male gazes, and then she is fixed in a very feminine figure that results from gender binarism. She points out that while this conventionally fashioned image of a heroine is depicted in the film story, male heroes experience active power from their erotic view, controlling cinematic fantasy. The heroes also function as “a bearer of the look of male spectators” because they help male spectators identify with them including active power over female characters (Mulvey 12).

Just as Mulvey discusses the conventions of the Western traditional cinema, I detect a similarity in storylines of the t’alch’um. Of course, there are space differences between film and live performance – limitation – because the male character’s gaze in
film was shaped by the director. By contrast, monk’s gaze in the mask dance does not have direction as film does. However, a similarity between Hollywood film and t’alch’um reconstructions is that male characters come to the front and control female characters. As a first example, I observe relationships between the female character Bune (yangban’s or high-class person’s concubine) and the male character Jung (old monk) in the old monk act of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 27). What is most interesting is that even though Bune appears from the beginning to the end, she does not speak lines, unlike the old monk. The only thing she says is “Bo-ok” twice in answer to the monk’s questions. The 2007 playbook of the Hahoe Byulsingut preservation society depicts Bune only through stage directions which offer important clues to understand how the female character enacts lascivious corporeal movements and what she intends and wants to do with the old monk:

Bune: (….Dancing alone voluptuously….After dancing cheerfully for a while, she feels that she has to pee….She pretends to look all around and furtively sits down, lifting her long skirt. She is peeing.) (Hahoe Byulsingut Preservation Society 27).13

Jung: (….Jung became aware that a woman is peeing, but he pretends not to know and passes her, glancing sidewise….He tries to restrain his sexual desire, counting Buddhist prayer breads.) (27).14

Bune: (The bune was surprised and ran away from the old monk. However, after she is sure it was the monk, she gets nearer to the monk, behaving and dancing coquettishly) (29).15

Bune: (When playing music, she flirts with the old monk by making eyes at him and showing her dance) (31).16
These stage directions indicate that Bune does not deliberately lift her skirt and pee in the beginning. After the middle of the act, she starts seducing the monk, excessively waving her hips and lifting up the hem of her skirt. The female character’s movements like dancing and peeing in front of the male character can be interpreted as interesting devices to cause spectators’ boisterous laughter.

Another example is the madanggŭk “Sorigut Agu” (1974) that criticizes Japanese capitalists’ inroad into South Korean economy during the 1960s (Ch’ae and Lim 49). This madanggŭk includes various characters: a Japanese male capitalist Maradesseu, Korean young men Agu and Japi, a female university student, and a female factory worker. This story opens with conversations between Agu and Japi. They begin lampooning a Japanese capitalist who came to Korea for sex tourism when they witness that a Korean female university student and a female factory worker are alluring the Japanese sex tourist using suggestive bodily movements. At the end, Agu wins the quarrel with the Japanese man and gains favors of Korean women who easily succumbed to the lure of the sex tourist. These female characters emerge in the very beginning of the story and sing a song together. Thereafter, they have no speeches, like Bune of the mask dance. That is, the only things the female characters utter are songlyrics. Their lyrics include “if you want me to take off my clothes, I will do. If you want me to take off my clothes, I will do even though I feel shame….The thrilling moment. A paying proposition. I will take off even if it is only a dream” (Ch’ae and Lim 51; 52). These two females’ appearance and song could be enough to attract attention from spectators because their lyrics can stir the audiences’ sexual imagination.
In these two examples, female characters can seem to initiate and arouse monk’s sexual desire, and the female characters’ bodily expressions become important instruments to lead the male character to move to the next plot events. However, in my view, women’s movements are directed by what male character wants to see and do. In other words, female characters’ sensual movements and lyrics are objectified by the male character’s gazes. For instance, the stage directions in the mask dance demand that Bune “voluptuously” comes into the performance space and “coquettishly” dance. These directions may show the female character’s propensity. Yet, how a person looks is determined by others’ perspective as well as his/ her own view. As long as the stage directions do not include Bune’s emotional intention toward the old monk, the voluptuous and coquettish qualities of Bune’s movements rely entirely on the old monk’s reception of them as erotic. In addition, the song lyrics of the madanggūk – taking off clothes – convey what the Japanese sex tourist wants the women to do. That is, the male character’s sexual desire decides their action. The male gaze frames and shapes female action and status.

The female characters in both mask dances and madanggūks do not expose through speech their feeling and intention about the male character. Their speechlessness suggests that the female characters are not central subjects. Rather, they just play an auxiliary role to support and react to the impact of the male character’s actions and speech. In this respect, the impact of the female characters’ corporeal movements in the act is determined by the male character’s erotic gaze which sexually and secondarily exaggerates the female characters. The female characters function as seducers who
trigger the immoral sexual desire of the male character, and their appearances are coded for strong erotic and auxiliary impact on the male-centered storyline.

According to Ok-Geun Han, an expert on Korean literature and traditional play, performers in 19th-century mask dance were mostly young boys from the lower classes and low-level male officers, even though each province had a different situation (Han 155). Han’s statement suggests that the mask dance’s performers consisted of men. In Korean Confucianism, women’s activity areas were confined to the home, patriarchal social regulations and norms did not allow women to participate in the mask dance. In 21st-century mask dances, many female performers participate in the mask dance, but weighty female characters are still played by male dancers. For example, the character of old wife is an important role in the act. This character produces a highly humorous performance by a skimpy costume and saucy jokes – jokes that are written in script and often improvised by performers. To depict the old wife, a male performer pretends to be a woman, at least on the performing space. This cross-dressing in the mask dance resonates with William O. Beeman’s 1992 discussion about the representation of women in Iranian Traditional Theatre.

Beeman examines two traditional Iranian theater forms, ta’ziyeh and ru-hozî. Ta’ziyeh depicts the martyrdom of the central religious figure in Shi’a Islam and ru-hozî is comic and improvisational theater. Neither theater forms allow female performers. Male performers portray female characters in three ways: non-mimetic (in ta’ziyeh), pretended mimetic (in ru-hozî) and mimetic (in ru-hozî). In the non-mimetic representation, a male performer employs a “conventional semiotic device” instead of
directly imitating women’s overt gender markings such as voice patterns and feminine gestures (Beeman 17). By contrast, the pretended mimetic representation proposes to simulate women in burlesque fashion. Spectators easily perceive that a male pretends to be a female. A male performer in mimetic representation completely imitates a woman with great skill, which may confuse audiences about the performer’s sex.

What is most interesting for me is the “pretended mimetic representation” in the ru-hozi because it parallels a male performer’s cross-dressing in the mask dance. In the ru-hozi, a male performer pretending to be a woman attains his distancing effect by using ludicrous and exaggerated clothing. A main reason male performers emulate females in the performance is that the depiction of women in a public setting is inappropriate in orthodox Islam. According to Beeman, orthodox Islam considers women as beings who incite sexual desire in men, so women should be protected from situations where they become objects of men’s lustful desires. By depicting female characters as funny-looking and unusual, male performers remove any possibility for spectators, especially men, to imagine sexual image of women (Beeman 20).

The main reason for a cross-dressing in ru-hozi differs from that of Korean traditional mask dance. Even though Korean Confucianism did not regard women themselves as triggers of men’s sexual desire, it placed women under male domination and emphasized women’s charity and fidelity. Korean women could not perform in the mask dance. As Du-Hyeon Lee and Ok-Geun Han mention, when the mask dance’s performers began expressing erotic dialogue in the Joseon period, many female spectators left the performance space, to not feel embarrassed (D.-H. Lee, Korean Mask-
This statement suggests women themselves refused to participate in the mask dance as audiences as well as performers. The absence of women facilitated male performers to tell male audiences dirty jokes without hesitation. A female character portrayed in men’s jokes became an object of sexual desire for both male performers and spectators. Thus, unlike the *ru-hozi* in which a male character humorously and exaggeratedly imitates a female to not offend anyone’s sensibilities, male performer’s bombastic feminine expressions in the mask dance marginalize a female character as a sexualized object. The male characters’ cross-dressing re-confirms female characters as subsidiary beings who belong to the male character and are controlled by the male characters. In the mask dance, cross-dressing becomes an effective device to produce male fantasy.

Another feminist theory from Joan Riviere can be applied to the *t’alch’un* and *madanggūk*. In “Womanliness as a Masquerade” (1929), Riviere exemplifies clinical cases of American women from everyday life. Based on these cases, Riviere theorizes that a woman who is traditionally reserved for a man and child parallels a woman who emphasizes her seductive activity because their activities try to avert anxiety and revenge their fears from men (Bleichmar 191). For example, if a woman shows her capacity to well manage audiences and deal with intellectual discussions in public performance, she after the performance would be not only overcome with a fear about “whether she had done anything inappropriate,” but also “obsessed by a need for reassurance” (Riviere 36). Riviere discovers the cause for imitating womanliness in feminine Oedipus attitude. While recognizing the absent penis on her body, a girl appreciates that she cannot
sexually possess her mother. Instead, to satisfy a desire to possess a penis, a girl redirects her aspiration for sexual union upon a father. In these processes, a woman develops femininity in heterosexual relation to her father and culminates in giving birth to a child who redeems her absent penis. This logic demonstrates that women supplant their subconscious desire for possessing a penis through playing a role of wife and mother in heterosexual marital relations. Riviere suggests that exposing intellectual and practical abilities is not a traditional feminine behavior. To compensate for the absence of maternal and wifely acts, a woman may seek complimentary and sexual attention from men (36). Riviere calls it womanliness as a masquerade.

Riviere’s analyses and conclusions cannot be regarded as universal because of the limited range of data she used: a couple of clinical cases and selecting Western (American) women as focuses in these cases. For these reasons, it would be impossible to assess female characters of the t’alch’um and madanggūk by Riviere’s theory. Can I productively apply it to quite different Korean situations? Riviere presumes that intellectual and practical behaviors – these can be considered as socio-economic activities – are masculine actions. This is to say that masculinity relies on socio-economic activities, whereas femininity depends on domestic roles. If a woman is seen as more career-oriented, men can judge that she fails in possessing her womanliness. In that situation, masquerading womanliness could be a kind of protective coloration for a woman. Women in Riviere’s clinical cases recognize themselves by and conform to an androcentric view on women. In the way that masquerading womanliness hinges on the
male-centered standpoint, Riviere’s idea parallels the way actions of the female character Miyal are determined by male character’s point of view.

In the old couple act of the Bongsan mask dance, old husband’s long absence permits old wife to be strong because she must bring home the bacon. Women are described as a weak and secondary being in Confucian patriarchal ideas. But, the old wife’s tough man-like vitality is inconsistent with patriarchal views. I detect some clue about Miyal that confirms her lack femininity. After the old husband returns home, Miyal expresses her delight in seeing the husband again even though she considers his irresponsibility unfair. Miyal clings to her husband. The husband lies on the ground, and the wife passes over his entire body. This obscene act is reminiscent of sexual intercourse. After then, Miyal says “ouch backache, I am seventy years, but bear a son. A matter for congratulation happens. Really happy to see my son” (D.-H. Lee, Korean Mask-Dance Drama 320). Miyal’s lines suggest that the female character is confusing or blurring sexual intercourse with a moment to give a birth to a child. Her illusion can be construed as follows: since her husband ran away from home, Miyal has maintained sexual fidelity – the fidelity is a required condition for married women in Confucian patriarchy. So, Miyal has been unable to enact her sexual womanliness for a long time. When she met her husband, coming on to him shows Miyal’s effort to reclaim womanliness. Miyal wants to confirm her position as wife even though the husband comes home with a young concubine. Also, Miyal’s mistake to muddle up with a son reflects an old woman’s hope to reproduce in spite of knowing her inability to do so. Miyal, through the sexual act with
her husband, reconfirms that she “was” able to produce offspring. In this way, Miyal guarantees again her womanliness by the husband’s erotic gaze and with sexual action.

With these keen analyses about androcentric perspective and masquerade as protection from male retribution, I argue that female characters in both mask dances and madanggûks are passively and erotically imaged by male gazes, and their actions as given in the scripts are completely determined by what male characters want to see and do, although what the actors do in actual performance is not so controlled. According to Laurence Senelick in “Introduction” to Gender in Performance: The Representation of Difference in the Performing Arts (1992), “the gender signals sent from the stage are more powerful than those available in ordinary life” (Senelick xii). I argue that storylines of both mask dances and madanggûks become powerful mediums to re-emphasize patriarchal and andocentric ideas, showcasing female characters’ images which are reminiscent of those of a typical female figure in Confucian patriarchy.

GENDER BINARY AND HIERARCHY ARTICULATED
IN TRANSMITTERS OF PERFORMING GROUPS

The Cultural Heritage Protection System is built in power relations between the South Korean government and its collaborators – folklorists and professional performers in t’alch’um preservation societies. Preservation societies, which have played a subordinate role in the cultural system, manifest a hierarchical form in their internal structures, and relationship between male and female performers are also hierarchical. In the 2010s, the number of male performers participating in the preservation societies is
higher than that of female performers, according to official homepage records of each preservation society. I argue that numbers of male and female participants are not equalized in the performing groups suggested by preservation societies. Furthermore, performer roles in madanggŭks, as part of the Cultural Movement, were taken by university students, but student participants were fluctuating because of the graduation system. The higher ratio of male student performers is affected by student activists’ participation pattern in the minjung (common people) movement in which male and female activists’ roles tend to be separated (I.-S. Kwon, *South Korea is like Army* 104; 107; 108). I argue that inequality phenomenon in numbers of male and female performing group members of both the t’alch’um preservation societies in the 2010s and madanggŭk closely intertwines with Korean Confucian patriarchy.

**Historical Participation in T’alch’ums**

In order to assess the internal organization of *t’alch ’um* preservation societies after their official establishment in 1986, it is important to figure out who performed those dances in the past, particularly from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century. Scholars like Ung Choi, Tae-Su Yu, and Dae-Beom Lee classify 19th-century mask dances by performance locations: Nongchon (rural) and Dosi (urban) *t’alch ’um*. The *Yangju Byulsandaes, Bongsan*, and *Tongyeong Ogwangdaes* belong to the urban mask dance, and the *Hahoe Byulsingut* and *Bukcheong Saja* are rural mask dances (Choi, Yu, and Lee 29). The rural mask dance was carried out as a part of an exorcism performed when a village prayed for good harvest. Participants in the rural mask dance were, by and
large, peasants and they formed a farmers band for the mask dance (29). Their performing methods, like dialogue and bodily movements, were changeable and improvised (30).

By contrast, the development of urban mask dance was involved in that of commerce and manual industry (I.-C. Kim 105; Choi, Yu, and Lee 30). After the eighteenth century, urban areas emerged in the suburbs of Seoul and Tongyeong which merchants utilized as transport centers in the Joseon dynasty. In order to further expand markets, merchants began inviting wandering artist groups to perform the mask dance in the marketplace (Choi, Yu, and Lee 30). Scholar Il-Chul Kim called these wandering groups’ performers “somin” – people of the lowest classes who did not farm, but begged for meals (I.-C. Kim 106). Scholar Gyeong-Uk Jeon points out that the urban mask dance, especially the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance, was performed by “banin” – people of the lower class living around Seoul and attached to Seonggyungwan to work as servants for the government offices: to farm (Jeon 161). Thus, people who were lowly ranked like banin and somin produced and conducted urban mask dances during the Joseon period.

People coming from the lower classes acted as main choreographers and performers of both rural and urban mask dances in the nineteen century (I.-C. Kim 106; Jeon 161). It is not clear whether women were performers. In the case of the Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance, a hahoe village in Andong, Gyeongsanbuk-do province, conformed to an annual Confucian rite to make offerings to a village god (D.-H. Lee, Korea’s T’alch’um 28). The rite was open to all village people as observers, regardless of age and sex. However, only men could directly participate in the rite under the lead of a
possessed shaman (28). Participants in the mask dance were also limited to men in that the Hahoe Byulsingut comprised part of this rite. In a 2012 interview with me, Sang-Ho Lee mentioned a reason why only men participated in the Hahoe Byulsingut:

The Hahoe mask dance is a kind of religious ritual, shamanism. Shamans were male or female in the primitive religion. Both male and female shamans performed small exorcisms. Yet, when a huge shamanistic exorcism was performed, a female shaman could not do alone and did not have ability to connect strong god by herself. Instead, a male shaman mainly performed a shamanistic exorcism in order to meet the topmost god. On the other hand, female shaman played a secondary role. As a result, male performers could be mainly performed in the Hahoe mask dance because the mask dance is an enormous shamanistic ritual through connecting to the powerful god….Women are in a period every month [menstruation]….Ancestors believed that bleeding on body symbolizes an evil omen. Women bleeding every month contained a bad mood, so women with harmful influence could not perform the Hahoe mask dance ("Interview Transcript," n.p.).

Lee’s statement confirmed that people fulfilled a shamanistic (folk religion) ceremony to maintain peace in the village; during the Joseon period, that was the era of Confucian philosophy as the state policy. In the same vein, people following Korean Confucianism held memorial services for their ancestors. The shamanistic idea parallels the Confucian principle (C.-S. Lee, Read the World through Religions 113). While carrying out the Hahoe Byulsingut as a part of shamanistic exorcism, Hahoe village people not only devalued female shamans’ ability, but also excluded female participants from the performance.

According to Il-Chul Kim in Korean Folk Dancing, peasants in the bukcheong area performed the Bukcheong Saja mask dance as an annual event for the day of the first full moon of lunar year (I.-C. Kim 78). Like the Hahoe Byulsingut, this dance had a ritual
characteristic. I cannot find whether the *Bukcheong Saja* accepted female performers.

Du-Hyeon Lee’s book, *Korea’s *T’alch’um*, offers eight performers who were designated as human cultural assets after the 1960s, even though some of them had already died.\(^\text{20}\) They were seven men and one woman. Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee (1924) is still alive in 2015 and plays an important role in the preservation society. The seven male dancers all were born between the 1900s and the 1910s. I discovered five more male dancers’ names on the official website of the preservation even though their birth years are unknown.\(^\text{21}\) Except for Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee, all performers in the records were men. In her 2013 interview with me, Lee recalled the situation when she began dancing: “mainly male dancers. In the past, women did not participate in mask dance performances because Korean people tended to consider dancing women as vulgar women. In my case, I was okay to dance with other male dancers. I was very young when I began to dance” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Lee’s statement gives clear support to the view that the *Bukcheong Saja* mask dance was limited to male dancers. The absence of female dancers was affected by Confucian patriarchal ideas about female behaviors that confined women and their role in domestic sphere.

In terms of the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance, no scholars have discussed existence of female dancers prior to their designation as intangible cultural properties in 1964. Sun-Ok Kim and Sun-Hong Kim – sisters who are professional dancers in the preservation society – provided an important clue in a 2012 interview with me:

> In order to maintain the *Yangju Byulsandae* mask dance, Sungtae Kim organized a performance group in 1962, calling up young girl dancers. In fact, performance groups of the mask dance generally tended to select only male members before
Kim formed his troop only with female members. This was due to dirty jokes in dialogues of the mask dance, so women avoided participating in the mask dance. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

Kim sisters’ words suggest that female performers did not perform the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance until at least the 1950s, due to performance voicing of dirty jokes.

In Confucian patriarchal ideas, a woman must be a lady of refined manners and never express her lustful feeling and behaviors. When a woman meets these conditions, she is qualified for being a good wife, as Yong-Jin Choi puts it (Choi 8). The emphasis on a chaste maiden in Confucian patriarchal ideas cast a long shadow on the mask dance performing group.

According to Du-Hyeon Lee, performers of the Bongsan mask dance were composed of all men, and they passed the dance to their descendants before the 1920s (D.-H. Lee Korea’s T’alch’um 92). Kisaengs who had distinguished talent for songs, dance, paintings, and writings in the 19th-century started participating in and played the role of young concubines in the Bongsan after kisaengs associations appeared in the 1920s.22

The Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance began acknowledging female performers in similar vein to the Bongsan. Hong-Jong Kim, human cultural asset, offered a hint about female participants: “women did not dance at that time….Well, there were no female dancers before the Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance was registered as an intangible cultural property [in 1964]….Palsunyeo means a female entertainer, kisaeng. Kisaengs performed dances in the past” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). It is hard to discover what year kisaengs started participating in the Tongyeong Ogwangdae.
As examined above, all five t’alch’ums from the 19th-century through the 1910s had a majority of male members. That is not surprising: prior to Japanese colonialism (1910-1945), Korea was a nation following Confucianism, which divided men from women according to its “dichotomous way of thinking” and put men above women in patriarchal relationships (Choi 3). What is interesting to me is that males progress more rapidly than females to highest rank and certification in mask dance preservation societies even though the Cultural Heritage Protection System since 1962 has designated performers as traditional gatekeepers for each t’alch’um regardless of sex and according to performers’ ability to present the original form of the mask dance (Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University 16). Internal procedures by which female performers could become transmitters show how female dancers still have less priority to be selected than male dancers.

Progress toward Yeneung Boyouja

Performers in each mask dance preservation society are ranked based on four levels; Yeneung Boyouja (human cultural asset or In’gan Mun-Hwa-Jae), Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo (initiator), Isuja (follower), and Junsu Janghaksaraeng (apprentice). The Cultural Heritage Protection System classifies four ranks, but the system only counts and records the numbers of performers from the two top ranks every few years. Because the system regards performers in these two ranks as responsible transmitters, the system authorizes only these performers to instruct t’alch’ums and foster the next generation of preservation societies. The protection system does not keep records of the number of the 3rd and 4th
ranks because performers in these ranks are fluctuating. Initiators like Sun-Hong Kim, Sang-Woon Park, and Seon-Yun Gang lecture on mask dances at universities and arts high schools. When they teach mask dance classes, they can recruit pupils who are good at and interested in mask dances. The protection system is not involved in recruiting and expelling members of the 4th rank (Kim; Park; Gang "Interview Transcripts," n.p.). For this reason, I focus on the two top ranks here – human cultural assets and initiators as transmitters.

Prior to analyzing differences in promotion processes for male and female transmitters, it is important to take a look at the big picture of the number of members in each preservation societies. I made charts based on 2011 and 2015 records of the Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory, the Cultural Heritage Administration, and homepages of each preservation society. The charts treated the same five preservation societies, but the data for these two charts come from different year sources. The charts show yet another rank – Non-Active Assets or Active Senior Assets in these charts. This rank is identical to the 1st rank (human cultural asset), but the title of asset was automatically terminated for those who died. Even though some assets, who were designated in the beginning, are still alive, they are so elderly that they can be inactive in societies. For this case, preservation societies of the Tongyeong Ogwangdae and Bukcheong Saja mask dance name them senior human cultural assets. The 2011 chart briefly provides the total number of Yeneung Boyouja (human cultural assets) and Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo (initiators) without photos and names of member given (Figure 3.1). By contrast, the 2015 chart confirms the total number, proportions of males and females, and
Figure 3.1. 2011 Chart for the Number of Current Members in Preservation Societies December 2011 Records Researched by Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University, ed. *The Review about Management Plan of Important Intangible Cultural Properties*. Cultural Heritage Administration: N.p., 2011. (No Photos of Members provided; No Name of Member Given)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Society</th>
<th>Total members</th>
<th>Of the Total what number or % were male</th>
<th>Of the Total what number or % were female</th>
<th># of Active Senior Assets or Non-Active Assets</th>
<th># of Assets: Total</th>
<th># of 2nd rank:</th>
<th># of 3rd rank:</th>
<th># of 4th rank:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yangju Byulsandae</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 total</td>
<td>7 total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongyeong Ogwangdae</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 total</td>
<td>4 total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukcheong Saja</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1 total</td>
<td>5 total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bongsan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2 total</td>
<td>6 total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hahoe Byulsingut</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3 total</td>
<td>5 total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 3.2. 2015 Chart for the Number of Current Members in Preservation Societies
2015 Records of Cultural Heritage Administration Homepage and Each Preservation Society Homepage (See next page) (Compiled through Photos of Members with Names which Allows Confirmation of Gender)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Of the total what number or % were male</th>
<th>Of the total what number or % were female</th>
<th># of Non-Active Assets or Active Senior Assets</th>
<th># of Assets: Total male and female among them</th>
<th># of 2\textsuperscript{nd} rank: Total male and female among them</th>
<th># of 3\textsuperscript{rd} rank: Total male and female among them</th>
<th># of 4\textsuperscript{th} rank: Total male and female among them</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yangju Byulsandae</strong></td>
<td>41 total</td>
<td>26 (64%)</td>
<td>15 (36%)</td>
<td>Non-Active, but Previous Asset 16 total 16 male:0female</td>
<td>2 total</td>
<td>7 total</td>
<td>20 total</td>
<td>12 total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tongyeong Ogwangdae</strong></td>
<td>27 total</td>
<td>24 (89%)</td>
<td>3 (11%)</td>
<td>Non-Active, but Previous Assets 10 total 10 male:0female Active Senior Assets 4 total (all alive) 3 male :1female</td>
<td>1 total</td>
<td>5 total</td>
<td>13 total</td>
<td>6 total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Village</td>
<td>Total Members</td>
<td>Of the total what number or % were male</td>
<td>Of the total what number or % were female</td>
<td># of Non-Active Asset or Active Senior Assets</td>
<td># of Assets: Total male and female among them</td>
<td># of 2nd rank: Total male and female among them</td>
<td># of 3rd rank: Total male and female among them</td>
<td># of 4th rank: Total male and female among them</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bukcheong Saja</td>
<td>55 total</td>
<td>28 (51%)</td>
<td>27 (49%)</td>
<td>Non-Active, but Previous Assets 12 total 12 male: 0 female Active Senior Assets 1 total (1 female alive) 1 male: 1 female</td>
<td>0 total</td>
<td>5 total</td>
<td>27 total NO PHOTOS: SWH’s best guess</td>
<td>22 total NO PHOTOS: SWH’s best guess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bongsan</td>
<td>61 total</td>
<td>38 (62%)</td>
<td>23 (38%)</td>
<td>Non-Active, but Previous Assets 11 total 9 male: 3 female</td>
<td>2 total</td>
<td>6 total</td>
<td>26 total</td>
<td>27 total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hahoe Byulsingut</td>
<td>32 total</td>
<td>30 (94%)</td>
<td>2 (6%)</td>
<td>Non-Active, but Previous Assets 1 total 1 male: 0 female</td>
<td>3 total</td>
<td>5 total</td>
<td>20 total</td>
<td>4 total</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
* Homepage URL

- Cultural Heritage Administration Homepage: http://www.cha.go.kr/korea/heritage/search/Detail_Result_new2012.jsp?mc=NS_04_03_01

- Yangju Byulsandae mask dance: http://www.sandae.com/

- Tongyeong Ogwangdae Mask Dance: Does not work

- Bukchheong Saja mask dance: http://www.북청사자놀음.kr/

- Bongsan mask dance: http://www.bongsantal.com/introduce/introduce04.html

even the numbers of performers in the 3rd and 4th ranks (Figure 3.2). Because some preservation society homepages provide pictures of members with name, it is possible to identify gender of society members. The 2015 chart indicates that male members are numerically superior to female members in four mask dance societies while the numbers of males and females were almost equal in Bukcheong Saja mask dance society.

*Overview of the five; Hahoe Byulsingut and Tongyeong Owangdae.* According to the 2015 official homepage of Hahoe Byulsingut preservation society, total members are thirty-one. Eight male dancers are main transmitters. The Tongyeong Owangdae has thirty members, as recorded by the playbook of society (Tongyeong Owangdae Preservation Society 61; 62). Ten dancers act as transmitters. Among them, there is only one female transmitter. The Yangju Byulsandae includes thirty-six members, as indicated on the 2015 official homepage of the society; there are two male and two female transmitters. Both the Bongsan and Bukcheong Saja cite numbers of members over fifty, transmitters in the Bongsan are just six – one female and five males, and three in the Bukcheong Saja: two females and one male. Through these current ratios, male and female imbalances in the transmitter group are evident only for the Hahoe Byulsingut, Tongyeong Owangdae, and Bongsan mask dance societies. Yet, in order to be promoted to human cultural assets or initiators, female dancers had to devote more time in comparison with male dancers. Circumstantial evidence of female dancers treated as accessory objects is available for the performing group of Hahoe Byulsingut. In a 2012 interview with me, Sang-Ho Lee, human cultural asset, offered an interesting statement about the absence of female performers:
In the initial stage [in 1986], the preservation society composed of all men. I already knew that men should play all male and female characters. However, I thought that male participants would be further interested in the mask dance when they belonged to the group with female dancers. I was the only person who got married at that time. The rest of dancers were bachelors. Those dancers started to marry one by one. Even though they got married, they constantly hit on female dancers and caused scandals. This problem not only made male dancers fight with their wives, but also these wives disliked their husbands’ participation in the society. So, I removed female members from the performing group. ("Interview Transcript," n.p.)

I am not able to say that all male participants shared Lee’s thinking. However, the government designated Lee as a human cultural asset in 1980, and since then, he has served as the society’s main representative. Lee says he released females from the group to prevent group disruptions, which suggest that male performers had a prior claim to participation in the performing group. Here, I argue that questions or issues regarding female performers’ participation/membership quite possibly gained sway from Confucian views about female figures’ duties.

Ok-Yeon Kim is the only female human cultural asset in the transmitter group of Tongyeong Ogwangdae mask dance. According to an online news article in Hansan (Local) Newspaper, Kim joined the preservation society in 1968 as a Junsu (Janghak)sang (apprentice) and received the title of Isuja (follower) in 1977. She became a Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo (initiator) in 1985 and a Yeneung Boyouja (human cultural asset) in 2002. She is currently in the position of honorary cultural asset (Hansan Newspaper 2012, n.p.). What is curious here is how many years it took her to be promoted to each position. The Cultural Properties Protection Law prescribes that dancers who received training for at least three years in the preservation society are qualified to take an
examination for the title of Isuja (Korean Cultural Heritage Research Laboratory at Chungang University 43). According to Hong-Jong Kim in a 2012 interview with me, apprentices need to spend three to five years in the society, and then they are able to get certificated in completing dance courses as an Isuja (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). The length of study varies according to each individual’s skill in the mask dance. However, to be promoted to an Isuja, Ok-Yeon Kim spent four or six years more than the number projected as typical in the criteria. She also spent seven more years to gain the next higher position, Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo in 1985. After seventeen years, Kim gained recognition as a human cultural asset in 2002, thirty-four years after she joined in the society. By any measure, Kim’s procedures to be promoted were protracted.

By contrast, Hong-Jong Kim, who is the current president of the preservation society, joined the society in 1980. According to an interview record in Hanryeo Today (Local) Newspaper, he became a Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo in 1996 and a human cultural asset in 2012 (Hanryeo Today Newspaper 2012, n.p.). Like Ok-Yeon Kim, Hong-Jong Kim spent more than thirty years to reach a top position in the society. A difference from Ok-Yeon Kim is that Hong-Jong Kim was directly promoted from the position of apprentice to that of Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo without spending time training as an Isuja. That is, this male dancer was not evaluated step by step, whereas that female dancer advanced by passing through all stages.

Furthermore, Hong-Jong Kim in a 2012 interview stated that government-affiliated scholars visited the society to evaluate and select Hong-Jong Kim as a new human cultural asset in 2002. However, he told them that he had no desire for a title, so
he wanted to get it later. After these scholars returned, they decided to give a title to Ok-Yeon Kim ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Hong-Jong Kim did not directly state that Ok-Yeon Kim was designated because he himself had deferred. His statement, however, opens the possibility that the government-affiliated scholars wanted to first provide a male dancer, Hong-Jong Kim, with the title of the top position rather than a female performer, Ok-Yeon Kim, even though she was as talented and she had joined the society before him. Hong-Jong Kim also goes on to say “if (Ok-Yeon) Kim was refused a title because she was a woman, it would be not fair. It was time to become a human cultural asset for her” (15).

_Bongsan_. The 2015 transmitters of _Bongsan_ preservation society currently consist of six dancers. What is remarkable is that a female dancer, Ae-Seon Kim, is the only designated human cultural asset. Under Kim, there are five male _Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyos_. The _Bongsan_ situation seems like a female dancer plays a role of the supreme representative. Here, it is important to investigate how Ae-Seon Kim started to dance and participate in the society. The 2015 official homepage of the preservation society records nine human cultural assets, six males and three females who had died before 2009. The women were So-Un Yang, Seon-Bong Kim, and Ok Yun. Unlike the male dancers, the female dancers were former kisaengs; the preservation society began accepting them as members after the 1910s. According to Yeon-Ho Seo, scholar of Korean literature, So-Un Yang and Seon-Bong Kim came from kisaeng associations. Ok Yun did not register her name on the list of kisaeng but received dance training from the association (Seo,
These three female performers participated in the Bongsan performing group at their own initiative, not at the men’s request.

The case of Ae-Seon Kim is quite different from the three female dancers above. Kim’s father, Jin-Ok Kim, was one of the performing group’s initiators before the government designated the Bongsan as an intangible cultural property in 1967. In the 2013 Wolgan Munhwajae [Monthly Issue Cultural Properties], Ae-Seon Kim states that her father handed the mask dance down to his young daughters. Her older sister gave up dancing after a marriage, but Kim kept dancing and performing with the father before he died in 1969. Twenty years later, Ae-Seon Kim was designated as the youngest human cultural asset in late 1989 (Korea Cultural Heritage Foundation 2013). I understand Kim to be saying she was suddenly raised to a higher position without proceeding step by step. However, it is important to address that a male dancer was chosen as a human cultural asset before Kim.

At that time, in 1987, all male cultural assets had already died, leaving three female cultural assets. In the circumstance at which over half of the first generation dies, I think it would be an urgent priority to designate dancers among the second generation who had been trained by the first generation. Gi-Su Kim and Ae-Seon Kim were representatives among four performers of the second generation, three males and one female, at that time. The government awarded a title of human cultural asset to Gi-Su Kim and Ae-Seon Kim in 1987 and 1989 respectively. According to Korea Joong-Ang Daily, Gi-Su Kim participated as an informant in folklorists’ research studies for designation of the Bongsan in 1965 and for other mask dances from 1969 through 1976.
(E.-Y. Lee, “Gi-Su Kim and Bongsan Mask Dance: 25-Year Enthusiasm for the Mask Dance” 7). He came up to Seoul in 1960 to be a stage actor and learned the mask dance when he joined in the Bongsan performing group (7). He eventually became a human cultural asset in early 1987 as the 2015 official home page of the Bongsan preservation society records. Gi-Su Kim devoted himself to the mask dance for twenty-seven years. However, in contrast to Ae-Seon Kim, he did not focus solely on the Bongsan. Even though he spent training period of similar length to that of Ae-Seon Kim, he gained top recognition three years earlier than she. One could say the difference was just three years. However, I argue that this difference exposes preference for male dancers over female dancers as they rise in the ranks.

Yangju Byulsandae and Bukcheong Saja. In the case of the Yangju Byulsandae mask dance, Sung-Tae Kim established a performing group in 1962 for tour performances. He accepted only young girls as dancers. My interviewees, Sun-Ok Kim and Sun-Hong Kim, automatically belonged to this group because they individually started learning the mask dance from him when they were eight and twelve. In 1975, they joined in the society as its first female apprentices. Passing through Isuja status in 1980, Sun-Hong Kim became a Junsu Gyoyuk Jogyo in 2000. Sun-Ok Kim remains on the position of Isuja in 2015 because of her personal situation. Different from other examples above, the performing group of Yangju Byulsandae welcomed female dancers. However, Sun-Hong Kim and Sun-Ok Kim in their 2012 interview gave evidence that transmitters of performing group were disinclined to teach female dancers: “even if teachers taught the mask dance to young girls, they often said, ‘why do girls learn dance? It is useless for
girls.’ I continued to learn dance although I hated to hear such a speech from teachers” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Their statements reveal that if female dancers wanted to learn the dance, male transmitters in the performing group did not deny their enthusiasm. However, they thought that dancing the mask dance was not women’s job. This shows that at least in the 1960s the leadership pursued a gendered division of labor similar to that emphasized in Confucian patriarchy. In the case of Bukcheong Saja mask dance, total members in 2015 are over fifty, and their transmitters are three – two females (one human cultural asset and one initiator) and one male (initiator). Geun-Hwa-Seon Lee in the transmitter group is the only designated human cultural asset. Lee recently designated a senior human cultural asset. No one is in the asset rank in 2015.

Except for the Bukcheong Saja mask dance, I argue that female performers in each transmitter group were delayed when they worked to rise to each step in the ladder of positions in comparison with male dancers in their societies. Female participants could not circumvent this hierarchical relationship between men and women members. According to Seon-Yun Gang in a 2013 interview with me, all members in the Bukcheong Saja preservation society hold an annual meeting to nominate one or two dancers and make a decision by a majority vote. Then the society forwards the nominated applicants to the Cultural Heritage Administration. The government-affiliated committees assess these nominees, based on opinions of existing human cultural assets ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). No one can voluntarily apply for an examination for advancement. Screening is only available to those nominated by colleagues and human cultural assets. Male dancers comprise a majority of each society’s members in 2015 even though the
preservation societies accept female dancers, once they are registered as official performing groups. By and large, former but deceased human cultural assets were also men (See Figure 2). Nomination in these male-preponderant societies would prefer males to females even though all dancers must demonstrate their ability at each rank. While ceding to the male opinions, female performers are delayed in their effort to be promoted. Thus, the transmission procedures of mask dance preservation societies from the 1960s to the 2010s that I have examined do not eradicate preferential advancement of male dancers. I argue that this phenomenon of being delayed, which mostly happens among female performers, provides evidence that the male dancers are preferred, and that female dancers played a subordinated role in performing groups of preservation societies.

**Fluctuating Performers in Madanggūk Student Performing Groups**

University clubs performed *madanggūks* from the 1970s through the 1980s. As a part of the Cultural Movement that occurred around campuses, their activities played a pivotal role in claiming a public-centered national identity and disclosing details of undemocratic measures of the military government. In these clubs, especially mask dance clubs, male and female students mingled and devoted themselves to performing the *madanggūk* for “Korean” democracy. Even though they adhered to historical continuity in connection to 19th-century traditional mask dance, they did not want to return to and pursue the past Confucian creeds (J.-T. Lim 294). What is most interesting is that male student students occupied important positions in the leadership of groups, whereas female
students functioned as secondary supporters for males. I argue that these sex-typed labors nonetheless paralleled Confucian patriarchal ideas.

In order to discussing gender hierarchy in the leadership of the madanggūk performing groups, it is important to figure out vertical relationships among student activists in the minjung movement from the 1970s to the 1980s. According to Korean historian Nam-Hee Lee, school senior-junior (sonbae-hubae) ties were “one the most important types of social capital in South Korea where age and hierarchical relationships are very much operational and where school and regional ties remain instrumental in one’s social relationships” (N.-H. Lee 160). I see connections between Lee’s statement about the senior-junior ties and 19th-century Confucian principles because they paralleled patriarchal ideologies of respecting elders, giving priority to the eldest son, and considering people’s region birth and lineage. Based on senior-junior ties, student activists in various kinds of university clubs entered into relations. These relations which became the “gateway to the [student] movement,” Lee argues (161). Lee criticizes that the senior-junior ties were not formed freely and equally. Rather, they were strict and unilateral in a hierarchical atmosphere (161). Seniors functioned as a role model and adviser, and they considered themselves as responsible people who provided their juniors with a new direction. Because of the seniors’ commitment, the juniors could not easily break faith with the seniors. The juniors promoted a close relationship by engaging in clubs the senior recommended, where they learned everything about student movements from their seniors. Student activists from the 1970s to the 1980s seemed like ideological colleagues pursuing the same goals for Korean democratization, but their groups operated
under a rank order that was analogous to vertical relationships between elders and younger people in Confucian patriarchy.

The solid nexus between school seniors and juniors was a vital requisite for the madanggūk performing groups. Collaboratively creating madanggūks, student members in the mask dance clubs put time into learning the mask dance. As Gi-Sung Nam stated in a 2013 interview with me, student members had two channels to learn the mask dance. They invited or visited human cultural assets to take mask dance classes. If juniors missed chances to take cultural assets’ lessons, club seniors who had taken those classes before taught their juniors the mask dance ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Juniors in the mask dance club had “spartan training” from their seniors, as Jae-Oh Son also recalled in a 2013 interview with me ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Acquisition methods in the mask dance club function in a similar vein to that which Lee stated. While teaching the mask dance, seniors took responsibility for juniors’ improvement in the mask dance and helped juniors become better performing activists. Seniors who danced well became role models for juniors. The trust between seniors and juniors could develop a bond of sympathy with the mask dance. As long as seniors were in a strict instructor position, juniors were expected to obedient followers. In this respect, student performers in mask dance clubs did not challenge vertical relationships in the internal structure of their groups even though they stirred up revolution against the military government for pursuing hierarchical relationships in political and economic policies.

How did vertical relationships intensify between male and female performers of madanggūk performing groups? Detailed information about internal structures of the
performing groups is nonexistent. Because student performers preferred last-minute announcements about performances to avoid the military government’s censorship from the 1970s to the 1980s, they did not record who the main performers were or how many male and female students participated in each performance. Lack of materials prevents me from calculating the ratio of men to women in madanggūk performing groups at each university. Yet, Hui-Wan Ch’ae, Gi-Sung Nam and Jae-Oh Son, in three interviews I conducted in 2012 and 2013, help me recognize that by and large, male students would exceed female students in number, and they would be at the hub of performing activities. The interviewees’ words are important as empirical clues even though they do not speak for all nor for all aspects of hierarchical relationships between male and female student performers at that time.

In a 2012 interview, Hui-Wan Ch’ae gave a detailed account of who played each character in madanggūk “Sorigut Agu” (1974). This piece needed five characters, three male and two female, but participants were four males and one female. Ch’ae played one of the two female characters instead of recruiting a female performer. Ch’ae mentioned that he was the best ugly female character in that venue, and his feminine actions with a masculine body gave spectators something fun (“Interview Transcript,” n.p.). His interview statement offers an important insight; as in the mask dance, this madanggūk sets up the male player’s cross-dressing as a laughing point. While female performers only took roles for female characters, in this case male performers could play both male and female characters. It would have been possible to perform the madanggūk without female participants or with a small number of them. Could the 1974 madanggūk
production have used a male performer to perform a female role in order to maximize satire?

Gi-Sung Nam and Jae-Oh Son in their 2013 interviews confirmed that in the 1980s, the ratio of male participants was higher than that of female students. Gi-Sung Nam said, “I do not exactly remember the ratio of females to males [in the mask dance club of Chungang University in Seoul]….Well….Roughly 1/3 or 1/4…. [If they joined in the group,] female students merely played several [female] characters [in the mask dance and madanggûk] ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). In a similar vein, Jae-Oh Son mentioned that provinces like Jeollabuk-do had a strong conservative inclination in the 1980s, and many elders had a negative view of females dancing. Because of their parents’ opposition, female students could not easily join in the mask dances. This phenomenon contributed to the lower numbers of female performers in the madanggûk performing group ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). These interview statements are insufficient to prove that more men than women participated in mask dance performances of the 1980s, but they do offer valuable indications. I suggest the superiority in numbers of men likely resulted in male leadership and limitation of women to portraying female characters. While it must remain unsettled given the absence of data, I ask whether female participants’ limited role in the madanggûk is similar to that of female protesters in student movements.

According to feminist In-Suk Kwon, student protesters from the 1970s to the 1980s extremely emphasized unity and tried to guard against disruption of their organizations. (I.-S. Kwon, South Korea is like Army 122). Another scholar Sung-Woo Heo points out that student protesters were in a male-centric military culture (S.-W. Heo
These two scholars argue that the student protesters’ organizational system, which stressed order of rank and solidarity, was analogous to organization of the Korean military. Since the Korean War and the division of territory in the early 1950s, military service has been compulsory for all adult males, so there is strong consensus that men monopolize the military in South Korea. While highlighting hierarchy between seniors and juniors and prioritizing a united great cause rather than private opinion, Kwon asserts, student protesters accustomed themselves to strict rules that were reminiscent of the military system and, they worked with a militant mindset in student movements (I.-S. Kwon 118).

Female student protesters were no exception to this militant mindset. As Sung-Woo Heo mentions, if females wanted to join in demonstration groups, they dressed like male colleagues in pants and shirts and utilized virile languages. They even accepted elders’ criticism about their masculine appearance (S.-W. Heo 50). Heo’s statement suggests that South Korea from the 1970s to the 1980s operated under the assumption that matters involving socio-politics were men’s jobs. This assumption induced female student protesters to act masculinize while participating in student demonstrations. Thus, the way they sidestepped the passive and obedient roles given to women was by acting, dressing, and talking with the energies of men.

Even though some female protesters consistently tried to be masculinized, it was no more than outward changes. Male student protesters did not treat female colleagues as equals, but still expected them to follow traditional “familistic values” (I.-S. Kwon 118). When assigning roles in groups, male protesters acted as leaders and took front position.
in demonstrations, whereas female protesters were required to take care of newcomers and manage goods (S.-W. Heo 53). For example, male and female student protesters participated in intense demonstrations together. However, male protesters were always in the lead and threw rocks at riot police. By contrast, female protesters were not confident of accurately throwing stones, so they stood behind male students and reserved stones for up-front male protesters (I.-S. Kwon, "Interview Transcript," n.p.). Because riot police shot tear gas, student activists after demonstrations returned to their campus in order to wipe gas off their faces. Female protesters on campus waited with water buckets to help wash (N.-H. Lee 172). In these respects, female student protesters in the 1970s remained in the background and played a role of assistant supporter in the group.

Such sex-typed division of labors was seen in mask dance performing groups. Jae-Oh Son gave a clue about this in his 2012 interview with me; “In the performing group, duties were divided according to sex….Well, women could not carry heavy loads, so they were not able to participate in building stage settings and props. Instead, they paid attention to sewing costumes and applying a make-up to performers because they were delicate” ("Interview Transcript," n.p.). Son’s words sound like male performers showed consideration to female performers. However, in my view, their solicitude precluded female performers from acting on even footing with males. The double standard male performers applied to female colleagues positioned female performers as weak beings who were always assisted by males. Madanggūk activities consolidated male dominance.

I suggest that the internal organization of the madanggūk performing groups still maintained gender hierarchy with considerable gendered division of labor. These sex-
typed labors paralleled role allocation in Confucian patriarchal ideas. Thus, while challenging economic and political policies of the military, madanggūks in their operation as performing groups did little to challenge contemporary gendered division of labor in cultural reproduction. What is most interesting is that retention of male-dominated operation methods in t’alch’ums and madanggūks parallels the way in which the Korean government’s ruling method while reconstituting t’alch’ums still resembled sovereign-centered systems during the Joseon period. Also, although student performing activists from the 1970s to the 1980s created their own performances, madanggūks, in order to oppose the military government and to help the public place themselves as main subjects in a new-born democracy, they did not eliminate their elitist ascendancy over the public, and in this way were no different from the government’s dominating approach. The Korean government and university student performers from the 1960s to the 1980s each pursued democratic revolution and different goals, but they did not escape from prevailing practices infused by Confucian ideologies. Confucian ideologies continue to shape behaviors in 2010s Korean society.
Endnotes


2 Bongsan, Yangju Byulsandae, and Hahoe Byulsingut mask dance

3 It is just a different word, but same meaning.

4...Sijipganji Saheulmane Ireonili Ttoitneunga. Yeoldaseotsal Meokeunnai Gwabudoeljul Alatdamyeon Sijipgalnyeun Nuireonga...Ilpyeongsanegul Sijipsali Agudapdap Naepaljaya...Ego~ego~ Mutjimaso Sijiponnal Ipeunchima Bunhongchima Nunmuludoegu Dahongchima Haengjudoene Samdaedoknyeoe Oedongtalli Sijiponji Saheulmane Jeoyangbanjip Ssjongsali...Doksugongbang Bapmegina...Mojinsameun Jaldogandei. (Hiu~)

5 Yeobo, Manura. Igeon mwolheoreo jjota nawateo...Kotmuleul jiljil heulrigu Jipangmakdae geolteo jipgu mwolhareo jjota nawatnu. Geureonde sotgae budeunggarina mondurajin tutgaleun da eotda dueotna.

6 Mueoya, Injeneun jasikdo jukigo amu geotdo bol geoti eopseuni neohago nahagoneun yeongyeong heejigyo malja...Jasikdo eopneunde neowa nawa sal jaemiga jogeumdo eopji annya.

7 Inomeu yeonggam, jeoreotge goun nyeoneul eoteo dueuteunikka nareul miworado hyungmannaeiji...Inyeon, neohago nahago museum worsuga itgirae jeonomeu yeonggameul hwanjaneul sikeyoktna. Nenyeon jukigo na jukeumyeon geumanida (dalryeodeuleo ttaerinda).
이놈의 영감, 저렇게 고운 녀석을 얻어 두었으니까 나를 미워라고 흉만내지...이년, 너하고 나하고 무슨 원수가 있길래 저놈의 영감을 환장을 시켰나. 내년 혹이고 나죽으면 그만이다. (달려들어 헤련다).

8 (Dwittara oneun eomeonireul dolabomyeo) Ei, jipe gyesiraedu wae jakku ttaranaseoneun geoyeyo?...Oneulijeum milrin sudangi naolji moreugetne...Gongjang naganeun geotdo ijen jigyeopdaguyo. Eodiro hwolhwol jom teodola danyeoteumyeon jotgeteoyo.
(뒤따라 오는 어머니를 돌아보며) 에이, 집에 계시래 돈 자꾸 따라서는 거예요?...오늘 퇴근하는 길에 약이라두 사뭇가 갑데니 집에서 좀 쉬세요. 제기, 오늘쯤 밀린 수당이 나올지 모르겠네...공장 나가는 것도 이젠 지겹다구요. 어디로 휴월 좀 떠돌아 다녔으면 좋겠어요.

뒤가 어때? 배포 한번 편하구나. 은 식구가 바둥바둥 매어달려도 엽에 풀칠하기가 근근할게.

10 Eohyu, alateoyo, jansori jom geuman haseyo. Euhyu, nan bokdo maneo. Eojjeda ireon jipe jangnamssikina ewaeteunji…
어휴, 알았어요 잔소리 좀 그만 하세요. 우휴 난 복두 많아. 어쩌다 이런 집에 장남씩이나 됐는지...

잘한다 잘해. 집안 구석이 어떻게 돌아가는지 모르고 매일 저녁 술만 퍼마시고 다니…남편이라고 오죽이나 못했 (*((만날 노조를 만드는데 모임을 만드네 하면서도 언제 임금인상 한번 환경하게 시켜 봤어? 고작 술이나 먹고 떠들다가 말지. (돌아서서) 그럴 바에야 최성구씨 처럼 기사 자격증 시험이나 와서 호봉이나

309
올리지 노조는 해서 뭐해…(바락 악을 쓴다) 끝나 굴게 된 판에 노조가 무슨 얼어 죽을 노조야.

12 Jeo gateun yeojaeun jagyeoki eopeoyo. Hajiman jeong geureosidam euri abeonimkke malssum deuryeoboseyo.
저 같은 여자는 자격이 없어요. 하지만 정 그러시담 우리 아버님께 말씀 드려보세요.

13 (…Honjaseo yoyeomhage chumeul chunda…Jagi heunge gyeowo hancham chumeul chudeon buneeun saengrioyokgureul neukkigo…Meon gokkkaji salpyeo amudo eopneun geotel hwakinhan buneneun ojumnugie jeokdanghan goteul salgeumeoni anja chimareul salijak deuleo eongdeongireul gamchugo eonggeojuchumhage anjaseo ojumeul nunda)
(…혼자서 요염하게 춤을 출다…자기 홍에 겨워 한참 춤을 추던 부네는 생리욕구를 느끼고…먼 곳까지 살펴 아무도 없는 것을 확인한 부네는 오줌누기에 적당한 곳을 살그머니 앉아 치마를 살짝 들어 영덩이를 감추고 영거주춤하게 앉아서 오줌을 눈다)

14 (…Jungeun yeoini ojumeul nugo itdaneun geoteul han nune alabojiman moreun cheok seuchyeo jinagamyeo seuljeokseuljeok gyeotnunjilro bomyeonseo jinaganda…Yeomjureul manjimyeo maeum sokeseo kkumteuldaeneun yokjeongeul igyeonaeryeogo aesseunda)
(…중은 여인이 오줌을 누고 있다는 것을 한 눈에 알아보았지만 모든 척 스쳐 지나가며 슬쩍슬쩍 걸음질로 보면서 지나간다…염주를 만지며 마음 속에서 꿈틀대는 욕정을 이겨내려고 애쓴다).

15 (Ojum nudaga junghante deulkyeobeorin buneneun nolraseo domangchyeotjiman, ingicheoki jungirangeol algoneun dasi yoyeomhan geoleumgeoriro jeomanchi tteoleojyeoseo yoyeomhan jataereul boimyeo yuhokhaneun chumeul chunda.)
(오줌 누다가 중한테 들켜버린 부네는 놀라서 도망쳤지만, 인기척이 중이란걸 알고는 다시 요염한 걸음걸이로 지만치 떨어져서 요염한 자태를 보이며 유혹하는 춤을 출다.)

16 (Jangdani yeonjudoeja, nunuteumeul jieumyeo pungmule machwo yoyeomhan chumeul chumyeo jungeul yuhokhanda)
(장단이 연주되자, 눈웃음을 지으며 풍물에 맞춰 요염한 춤을 추며 중을 유혹한다.)
Beoteuramyeon beotgesseoyo. Dangsini beoteurasimyeon changpihaedo
beotesseoyo…Jarithadeon geu sungan. Suji matdeon geu sijeol. Kkumieotda
sanggakhaedo beoteuramyeon beotgesseoyo.

벗으라면 벗겠어요. 당신이 벗으러시면 창피해도 벗겠어요…짜릿하던 그 순간.
수지 맞던 그 시절. 꿈이었다 생각해도 벗으라면 벗겠어요.

Aigo Heoriya, nyeon man chilsipe saengnamjahayeoteuni ireon gyeongsaga eode itna,
adeul boni joeulsigu.
아이고 허리야, 년 만 칠십에 생남자하였으니 이런 경사가 어데 있으나, 아들 보니
좋을시구.

Seonggyungwan was Joseon’s best educational institution for Confucianism.

Yun Yeong-Chun (1907), Kim Su-Seok (1907), Byeon Yeong-Ho (1907), Dong
Seong-Yeong (1909), Yeo Jae-Seong (1916), Jeon Jung-Sik (1914), Jeon Gwang-Seok
(1917), and Lee Geun-Hwa-Seon (1924).

Kim Yeong-Gon, Dong Tae-Seon, Dong Si-Hyeop, Ma Hui-Seong, and Ma Hu-Seop.

Kisaeng were divided in three ranks: female dancers in a court and government office
belonged to a first rank, retired court dancers but prostituted themselves are placed in a
second rank, and kisaengs in the last rank were prostitutes. All kisaengs originated from
the lowest classes at that time. Court kisaeng groups were disbanded in 1908. Japanese
colonizers established kisaeng associations like Japanese-style (geisha) call-offices in the
1910 to the 1920s.

Hui-Wan Ch’ae, as the first generation of madanggūk, was a leading member in the
mask dance club at Seoul National University in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Nam and Son
acted as leaders of a mask dance club of respectively Chungang University in Seoul area
and Jeonju University in Jeollabuk-do province.

Jin-Taek Lim played the character of a Japanese factory owner. A young man was
played by Suk-Man Kim and Man-Cheol Jang [his stage name is Sun-Woo Jang]. Ae-Ju
Lee played one of the female factory workers (Ch’ae “Interview Transcript”12).
CONCLUSION

In the scholarly writings of Korean academics, the two different reconstitutions of the t’alch’um by the military government and university student activists have tended to be analyzed separately; the reconstitutions by the government are studied in relation to their involvement in a Korean cultural project, whereas the reconstitutions of student activists – madanggūks – are regarded as part of larger social protests. Differing from these existing scholarly approaches, my dissertation has juxtaposed the reconstitutions produced by these two different agents and examined their different methodologies of reconstituting t’alch’ums to better understand how Korean mask dances were understood during a period of upheaval.

The Cultural Heritage Protection System under the government revived the original forms of the mask dance by focusing on reconstituting processes that were guided by government-affiliated folklorists. What I have argued here is that the government focused predominately on collecting materials for written archives and reconfigured power relationships among the government, folklorists, and professional dancers for its decision-making project. That is, while professional dancers were treated as important assistants but not sole authorities, the government operated the Cultural Heritage Protection System and increased the power difference between scholarly researchers and professional dancers (Lee, “Interview Transcript, n.p.”; Park, “Interview Transcript, n.p.”).

By contrast, university student activists re-contextualized the t’alch’um in relation to the socio-political and economic issues that the military government caused with oppressive policies during the 1960s to the 1980s. The outcome of re-contextualizing the mask dance was a new form of theatre: madanggūk. Student
activists selectively mingled concepts and conventions of the mask dance in their theatrical productions. In other words, student activists construed these mask dances to align with their goals and re-birthed the mask dance as the newly created *madanggŭk*. They designed the *madanggŭk* to create a sense of community for the Korean public. I argue that even though the government and student activists both engaged with the same historical dance drama, they reconstituted the *t’alch’um* in different ways with different goals.

Analyzing how the government and student activists differently forged national identity and subjectivity, using their reconstitutions of the mask dance, I have argued that the government defined reconstitutions of the mask dance as an indispensable national task of a newborn democratic nation. Operating the official cultural system, the government endeavored to keep traditional culture alive and drew the nation’s “authentic” image from the traditions of the past. This search for “authentic image” aligned with other government efforts to forge South Korea as a nation-state at a time when the government actively pursued capitalist industrialism, pro-Americanism, and anti-Communism.

As part of these strategies of reconstitution, the government criticized the King-centered ownership of the mask dance during the 19th-century *Joseon* dynasty. Rather, the 1960s government designated all Koreans as public owners of the traditional mask dance *t’alch’um* and took it upon itself to act as a gatekeeper for historical continuity and for liberal democracy. However, I argue that the government programs still maintained the hierarchical structure of the 19th-century royal dynasty. The government not only held a leading position while managing the preservation of the mask dance, but also kept secure its authority over socio-political and economic
policies. Hence, the government from the 1960s to the 1980s established a “guided democracy” in which the public acted not as subjective agents forming and reinforcing the nation, but as followers of the government’s orders. The government’s political dominance paralleled 19th-century sovereign-centered systems, rather than established a new version of national identity and subjectivity.

University student activists advocated for a restoration of traditional culture, the overcoming of post-colonial sentiments, and the re-building of historical subjectivity among South Koreans. Student activists concluded that the common people, called minjung, were below the petite bourgeoisie as an isolated group, and they designed madanggūks based on the t’alch’um for previously marginalized groups, especially low-income workers. Through madanggŭk’s address of problems with the government’s socio-political and economic policies from the 1970s to the 1980s, student activists attempted to locate individuals or marginalized workers as main subjects in Korean history and its newborn democratic society. Student activists produced madanggūks to encourage the public to reposition themselves not as objects of the state’s development project, but autonomous people entitled to free speech and free election in the newborn democracy. Student activists, through the madanggŭk, worked to forge a commonly shared national identity and individual subjectivity in the nation-state. However, I argue that student activists did not demolish hierarchical ways of thinking in relation to the common people, even though they criticized the government’s top-down ruling systems. In South Korea, people tended to regard university students as elites. Student activists contended that they rejected their status as intellectual elites while sharing the agony of the common people through the madanggūk. Paradoxically, student activists were still attached to the universities,
which had state recognition as the country’s topmost educational institutions. As long as student activists lived a sheltered life, their ideological struggles in the madanggŭk could not be the same as the practical struggles the common people encountered. Hence, student activists remained as instigators who gained an intellectual ascendancy over the common people. In these contexts, the ideal of national identity and subjectivity pursued by student activists were not identical with those the common people enacted.

These reconstitutions of t’alch’um by the government and by university student activists illuminate trajectories of Korean Confucian patriarchal structures and androcentric perspectives. The storylines of the mask dance and the madanggŭk I have described in this dissertation illustrate how gender binaries and androcentric perspectives in Korean Confucian patriarchy circulated in the everyday life of the Korean public. The reconstitutions emphasized Confucian patriarchal ideologies, and masculine and feminine binary frames are exemplified by the productions’ consolidating of patriarchal family structures. These frames locate female characters within the domestic sphere, and androcentric perspectives embodied by both male characters and spectators place the female characters as erotic and passive objects. These perspectives also call for the female performers’ corporeal movements to be sexy or seductive. Thus, I have argued that although the t’alch’um’s reconstitutions played instrumental roles in preserving Korean traditional performing arts and establishing national identity at both state and individual levels, they were still shaped by Confucian patriarchal ideas. In fact, in 2010s Korean society, patriarchal authority continues to invisibly infuse a wide range of socio-economic issues including marriage and divorce, inheritance and distribution of wealth, labor and wages, and
education. These issues have continuously sustained power imbalances between men and women in familial, social, and economic areas. What is worse while observing Confucian patriarchal ideologies in t’alch’um’s reconstitutions, the 2010s Korean public has continued to witness in productions the fixed gender binaries and the androcentric perspectives that are distributed in patriarchal family structures and unfair division of labor between men and women.

**Contribution to Dance Studies**

My dissertation project intersects with several questions and debates in Dance Studies. Many dance scholars since the 1980s have analyzed the presence of discourse about nationalism, racism, feminism, and globalization in dance productions. Their work has endeavored to demonstrate the importance of dance practices and dance studies as cultural vehicles for people to understand the past and the present. For example, in *Ecstasy and the Demon: Feminism and Nationalism in the Dances of Mary Wigman*, Susan Manning connects Wigman’s choreography to changing sociopolitical conditions of Germany before and during the Third Reich. My dissertation project is in a similar vein and it reads the complicated socio-political, economic, and cultural contexts during South Korea’s transition to democracy through the lens of the Korean mask dance, t’alch’um. This project adds to the body of dance studies analyses that show how the past is persisted into the present and permeates our culture, society, politics, and economy as a whole.

This dissertation project is especially able to participate in the debate of how dance reconstitutors’ practices intersect with “industrialization.” Scholars like Georgina Boyes and Linda J. Tomko argue that revival dances are potent sites for
people to figure out their identities during periods of sociopolitical and economic changes. Just as these two scholars try to grasp changing economic circumstances in relation to revival dances, I examine how reconstitutions of the *t'alch’um* were bound up with South Korea’s capital industrialization from the 1960s to the 1980s. This project may provide a model for examining the mutual relationships between dance and industrialization in additional East Asian nations.

Sociopolitical and economic explanations in my dissertation are interlinked with discussions about national identity and subjectivity. As scholars like Susan Manning and Georgina Boyes have brought dance scholarship into conversation with the concepts of nation and nationalism, I illuminate how reconstitutions of the *t'alch'um* engaged in imagining a nation and endeavored to establish a national identity and subjectivity. Applied to reconstitutions of dances past, I suggest that dance practices can be seen as key instruments in pursuing the nation and creating identity and subjectivity among the public.

I concur with Judith Butler in her argument that gender binarism is continuous today, and that it also deepens androcentric perspectives on women and their social status (Laura Mulvey and Joan Riviere analyzed such binaries too). My dissertation project provides clear examples of how complicated trajectories of Korean Confucian patriarchy, male-centered perspectives, and gender inequalities are visible in 1960s to 80s mask dance playscripts and organizational practices by student activists presenting *madanggūks*. Detecting vestiges of Confucian patriarchal ideologies in reconstitutions of mask dance through analyses of dance and dancers, this project offers a case study of gender hierarchy remaining in social structures.
According to dance scholar Ramsay Burt, “reconstruction helps counteract the more authoritarian and patriarchal tendencies of the process of canonization, not only through reviving works that were too subversive and disturbing for their day, but also where the process reinstates the agency of dancers who always contribute their own originality to the process of re-presenting choreography” (Burt 33). Burt here is discussing reconstructions from the 1990s. I believe that studies of reconstructions of dances past are able to lead dance scholars to recognize dancers, too as agents, not solely choreographers. Comparing two different reconstituting methodologies in my dissertation enables me to examine how the Korean government revalued dancers and placed them in a different decision-making structure from that which operated in the Joseon dynasty, as well as how university students functioned as choreographers and performers in students’ recreations of the mask dance.

Traversing socio-politics, industrialization, and gender issues in dances past, my dissertation encourages dance scholars to employ interdisciplinary viewpoints to better understand dance and to formulate their analyses in conversation with issues from other fields. An interdisciplinary approach to researching dances past in various contexts may help dance studies gain a center and less of a marginalized position in Humanities Studies.

Future Research

In Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I discussed some effects of cross-dressing by male performers in the mask dance, and I argued that a female character who is humorously portrayed by a male performer becomes an object of sexual desire for both male performers and spectators. Even though I have not concentrated on gay and
lesbian sexuality in this research study, I have raised the question of whether it is possible that cross-dressed men in the mask dance could stimulate male homosexual desire. According to scholar Ji-Hun Park, a Korean academic specializing in media studies, Korean scholars have rarely discussed issues related to Korean gays and lesbians (Park 321). Even though the first homosexual human rights group Chodonghoe was launched in 1993, only a handful of scholars today discuss gay and lesbian issues, and many Koreans still see homosexual relationships as unusual (322). In these unwelcoming circumstances, it is significant to consider the possibility of double addresses – heterosexual and homosexual – and an analysis of cross-dressed male performers in t’alch’ums would be an important case study in Korean gay and lesbian studies. The performances predate the rise of gay and lesbian studies in the 1990s, and an examination of these dances from the 1960s to 1980s would help to illustrate an overlooked period of the history of gay and lesbian issues and individuals in Korean society. These studies can help to demonstrate how social engagement with issues related to gays and lesbians in Korea were hidden and (re)discovered in the 1990s. This research project’s brief examination of these issues hopes to encourage scholars to further develop gay and lesbian studies.

Although this dissertation foregrounds madanggūks performed by university students’ cultural activities during the 1970s and 1980s, I am also interested in how long the interest in madanggūks would be sustained after that time. With the end of Doo-Hwan Chun’s presidential term in February 1988, the military government system no longer existed in South Korea. The next president, Tae-Woo Roh, was elected directly by the vote of the people, and South Korea truly became a democracy. Unlike the previous regime, which implemented anti-communist policies, Roh’s
regime began setting up diplomatic ties with communist countries like China and even North Korea. This regime also took actions to investigate former president Chun on charges of corruption and ferreted out the facts of 1980’s Gwangju massacre (uprising), which Chun led (Go 403). In spite of changes in governmental systems, some university student activists still saw the Roh regime as a prolongation of the military dictatorship. This was due to the fact that Roh had a history of engaging in martial law as a leader during the previous regime. Roh also issued a last minute stay of punishment for Chun’s leadership of the bloody massacre (Jeong, The Hankyoreh Newspaper, n.p.). For student activists, Roh was not truly the person who could rescue them from the vestiges of past autocracies. After Roh, Young-Sam Kim, who was not a former military man, became president in 1992. By then, student activists’ opposition against the government gradually died down, and participation in the madanggŭk decreased.

While interviewing Gi-Sung Nam and Jae-Oh Son in 2013, I found that madanggŭk performing groups, which were started by university graduates during the 1970s to the 1980s, are still operating in the 2010s. For example, the performing groups Handure and Gaetdol were still working in the madanggŭk-style. This means that at least two groups have continued to exist through the 1990s until the 2010s. Their existence suggests a possible line for further research by scholars, about whether or not these groups are still adhering to the founding purposes of the 1970s and the 1980s: to help the common people establish a national identity and subjectivity in a newborn democratic country. If so, even though the times have changed and no military regimes have appeared since the early 1990s, do these madanggŭk groups still utilize the same performing formats such as borrowing
conventions and concepts of the *t’alch’um* and criticizing sociopolitical issues? Do they still employ the *madanggŭk* as a vehicle to express resistant voices? On the other hand, what changes have occurred in the performing styles and goals of *madanggŭk* groups? What elements have been altered? Why did the group change those parts? Do their changes relate to changing politics in South Korea? Finally, even if they do not conform to their initial goals, why do these groups still refer to themselves as “*madanggŭk*” groups?

In addition to the *madanggŭk* performing groups, university mask dance clubs still exist in the 2010s. When I visited my old campus while researching my dissertation in 2012-2013, I often saw students practicing *pungmul*, a traditional Korean percussion group, which student activists from the 1970s to the 1980s mainly played in *madanggŭks*. I also saw campus notices recruiting new members for the mask dance club. That is, mask dance clubs in some universities remain alive in the present. The continuity of these clubs on campuses suggests a focus for additional research: what activities do the mask dance clubs of the 2010s conduct? Are their activities closely linked to those formed during the 1960s through the 1980s?

Such questions could open up conversations about changing meanings of performing *t’alch’um* reconstitutions in relation to political transformations. These conversations could also encourage other scholars to examine how Korean national images are differently re-contextualized by laboring dancing bodies in traditional performing arts, and in commercial dances and films in the *Hallyu* (Korean Wave). Since the mid-1980s, the South Korean government has implemented cultural policies to globalize Korean culture and actively engaged in cross-cultural exchange and cultural tourism. The cultural policies from the 1980s to the 1990s concentrated on
creating a national image projecting the past through traditional performing arts. In contrast, the policies beginning in the 2000s paid attention to commercial performance forms in the Hallyu. In just ten to fifteen years, Korea transformed its national image from a traditional gatekeeper to a global trend leader. For the younger generation of Korean/Korean Americans, a boom in Korean pop and films brings a significant opportunity to have a new understanding of Korean culture. This rapid change of image could lead scholars to examine why Korean cultural policies have projected different performing bodies in this period. How have the changed dance materials – from Korean dances past to Western-style dances – responded to or paralleled government initiatives in political and academic realms? These questions could not only extend scholars’ research interest in Korean dancing bodies in relation to national and cultural policies, but help investigate the use of performing art forms for socio-political purposes.
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