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Adversarial Diplomacy and African American Politics

By

Ronald Cartell Williams II

A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

African American Studies

in the

Graduate Division

of the

University of California, Berkeley

Committee in charge:

Professor Charles P. Henry, Chair
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Fall 2011
Abstract

Adversarial Diplomacy and African American Politics

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Ronald Cartell Williams II

Doctor of Philosophy in African American Studies

University of California, Berkeley

Professor Charles P. Henry, Chair

This dissertation is a study of African Americans and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa in the post-civil rights era. It adds to the literature on African Americans in international affairs by exploring the ways that the liberation movements in Southern Africa became a central focus among Black leaders in different ideological camps. It also highlights Congressional politics, mass mobilization, and institution building as strategies employed by African American activists to challenge U.S. political and economic policies toward Southern Africa. Chronicling the rise and fall of these approaches, this study also gives significant attention to the founding of the foreign policy lobby TransAfrica in 1977. Moreover, it highlights how TransAfrica became the principal intermediary for African American interests in U.S. foreign policy, as exemplified by its rise to the forefront of the U.S. based anti-apartheid movement activities. Drawing upon the fields of African American politics, African American history, and international relations, and theories of transnationalism and diaspora, I provide an alternative conceptual framework for the intersection of race and foreign policy. To these ends, this project offers the concept “adversarial diplomacy” to characterize the activities of non-state actors that circumvent the diplomatic functions traditionally reserved by the state. Focusing on the international political activism of African Americans, this study highlights Congressional politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building as dominant approaches to adversarial diplomacy.
To the memory of C. Diane Howell
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................... ii

Curriculum Vitae ............................................................................................................................. v

Glossary of Acronyms ..................................................................................................................... ix

Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1  Review of the Literature ............................................................................................... 18

Chapter 2  U.S. Foreign Policy and Southern African Liberation: Contextualizing Adversarial Diplomacy ........................................................................................................ 46

Chapter 3  The Post-Civil Rights Era and the New Black Politics .................................................. 76

Chapter 4  The Watershed of 1972: Embedding African Liberation into African American Politics ........................................................................................................... 110

Chapter 5  The Decline of Mass Mobilization and the Continuity of Congressional Politics: Toward a New Foreign Policy Strategy for Black America ...................................... 140

Chapter 6  TransAfrica ...................................................................................................................... 162

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 189

Bibliography ................................................................................................................................. 208
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For me, completing a Ph.D. is somewhat unlikely. I have traveled a different road than many of my colleagues. I am not of the social or academic pedigree that produces graduates from elite universities. I am from a working-class family. Neither of my parents completed an undergraduate education. Notwithstanding the two years I spent as a graduate student at Howard University, my entire education has been in public schools. Academically, I was not the best high school student and I was far from a remarkable undergraduate. I therefore consider myself incredibly fortunate for the opportunity to study for the Ph.D. in African American Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. However, this achievement is, by no measure, a reflection of my efforts alone. It has been with the help and support of many people and institutions that I have reached the end of a journey that I began almost fifteen years ago. I will make a daring attempt to thank some of them here.

As an undergraduate at San Diego State University in the late 1990s, my scholarship and general interest in a career in higher education was nurtured in critical ways both in and out of the classroom. I was fortunate to study with Professors Shirley Weber and Charles Toombs in the Department of Africana Studies as well as Professors E. Walter Miles and George Bergstrom in the Department of Political Science. As an active participant in campus life and governance, I enjoyed the support of my mentors and friends, Evangeline McConnell-Castle, Lori White, Jon Cawthorne, Evette Castillo Clark, James Kitchen, Sally Roush, and Dan Cornthwaite. Before beginning my doctoral studies at Berkeley, I was a graduate student in the Department of Political Science at Howard University. There, I benefited from the guidance and support of Professors Richard Seltzer, Lorenzo Morris, Babalola Cole, and Daryl Harris. The graduate program at Howard was instrumental in shaping my scholarly interests in African American politics.

As challenging as it has been, I have enjoyed my time at Berkeley. My dissertation experience has been enriched by the support of my committee, who were committed to rigor and a timely finish. As my advisor and dissertation chair, Professor Charles P. Henry was instrumental in honing my interests in African American politics on a project focused on African Americans and U.S. foreign policy. In addition to providing immeasurable support throughout my studies, Professor Henry is an outstanding role model to be followed by those of us beginning our careers in the professoriate. I am fortunate to have had the opportunity to work with him. Professor Henry and the other members of my dissertation committee—Professors Ula Taylor, G. Ugo Nwokeji, Robert Allen, and Kim Voss—encouraged my work and challenged me to refine my ideas at critical points. I extend a very special thank you to Professor Taylor. She has been an outstanding mentor on all fronts and has tirelessly read and re-read this dissertation throughout the writing process. It is a much better product because of her than it might have otherwise been.

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The friends that I have made among my graduate colleagues have also enriched my years at Berkeley. These include Michael McGee, Jr., Christopher Petrella, Shaun Ossei-Owusu, Asia Leeds, Kelley Deetz, Ryan Rideau, Petra Rivera, Jasminder Kaur, Mario Nesbitt, Justin Gomer, Jasmine Johnson, Ameer Loggins, J. Finley, Reggie Royston, Adam Reich, Dmitri Seals, Jordan Gonzales, and Tianna Paschel. In addition, my African American Studies comrade, Jonathan Fenderson, has been a critical part of this journey and one of my closest friends in graduate school, even though we have never studied at the same university.

In addition to working on the dissertation, and teaching and assisting in numerous classes, I have worked in the Division of Financial Services at the Oakland Unified School District for the last two years. My colleagues Vernon Hal, Roberta Sadler, Marrecio Coleman, Sandra Anderson-Knox, and Michael Moore have been immensely supportive and encouraging during some of the most difficult parts of this journey.
There are also members of my family who have been instrumental in my development and supportive of my pursuit of this degree. I thank my parents, Carmen Luckett and Ronald Williams. My mother is especially deserving of my gratitude for her unconditional love, encouragement, and for the many personal and professional sacrifices that she has made so that I could have the best start possible. My sisters Erika Williams, Veronika Williams, and Lawana Stuckey have been among my cheerleaders and my oldest and closest friends. In addition, my aunts Linda Brown, Annette Starks, Aduni Luckett, and Dolores Luckett, my uncles Michael Luckett and Andrew Luckett, and my godparents Linda Amoah and Kevin Best, all supported this endeavor in tangible and intangible ways. My deepest appreciation is also owed to Carolyn Getridge, who has been an integral part of my life for the past sixteen years. From high school to Ph.D., and everything in between, Carolyn has been unfalteringly supportive of my aspirations as if I were one of her children. In so many ways, this experience has been easier because of her.

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AAAA (Athletes and Artists Against Apartheid)
AANCA (African American National Conference on Africa)
ABPsi (Association of Black Psychologists)
ACOA (American Committee on Africa)
AFSCME (American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees)
AHSA (African Heritage Studies Association)
AIPAC (America Israel Public Affairs Committee)
ALD (African Liberation Day)
ALDCC (African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee)
ALDSC (African Liberation Day Steering Committee)
ALSC (African Liberation Support Committee)
ANC (African National Congress)
ANLCA (American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa)
APA (American Psychological Association)
APSA (American Political Science Association)
ASA (African Studies Association)
ASA (American Sociological Association)
BPP (Black Panther Party for Self Defense)
CAA (Council on African Affairs)
CAP (Congress of African People)
CBC (Congressional Black Caucus)
CBEO (National Conference of Black Elected Officials)
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)
COAHR (Committee on the Appeal for Human Rights)
COINTELPRO (Counterintelligence Program of the Federal Bureau of Investigation)
CORE (Congress on Racial Equality)
CPA (Committee for Positive Action of the African Heritage Studies Association)
DNC (Democratic National Convention)
DSC (Democratic Select Committee)
ELEC (Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda)
FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique)
FSAM (Free South Africa Movement)
IBW (Institute for the Black World)
IFCO (Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization)
MFDP (Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party)
MPLA (People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MXLU (Malcolm X Liberation University)
NAACP (National Association for the Advancement of Colored People)
NCC (National Council of Churches)
NCNW (National Council of Negro Women)
NCOBPS (National Conference of Black Political Scientists)
NSAM (National Security Action Memorandum)
NSSM (National Security Study Memorandum)
OAAU (Organization of Afro-American Unity)
OAU (Organization of African Unity)
PAC (Pan African Congress)
RENA MO (Mozambican National Resistance)
RF (Rhodesian Front)
RMSC (Roxbury Multi Service Center)
RRP (Rhodesian Reform Party)
SAIS (School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University)
SANC (Southern Africa News Collaborative)
SARF (Southern Africa Relief Fund)
SASP (Southern Africa Support Project)
SCLC (Southern Christian Leadership Conference)
SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee)
SOBU (Student Organization of Black Unity)
SRLP (Southern Rhodesia Liberal Party)
SWAPO (South West Africa People’s Organization)
SWP (Socialist Worker’s Party)
UDI (Unilateral Declaration of Independence)
UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
USAID (United States Agency for International Development)
WCG (Western Contact Group)
WOA (Washington Office on Africa)
ZANU (Zimbabwe African National Union)
ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People’s Union)
ZIPRA (Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army)
INTRODUCTION

On 25 September 1976, 120 African Americans gathered at the Washington Hilton Hotel for a two-day Leadership Summit on Africa convened by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). This conference brought together representatives from more than thirty prominent organizations and constituencies. Present were representatives from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Operation PUSH, the Black Economic Research Council, the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA), the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW), the Opportunities Industrialization Center, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW), the AME Church, African American mayors, the Caucus of Black Democrats, Black labor groups, and Blacks formerly involved in the upper echelons of the U.S. Department of State. Other notable participants included Gary, Indiana Mayor, Richard Gordon Hatcher; former U.S. ambassador to Upper Volta, Elliot Skinner; and former U.S. ambassador to Ghana, Frank Williams. The purpose of this meeting was to organize prominent African American leaders to declare their collective support for the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. The most eminent of these was the growing movement around the world to eradicate apartheid in the Republic of South Africa.

The product of the two-day affair was a document that became known as the Afro-American Manifesto on Southern Africa. Adopted by unanimous vote, the Manifesto called attention to the political strife in Southern Africa and declared the support of African American leaders to aid in the eradication of these conditions and establish democracy in the region. Explicit in the Manifesto was the pronouncement of an inextricable connection between Africans, African Americans, and other African descendants throughout the Black Diaspora. The Manifesto affirmed the belief that “racism and other forms of oppression respect no territories or boundaries.” Framed as part of a domestic and global Black Freedom struggle, the Manifesto drew upon the activism of earlier Black world leaders. It declared:

We do this because we are African Americans and because we have a mandate from our revolutionary predecessors: from Crispus Attucks to W.E.B. Du Bois, from Dinizulu to Amilcar Cabral, from Martin Luther King to Malcolm X, from Nkrumah to Lumumba, from Nat Turner to Whitney Young, from Sojourner Truth to Mary McLeod Bethune, to proclaim the truth of the Revolution of 1776, which is also the truth of the Revolution of 1976 in Southern Africa.

As a statement in support of the liberation of Southern Africa, the Manifesto used an ideological approach similar to the earlier American and African American freedom struggles. It took literally the notion that “all men are created equal;” extending this to mean wherever they are in the world. These principles are at the foundation of the Manifesto’s most powerful declaration, which was that the leadership of African America would commit to creating a sustained presence in all matters of U.S. foreign policy with any impact on the people of Africa and the African diaspora.
The Leadership Summit on Africa and the Afro-American Manifesto are important to the three primary themes that are at the heart of this dissertation. First is the involvement of African Americans in the politics of the African Diaspora in the post-civil rights era. In the decade before the summit, the issue of African liberation had become squarely embedded in the fabric of African American political organizing. This occurred through the heightened involvement of African American leaders of in the politics of the African Diaspora as they challenged their government’s detrimental policies toward Africa. Like many African American leaders who had come before them, this cadre of activists saw themselves as part of a larger Black Diaspora and believed that the struggles against racism transcended geopolitical borders. Second, the Summit and the Manifesto were the event and the document through which the mandate was engineered to establish the African American foreign policy lobby that became known as TransAfrica. On the heels of a period of disjointed efforts to organize African Americans around African liberation, the establishment of TransAfrica marked a turning point. It crystallized similar efforts that had been waged by the African Liberation Support Committee, by Michigan Congressman Charles Diggs and his staff of foreign policy experts. All of these groups had, at some point expressed the belief that Black America should have a foreign policy lobby. Moreover, the establishment of TransAfrica reflected a commitment to institution building as a critical approach of African American political organizing beyond domestic matters to include foreign policy issues. Finally, the Summit and the Manifesto are two examples of the ways that African Americans and other marginalized constituencies participated in international relations despite having limited access to state apparatuses and when their objectives ran counter to the foreign policies of the state. These three concerns are the subject of this study.

African American Politics, the African Diaspora, and the Post-Civil Rights Era

African American involvement in diaspora politics came of age during the post-civil rights era (post-1965). It was during this time that many African American activists began to mobilize around the multitude of political issues that transcended the borders of the U.S. Following in the footsteps of those who had gone before them, these activists embraced the notion that they were a part of a global Black struggle for freedom from various forms of racial, political, and economic oppression. Prominent throughout African American history, this notion of a common struggle served as the basis upon which various African American leaders involved themselves in the politics of the African diaspora during the latter part of the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century. With the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the major legal barriers that prevented Black Americans from realizing the benefits of full citizenship and participation in the American political system were dismantled. This ushered the legal end of the Civil Rights Movement and the beginning of an avant-garde period in African American politics and, with it, an ideologically diverse cadre of activists that began to organize around domestic and international issues in novel ways.
At the cusp of the 1960s and 1970s, the principal international issue of concern to this new Black American political vanguard was the independence struggles in Africa. Beginning with Ghana in the late 1950s, the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, and Germany had surrendered a significant number of their African colonies through negotiations with Black leadership largely because it was no longer economically expedient to maintain their colonial domination. However, Portugal was reluctant to do the same. As a result, the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe were engulfed in independence wars that lasted well into the 1970s. Yet, the political struggle that stood out most prominently was the struggle against apartheid in the Republic of South Africa. Here, collections of laws were designed by a White minority to oppress and deny basic human rights to the Black majority. Given that South Africa’s Black citizens were denied basic rights such as land ownership, access to the courts, and the ability to exercise the franchise, the apartheid policy or racial segregation—which had existed for much of the twentieth century—was engineered to propagate itself indefinitely. These issues combined to make the region of Southern Africa a major point of trepidation for activists around the world working to advance human rights and dismantle the institutions that supported global racism.

Through a complex and ideologically-fractured web of political organizing in the late 1960s and early 1970s, African liberation became an integral part of the mélange of issues that framed African American political organizing for the remainder of the twentieth century. For African American activists, two major issues framed their efforts to mobilize among their ranks to support the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. First was that the U.S. government, through its political and economic foreign policies, continued to support the White minority regimes in Southern Africa. This was evident through the failure of successive U.S. presidential administrations to advance foreign policies that actively opposed apartheid and other manifestations of White minority rule in the region. For many African American activists, scholars, and political leaders, this was in direct contradiction to the strides that they made at dismantling the institutions of racism in the U.S. in the previous decades. The second issue was that African Americans still had limited access to the state institutions of official diplomacy. Even those African Americans who had been able to secure diplomatic appointments in the State Department in the post-WWII era were severely restricted in their ability to shape progressive U.S. foreign policies toward Africa and the African diaspora.6

One of the most telling examples of the limits of African American involvement in traditional diplomacy is the short yet controversial tenure of Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. during the administration of President Jimmy Carter (1977-1981). It was through his connections to President Carter (a fellow Georgian), the Black political community, and the Democratic Party, that Young was appointed to the high post of U.N. Ambassador in 1977. However, his outspokenness against U.S. foreign policies resulted in Young’s forced resignation on 15 August 1979.7 It became clear early on that Young’s approach to his ambassadorship was a point of
contention for President Carter. This reached a boiling point on 7 August 1979 when, in a special meeting of his Cabinet, Carter lambasted Young for several controversial remarks he had made publicly. Carter was enraged that Young would make comments suggesting that “the British were ‘a little chicken’ on race issues,” “former presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford had racist attitudes,” “the Cubans were ‘stabilizing their influence’ in Africa,” and that the “U.S. jails [had] ‘hundreds, maybe even thousands of political prisoners.’” Yet it was a secret meeting with leaders from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that ultimately sealed Young’s fate. Still, he remained unapologetic for his actions. He remarked in Time magazine that, “It is very difficult to do the things that I think are in the interest of the country and also maintain the standards of protocol and diplomacy...I really don't feel a bit sorry for anything that I have done. And I could not say to anybody that given the same situation, I wouldn't do it again almost exactly the same way.”

Young’s actions underscore the limitations of existing institutions in advancing diplomatic interests of African Americans, particularly when they run counter to the foreign policy objectives of the state. What is more, Young's unapologetic response to the forced resignation further emphasizes the adversarial relationship that can arise between various ideological factions and the U.S. government on approaches to diplomacy. Finally, Young’s controversial tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. underscores the near impossibility of advancing oppositional foreign policy interests through existing institutions. President Carter (who was considered a liberal and a friend of Black America) makes it painfully clear, through his engagement with Young, that African Americans concerns about African liberation and the Israel-Palestine conflict could scarcely be advanced through their own government.

It was a few short months following Andrew Young’s appointment as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. that TransAfrica was incorporated in Washington, DC. With a dearth of opportunities to shape U.S. foreign policy, the formation of TransAfrica in 1977 brought into existence an institution through which the oppositional foreign policy and diplomatic interests of African Americans—as they were understood by certain segments of Black American political leadership—could be advanced. It was because they lacked access to, and influence in, institutions of official diplomacy that African American leaders engaged in a host of activities that circumvented and challenged the state in order to advance their diplomatic objectives. These approaches reflected the ideological miscellany of Black political communities. The elected officials, such as Representative Charles Diggs of Michigan, advanced foreign policy issues focused on Africa through the House of Representatives’ Subcommittee on Africa. During his ten year chairmanship of the Africa Subcommittee (1969-1979), Diggs was aided by a coterie of African American academics who also challenged their professional associations and universities to support the African liberation struggles and other issues they believed to be apropos to African Americans. It was radical Black activists such as Owusu Sadakuai, who coordinated the series of African Liberation Day marches between 1972 and 1975 and mobilized over 100,000 people in the U.S. (in 1973 alone) to stand in solidarity with the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. In many ways, these varying modes
of participation by African Americans in diaspora politics, with their specific focus on the Southern African liberation struggles laid the groundwork for the founding of TransAfrica in 1977.

Adversarial Diplomacy and Diaspora Politics
Redefining the Intersection of Race and Foreign Policy

The involvement of African Americans in the politics of the African Diaspora during the post-civil rights era may be characterized by the concept, “adversarial diplomacy”. I define adversarial diplomacy as the participation of non-state actors in the international system that circumvents the diplomatic functions traditionally reserved by the state or its representatives. For the purposes of this study, I use the term “non-state actor” as it has been traditionally used in international relations discourse—referring to actors in the international system that are not nation-states or representatives thereof. Consequently, adversarial diplomacy serves as basis upon which to reexamine the role of non-state actors in the international system and to redefine the intersection of race and foreign policy. Moreover, adversarial diplomacy legitimates the international activism of these actors, in shaping the foreign policies of their state of citizenship. Undergirding this definition are three major premises. First, non-state actors are relevant participants in international relations. Second, pluralism—as manifested by ideological, racial, and political factions—is an integral part of American political life and the interests of these factions become apparent in global affairs. This leads to the third premise—that these factions give rise to multiple sets of interests in international relations. The presence of multiple interests creates a triangular relationship between the foreign policy and diplomatic interests of a non-state actor, the state, and a foreign issue.

I identify two conditions that give rise to adversarial diplomacy. First, a non-state actor must have limited access to the government institutions traditionally charged with the conduct of international relations. The second condition is that a non-state actor must have an identified conflict with the foreign policy program of the state. Based on these conditions, adversarial diplomacy can involve a broad range of political factions that take exception to the foreign policy program of the state. The combination of these two conditions creates an adversarial relationship between non-state actors and the state on foreign policy and approaches to international relations. These two conditions cause political factions, or their representatives, to employ alternative means of participating in international relations. The major supposition here is that the multifaceted ways that non-state actors have engaged in foreign relations, and diplomacy, must be understood both theoretically and practically. Thus, I employ adversarial diplomacy to characterize an alternative means of participation in international relations that both challenge and circumvent the state.

The primary focus of this study is when adversarial diplomacy intersects with diaspora politics. That is, when a particular racial or ethnic group identifies itself with the people and politics of a part of the world that they have embraced as their land of
origin, and the other parts of the world with which they claim transnational alliances. To this end, I draw upon the narrative of African American politics in the post-civil rights era to highlight the different strategies employed by political factions to advance their diplomatic objectives when they have limited access to, and influence in, the official channels of state diplomacy.15 These include (but are certainly not limited to) working to directly influence particular American foreign policies, engaging with leaders of foreign nations (be they official representatives or organization, movement, or opposition leaders), establishing institutions in other nation-states, monitoring elections, speaking as free agents before international organizations, and fundraising in support of the political movements in other parts of the globe. African American involvement in diaspora politics during the post-civil rights era includes four major approaches to adversarial diplomacy: Congressional politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building.

As a conceptual framework, adversarial diplomacy draws upon several concepts that have been used to characterize the varying forms of participation of non-state actors in the international system. Because the conceptualization of adversarial diplomacy offered in this study draws on the foreign policy lobbying efforts of African Americans in the post-civil rights era, I also draw upon the concepts that have been used to conceptualize the ways that African Americans have engaged in international relations and involved themselves with the political struggles on the African continent and elsewhere in the world. The most relevant of these are citizen diplomacy, internationalism, transnationalism, and its derivative, transnational activism. All of these are useful in understanding the engagement of non-state actors in the international community. Thus, adversarial diplomacy advances a conceptual framework that builds upon familiar concepts yet characterizes a very distinct form of participation in international affairs.

Citizen Diplomacy

Citizen diplomacy is related to adversarial diplomacy in that it occurs when private citizens engage in international affairs on behalf of the interests of identified constituencies.16 It also occurs outside of the official institutions and, at times, runs contrary to the state diplomacy.17 Moreover, citizen diplomacy is often fueled by the desire of non-state actors to help facilitate the peaceful resolution of international conflicts and to engage questions of morality on a global level. Also akin to adversarial diplomacy, citizen diplomacy transpires at the point of impasse between the non-state actor and the state foreign policy establishment on questions of access and political philosophy. In most cases, standoffs leading to citizen diplomacy occur on issues related to “peace, war, hostages, business deals, disagreement with government policy, and feelings of nationalism and/or ideological affinity.”18 The shortcoming of citizen diplomacy is that it inadequately accounts for the specific instances where the foreign policy and diplomatic interests of the said citizens or their constituency are in opposition to the state. Citizen diplomacy can be used by a non-state or a state actor to advance foreign policies and diplomatic objectives that
are, in fact, congruent with those of the state. Adversarial diplomacy, on the other hand, occurs in the specific instances when a non-state actor is interested not only in the foreign entity, but also in changing the policy positions of his or her government toward the foreign entity of concern. Otherwise stated, adversarial diplomacy can only occur at times when the foreign policy interests of the individual or constituency are in opposition to the foreign policies of the state (hence the term adversarial). Adversarial diplomacy also differs from citizen diplomacy in that it can be used to account for the instances when state actors—such as elected officials from other branches of government—engage in international relations that dispute the foreign policies of the current administration. Though they may not be representatives of the institutions of official diplomacy, would it be appropriate to characterize the diplomatic activities of a member of Congress that challenge the foreign policies of the administration as citizen diplomacy? To do so would be to diminish the significance diplomatic efforts of the individual actor and marginalize the role that Congress is to play in shaping the U.S.’s approach to international relations.

Transnationalism

The engagement of non-state actors in the international system can also be situated within the broad conceptual framework of transnationalism. On a rudimentary level, transnationalism characterizes the political, economic, and cultural interconnectedness of people throughout the world. A key tenet of transnationalism is that it diminishes the salience of nation-state boundaries and, in many ways, challenges the idea of the nation-state as the primary actor in the international system. This characteristic of transnationalism is critical to understanding the interconnectedness of ethnic groups throughout the world and how they have engaged with the people, politics, and cultures of the places from which they migrated. Because these ethnic groups may, at times, have limited access to the seat of government in the nation-state, transnationalism provides a framework for these types of cultural exchanges that occur at the supra state level. What is more, considering that the concept “transnationalism” is an amalgamation of “trans” and “nationalism,” for ethnic groups, this framework acknowledges the nationalist notions created by phenotype and cultural commonalities that transcend the boundaries of nation-state.

Prominent in the social movement literature, transnationalism has served as the foundation for the sociological subfield of transnational activism. Borrowing from the definition posited by Sidney Tarrow, transnational activism has been used to characterize the activities of “individuals and groups who mobilize domestic and international resources and opportunities to advance claims on behalf of external actors, against external opponents, or in favor of goals they have in common with transnational allies.” This concept has been used largely within the social movement literature to explain and analyze the emergence of a wide range of transnational movements. Moreover, transnational activism can be seen as one of the political manifestations of transnationalism and is indeed useful in understanding
certain types of transnational political organizing that surpasses nation-state boundaries.

Transnational activism has a particular relevance to the interconnectedness of ethnic minority groups that have been dispersed throughout the world through various modes and experiences of migration. Different from other types of transnational exchanges, these minority groups have forged and maintained political, cultural, and economic ties with their ancestral homelands often with limited access to the state institutions through which these transnational exchanges might otherwise take place. Indeed, the interconnectedness of these ethnic groups has been the foundation of the concept of diaspora and have been examined through the associated framework. When applied to the active interconnectedness of ethnic minorities, transnationalism and transnational activism become a type of diasporic behavior. When this interconnectedness occurs on political lines, they can be characterized as a type of diaspora politics.

As a conceptual framework for the participation of non-state actors in the international system, the strength of transnationalism is that it does acknowledge the interconnectedness of peoples, cultures, and politics of the world and the fact that these connections do not always occur through the nation-state. Transnationalism is relevant to a wide range of global exchanges, including the cultural and the political. However, the strength of transnationalism is also its weakness. The concept is far too encompassing to accurately capture the distinct form of political participation represented by the efforts of non-state and non-state sanctioned entities to influence foreign policy in the face of limited state access and differences in existing policies. When connected to diaspora politics, transnationalism and transnational activism make a critical contribution to conceptualizing adversarial diplomacy. In other words, the intersection of these two concepts creates a three-way relationship, which has been characterized by political scientist Ramla Bandele, in her work on Marcus Garvey and the Black Star Line, as being between, “the actors themselves; the nation-states from which émigrés have settled; and the homeland, which may be dependent on diaspora remittances or lobbying assistance.”

**Internationalism**

Finally, through adversarial diplomacy, I endeavor to make an intervention into the conceptual framework of internationalism. When used as a political phenomenon, internationalism has been customarily used to characterize the relationships among nation-states in the international system. In this sense, internationalism is premised on the belief that political and economic cooperation among nation-states is ultimately for the benefit of all parties involved. However, in conceptualizing internationalism, I again borrow from the alternative definition posited by Sidney Tarrow who uses the term in a more complex fashion. Tarrow identifies internationalism as “a dense triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system.” It is through this expanded definition that adversarial diplomacy can be characterized as a type of
political internationalism. The most relevant component of this definition is the notion of a “triangular structure” that considers the activities of non-state actors as an integral part of the international system. It is this triangular structure and the presence of multiple actors (which are also characteristics of transnational activism) that creates the types of adversarial relationships that give rise to adversarial diplomacy. In conceptualizing the diplomatic activities of non-state actors in the international system, the shortcomings of internationalism are similar to those of transnationalism. That is, conceptually, internationalism is far too broad of a concept to capture the particular type of international engagements represented by the diplomatic efforts of non-state actors at times when they have limited access to the institutions of official diplomacy.

The Origins of the African American Foreign Policy Lobby: Rethinking Non-State Actors in the International System

This dissertation is the foundation for a larger project that aims to produce the first comprehensive history of TransAfrica and to further develop adversarial diplomacy as a conceptual framework for the participation of non-state actors in international relations. In the previous section, I have identified approaches to adversarial diplomacy as Congressional politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building. The latter of these—institution building—is perhaps the most significant contribution of this study. That is, through its focus on TransAfrica’s early history this study underscores institution building as a critical approach to adversarial diplomacy. By focusing on the context out of which TransAfrica emerged and the early efforts to launch and sustain the organization, this study also illustrates the ways in which TransAfrica expanded the boundaries of African American politics to matters of U.S. foreign policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s as they were advanced by non-state actors. In a broader sense I am also interested in how adversarial diplomacy may be used to characterize the diplomatic and foreign policy advocacy activities of other non-state entities in the international system. These can include the international political activities of other ethnic groups, elected officials, and other entities that have participated in international relations with the objective of challenging the state on its foreign policies and its conduct of international relations. Considering the domestic and international political context at the close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, a full study on TransAfrica presents an opportunity to explore the possibilities of adversarial diplomacy as a conceptual framework for the participation of non-state actors in the international system. Not only will this lend to a full exploration of adversarial diplomacy, but it will also be a basis upon which to interrogate existing conceptualizations of diplomacy, including who can participate and what actions or activities are considered diplomatic.
Methodology

Though primarily situated in the fields of African American Studies and African Diaspora Studies, this interdisciplinary study can also be located within political science, history, and sociology. In political science, I locate this study within the subfield of international relations—specifically among the works that deal with non-state actors in the international system, ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy, and diplomacy, broadly construed. In history, I situate this study within the subfield of African American political and social history. More specifically, I locate this study among those works dealing with African American politics in the post-civil rights era. In addition, in both history and political science, this study can also be located among those works that have addressed the participation of African Americans in global affairs. In sociology, this study has implications in the subfield of social movements; specifically in the subfield of transnational social movements.

In addition to contributing to the fields and subfields described above, I also draw important theories and concepts from these fields throughout this study. Concepts within the field of international relations are particularly useful in constructing adversarial diplomacy as a conceptual framework. Such is also the case for the sociological concepts, social movements, transnationalism, transnational activism, and internationalism. These are also aided generally by the conceptual framework of diaspora, which I have also recognized as critical to conceptualizing adversarial diplomacy when it involves ethnic or racial groups with transnational alliances. The field of African American political and social history has also proven useful in this study both theoretically and practically. Studies by historians, political scientists, and sociologists on African Americans and global affairs, Black Power, the Civil Rights Movement, and African American politics, have provided a roadmap for understanding the complexity of African American politics and political organizing during the final four decades of the twentieth century.

This study also employs primary sources. These include oral history and archives. With the exception of one interview that was conducted in October 2007, the oral histories took place between December 2009 and February 2001. In total, I conducted 35 interviews with activists involved in various aspects of African American domestic and international political organizing during the latter part of the twentieth century. These interviews can be placed into five categories: (1) former Congressional staffers and foreign policy advisors to Representative Charles Diggs during his tenure as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa; (2) prominent Black elected officials involved with Black political organizing in the early 1970s; (3) people who were part of the early efforts to establish an African American foreign policy lobby; (4) people who worked with TransAfrica in both paid and volunteer capacities between its founding and 2009; and (5) people who were a part of the cadre of activists who worked on foreign policy advocacy efforts in support of African liberation during the 1980s and 1990s. This latter category includes people who were both supporters and critics of TransAfrica and of its Executive Director, Randall Robinson. 30
The oral histories serve two purposes in this study. They supplement the existing works on the foreign policy advocacy efforts of African Americans in the post-civil rights era. These interviews are particularly useful in constructing the narrative of the origins and early history of TransAfrica. In some instances and on certain topics, these personal accounts function as counter narratives to those found in existing studies on African American international political activism in the post-civil rights era. Moreover, because these interviews include both well- and lesser-known people, they also present an opportunity to ensure that the personal narratives and perspectives of some of these otherwise undistinguishable actors become part of the written record.

The archive was most useful in constructing the narrative on the first few years following the initial founding of TransAfrica. The archival materials included a host of documents including speeches by Randall Robinson and other TransAfrica affiliated personalities; and articles from newspapers including The Washington Post, New York Times, The Boston Herald, and other newspapers of local, national, and international reach. Other archival materials employed in this study include organizational budgets, minutes from board of directors’ meetings, fundraising letters, and financial statements. In addition, regular publications issued by TransAfrica including its periodic issue briefs and its journal, TransAfrica Forum, also function as primary sources.

Structure of the Dissertation

In chapter 1, I review several bodies of literature relevant to the study of African American efforts to influence U.S. policies toward Africa in the post-civil rights era. Through this chapter, I locate the dissertation among studies that have focused on African Americans and U.S. foreign policy, ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy, and Anti-Apartheid activism in the U.S. I draw upon the book-length works of Randall Robinson as well as the studies that have made chapter length contributions on the role of TransAfrica as part of broader studies on the multiracial movement against apartheid in the United States, and those that have focused on African American anti-apartheid activism, more specifically.

In chapter 2, I examine the international political context of the 1960s and 1970s. In this chapter, I describe the origins and trajectory of apartheid in South Africa as well as the conditions leading up to the Zimbabwe War of Liberation and the Angolan and Mozambican Civil Wars. To aid in contextualizing the 1960s and 1970s, I also consider the history of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa since 1960. I am specifically concerned with the impact of Cold War politics, and how fear of the spread of communism shaped U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. I use this chapter to highlight the different ways that successive U.S. presidential administrations—from John F. Kennedy to Jimmy Carter—creatively evaded foreign policy positions that would have facilitated the restoration of Black majority rule in Southern Africa. This chapter frames the oppositional logic of African American leaders about their collective relationship to the U.S. foreign policy establishment and how this laid the
groundwork for a type of adversarial diplomacy that would be employed by African American leaders in the decades that followed. In other words, this chapter provides an explanation for why the diplomatic and foreign policy interests of African Americans became oppositional to those of the state in the 1960s and 1970s.

In chapters 3 through 6, I examine the complex web of African American political organizing in the post-civil rights era. I distinguish this period by the emergence of a new Black politics that was instrumental in blurring the lines between the domestic and the international. I use these chapters to advance the argument that African American political, intellectual, and organization leaders mobilized to support African liberation despite their ideological divisions on domestic matters. Moreover, through the narrative offered in this chapter, I aim to show how these Black leaders defined, Congressional politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building as the four major approaches to adversarial diplomacy, even in the face of their ideological divisions.

In the third chapter, I consider the impact and outcomes of the Civil Rights and Black Power Movements and how this era facilitated the engineering of a new African American politics. It is within this new African American politics that I locate the emergence of a commitment among African American leaders to creating a sustained oppositional voice in matters of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the African diaspora. In my review of the new Black politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s, I examine the ways that African Americans engaged with African liberation utilizing various approaches and how these represent approaches to adversarial diplomacy. In Congressional politics, I consider the work of Congressman Charles Diggs through the House Subcommittee on Africa and how this entity provided a critical connection between African American intellectuals concerned with African liberation and the traditional U.S. foreign policy establishment. In the area of intellectual politics, chapter 3 looks at what I characterize as the liberal and the radical. It associates the liberal intellectualism with Black American academics who worked in the universities and on Congressional staffs to engage issues related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. In my review of the radical Black intellectual politics of the late 1960s and early 1970s, I locate this brand of intellectualism within the narrative of Black Leftist politics that surfaced in the mid-1960s in consequence of the ideological fissures of the civil rights era. Though I am principally concerned with the ways that radical intellectuals engaged with the African liberation struggles, I nonetheless engage the ways that they endeavored to mobilize around domestic issues as well. Finally, in this chapter, I point to the ways that these different intellectual camps overlapped. By this I mean that there were in fact people who operated effectively in the different African American political camps and served as critical conduits in the domestic and foreign policy organizing efforts of the late 1960s and early 1970s. This chapter ends on the eve of 1972, which I characterize in the subsequent chapter as a crucial year for African American domestic and international political organizing.

In chapter 4, I focus on four prominent events that highlight 1972 as a pivotal year in African American political organizing on domestic and international issues.
First is the meeting of a cadre of African American academics, foreign policy authorities, and organization leaders held in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico. I show how the participants at this gathering addressed some critical issues on the horizon related to U.S. foreign policy and the African liberation struggles. I also characterize the Barranquitas meeting as one of the first instances where African American intellectuals explored the idea of a foreign policy lobby in any significant measure in the 1970s. Second is the National Black Political Convention, held in Gary, Indiana. I point to the attention given to Africa and African Liberation in the National Black Political Agenda and the Gary Declaration and how these profound expressions connected African American politics and African liberation in the post-civil rights era. The third event was the CBC’s African American National Conference on Africa which helped to galvanize an international contingent of Black leaders around the Southern African liberation struggles, issues of development and aid, and on U.S. foreign policy toward the region. Finally, in chapter 4, I examine the first African Liberation Day (ALD) demonstrations held in 1972. I locate the origins of the ALD within the Black Power politics of the 1960s and 1970s. I use the ALD demonstrations and the subsequent establishment of the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) to illustrate how Black Power leaders succeeded in bringing together an ideologically diverse group of activists, employed the Black Power strategy of mass mobilization, and succeeded in galvanizing the American masses around a foreign policy matter in ways theretofore unseen. Through this chapter, I point to how the activism of 1972 placed African liberation squarely on the table of issues important to Black political, intellectual, and organization leaders. Moreover, I contend in this chapter that 1972 was also a fundamental moment in the making of adversarial diplomacy. It was in this year that African American leaders continued to employ Congressional politics, and intellectual politics to advance their oppositional interests vis-à-vis the state on foreign policy issues. However, I show how the first ALD demonstrations succeeded in defining mass mobilization as an additional approach to adversarial diplomacy.

In chapter 5, I discuss the African liberation advocacy efforts of African American activists that took place between 1973 and 1977. I return to the establishment of the African Liberation Support Committee, the subsequent ALD demonstrations of 1973 and 1974, and the intra-organization and intra-racial conflicts that contributed to the fall of the ALSC. This chapter also considers the ongoing efforts in the House of Representatives to challenge U.S. policies believed to be detrimental to the interests of Blacks in Southern Africa. I argue that the organizing activities in Congress provided necessary continuity to the African liberation mobilizing effort in the U.S. as the mass mobilization strategy of the ALSC faltered by mid-decade. This chapter concludes with the CBC’s Leadership Summit on Africa and the adoption of the Afro-American Manifesto on Southern Africa. I identify this conference as one of the most significant gatherings out of which the commitment to maintain an active presence of African Americans in matters of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa would materialize through the establishment of TransAfrica less than one year later. Through this chapter, I situate TransAfrica as
not only an outcome of the CBC’s Leadership Summit and the Manifesto, but also as the outgrowth of a trajectory of efforts by African American activists to mobilize in support of the Southern African liberation struggles in the 1970s.

In the final chapter, I tell the story of the early development of TransAfrica. This chapter looks at TransAfrica’s initial efforts to build infrastructure, its attempts to secure funding from various foundations and private donors, and to secure a foothold in the African American community whose interests its architects envisioned it would represent. Owing to the seminal role that Randall Robinson played in TransAfrica’s history, this chapter engages some of the details about Robinson’s life. This includes an exploration of the sequence of events that led Robinson to his role in TransAfrica, his significance to the organization, to the communities of activists working to support African liberation, and who he became—through TransAfrica—in the Washington, DC foreign policy establishment and community of lobbyists. I also examine TransAfrica and Randall Robinson’s efforts to build a high-profile board of directors who could serve a financial, political, and social backbone for the organization. In the end, this chapter draws attention to institution building as an approach to adversarial diplomacy as exemplified by the establishment of TransAfrica.


2 Though it was published unsigned, the Manifesto is recorded as having been written by Herschelle Challenor, Randall Robinson, and Charles Cobb. See Randall Robinson, Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America (New York: Penguin Publishers, 1999); Herschelle Sullivan Challenor, Interview with the author, 9 February 2011, Atlanta, GA.


4 Ibid.

5 Some of the early twentieth century engagements with Africa by African Americans emphasized repatriation. This was at the foundation of the Marcus Garvey-led Universal Negro Improvement Association. Others focused on aiding in the decolonization of Africa, which had been the major focus of the five Pan African Congresses organized by W.E.B. Du Bois between 1919 and 1945. During the final years of the Civil Rights Movement, African American participation in diaspora politics was framed around the desire of some African American activists to seek support from the global community of Black leaders for the Black freedom struggle in the U.S.

It was in this same meeting that Carter praised Young as being “responsible for improved relations with about 50 countries in the world. See Jacqueline Trescott, “The Survival of Andy Young: Walking the Tightrope Between Activism and Diplomacy,” Washington Post, 8 August 1979, E1.


Previous efforts to mobilize African Americans around Africa related issues in the post world war II era were short lived. These included the Council on African Affairs (1937-1955), the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (1962-1968), and the African Liberation Support Committee (1972-1975). The failures of these earlier efforts were largely in consequence of the domestic and international political climate of their respective time periods. Factors contributing to the fall of these earlier efforts included McCarthyism of the 1940s and 1950s that resulted in the accusation that African American domestic and international activists were aligned with communism as advanced by the Eastern Bloc. Efforts such as these also faltered in the mid-twentieth century as dominant African American organizations such as the NAACP harnessed their energies around the imminent battle for domestic civil rights in the United States that would gain momentum in the early 1950s. And in the 1970s, the ALSC would disintegrate owing to ideological factions among Black American radicals coupled with U.S. government-led efforts to neutralize African American leaders perceived to be a threat to the state. See Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: African Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); James H. Meriwether, Proudly We Can Be Africans: African Americans and Africa, 1935-1961 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002); Brenda Gayle Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Cedric Johnson, Revolutionaries to Race Leaders: Black Power and the Making of African American Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007).

I am not the first to make use of the term adversarial diplomacy. However, the conceptual framework that I offer in this study differs from the other instances in which the term has been used. Political Scientists Brigid Starkey, Mark Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld have already identified adversarial diplomacy as occurring at the point where “the interests of two more countries clash, but there is little or no chance of armed conflict.” They go further to identify recent examples of adversarial diplomacy such as in the case of “negotiation over economic issues—market shares, methods for dealing with trade imbalances—and, more recently, negotiations over intellectual property rights.” Moreover, they identify other strategies used in adversarial diplomacy that “range from imposing strict deadlines on negotiations to threatening the cessation of diplomatic contact.” In their estimation, these other approaches can also range from those emblematic overtures appealing to the court of public opinion or those that they characterize as “more activist in nature,” translating into specific actions against an opposing party. See Brigid Starkey, Mark Boyer, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Negotiating a Complex World: an Introduction to International Negotiation (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 128.

The participation of non-state actors in the international system has been recognized in the international relations scholarship. As a type of “ unofficial diplomacy,” non-state actors have been characterized by political scientists as track II diplomacy, which situates intra-state political factions as actors in the international system. Also, note that Joseph Montville made the original distinction between multiple tracks of diplomacy in the early 1980s. See, William D. Davidson and Joseph V. Montville, “Foreign Policy According to Freud,” Foreign Policy No. 45 (Winter, 1981-1982): 145-157. For more information on track II diplomacy see, for example, Hussein Agha, Shai Feldman, Ahmad Khalidi, and Zeev Schiff, Track II Diplomacy: Lessons from the Middle East (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 2003). For more information on diplomacy in general, see, for example, Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration (New York: Routledge, 2011).
Foreign policy scholars such as Alexander DeConde have pointed to the conundrum that pluralism (specifically ethnic pluralism)—and its acknowledgement of, or allowance for, hyphenated identities—presents on questions of U.S. foreign policy. See Alexander DeConde, *Ethnicity, Race, and American Foreign Policy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), x.

I am indebted to my colleague Margo Mahan for her feedback on this chapter in its very early stages.

Other examples illustrating the intersection of adversarial diplomacy and diaspora politics include the various U.S. based foreign policy lobbying organizations that claim particular ethnic groups as their constituencies. These include, for example, the Jewish American Lobby, the America Israel Public Affairs Committee, the Egyptian Lobby, the Cuba-American Lobby, the Turkish Lobby, and the China Lobby.


Ibid.


See Note 20.

Though they have been applied to the transnational exchanges of white and non-white ethnic groups, the concept of a diaspora has been particularly relevant to the transnational exchanges of ethnic minority groups. See for example, Ronald W. Walters, *Pan Africanism in the African Diaspora: An Analysis of Modern Afrocentric Political Movements* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993); Donald M. Macraiden, *The Irish Diaspora in Britain, 1750-1939* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Marc Simon Rodriguez, *The Tejano Diaspora: Mexican Americanism & Ethnic Politics in Texas and Wisconsin* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011); Rebecca Kobrin, *Jewish Bialystok and its Diaspora* Rebecca Kobrin (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010); Frank Andre Guridy, *Forging Diaspora: Afro-Cubans and African Americans in a World of Empire and Jim Crow* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010).

Engaging a particular diaspora, political scientist Ramla Bandele characterizes the connection between diaspora politics and transnational activism. When these two intersect, she argues, “there are three political actors involved… the actors themselves; the nation-states from which émigrés have settled; and the homeland, which may be dependent on diaspora remittances or lobbying assistance.” See Ramla Bandele, *Black Star: African American Activism in the International Political Economy* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 2.

Ibid.


Ibid.
At its founding in 1977, TransAfrica was incorporated as TransAfrica, Inc. Initially operating as a 501c4 organization for tax purposes, TransAfrica, Inc., was limited in its ability to raise funds from foundations and other grant-making organizations. Thus, its board of directors incorporated TransAfrica Forum, as an educational arm of TransAfrica. This organization operated as a 501c3 organization and enabled “TransAfrica” to appeal for funds from foundations and other philanthropies from which it was previously unable to appeal for funds. Known as the “Lobby”, TransAfrica, Inc. is now defunct. Surviving in its place is the 501c3 organization, TransAfrica Forum. This will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.

There have been several book-length studies that have dealt with TransAfrica in breadth. In many cases, these works have located TransAfrica within the broader transnational movement to aid in economic divestment and the imposition of sanctions leading to the ultimate fall of apartheid in South Africa. However, among the handful of studies that have addressed TransAfrica as part of the broader global movement against the apartheid regime in South Africa, none have focused specifically on TransAfrica and the role that its first executive director, Randall Robinson, played in its founding and its work during the organization’s initial twenty-four years. Existing studies have dealt with the broad multi-racial coalition that organized around the cause of anti-apartheid. Others have chronicled the work of African Americans against apartheid during the latter half of the 20th century. Still, there remains absent from the literature a comprehensive study history of TransAfrica’s history and its contributions to the U.S. and global anti-apartheid movements and to efforts to engage broader questions of U.S. foreign policy on matters apropos to continental Africa and the African Diaspora in the Caribbean and Latin America.

The full list of interviews conducted for this study can be found in the bibliography.
CHAPTER 1
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The purpose of this chapter is to examine some of the major texts in several academic subfields that are relevant to a study on the efforts of African Americans to support the Southern African liberation struggles in the post-civil rights era. Though this study can be situated within numerous fields, I have identified what I believe to be the most relevant. First are studies that deal with the specific topic of African Americans and U.S. foreign policy. Second is the body of works on the anti-apartheid movement, specifically those studies that have both historicized and analyzed American activism around Southern Africa, before, during, and following the fall of apartheid in South Africa. The third field engaged in this literature review is ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. Because this study is premised on an interest in the origins of the foreign policy lobby, TransAfrica, this chapter also engages some of the writings by TransAfrica’s founding executive director, Randall Robinson. This is in addition to reviewing the few studies that have focused specifically on TransAfrica, its history, influence, foreign policy campaigns, and the people involved with the organization at various points in its history. In reviewing the numerous studies that comprise these various fields, my principal objective is to situate this dissertation within a larger body of knowledge. These bodies of scholarship also reflect the fields in which I locate this study, particularly its theoretical intervention, adversarial diplomacy. Though I offer an analysis of some of these works (including identifying some of their shortcomings), my intent here is not to dismiss the contributions of these authors in order to substantiate my own. Rather, my objective is to contextualize this study and illustrate how it might add to the bodies of knowledge engaged in this chapter.

African Americans and U.S. Foreign Policy

The field of African Americans and U.S. foreign policy is largely dominated by historians and political scientists. Studies conducted by historians deal primarily with U.S. foreign policy in the period up to and immediately following the Civil Rights Movement. Among the works by political scientists, most volumes are edited collections that cover various periods and subject areas. In both instances, the field of African Americans and U.S. foreign policy includes works that focus on African Americans and Africa, African Americans and global affairs, and African Americans and U.S. foreign affairs. Collectively, these works provide important and diverse perspectives about the different ways that African Americans have engaged in global affairs. These include African Americans working through the U.S. Department of State and other relevant agencies dealing with matters of foreign policy, the United Nations, and African Americans who have engaged in foreign affairs advocacy, diplomacy, and foreign policy development through non-traditional means.
Some of the earlier and most prominent works on African Americans and U.S. foreign policy dealt primarily with African American engagement with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, and date this interest on the part of African Americans to the mid-nineteenth century. Among these is the sole text authored by Elliott P. Skinner (1992), *African Americans and U.S. Policy Toward Africa, 1850-1924: In Defense of Black Nationality*. Skinner describes African American efforts to influence U.S. policy toward Africa as a project aimed, initially, at facilitating the creation of a Black Nationality, through which Africans and African descendants could realize a collective effervescence and “impact within on the global system.”

Skinner also provides some important historical context grounding contemporary methods through which African Americans have worked to influence U.S. policy toward Africa. He identifies two primary trends in this area. First, are those who participate in unofficial capacities and work to serve as an overtly oppositional voice vis-à-vis the U.S. government on foreign policy matters toward Africa. The second group he identifies is comprised of those African Americans who have worked in official capacities within the U.S. government including service as envoys, diplomats, and in other roles. To the latter point, Skinner makes the astute, but not surprising, observation that those African Americans who participated in the foreign policy community as envoys and diplomats required a certain allegiance (or perceived allegiance) to the U.S. and thus U.S. national interests. However, he does not label these individuals as “sell-outs” to the interests of Africa and African Americans. Instead, he contends that these envoys interfaced with “the structural equivalence of what Du Bois once described in psychological terms as ‘double consciousness’.” Though Skinner’s study is consigned to a period ending in 1924, he mentions “double consciousness” at work among African Americans involved in the foreign policy process through the Department of State in the decades immediately following 1924 and during the remainder of the twentieth century. The impulse of “double consciousness” undoubtedly has implications for how we understand Africans in the U.S. Department of State, the United Nations and other national and international agencies through which matters of foreign policy are negotiated and engaged. Indeed this strand of African American participation in foreign affairs is personified historically by Ralph Bunche, Patricia Roberts Harris and others. More contemporarily, this filament of foreign affairs participation is exemplified by U.S. Secretaries of State Colin Powell and Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Susan Rice, and, preceding the three of them, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young.

Skinner’s elucidation of the U.S.’s initial ignoring of the work of African Americans in this area can be used to explain the oppositional or alternate venues that many African Americans employed in their participation in foreign policy and global affairs. What is more, Skinner cites the elite nature of foreign affairs and the foreign policy making process, which, combined with the subjugation of African descendants in the U.S. based on race, has served as one of the principal bases on which African Americans have been denied participation in foreign affairs and the devaluation of their independent efforts. Interesting though, is Skinner’s observation...
of an apparent conflict between the systematic disregard for African American participation and interest in foreign affairs (particularly concerning Africa) by many African American leaders in the early twentieth century. This conflict is most acute when considered relative to the role that Africa has played in the African American freedom struggle. As Skinner, and others, point out, a significant component of the narrative of freedom, advancement, and uplift articulated by African Americans has demonstrated an awareness of the need to have a say in how the U.S. interacts with the world, particularly with Africa.  

In *From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960* (1981), Henry Jackson offers a detailed and sweeping overview of the different issues and challenges in the development of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa starting at 1960. Chronicling U.S. engagement with Africa beginning with the Congolese crisis, Jackson illustrates the different ways that the U.S. has engaged with Africa since the Kennedy administration (1960) and shortly before the book’s publication. Jackson notes the ways that the Congolese crisis served as the principal basis on which the U.S. could come to establish itself as a world power vis-à-vis Africa, and how this approach would shape the ways that the U.S. engaged with the African continent for decades to come. An important and timely update to the scholarship at the time, *From the Congo to Soweto* mentions the decline of U.S. power in Egypt; U.S. economic dependence on Africa—particularly North Africa—for petroleum; and cites the crisis in Southern Africa (that was current at the time the book was written) as a place where the U.S. was in dire need to make critical decisions about the role that it would play in the broad region of Southern Africa, and, more pointedly, in South Africa. Jackson also draws a connection between the U.S.’s pre-1960 practice of “dismissing Africa as an appendage of colonial Europe” (and thus categorically ignoring this part of the world) with the lack of a presence of an African American foreign policy lobby (that is, prior to the establishment of TransAfrica in the late 1970s). And, pertaining to the Black foreign policy lobby, *From the Congo to Soweto* is one of the earlier works that mentions TransAfrica’s founding and some of the people involved with the organization at the outset.

Jackson also provides some important information in both historical and then contemporary terms about the efforts of African Americans to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. In a thorough chapter on the linkages between African Americans and Africa, Jackson dates these activities back to the mid-to-late-nineteenth century and includes the American Colonization Society, African American missionary work, the Pan African Congress movement, the Universal Negro Improvement Association, Council on African Affairs, American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa, and the debate between radicals and integrationists about the best approach for African American engagement with Africa. Consistent with other works on the subject, Jackson engages questions of aid to Africa and underscores the prevalence of two trends in African American foreign affairs participation. These are, participation through the appropriate U.S. and U.N. foreign policy making entities, and through oppositional means. The latter of these two trends is characterized by the African American foreign policy lobby as
established in the late 1970s and the efforts of organizations such as the Council on African Affairs and the others named above.

In addition to studies previously mentioned, the topic of African Americans in foreign affairs has gained increased attention from historians in recent years. Some of the more contemporary works on the subject engage the period up to 1960. Thus, Jackson's work—though more broadly focused on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa in general—provides somewhat of an update to this scholarship, even though his book was published fifteen to twenty years before some of the other texts. For example, in *Proudly We Can Be Africans: Black Americans and Africa, 1935-1961*, James Meriwether examines the role of Africa in African American political discourse and life during the period of 1935-1961. Particular attention is given to the role that Black Americans have played in responding to “pivotal developments” in Africa during this period. Moreover, this work explores the role of African American newspapers during this period and the impact that they had as transmitters of information among African Americans. Central to this discussion is the diverse approaches that each of these newspapers took to the various international and domestic issues facing Africans in the U.S. and in Africa. This book further explores the role that Africa played in the “Black freedom struggles in America,” with a specific focus on the role of Africa in the evolution of the African American collective identity. By focusing on the period of 1935-1961, the text explores the redefinition of the relationship between contemporary Africa and the Black American. In this text, Meriwether discusses several historical moments during the period of 1935-1961 in which major political developments in Africa took place and examines the ways in which these events resonated with African Americans and their freedom struggles in the United States. Utilizing archival information available from newspapers such as the *Courier, Crisis, African World*, Meriwether constructs a historical account of the ebbs and flows of the collective relationship between the African American freedom struggles and the African independence movements. Also significant in this text is Meriwether's discussion about the varying opinions that Black Americans held about Africa and how these ideas further shaped the overall consciousness of African Americans about Africa and African issues.\(^\text{13}\)

With a more pointed focus on the work of the Council on African Affairs, Penny Von Eschen, in *Race Against Empire* (2001) explores the efforts of African Americans to fight against colonialism in Africa. Von Eschen advances the argument that African Americans have always understood that their fight and plight against racism and discrimination in the U.S. was connected to the struggles of other diasporic and continental Africans. This text accomplishes the important task of exploring the ways in which the Black American fight against racism was used to reframe the way the world understood racism during the Cold War. Von Eschen associates this period of African diaspora politics with nation building projects in continental Africa and makes the important contribution of identifying the “political leaders, intellectuals, journalists, and activists who articulated the bonds between Black Americans, Africans, and all oppressed peoples; to emphasize their creative interventions in a rapidly changing world of war; and to trace the processes by which
their vision came to animate African American political discourse." Moreover, her work focuses on the activities of particular organizations including the NAACP and the Council on Foreign Relations. Specific sections of the text focus on the "emergence and elaboration of anticolonial politics during World War II and the immediate postwar period"; the obscuring of African diaspora politics and several processes that are related to this; and the impact of the fall of anticolonialist movements on African Americans.15

More recently, the field of African Americans and U.S. foreign policy has been populated by several edited collections. These works have provided important historical context as well as engaged some of the more contemporary issues impacting African Americans in all aspect of global affairs and foreign affairs participation. To their credit, these compilations have illustrated the broad reach of African American involvement in global affairs, and have included the works of state and non-state actors, extending the reach of the subject to reflect an engagement with more sweeping questions of U.S. foreign policy toward the wider African diaspora.16

Anti-Apartheid Activism in the United States

Because anti-apartheid was a prevailing foreign policy issue for African American activists concerned with African liberation during the post-civil rights era, and was the foreign policy campaign for which TransAfrica is most known, this study must be situated within the literature on the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. In comparison to the relatively large collection of works dealing with the rise, maintenance, and fall of apartheid in South Africa, few works have addressed the contributions of U.S. activists to this effort. Pointing to some of the major texts on American anti-apartheid activism during the latter part of the twentieth century, this section highlights the major trends in the scholarship. Common themes among texts that have focused on U.S. anti-apartheid activism are as follows: first, although the U.S. anti-apartheid movement crystallized with marked legislative action by the U.S. Congress in the late 1980s, there were musings of an anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. dating back to the earlier parts of the twentieth century; second, the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. was part of a broad international movement among like-minded activists to eradicate apartheid in South Africa; third, the anti-apartheid, while focusing specifically on South Africa, was part of a regional focus on Southern Africa, including Rhodesia, Zimbabwe, and Namibia; and last, but not less important, is these studies' collective focus on anti-apartheid as a multiracial movement.

Janice Love (1985) offers a timely contribution to the anti-apartheid literature. Representing one the earliest tomes on the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S., Love’s study was researched and written at a time when the anti-apartheid movement was well underway.17 As a result, it makes an important contribution to what was a dearth in the literature, and captures elements of history while they were happening. Illustrating the multiracial makeup and global reach of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement, this study points to the predominance of nongovernment
organizations—both national and international—in launching and sustaining the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. This study also illustrates the ways that U.S. activism was part of a worldwide movement against apartheid that was initiated by the people of South Africa themselves. Contextualizing the later activities of the anti-apartheid movement, Love points to the almost laissez-faire approach employed by the U.S. in dealing with the question of its support of the apartheid regime. In so doing, Love points to an important contradiction in U.S. foreign policy at the time. The U.S.—and its relevant agencies—while aware of the racist apartheid conditions of South Africa, went to great lengths to protect its economic interests thus contributing to its maintenance. Love also shows how the U.S.—through the Reagan administration’s policies of Constructive Engagement and the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce’s continued role in maintaining trade and investment relationships between the U.S. and South Africa—provided the fuel for the broad focus of U.S. anti-apartheid activists imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, and prohibiting American corporations from conducting business in South African economic markets.

In The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement, Love also offers an analysis of the “economic sanctions activities” advocated by anti-apartheid activists around the globe. She also mentions the numerous other activities associated with anti-apartheid activism in the U.S. These include unambiguous recognition of the contributions made by Black Americans to the cause of anti-apartheid early in the twentieth century and again in the 1970s, and the role of church organizations, which engaged in missionary work and helped to finance other anti-apartheid activities. Directing attention to the early protest activities such as the protest of the South African rugby team’s 1981 tour of the U.S., scholarship programs for South African students to study at American colleges and universities, and the stances taken by celebrities (of all racial designations) in refusing to perform in Southern Africa, Love depicts the anti-apartheid movement’s growth into a broad multifaceted transnational movement of organizations and famous, lesser-known, and undistinguishable people. This study also represents one of the first times that TransAfrica is mentioned in the scholarship on the anti-apartheid movement. In particular, Love mentions TransAfrica’s role in gaining access to classified documents from the State Department during the Reagan administration, including documents detailing “formal meetings between administration and South African officials,” and evidence of attempts by the U.S. government to cooperate in efforts to incapacitate the African National Congress.

Owing to its timeliness, this study’s central focus on the sanctions debate is critical. Through her discussion on the sanctions component of the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S., Love points to the myriad activities of individuals and organizations lobbying the U.S. government to impose sanctions on South Africa and on organizations doing business with South Africa. She points to the sanctions activities at various levels, including state and local governments. By focusing on the various levels of sanctions activism, Love illustrates the far-reaching nature of
anti-apartheid activism. In short, the sanctions debate helped to prove that the anti-apartheid activism in the United States was a movement that actually engaged multiple levels of state activity. What is more, Love highlights the various responses to the sanctions debate, including the reactions by the U.S. government and the ways that this response varied depending on the presidential administration occupying the White House. In addition, this study points to the responses of industry (both domestic and international) and the South African government to the call for sanctions. Business responses included the “adoption of a code of conduct for their subsidiary operations,” which was based on the Sullivan Principles established in 1977 by noted African American preacher, Leon H. Sullivan. Love shows the responses of the South African government to the threats of sanctions from the international community as well.

An additional point worthy of mention from Love’s analysis is her presentation of the anti-apartheid activism on the part of shareholders. She points to the ways that individuals and groups not only divested from the holdings they may have had with corporations that do business with South Africa, but also the divestment activities which “attempted to get churches, universities, states and other institutions to sell their shares or withdraw their patronage from banks and corporations that do business in South Africa.” Finally, an important feature of Love’s project is the attention paid to the role that African Americans played throughout the anti-apartheid movement. In addition, this study provides important historical context on the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. on a national, state, and local level while placing the issue within international context.

William Minter, Gail Hovey, and Charles Cobb (2008) also add an important element to the relatively slim body of knowledge on American support of the liberation struggles of Southern Africa. In their edited collection, No Easy Victories: African Liberation and American Activists Over Half a Century, 1950-2000, Minter et al, present an extensive representation of the history of American activism in support of African liberation during the latter half of the twentieth century. Using oral history, archival data, and autobiography, the essays contained within this collection present one of the first accounts on the work of individual activists who devoted their lives and careers to aid in liberation struggles on the African continent. This text provides some important historical background on American activism around anti-apartheid from some of the people who participated in these activities. Different from other studies on the anti-apartheid movement, this collection details the work of American anti-apartheid activism by engaging the narratives of some of the actual people who labored against apartheid. In its historical overview, No Easy Victories points to the ways that African American organizations have long partnered with other ostensibly “non-Black” organizations in the name of African liberation—as evident through the complimentary work of the Council on African Affairs and the Americans for South African Resistance. This study does not romanticize these relationships. Instead, it acknowledges the complex issues surrounding American race relations in the mid-twentieth century, and shows how these organizations worked toward similar objectives even in the face of these issues.
Similar to Nesbitt and Hostetter, *No Easy Victories* connects the anti-apartheid activism of the 1940s to the movement’s crystallization in the 1980s. It accomplishes this by pointing to the significance of the civil rights and Black Power activism of the 1950s through the early 1970s and the ways that this period coincided with African liberation struggles. In the introduction, Minter points to the broad multiracial character of the people who labored against apartheid during this period and illustrates that this was the same multiracial group that labored against racism in the U.S.

This collection also provides a wealth of short essays by and about a cross section of American activists who labored in support of the liberation struggles on continental Africa. The mention of Alphaeus Hunton, E.S. Reddy, Robert S. Browne, Charles Cobb, Harry Belafonte, Robert Van Lierop, Goler Butcher, and numerous others whose contributions are scarcely reflected in the written record, adds an important dimension to the scholarship on anti-apartheid activism, particularly among people in the U.S. To its credit, this collection accomplishes the important task of disaggregating the general sanctions movement and the anti-apartheid movement. It unearts the differences between these very distinct movements and the people who played important roles in advancing the cause of African liberation in the U.S.

*No Easy Victories* locates TransAfrica as one of several American organizations working against apartheid and for the broader cause of the liberation of Southern Africa. However, *No Easy Victories* stops short of acknowledging the magnitude of TransAfrica’s contribution to the collective struggle for African liberation. Pointing to TransAfrica as an African American organization whose focus was to represent Blacks on matters of U.S. foreign policy concerning the Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean, *No Easy Victories* considers the organization in relation to groups such as the American Committee on Africa (ACOA), Africa Fund, and the Washington Office on Africa (WOA). In his introduction to the volume, Minter triangulates these organizations as equally central to American anti-apartheid efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. However, his analysis of the impact of race during this period is quite awkward. He lauds organizations such as ACOA and WOA as being multiracial—a point that is not disputed here—contending that they received unfair assessments as being “White” organizations even when there were African Americans in key leadership roles in both of them. However, his acknowledgement of race as the most important differential between the three organizations does not recognize the significance of inserting an African American foreign policy lobby into the anti-apartheid movement, or the ways that TransAfrica was able to mobilize popular and Congressional support for sanctions legislation. In a sense, Minter’s contribution in *No Easy Victories* attempts to de-center TransAfrica’s impact on and contribution to American anti-apartheid activism, and, by extension, the global movement against apartheid.

activism dating back to the mid 1940s. This includes the challenges of anti-apartheid activism during the Cold War—through the civil rights and Black Power movements of the 1950s and 1960s and into the wholesale anti-apartheid activism of the 1980s. Nesbitt provides important historical context for African American anti-apartheid activism. Through an analysis of the aforementioned periods, Nesbitt situates the efforts of African Americans to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Africa into three ideological factions, which he delineates as left, liberal, and nationalist. One of the central objectives undertaken in this study is an attempt to locate African American activism at the center of the anti-apartheid movement throughout its long history. Race for Sanctions succeeds at illustrating the anti-apartheid movement’s origins in “the Black internationalist politics of the 1940s” and chronicles its evolution through the 1980s—despite the declining interest in the cause from White liberals in the 1950s—when it saw a resurgence of anti-apartheid activism ushered by and through the leadership of African Americans. Nesbitt also situates African American anti-apartheid activism within a global movement to end apartheid. However, different from other studies, Nesbitt points to the early work of African Americans—particularly during the decades of the civil rights and Black Power movements—to locate civil rights, anti-colonialism, and, more pointedly, anti-apartheid, within a global Black freedom struggle. By locating the origins of African American anti-apartheid activism in the mid-1940s, Nesbitt shows how African American activists were engaged with this issue for decades before the Free South Africa Movement.

Through a chapter on TransAfrica, Nesbitt provides some important background information on the development of the African American foreign policy lobby. He locates TransAfrica’s emergence within three—often overlapping—communities of African American intellectuals: one being a group which had long advocated the need for an African American foreign policy; those who worked on and in the Congressional offices of African American members of Congress; and the Congressional Black Caucus itself. He shows how these groups came together for the CBC’s Leadership Summit on Africa in 1976, which resulted in the adoption of the African American Manifesto on Southern Africa. Through his brief biographical notes on Randall Robinson, Nesbitt—like Hostetter—references Robinson’s coming of age in the American South, service in the U.S. Army, studies at Virginia Union University and Harvard Law School, the year he spent living in Tanzania, and the interface with race and racism in these times and spaces. Importantly, he shows these as foundational to Robinson’s understanding of a relationship between African Americans and Africans throughout the world, and the role that Robinson believed he and other African Americans ought to play in aiding in these liberation struggles. Nesbitt locates Robinson in the company of other Pan African activists and intellectuals including Du Bois, Robeson, A. Philip Randolph, Martin Luther King, Martin Delaney, and Alexander Crummell.

This study also points to some of the broader political forces operating in the U.S. and abroad and the impact these had on anti-apartheid activism. To this point, Nesbitt gives voice to the work of Rev. Jesse Jackson and the role that he played in
the anti-apartheid struggle as a presidential candidate. He also makes mention of transnational partnerships forged with world leaders such as Bishop Desmond Tutu. Although Nesbitt makes a marked contribution to the literature by updating the history of the anti-apartheid movement to include the contributions made by African Americans over the span of nearly fifty years, this work is not without its shortcomings. Nesbitt makes important interventions in the scholarship on African Americans in foreign policy and African American internationalism more broadly. However, his chapter on the TransAfrica, called “The Free South Africa Movement,” and the succeeding chapter, “The Race for Sanctions,” only tell a partial story of this important dynamic period. Considering the number of people who were active in TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement, this study grossly under-utilizes oral history; citing only eleven oral history interviews, most of which were conducted by teleconference.31 As with other chapter length works on TransAfrica, Nesbitt employs Randall Robinson’s autobiography as the primary source of some factual and perspective-based information. By inadequately utilizing oral history, this study misses an important opportunity to engage the perspectives of the numerous people who were involved with TransAfrica, the Free South Africa Movement and the overall sanctions debate. Nesbitt’s study, particularly its under-utilization of oral history, is equally flawed owing to its failure to engage a gender analysis of broader anti-apartheid activism, of TransAfrica, or the Free South Africa Movement. Surely, those who read the history of this movement should be able to learn about the numerous African American women who labored against apartheid in the face of the gender-specific challenges endured by women. At best, Race for Sanctions only makes cursory mention of the contributions of African American women like Herschelle Challenor, who was instrumental in the founding and early advancement of TransAfrica. It does not refer to the contributions of predominately women-led organizations such as the Southern Africa Support Project and others to the anti-apartheid cause.

Another shortcoming of this study is its failure to engage the people of TransAfrica in its chapter on the organization. While it makes significant mention of the Robinson’s work and activities, it fails to engage the other people involved in the group. Moreover, it makes mention of TransAfrica’s lobbying efforts, including letters written and publications authored, however, it references these as contributions of “TransAfrica” without engaging the people behind the scenes. The chapter on TransAfrica seems to de-center TransAfrica, Randall Robinson, and other people involved with the organization, even from the organization’s very activities. This is most evident through his mention of then presidential candidate Jesse Jackson’s work with the anti-apartheid movement during and surrounding the presidential election. Surely, Jackson made marked contributions in his own right to the anti-apartheid movement.32 However, these stand independently of a chapter focused on TransAfrica.

In discussing the Free South Africa Movement, Nesbitt, misses an important point. By separating the Free South Africa Movement from TransAfrica, the author dilutes the central role that TransAfrica played in launching the Free South Africa
Movement. Even his mention of the sit-in at the South African Embassy by Robinson, Walter Fauntroy, Mary Berry, and Eleanor Holmes-Norton does not engage these people’s connections to TransAfrica. Thus, it ignores the fact that TransAfrica not only played the leading role in launching the Free South Africa Movement but, with very slim staff, coordinated the protests and arrests at South African embassies and consulates for nearly two years. What is missing here is the significant role that TransAfrica—and, in particular, the people who worked and volunteered with and for it—played at a turning point in a long movement against apartheid. Nesbitt’s failure to engage the actual people of TransAfrica and the Free South Africa Movement (regardless of how the relationship between the two organizations is understood) represents a missed opportunity to write people into history who made significant contributions to the anti-apartheid movement, but remain otherwise unmentioned.

Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy

This study can also be located within the broader field of ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. Collectively, the works that comprise this field provide important historical context and a conceptual framework within which this dissertation can be located. Studies dealing with ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy began to surface in the mid- to late 1970s and have analyzed the efforts of ethnic based-organizations (i.e. organizations claiming an ethnic or racial group as its constituency) to influence U.S. foreign policy. These studies also engage important questions about the role that ethnicity should play in the development of U.S. foreign policy. The arguments in these studies range. There are those that critique, and in some ways attack, the involvement of ethnic-based organizations in U.S. foreign policy toward what is perceived as their ancestral homelands, pointing to the conundrum of ethnic pluralism and the conflicting or dual identity of hyphenated Americans. There are also studies that pointedly illustrate the long history of ethnic foreign policy lobbying on the part of White Americans in the early days of the republic and the ways that understandings and critiques of ethnic lobbying have changed throughout American history.

Alexander DeConde (1992) presents one of the first histories of ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy. This study provides historical context on a topic that is often associated with or reduced to contemporary efforts of modern-day minority ethnic organizations to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the places in the world understood to be their ancestral homelands. One of the most important features grounding this study is its recognition and critique of the overused practices of associating “ethnoracial” groups only with those who have historically been relegated to minority status vis-à-vis European-descended Americans, thus obscuring the actual ethnoraciality of American Whites. Offering a critique of existing scholarship on race and ethnicity, DeConde contends that most works on race and ethnicity have focused on “minorities,” thus excluding American Whites from their analyses. Instead, DeConde considers “Americans of English or British stock as belonging to a
discernable ethnic group with a traceable history” and thus focuses on the supremacy that these groups have brandished in the normativism of Anglo-American foreign policy.34

Central to DeConde’s analysis is his review of the history of European immigration to British Colonies in North America, pointing out the efforts of the early British settlers to maintain the ostensible Britishness of the colonies in the face of multiethnic European immigration and the presence of African descended and Native American populations. By focusing on the ways that the British immigrants to the American colonies engaged in ethnocentric politics, DeConde offers an imperative appraisal of the dominant discourses on ethnic groups and U.S. foreign policy. He points out that scholars of the subject tend to disagree “as to the origin of consciously practiced ethnic politics designed to influence American foreign relations.”35 Disputing this notion, DeConde observes that most scholars tend to locate the origin of “ethnic politics designed to influence American foreign relations” in the early nineteenth century with “the ‘new immigrants’ and their offspring.” This group of “new immigrants,” DeConde observes, are “the people of color, and the other minorities…the hyphenates who are usually associated with the special-interest lobbying in international matters.”36 By drawing attention to the early practices of European-descended ethnic groups to influence American foreign policy and relations, DeConde counters notions that, “Americans of British stock did not engage in such politics because they held to no allegiance other than to the United States.”37

DeConde also recognizes the significance of pluralism in American politics and the way that this manifests itself on matters of domestic and foreign policy. He engages an important critique of what he calls “academic assimilationists,” who see ethnicity as a threat to American politics, owing to its failure to dilute differences among Americans.38 He further contends that academic assimilationists present a less than sophisticated critique of ethnicity in American politics by blurring important distinctions between cultural and political loyalties among America’s “ethnic” populations. It is from this point that DeConde underpins the common political assertion about a general concern for “national interests,” illustrating the long history of the subjective nature of national interests.

Early on in the study, DeConde calls attention to the privileged nature of foreign affairs and foreign policy discourses,39 and later highlights the ways that national interests have been formulated by a power holding elite, who has explicitly expressed concern about the influence of ethnic groups in foreign policy. DeConde accentuates the decidedly subjective temperament of foreign relations, insisting that those who have embraced an “anti-ethnic” sentiment have “overlooked the reality that in the conduct of foreign relations the governing elite defined the national interests in its own terms, oftentimes as though it were a special-interest group.”40 Moreover, adds DeConde:

The dominant Anglo-American ethnic community also implemented the prescribed national interest so as to intimidate its possible challengers. So when the behavior of
minorities did not fit its criteria of national unity, its spokesmen condemned their politics as part of dirty business that had no place in diplomacy.\textsuperscript{41}

This study also provides information useful in countering allegations of the inappropriate involvement of ethnic based organizations in influencing U.S. foreign policy. It points to the assertions made by defenders of pluralism, particularly those dubbed the “new pluralists,” that the politics of minority interest groups are no more “divisive as the assimilationists claimed,” than “other forms of political confrontations.”\textsuperscript{42} As such, why should these organizations be considered any more or less divisive than those organizations who try to challenge the state and influence U.S. foreign policy decisions based on “economic, regional, or ideological reasons”?\textsuperscript{43} Finally, in his analysis of Anglo-American ethnic groups in relationship to “minority” ethnic groups and their respective efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy, DeConde reveals, and in some ways counters, many of the negative associations made with ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy.\textsuperscript{44} He writes:

When taken on its own terms, this negative appraisal of ethnic power can be persuasive. When, however, the Anglo-American group is included in any assessment, then the perspective changes. Mainly in comparison to this ethnic community do the achievements of minorities, even the Jewish-Americans, seem less than significant in the making of foreign policy. If, as in this study, the Anglo-Americans are counted as ethnics, then we can hardly avoid considering ethnicity a significant determinant of policy.”\textsuperscript{45}

In \textit{Foreign Attachments: the Power of Ethnic Groups in the Making of American Foreign Policy}, Tony Smith (2000) also adds to an otherwise scarce field of ethnicity on U.S. foreign policy. Smith advances three primary assertions. First is the contention that ethnic groups, contrary to popular understanding or recognition, do play a significant role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, connecting successful activism by ethnic based organizations as a unique feature of a pluralist democracy. The second proposition offered in this study is that there are negative consequences associated with ethnic involvement in foreign affairs and that these consequences sometimes outweigh the benefits of the participation of ethnic groups in global affairs. Finally, Smith points to the relevant contradictions of the U.S.’s pluralist democracy, as it relates to foreign policy. He contends that it is on matters of foreign policy that “the contradictions of pluralist democracy are particularly evident.”\textsuperscript{46} While all three propositions are important considerations in evaluating ethnic groups in U.S. foreign policy, the latter, when explained further, provides a fundamental question to be considered in analyzing the place or function of ethnic constituencies in U.S. foreign policy. That is, how real are the alleged contradictions of pluralism and nation-state based nationalism? It is this proposition that interrogates—and arguably attacks—the role and presence of ethnic constituencies in American foreign policy. To this point, Smith questions the claims that ethnic constituencies make to their need, desire, or perceived obligation to “have a dominant voice in deciding how American power should be used with respect to their
kinfolk aboard.” Within this interrogation is the author’s limited critique of multiculturalism wherein he insists that, through multiculturalism, ethnic constituencies privilege their ethnic identities over what, he seems to argue, should be their allegiance to the U.S. as their nation state of citizenship.

The central question foregrounding Smith’s study is one of exactly who should decide American foreign policy, or more broadly, “who should speak for America in world affairs.” His answer to this question is that those who should decide American foreign policy and speak for the republic in world affairs are “those who think of themselves first and foremost as Americans.” He follows this statement with his ongoing critique of multiculturalism, contending that so-called multiculturalists would be hesitant to give the required response. In short, Smith offers a critique of multiculturalism and the role that it plays in world affairs. However, several problems prevail in his analysis. On the one hand, his point about the need for a common national identity among all Americans is important, particularly on matters of foreign affairs. Yet, the notion of “national identity” rooted in nationality and nationalism does not properly engage the realities of conflicted nationalisms among certain ethnic communities. Smith mentions the “involuntary immigration” of the Native and African American populations in the U.S. contending that their ethnicity functioned as an important defense mechanism “against a national majority bent on denying them their rights of democratic citizenship.” This differs from other Americans whose relationship with the state, or mode of entry into the state differed and thus they should be more allegiant to the U.S. as their nation state of residence and citizenship than they should be to their ancestral or migratory homeland. The problem in Smith’s conclusions is that they are based on several narrow understandings of citizenship, nationalism, and the meaning of ethnic identity. Smith’s obsession with American identity and loyalty as a prerequisite for representing the United States in world affairs represents a concern with the preservation of “national interests.” While he engages some discussion about the complicated nature of national interests including the subjectivity associated with defining them, Smith discounts the ways that pluralism manifests in a global conceptualization of citizenship.

In the concluding chapter of Foreign Attachments, Smith makes an important observation wherein he cites the language of the oath of United States citizenship taken at the point of naturalization. Without citing the oath verbatim here, it is worth mentioning, as Smith summarizes, that through this oath “the national interest of the United States becomes a primary loyalty—certainly not exclusive but one that, only in extreme cases needing special justification, may be treated as secondary to the citizens’ religious or ethnic allegiance.” From this, he contends, “the use of American citizenship by members of a diaspora as a tool in the service of a foreign government or people would be a practice that…these ethnics’ fellow Americans could reasonably deplore.” It is from the foregoing assertion that Smith’s analysis is rendered difficult in efforts to understand the role of ethnic groups and ethnic constituencies in U.S. foreign policy and in world affairs. It falls short of recognizing the problems inherent in a pluralist democracy, which include the reality that not all ethnic groups were able to take the “oath of naturalization” or are not descendants of
people who have taken the oath of naturalization, as is the case for indigenous U.S. African Americans, some Mexican Americans and Native Americans. Even in the case of those hyphenated Americans who took the required oath of naturalization, to declare that the implicit allegiance to U.S. national interests should rein supreme, ignores the realities of American racism and the ways that this has functioned to produce an ambivalent relationship between hyphenated Americans and the U.S. Surely, mixed emotions arise as these groups bear witness to the ways that American racism has impacted their lives as well as the ways that American global imperialism—or more pointedly, American national interests—has had adverse effects on the people who live in these ethnic constituencies’ ancestral homelands. In the case of recent immigrants, these so-called ancestral homelands are places where their kinfolk still reside.

The field of ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy has been supplemented by several edited collections. The earliest of these works was published in 1970 and—like the other edited volumes that have followed it—reflect the political and social dynamics of the time as it relates to both race/ethnicity and foreign relations both dependent and independent of each other. The collection of essays edited by George W. Shepherd (1970) represents one of the earliest volumes that seek to respond to the complex topic of ethnic and racial influences on U.S. foreign policy. Comprised of essays written largely by social scientists, this volume offers multiple, timely contributions that address race and foreign policy as it pertains to Asia, Latin America, and Africa. Included among these are also works that connect the American Civil Rights Movement to American foreign policy. In his foreword to the text, Shepherd makes several insightful observations about race, ethnicity, and U.S. foreign relations that are both timely and timeless. Chief among these is his attempt to situate the broad issue of race and foreign relations in the then-contemporary context. Given the political and social activity surrounding this book’s publication (i.e. the late 1960s and early 1970s) there are several observations made by Shepherd that are quite discerning. Among these are the connection between the local (American Civil Rights Movement) and the global (struggle against colonialism, and later, apartheid). This observation is predicated on the practice of African Americans of “challenging the traditional method of separating global from local problems.” Supporting Shepherd’s observations are the claims posited by the volume’s contributors who challenge lines historically drawn between domestic and international politics, emphasize the presence and relevance of multi-loyalties among racial groups in the United States, and critique the racist ideologies overshadowing American foreign policy. In comparing the foreign policy efforts of African Americans to those of other ethnic groups, the essays in this volume also address the inability of American Blacks to become acculturated into normative Americanness; thus heightening the desire of the United States’ African-descended populations to identify with people of like phenotype, regardless of their nationality.

Overall, Shepherd’s consideration of the impact and issues of race and American foreign policy accomplishes the important task—particularly in the 1970 context—of illustrating both why and how racial groups—particularly African
Americans—insist upon locating the domestic with the global. Moreover, Shepherd, points to the presence of racial stratification in both the domestic and international spheres; contending that just as the Kerner Commission argued that the United States is comprised of two Americas—one Black and one White, both separate and unequal—the globe is similarly divided.\(^58\) In his estimation, the developed (First World) nations are largely populated by Whites and the underdeveloped (Third World nations) are largely populated by non-Whites.\(^59\) Considered in relation to Shepherd’s observation that Black Americans have been unable to fully assimilate into American life and culture because of differences in phenotype, the foregoing observation about both domestic and global race relations forges an important connection in the motives of U.S. racial minorities to engage in foreign policy lobbying efforts for the parts of the world with which they identify ancestrally.

Abdul Aziz Said (1977 and 1981) argues that ethnicity has played an important role in U.S. foreign policy and diplomatic efforts. Writing during a time when the subject of ethnicity was grossly understudied and under-analyzed, Said points to the ways that the nation-state had realized a decline in significance as the foundation for which individuals’ identities are shaped. In a similar vein, Said contends that ethnicity and ethnic identity in the United States had multivariate meanings depending on the group in question. Comparing the acculturation experiences of African Americans to those of Italian, Jewish, and Irish immigrants, Said points to the salience of phenotype, (and differences therein) in the ability (or lack thereof) of an ethnic group (in this case, the African American) to assimilate culturally or physically with the prevailing assemblage.\(^60\)

It is in recognition of the foregoing that Said connects the domestic with the international. He highlights the ways that racial and ethnic differences produce conflicting views of national interest. He observes that “ethnic groups find more affinity along lines other than the national boundaries of traditional nation-states” and that ethnic groups have formed communities or embraced notions of community with groups of ethnic origin, despite differences in nationality. It is from these understandings of community—formed on both cultural and political lines—that divisions on national interest are solidified. Quite insightful is Said’s practical explanation of the implications of this kind of identity politics. He observes that, in consequence of their identities along lines other that nationality and with the transnational character of ethnic identities, “a given community may rejoice at victories other than those of its state, since the defeat of its state will be a victory for its vision of community.”\(^61\) Thus, in such instances, “the domestic dispute requires the creation of a foreign policy dispute.”\(^62\)

Adding to the literature on ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy is the work of Political Scientist Richard J. Payne. In his book, *The Clash With Distant Cultures: Values, Interests, and Force in American Foreign Policy* (1995), Payne points to the role of culture and cultural conflicts in the development of American foreign policy. Payne provides an alternative lens through which to understand the origins of international conflicts involving the U.S. and other nation states. Leaning of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Persian Gulf War, and the Bosnian Conflict, Payne
contends that cultural differences ultimately inform (or at least heavily influence) the
degree to which the U.S. perceives itself to be in conflict with a particular
international actor. What is more, Payne argues that these cultural distinctions also
come into play in the approach taken by the U.S. in these conflicts. Specifically,
Payne argues that “the greater the cultural distance between the United States and
another society, the more likely Americans are to perceive it to be in conflict with the
United States and to threaten or resort to violence to resolve conflicts with it that
endanger America’s perceived interests.” The final argument offered in this work is
that “when significant American interests are not at stake, in a country that is
culturally distant, the United States is less inclined to either rely on military might or
to vigorously pressure negotiations to resolve major conflicts in that society.”

Though Payne study draws on the Israel-Palestine, Bosnian, and Persian Gulf
conflicts to substantiate its major propositions, it offers a lens that may be useful in
understanding the different functions of ethnicity in American foreign policy. This
framework can be used to further understandings about the conditions out of which
ethnic or racial minorities organize to influence U.S. foreign policy toward the parts of
the world that they claim as their ancestral homelands and thus identify major
cultural similarities. In a pluralist society such as the U.S., these hyphenated
Americans (such as African, Mexican, or Chinese Americans) are not only
“otherized” on domestic issues, but, as can be deduced through Payne’s framework,
become otherized in the international sphere. Thus, in the case of, for example,
African Americans, the reality of identifying as an American of African descent can
produce a certain cultural conflict which may materialize in a divided allegiance
between the U.S. as their state of citizenship and Africa (or a particular region
thereof) as their understood ancestral homeland. This may be even more apparent
in the case of, for example, Chinese Americans whose connections to life and
culture in China may not be as distant as the connection between African Americans
and Africa. In effect, the cultural otherization of certain groups of American citizens
magnifies pluralism and furthers ethnicity as a relevant, yet multivariate feature in
American foreign policy.

Writings by Randall Robinson

The major work chronicling the history of TransAfrica is Randall Robinson’s
autobiography, *Defending the Spirit: A Black Life in America* (1999). This text
presents an autobiographical account of both Randall Robinson’s life and his work
with TransAfrica. In this book, Robinson makes important connections between his
experiences with American racism and his lifelong commitment to advocating for
progressive and socially responsible U.S. policies toward Africa and the African
Diaspora. Robinson’s reflections provide his readers with insight into his experiences
coming of age in the American South, attending a historically Black university and an
Ivy League law school, and his career in foreign affairs through the foreign policy
advocacy organization that he played a key role in founding and maintaining for
nearly a quarter century. *Defending the Spirit* informs popular interests in the origins
and development of TransAfrica between 1977 and 1999. It provides useful information about the various people directly and indirectly involved in TransAfrica that will be useful for a chapter or book length study on the organization. In the absence of a comprehensive study on TransAfrica, *Defending the Spirit* provides a wealth of information about many of the people and events in TransAfrica’s history. It captures the details of TransAfrica’s early beginnings and some of the challenges associated with starting and maintaining a new organization with limited resources. A central feature of this work is that it details TransAfrica’s contributions to launching the Free South Africa Movement in November 1984 and the role that the organization and its staff played in coordinating the demonstrations at South African embassies and consulates throughout the U.S. for nearly two years. In addition, the book presents Robinson’s accounts of the various foreign policy campaigns that were waged by TransAfrica under his leadership.

*Defending the Spirit* is not without its shortcomings. These are largely due to the fact that the book is an autobiography. The merits of autobiography as genre include the ability of a person to share his or her perspective on his or her life and on historical events as a participant in them. As well, autobiography provides individual autobiographers with the opportunity to reflect on their experiences and the ways that these experiences and events may or may not have affected them. Robinson unquestionably does this in *Defending the Spirit*. However, the autobiography’s major shortcoming lies in its subjective nature, which is characteristic of its literary genre. Thus, owing to this text’s self-reflective disposition, Robinson’s own perspective inevitably influences his accounts of history, and is further dependent on individual memory. Underscoring this is Robinson’s own observation that “Memory of distant events, or memory of anything for that matter, is not a function of discretion. One remembers what one wants to remember. Why one remembers is a great deal more important than what one remembers.” What is more, this autobiography, while functioning as a primary source on Robinson and to a lesser extent on TransAfrica, lacks an actual historical or sociological analysis. In addition, this study was published in 1999. Thus, it does not account for the issues surrounding Robinson’s 2001 departure from TransAfrica or the perspectives of other people who have been a critical part of the organization’s story.

In addition to his autobiography, Robinson’s writings include a novel and four other book-length works on various topics related to U.S. domestic policy concerning African Americans and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the African Diaspora. Collectively, these works provide important autobiographical information, supplemental to *Defending the Spirit*, and offer critical insight into Robinson’s thinking. Of his book length works that must be engaged in any biographical work on Robinson, *Quitting America: The Departure of a Black Man from His Native Land* (2004) stands out. This book describes the issues motivating Robinson’s decision to expatriate from the United States to St. Kitts and Nevis in 2004. This move was precipitated by what Robinson expresses as his lifelong frustration with the United States and its treatment of African Americans and other African descendants throughout the world. Offering insight into the culture and life of the people of St.
Kitts and Nevis, Robinson calls attention to the stark contrasts between life in the Virgin Islands and in continental United States. Robinson also offers his philosophies and opinions on a wide range of topics including what he distinguishes as the numerous contradictions in both historical and contemporary America. These include Christopher Columbus’ alleged discovery of the Americas which Robinson contends was impossible because of Columbus’ limited view of the geography of the world around him as well as the presence of other races of people on the continents of North and South America well before Columbus’ famed voyage in 1492. Concerning contemporary American life and politics, Robinson offers his opinions about topics and people including Associate Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas, Black elected officials in general, the war in Iraq, and Black American vernacular English. The autobiographical sensibilities of this book are underpinned by Robinson’s mention of the life of his mother and her pilgrimage to continental Africa at eighty years old. In relation to Robinson’s other works, it is clear that he has some philosophical leanings that are elucidated in his various statements about broader questions and beliefs about the human experience, and how people ought to interact with each other and with the world around them. While Quitting America—along with Robinson’s other works—is not academic text by any stretch, it nonetheless provides a point from which to analyze the thinking of TransAfrica’s key organizer.

Robinson’s political and social views are also expressed in his first published book, The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay (1978). In this short novel, Robinson introduces the character Wakefield Clay; a young African American man doing a brief tour in the U.S. Army. Robinson tells of Clay’s encounters with fellow soldiers and their complex interactions with race and racism. This work points to some of the ways that the young Clay’s interactions with people in the armed forces influenced his thinking about the world around him and the role that he might play in it. The second chapter of this novel is situated in Southern Africa. This section points to the atrocities of South African racism and reveals Robinson’s sensibilities about the origins of racism in South Africa and elsewhere. Through the story of Wakefield Clay’s journeys, Robinson illustrates the connection between racism in South Africa and racism in the United States. This is particularly evident through Clay’s experiences in public spaces where, consistent with norms of racism in the U.S., he could not patronize certain stores or parts of stores because he was Black. This novel is also of a prescriptive character in its treatment of the social conditions of Blacks in South Africa. In his voice as the story’s narrator and through the intonations of other characters in the story, Robinson offers pointed solutions for a more fair and equitable social, political, and economic order in Southern Africa. What is more, Robinson uses the characters in this novel to illustrate the various means through which the White ruling class of South Africa justified its continued subjugation of its Black citizens.

The struggles that Clay endured through his service in the U.S. army centered on an apparent conflict between his developing consciousness of the realities of racism in South Africa and his service to a nation that facilitated the maintenance of
a racist, political, social, and economic regime. Throughout this novel—particularly in its latter parts—Clay becomes increasingly outspoken against the U.S. and its support of racism against Blacks at home and abroad. He was forthright in his critique of the control of the South African economy wielded by American and European corporations, and the ways that this inhibited Black South Africans from realizing self-determination. As the story’s protagonist, Clay would eventually die in the line of service to the U.S., but would be hailed by the African Liberation Front who understood his death to be “for the cause of African freedom.”

When considered in relationship to the other works that Robinson would publish throughout his life—particularly those that are autobiographical—there are parallels that can be drawn between the life of Randall Robinson and that of Wakefield Clay. Clay’s brief stint in the U.S. Army mirrors that of Robinson: Clay’s studies were interrupted by his army tour just as Robinson’s undergraduate studies were, for instance. The second chapter’s narrative about Southern Africa reflects some of the observations that Robinson may have had from his brief stay in Tanzania on a fellowship sponsored by the Ford Foundation in 1970. Still, one of the most revealing aspects of this novel is the parallel that can be drawn between the thinking of Wakefield Clay and the work that Robinson would go on to do with his life and career. Considering this novel’s publication in 1978—written five years earlier—it would be appropriate that it reflects Robinson’s thoughts about the political and social conditions in South Africa.

This is, of course, in recognition of this novel’s publication following Robinson’s activist work against apartheid while a student at Harvard Law School, his stint in the U.S. Army, and during his time working on Capitol Hill.

Robinson’s political and social contemplations are also revealed through his book, *The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks* (2000). In this text, Robinson adds to the discourse about racial reparations for African Americans. Pointing to the myriad reasons for which the U.S. government is indebted to modern-day African Americans as descendants of American slavery, Robinson calls attention to the central role enslaved Africans living in the United States played in the building the infrastructure for the Republic in its early days and well into its first century. Robinson details not only the crimes committed by the U.S. against Africans through slavery, but he also points to the material and psychological legacy of this peculiar institution. Further, Robinson calls attention to the mammoth benefits enjoyed by the U.S. government and its economy in consequence of American slavery. Making the case for reparations for African Americans, Robinson, in *The Debt*, argues that only through a reparations program of epic proportions can African America ever make the necessary strides toward mitigating the material and psychological legacies of American slavery and the program of racism and discrimination that followed.

Subsequent to *The Debt* is Robinson’s book, *The Reckoning: What Blacks Owe to Each Other* (2002). In this work, Robinson uses the story of the life of Peewee Kirkland—a real life person—to highlight the ills of American society and life. In a prescriptive approach, Robinson uses *The Reckoning* to address matters of public and social policy, and locates the problems plaguing Black America in both
historical and contemporary context. Continuing from many of the points raised in *The Debt, The Reckoning* points to the ways that the contemporary social arrangement in the U.S. and the world is predicated on centuries old systems of racial inequality. However, in a different way, Robinson holds African Americans partially responsible for their social, political, and economic advancement. Throughout this text, Robinson offers a two-sided critique of American social, political, and economic life. He argues that the conditions in which many Blacks live, while founded in the material and psychological legacy of American slavery, are partially maintained by African Americans themselves. Like his other works, *The Reckoning* is not without its autobiographical leanings. After all, the protagonist, Peewee Kirkland is a person that Robinson actually met when giving a speech on the campus of Howard University. Although not necessarily a scholarly work by any stretch, *The Reckoning* makes a popular appeal; utilizing the story of a real person, to exemplify some of the challenges of race and class inequality in the U.S.

The most recent of Robinson’s book length works, *An Unbroken Agony: Haiti from Revolution to the Kidnapping of a President*, presents an analytic history of Haiti from its independence in the early nineteenth century to the recent political turmoil of the early twenty first century. In this book Robinson details the political strife in Haiti dating back to the arrival of Christopher Columbus in the fifteenth century. Through a series of short chapters detailing specific events in Haiti’s history, *An Unbroken Agony*, illustrates the impact of slavery on Haiti, its significance as a major slave port in the New World, and the ways that European nations (within which he situates the United States) have functioned to deny Haiti the infrastructure necessary to sustain itself economically, political, and socially. Reflecting Robinson’s long standing interest and work in U.S. foreign policy, *An Unbroken Agony* points to the various ways that U.S. foreign policy has adversely impacted Haiti and its people. Included in this, Robinson calls attention to the work of the presidential administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush, and the ways that American foreign policy—including economic policies—has contributed to the ongoing issues of political and social strife in Haiti.

Focusing particular attention on the 2004 ouster of democratically elected Haitian President Jean Bertrand Aristide, *An Unbroken Agony* connects contemporary Haiti with the long legacy of slavery and colonialism that preceded it for nearly two hundred years prior. He contends that the Haitian economy has long suffered from the devastation that the United States and France inflicted upon it during slavery and in the years following slavery’s demise. Cited as evidence are Robinson’s references to the economic sanctions imposed on the Haitian government by the U.S., and the forced reparations paid to the French government by Haiti following independence. Robinson argues that these policies bankrupted the Haitian economy for the greater part of the last two hundred years. Analogous to Robinson’s other works, *An Unbroken Agony* is replete with autobiographical underpinnings and is thus subject to the shortcomings of autobiography as genre. Still, Robinson’s first hand accounts provide insight into the inner workings of the
troubled relationship between Haiti and the United States that are scarcely articulated elsewhere in the literature.

In addition to informing interests in the history of Haiti, Robinson uses this text to provide an update on his work in the area of foreign policy beyond his work with TransAfrica. He references his twenty-seven day hunger strike in 1994 and the little material support he received for it among certain sectors of the African American political community. He compares this to the support he was able to generate ten years earlier when he, Mary Frances Berry, and Walter Fauntroy were arrested at the South African Embassy and provided a precursor to the launch of the Free South Africa Movement. Within this book, Robinson provides poignant accounts of the contributions made by him, his wife Hazel Ross Robinson, and U.S. Representative Maxine Waters to the development of Haiti during the closing decade of the twentieth century and first few years of the twenty-first century. *Unbroken Agony* situates African American leaders—through Robinson and his cotemporaries—at the forefront of advocacy efforts for Haiti and the ongoing effort to challenge the U.S. government’s involvement in the affairs of this nation and other nation states of the African Diaspora.

**Writings about TransAfrica**

The work of TransAfrica during the late 1970s and 1980s has been featured in chapters within book-length studies on broader topics. These studies have largely focused on TransAfrica in three principal ways: (1) as part of the global movement against apartheid; (2) as part of the wide-spread work of Americans mobilized against apartheid and other human rights violations in Southern Africa; and (3) those works that have focused specifically on the work of African Americans against apartheid.

In a sweeping overview of American anti-apartheid activism, David Hostetter’s *Movement Matters: American Antiapartheid Activism and the Rise of Multiracial Politics* (2005) situates TransAfrica among several American organizations working toward the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. The other two organizations detailed in this study are the American Friends Service Committee, and the American Committee on Africa. Titled, “Black Power on Embassy Row,” Hostetter’s chapter on TransAfrica places the organization in historical context. It underscores the critical connection between the earlier global activism of African Americans such as W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul Robeson through the Council on African Affairs (CAA) and the ways that these efforts laid the groundwork for an African American foreign policy lobby that would emerge nearly four decades later. Highlighting the activities leading up to TransAfrica’s founding—including the Congressional Black Caucus’ 1976 Leadership Summit Africa—and the role that TransAfrica played in launching the Free South Africa Movement, Hostetter locates Randall Robinson at the center of the TransAfrica’s work between the late 1970s through the end of the twentieth century. Employing Robinson’s written works—specifically *Defending the Spirit* and *The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay*—Hostetter underpins the correlation between
Robinson’s global activism and his experiences with racism coming of age in the American South. Further, Hostetter illustrates the important—albeit at times adversarial—relationship between TransAfrica and the U.S. Congress, particularly through the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC). In a similar vein, Movement Matters corroborates TransAfrica’s importance during its height, arguing that the organization, for a time, came to function as a conciliator between the U.S. government and the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

However, Hostetter’s chapter on TransAfrica falls short in a few important areas. Methodologically, it does not engage oral history and it relies largely on Robinson’s autobiography for factual information. Thus, this chapter misses the opportunity to engage the rich perspectives of the numerous other men and women who were instrumental to TransAfrica’s founding and were involved in its early activities. What is more, this study pays only cursory attention to TransAfrica’s inner-workings and intra-organizational life and culture. An example of this tendency can be made of Hostetter’s general mention of the National Council of Churches providing the funding support for TransAfrica in its early days, without making reference to the other funding sources and fundraising efforts, or more specifically, the challenges associated with funding an African American lobby that may be different from other ethnocentric foreign policy advocacy organizations.

This study also makes gross generalizations without appropriate evidence. For example, in discussing controversy surrounding Andrew Young’s tenure as the U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the U.N. during the Carter administration, Hostetter writes, “Young, however, saw economic involvement in Southern Africa as the best way for the U.S. to facilitate change, a position that put him at odds with TransAfrica activists who had adopted the necessity of boycott and armed struggle.” In addition to lacking supporting evidence, this assertion makes an unsubstantiated link between TransAfrica and a certain strand of militancy that was never present among TransAfrica’s leadership, board of directors, or participant base. This attempt to forge a connection between the pronounced militancy underway in certain parts of Black America is an appropriate way to characterize certain activities. However, the suggestion that TransAfrica’s activists adopted “armed struggle” as a method of advancing foreign policy objectives remains a problematic assertion because it is factually inaccurate and unsubstantiated.

Hostetter’s analysis of TransAfrica is also limited to the period leading up to and immediately following the Free South Africa Movement. While he devotes attention to the controversies surrounding Nelson Mandela’s post-release and post-election visits to the United States, and the ways that TransAfrica’s role in these visits was criticized by some, as well as diminished by the South African leadership, Hostetter does not account for TransAfrica’s work beyond South Africa. Importantly, however, he underscores the central role that TransAfrica played in the anti-apartheid movement by launching the Free South Africa Movement. By acknowledging this, Hostetter explicitly concedes that the Free South Africa Movement was, in fact, a Black-led movement.
Still, the major shortcoming of Hostetter’s contribution to the literature on TransAfrica lies in his analysis of TransAfrica which emphasizes its use of “strategic essentialism” to justify the understood connection between African Americans and the social, political, and economic struggles underway on the African continent and elsewhere in the African diaspora. Although “strategic essentialism” is not a term coined by Hostetter, its use in this study diminishes the significant role—even if on a symbolic level—that Africa, African people and the idea of Africa have played in the lives of African Americans for generations. Strategic essentialism may befit certain political activities of African American organizations. However, it represents a gross generalization of TransAfrica’s activities and approach to engaging in foreign policy lobbying efforts on behalf of Southern Africa. Implicit in the use of this term is the idea that the political struggles in which African Americans engaged within and without TransAfrica were not connected to the broader cultural and political connections that African Americans and other continental and diasporic Africans have worked to forge and maintain for well over three hundred years.

Yiesha Thompson (2009) uses TransAfrica as a case study to illustrate and analyze the limitations and opportunities of non-government organizations (NGOs) in the U.S. foreign policy arena. Focusing on the contributions of African Americans to the formulation of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa in the post-civil rights era (i.e. post 1970s), Thomson aims to draw conclusions about the role of TransAfrica—and by extension other NGOs—in “pushing the policy agenda, creating awareness, and reformulating United States policy toward Africa.” This study is centered on the argument that, “TransAfrica is in a unique position to exert a good measure of influence on American policy towards the region of Africa…[and] is able to do so because, as a NGO, it is theoretically free from the fetters of the state and has been designed not only to act ‘intermestically,’ but also to collect inputs from other Black Americans both as influential individuals and organized groups which enables it to influence America’s policy toward Africa.”

Locating this study within the four fields described in this chapter supports this project’s objective of developing adversarial diplomacy as a conceptual framework for the participation of non-state actors in the international system. It also provides a sound foundation for a more comprehensive study on the African American foreign policy lobby, TransAfrica. The books authored by Randall Robinson and the chapter-length works on TransAfrica provide some basic information about the history of the organization and of Robinson. Certainly, a book length study on TransAfrica can use these works as a starting point. The scholarship on the anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. is useful in situating African American anti-apartheid activism within a larger U.S. and global movement. The collection of studies and edited collections on African Americans in global affairs supports the development of a study on TransAfrica and adversarial diplomacy. In particular, it enables TransAfrica’s work in the latter part of the twentieth century to be appreciated as part of a trajectory of African American involvement in international affairs. As it pertains to adversarial diplomacy, the texts on African Americans in global affairs also highlights the ways that African Americans have historically understood their domestic and foreign policy
interests to be adversarial vis-à-vis the state. At the same time, these works highlight the ways that African American activists have worked both inside and outside of government institutions in order to advance these objectives. Finally, engaging with texts on ethnicity and U.S. foreign policy creates the opportunity for African American foreign policy activism to be considered in relationship to the foreign policy activism of other ethnic groups. These texts are also useful in envisioning the ways that adversarial diplomacy, as a conceptual framework, may be relevant to international political advocacy efforts of other ethnic or racial constituencies.

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2 Ibid., 12
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
10 Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, 50.
11 Ibid., 11.
12 Ibid., Chapter 4.
15 Ibid.
17 There are other studies (both earlier and later) that focus on the anti-apartheid movement in other parts of the world underscoring some of the points made by Love in *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*. These include, for example, works that focus on the anti-apartheid movement in Britain and in Australia. See Janice Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement: Local Activism in Global Politics* (New York: Praeger, 1985); Roger Fieldhouse, *Anti-Apartheid: A History of the Movement in Britain: A Study in Pressure Group Politics* (London: Merlin, 2005); Penny O’Donnell, *Australians Against Racism: Testimonies from the Anti-Apartheid Movement in Australia* (Annandale, NSW: Pluto Press, 1995); Rob Skinner, *The Foundations of Anti-Apartheid: Liberal Humanitarians and Transnational Activists in Britain and the United States, 1914-64* (Hampshire, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
19 Love points to the NAACP’s early opposition to apartheid dating back to 1912 through its early support of the African National Congress, the later work of the Council on African Affairs (CAA), and the 1972 march on Washington by 20,000 African Americans as a means of “express[ing] solidarity


21 Ibid. Also, see Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 127.


23 This study points to the greater level of support and access enjoyed by anti-apartheid activists during the administration of Jimmy Carter compared to that of Ronald Reagan. See Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*, 80.

24 The Sullivan principles were developed by Rev. Leon H. Sullivan were devised in response to South African Apartheid and represented Sullivan’s attempt to establish some standards for conducting business. These were adopted in 1977, amended in 1984, and later expanded to become internationally recognized standards. The original six Sullivan principles included 1. Non-segregation of the races in all eating, comfort, and work facilities; 2. Equal and fair employment practices for all employees; 3. Equal pay for all employees doing equal or comparable work for the same period of time; 4. Initiation of and development of training programs that will prepare, in substantial numbers, Blacks and other nonwhites for supervisory, administrative, clerical, and technical jobs; 5. Increasing the number of Blacks and other nonwhites in management and supervisory positions; and 6. Improving the quality of life for Blacks and other nonwhites outside the work environment in such areas as housing, transportation, school, recreation, and health facilities. The seventh principle, working to eliminate laws and customs that impede social, economic, and political justice, was added in 1984. See Love, *The U.S. Anti-Apartheid Movement*, 74; Leon Sullivan, *Moving Mountains: the Principles and Purposes of Leon Sullivan* (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 2000).


27 The challenges associated with anti-apartheid activism during the decades of the cold war—particularly those that impacted the efforts of organizations such as the Council on African Affairs—included allegations of communist influence and the ongoing government investigations associated with these allegations. Known widely as McCarthyism, it was this government surveillance that limited—and in many instances, neutralized—early efforts to organize on behalf of the cause of anti-apartheid. See Franis Njubi Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions: African Americans Against Apartheid, 1946-1994* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004); Richard M. Fried, *Nightmare in Red: The McCarthy Era in Perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).


29 Ibid., 103.


31 Nesbitt details his list of interviews in his bibliography. See Nesbitt, *Race for Sanctions*.


33 The 1992 publication date of DeConde’s study is important here, as it has been since then that several scholars have begun to analyze the history of whiteness in the United States and the ways that groups such as the Anglo-Americans and others were able to become part of the amalgamation of whiteness. See David W. Roediger, *Working Toward Whiteness: How America’s Immigrants*
In particular DeConde points to the skeptics of ethnic organizations in U.S. foreign policy who contend that the success of these organizations are only in small areas and on pointed issues, generally related to the areas of the world to which these groups are connected or descended. However, these groups have realized limited to no success at “alter[ing] fundamental foreign policy orientation.” See DeConde, Race, Ethnicity and U.S. Foreign Policy, 194; Bernard C. Cohen, The Influence of Non-Governmental Groups on Foreign Policy Making (Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1959).


James Moss, “The Civil Rights Movement and American Foreign Policy,” in Shepherd, Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy.


Moss, “The Civil Rights Movement and American Foreign Policy.”

Shepherd points to several shortcomings of the volume including its failure to direct attention to—among other things—African American efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy and to involve themselves in the foreign policy decision making processes. See Shepherd, Racial Influences on American Foreign Policy, 12.


Americans to influence U.S. politics toward Africa. The last of these—authored by Challenor (1977)—focuses specifically on African Americans and U.S. foreign policy and provides an excellent segue way into the next section of this chapter, which explores texts dealing with African Americans and U.S. foreign policy. Ibid.


64 Ibid.
65 Ibid.

69 See Randall Robinson, Quitting America.
70 Ibid., 42.
71 Robinson, The Emancipation of Wakefield Clay, 77-78.
72 Ibid. 82.
73 Ibid., 106.
74 In the preface to the novel, Robinson indicated that it was written five years before its actual publication. Ibid., 7
75 Robinson, The Debt.
76 Robinson, The Reckoning.
77 Randall Robinson, An Unbroken Agony, 22
79 Ibid., 89.
80 Ibid., 78.
81 Ibid., 79.
82 Ibid., 86.
85 Only cursory mention of this study is made here to acknowledge its presence within the body of knowledge on TransAfrica. While it is worthy of mention, out of respect for its researcher, this study makes a limited contribution to the literature on TransAfrica for several reasons. Chiefly, because it uses TransAfrica as a case study and attempts to draw conclusions about non-government organizations writ large, and their relationship to the U.S. foreign policy development processes. In addition, the researcher stops short of locating TransAfrica in the necessary—and arguably appropriate—historical context. See Yiesha Thompson, “African Americans and United States Policy Towards Africa: An Analysis of the Influence of TransAfrica,” (Ph.D. diss., Howard University, 2009).
86 Ibid., 12.
87 Ibid., 27.
CHAPTER 2

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND SOUTHERN AFRICAN LIBERATION: CONTEXTUALIZING ADVERSARIAL DIPLOMACY

The international political context of the post World War II era played an important role in fueling adversarial diplomacy and shaping African American political engagements with Africa. It was during this time that the U.S. began to strategically organize its international relations and foreign policy program with the tenets of the Atlantic Charter. Enacted on 12 February 1941 by Winston Churchill for the United Kingdom and Franklin Roosevelt for the U.S., the Atlantic Charter formalized the alliance between the U.S. and the U.K. during World War II and in its aftermath. The Charter articulated a set of goals for the U.S.-U.K. alliance during the Second World War.¹ This alliance framed the foreign policy agenda for the Allied Forces of World War II of which the U.S. and the U.K. stood at the forefront.² In the aftermath of the War, the principles articulated in the Atlantic Charter came to serve as a framework for the post-war era as allied nations adhered to a program that would prevent the spread of communism that facilitated the escalation of World War II. As sweeping as its program was, the Atlantic Charter remained vague on whether or not its clauses—particularly those that claimed to support self-determination for all people—extended to the African territories that remained under European colonial rule. However, it became clear, in the aftermath of the war, that the British did not consider their holdings in Africa to be inclusive of the provisions of the Atlantic Charter. Thus, European colonial domination of Africa persisted as a point of international political conflict in the post-World War II era.

During this same period, the U.S. began to play a major role in Southern Africa. Reflecting a series of ebbs and flows in foreign policy, the U.S. took an approach to Southern Africa that, at various times, included (1) aiding in the maintenance of White minority rule; (2) preservation of its strategic, economic, and scientific interests over the human rights violations that White minority rule represented; (3) supplying various forms of support to White minority governments; (4) embracing a series of ostensibly non-policy positions on the conflicts in Southern Africa, including apartheid in South Africa; and (5) ignoring the recommended sanctions and other punitive measures advocated by the U.N. during the various conflicts in Southern Africa. In other words, the U.S., despite its emergence as a world power, did very little to aid in the eradication of White minority rule in Southern Africa during the 1960s and 1970s.³ Through the several U.S. presidential administrations that occupied the White House between 1960 and 1980, the U.S. continued to privilege its economic and political interests over questions of human rights.⁴ This included embracing the unwavering commitment to preventing the spread of communism at any cost, even if it meant preserving racism. This approach to U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa continued well into the 1980s. However, it faced repeated challenges by the coalition of American activists committed to aiding in the liberation of Southern Africa. Beginning in the 1970s, as
their political capital increased, African American activists became a central part of the U.S. based movement to challenge the legacies of colonialism in Southern Africa. In their advocacy efforts, these activists sought not only to challenge the governments of Southern Africa, but they also confronted their government on its political and economic policies that worked against the liberation struggles. It was within this context that adversarial diplomacy became an integral part of African American politics in the post-civil rights era.

This chapter highlights the political struggles in Southern Africa and the capricious ways that the U.S. engaged with these governments as the two issues motivating African American adversarial diplomacy in the 1960s and 1970s. Its central argument is that the political turmoil in Southern Africa over White minority rule during the latter half of the twentieth century and the U.S.’s inconsistent policy positions toward the region stimulated African Americans to mobilize in support of the Southern African liberation struggles. Aligned with the Black world political struggles, African American activists began to situate themselves in direct opposition to U.S. foreign policies that in essence, privileged political and economic interests over the struggle for democracy for Blacks in Southern Africa.

The Mid-Twentieth Century and the Changing Black World

The latter part of the 1950s and the 1960s were dynamic times in the Black world. It was during these two decades that several key events occurred that altered the political situation in Africa and its diaspora. Between 1951 and 1968, some forty formerly colonized territories won their battles for independence from their European colonial powers and there were Black heads of state in all of these newly independent nation-states. The most significant of these independence struggles was Ghana, which won its independence from the British in 1957. As the first sub-Saharan country to win its independence, Ghana’s successful struggle against the British marked the beginning of the end of European colonization of Africa: a condition that had lasted for nearly three quarters of a century.

By 1968, forty African nations had won battles for independence from their colonial powers. However, vestiges of colonialism were still present on the continent. These were most apparent in Southern Africa, which included Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe (formerly known as Rhodesia), Namibia (formerly known as Southwest Africa), and the Republic of South Africa. The region was steeped in racial political turmoil over who had the right to govern the different territories. These conflicts were attributable to the fact that this part of the African continent had substantially larger numbers of White citizens than the other parts of the continent that had won their independence struggles throughout the 1960s. Motivated by a belief in their racial superiority, the White settlers worked diligently to maintain their stronghold and dominance of the region. Over time, however, the decline of the European empires rendered their efforts futile, and ultimately ushered in a period of intense political struggle over which Black Africans, who comprised an overwhelming majority of the population in the region, would eventually claim victory.
In the absence of a regional imperial power dominating the African continent, it had become increasingly difficult for White settlers, who controlled the economic and political institutions, to preserve their throttlehold on the region. Their efforts were challenged, weakened, and ultimately defeated by Black African political movements such as the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO), the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), and the African National Congress (ANC) began to take shape in the 1960s and 1970s.

Fueling their frustration and aiding in their cause was a heightened awareness of the liberties enjoyed by Africans in other parts of the region, the continent, and the world. This, in turn, caused Black Africans to organize political movements and organizations, and turn to guerilla warfare in order to realize their freedom. The actions of these groups were aided by the ability of African freedom fighters to find refuge in other regions of the continent, distinct from the areas in which they were fighting. In short, the demise of European imperialism in other parts of Africa ushered the end of colonialism as a whole. Though political strife plagued the region as whole, each territory—Zimbabwe, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa—had its unique set of challenges.

**Angola, Mozambique, and the Defeat of Portuguese Colonialism**

The struggle for independence waged against Portugal by Blacks in Angola and Mozambique can be traced to the fifteenth century when Portugal initially launched its imperial mission. This was the first global empire in world history and, when it relinquished its final territory in 1999, Portugal reigned as the longest lasting European colonial power. Over a span of six centuries, the Portuguese Empire would include holdings in Central and South America, Indochina, and Africa. Portugal’s dealings in Africa began in earnest in the early 19th century when it surrendered its holdings in South America including, most notably, Brazil which achieved its independence in 1822. With increased interest of Europeans in the land, people, and natural resources of Africa, the Portuguese directed their attention to Southern Africa in order to compete with other European powers that had expanded their colonial holdings. On its colonial quest in Africa, the Portuguese would come to occupy the areas of Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, Guinea-Bissau, Angola, and Mozambique.

Though Portugal enjoyed its status as a colonial power in Africa for quite some time, its influence was threatened during much of the twentieth century. After the Second World War, many European powers had begun to surrender their holding in Africa because of the independence wars waged by the Black people in the colonies. These efforts intensified in the early 1960s, as numerous territories in Africa became independent through various means; ranging from direct dissolution by their colonial powers to all-out revolutions. It was against this backdrop, and through independence wars lasting, in some cases, for as long as eleven years, that
Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe, Angola, and Mozambique achieved their independence in the mid-1970s. Guinea-Bissau became independent in 1974, following an eleven-year war that resulted in between 8,000 and 12,000 military causalities. This came just fifteen months following the assassination of Amilcar Cabral, who led the guerilla war against the Portuguese on behalf of the Guinea-Bissauan people. Cabral’s efforts were critical to the successful liberation of the nearby colonial territories of which he claimed ancestry. Not long after Guinea-Bissau achieved its independence from Portugal, so too did the island nations of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe. Cape Verde became independent on 5 July 1975 and São Tomé and Principe followed, a mere seven days later.

Both Mozambique and Angola engaged in long wars for independence against Portugal for much of the 1960s and well into the 1970s. Both these territories won their independence wars and became sovereign nations in 1975. Angola’s independence from Portugal was granted upon ratification of the Alvor Agreement on 11 November 1975. This agreement represented a truce between the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the government of Portugal. Mozambique achieved its independence in 1975 following a 10-year war that began in 1964 and ended with a cease-fire in 1974.

Mounting tensions finally came to a breaking point in 1964 as indigenous Mozambicans grew increasingly frustrated with Portugal’s racist policies toward its indigenous Mozambican populations. Rooted in the Portuguese Colonial Act of 1930, Portugal’s racist order placed Mozambicans of European ancestry in a position of superiority over all Blacks in the territory. Though the Colonial Act was repealed in 1950, its vestiges permeated life in its territories well beyond its abolition. It was against this milieu, combined with the wave of independence movements underway in the colonized world, that African Nationalists in Mozambique began their long battle for independence. It was in support of this objective that the FRELIMO was formed two years before the beginning of the war of independence. The year was 1962. Through an insurrectionary crusade spanning a full decade, the FRELIMO nationalists were ultimately successful. This was in the aftermath of a Lisbon coup d’état that resulted in the overthrowing of the dictatorship governing Portugal. This became known as the Carnation Revolution and put the nail in the coffin of Portuguese colonial rule in Africa.

Following their successful wars for independence, both Mozambique and Angola found themselves engulfed in civil wars. In Angola, the civil war lasted for twenty-seven years (1975-2002). The parties involved in the Angolan conflict were the communist MPLA and the anti-communist UNITA. Intensifying this mêlée were the liberation efforts in the Angolan province of Cabinda. It was from this entity that a third faction entered the Civil War: the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda (ELEC). Undoubtedly one of the most protracted and high-flying confrontations of the Cold War, the Angolan Civil War raised some critical concerns in a time of global conflict over communism and efforts to contain it. Thus, the warring parties in Angola were supported by their associated ideological
superpowers. The MPLA enjoyed the support of the communist Soviet Union, Cuba, and the other states aligned with the Eastern Bloc. Accordingly, the UNITA was united with the anti-communist forces, which included, among others, the United States and the People’s Republic of China. This quarter-century conflict resulted in casualties numbering in the several hundreds of thousands and outlasted the Cold War itself. Though the conflict was interrupted by brief periods of peace at different points during the 1990s, the war proved catastrophic and life altering for the people of Angola and drew attention from concerned activists around the world.

The civil war in Mozambique escalated in 1977, just two years following the end of the War for Independence. In this conflict, FRELIMO battled with the Mozambique Resistance Movement (RENAMO). The latter was heavily funded by the apartheid regime of South Africa who picked up the sponsorship of this effort following Rhodesia’s dissolution and transition to Zimbabwe. The RENAMO forces, under the leadership of Afonso Dhlakama, were organized to oppose the FRELIMO government, which was rooted in the same nationalist party that had led Mozambique to independence from Portugal just two years prior. FRELIMO’s successful war against Portugal posed a corporeal threat to White minority rule in Southern Africa, including the Republic of South Africa itself. The potential of this threat caused South Africa to play a leading role in instigating the Civil War in the newly independent Mozambique. South Africa’s support for the RENAMO forces in the Mozambican Civil War underscored its endorsement of White minority rule and its opposition to the presence of guerilla forces in any level of the new government. It was clear to the White minority rulers of South Africa that, as long as Mozambique was under the leadership of the FRELIMO party, the African National Congress (the Black South African lead guerilla opposition), could find refuge in its northern neighbor. With the objective of containing the Black African nationalist forces in Southern Africa, the Afrikaner Nationalist-controlled South Africa government helped to perpetuate the conflict in Mozambique.

The Mozambican Civil War continued well into the 1980s, and, owing to South Africa’s involvement, saw a gradual dissolution as the decade went on. This gradual phasing out of the Civil War in Mozambique was owed in large-part to agreements negotiated between the FRELIMO administration and the Republic of South Africa. Mozambican President Samora Machel agreed to put South Africa’s concerns to rest by prohibiting ANC leaders from seeking refuge in Mozambique. In return, the South African government agreed to cease their support of RENAMO forces, in an effort to restore peace in the region. These negotiations came together in the Nkomati Accord, which was entered into 16 March 1984 between Samora Michel on behalf of Mozambique and P.W. Botha, on behalf of the Republic of South Africa. Later evidence, however, would point to South Africa’s continued secret dealings with RENAMO long after the adoption of the Nkomati Accord.

The Mozambican Civil War ultimately ended in 1992 upon adoption of the Rome General Peace Accords. This treaty was entered into by Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano (who had become president upon the death of Samora Machel in a plane crash in 1986) and Afonso Dhlakama, leader of the RENAMO
regime and brought an end to a fifteen-year period of civil conflict. With the assistance of U.N. peacekeeping forces, the people of Mozambique realized the full changeover to a democratic government by 1994. It was in this same year that the people of Mozambique held their first democratic elections.

**Civil War in Zimbabwe**

The political crisis in Zimbabwe that escalated in the 1960s and 1970s takes its origins in the “Scramble for Africa” and the subsequent partitioning of the continent in the late 19th century. Known as the British Colony of Southern Rhodesia, the Republic of Zimbabwe had been under the control of the British since the late 1880s but operated its own colonial government since 1923.\(^\text{11}\) The namesake of Cecil Rhodes, leader of the British South Africa Company, Rhodesia operated under a system of White minority rule for nearly six decades before democratic elections were held in 1980.\(^\text{12}\) Under this system, the political and economic structures were engineered for the express benefit of the European minority often at the expense of the Black majority. Though colonialism was forced out of much of continental Africa in the 1960s and 1970s, it remained difficult for parts of the majority Black region of Southern Africa to realize their independence owing largely to the presence governments controlled by White minorities. Though it had granted independence to several of its colonies during the 1950s and early 1960s, the British government imposed a policy that prohibited independence in the territories that lacked majority rule. Therefore, as long as territories like Rhodesia had governments controlled by Whites, even though they had an overwhelmingly Black majority population, they would remain under the control of the British.\(^\text{13}\)

This policy did not win the favor of Ian Smith, who was, at the time, leader of the White minority government in Rhodesia. Smith was a native of Selukwe, Rhodesia, which was a small town not far from Salisbury, the capital of Rhodesia. He rose to preeminence in Rhodesian politics during World War II when he joined the Air Force of Southern Rhodesia. It was through this initial stint in the military that Smith would later serve as a Pilot Officer in the Royal Air Force. Smith’s entrée into politics came in 1948, when he made a successful bid for the Rhodesian Legislative Assembly as a member of the conservative Southern Rhodesia Liberal Party (SRLP). A staunch opponent of Black Rule in Southern Rhodesia, Smith divorced himself from the SRLP, and joined the United Federal Party (UFP). He went on to dissolve his association with the UFP to form what became known as the Rhodesian Reform Party (RRP). It was from this latter party that Smith broke away one final time, uniting the RRP with the preexisting Dominion Party. These two entities, both heavily opposed to Black Majority Rule banded together as the Rhodesian Front (RF). Following the parliament elections in 1962, the RF won a majority by a narrow margin. With his party in control of the government, Smith was elected Deputy Prime Minister. Two years later, he became Prime Minister.

Acting in opposition to the British Government’s imposition of its “No Independence Without Majority Rule” policy, Ian Smith, in his capacity as prime
minister, and leaders of the Rhodesian Front declared independence from the British. Issuing a statement that became known as the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965, Smith and his party pronounced their separation from the British on the grounds that the refusal to grant the territory independence was unacceptable and that the negotiations to that end had ceased. The UDI claimed that the insistence by the British of majority rule as a condition of independence would result in the “handing over the country to irresponsible rule.” The notion of “handing over the country to irresponsible rule” was a clear indicator that Smith and the Rhodesian Front were vehemently opposed to Black Rhodesians being in control of a territory wherein they represented a numerical majority.

The UDI was immediately condemned by governments around the globe and resulted in the adoption of sanctions by numerous nation states and the U.N. Security Council. On the day the UDI was issued, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson fervently deplored the declaration in a speech in Parliament. Though many states claimed to support Britain’s call for sanctions against Rhodesia through the U.N., some of these very nations, many of whom were permanent members of the U.N. Security Council stopped short of embracing the sanctions package adopted by the Security Council and continued to engaged in economic relations with Rhodesia.

Though the UDI represented an advance for Smith and his European minority government, it had grossly negative implications for Rhodesia’s Black African citizens. Thus, the Black Zimbabweans, who represented the majority of the population, sought to simultaneously end two oppressive forces. At once, they wanted independence from the British, and at the same time, they wanted to exercise control over the government of the territory of which they claimed a numerical majority. Accomplishing these objectives would result in the restoration of the territory to its former name, Zimbabwe. It was with these aims that Rhodesia’s Black citizens took to guerilla warfare in the name of independence, universal suffrage, and control of their government. This conflict resulted in a civil war that lasted for fifteen years, and was known by various parties as the Rhodesian Bush War and by other as the Zimbabwe War of Liberation. For the purposes of this narrative, let us use the latter.

Beginning in 1965, the Rhodesian government (led by Ian Smith) and the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia government (led by Abel Muzorewa) entered in an all out war against the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) under the leadership of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, respectively. Within these two groups emerged the Zimbabwe National Liberation and the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA). The Zimbabwe War of Independence lasted until 1979 when an Internal Settlement was reached between Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa. Effectively replacing the UDI, the Internal Settlement resulted in elections in April of that same year, in which Abel Muzorewa ascended to prime minister upon his party’s securing of a majority. It was in consequence of this victory that Rhodesia took on the name Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. However, this settlement and the subsequent election still left control of the country’s major
operations and civil entities in the hand of Whites. What this settlement—and subsequent election—accomplished was the solidification of a temporary power shuffle between Blacks and Whites, wherein each entity was guaranteed a certain number of seats in parliament. But the dissatisfaction with the attempted settlement was exacerbated by the refusal of the ZANU and ZAPU parties to participate in the election. Their opposition was based on their insistence that the Internal Settlement—of which they were not party to developing—was nothing more than a document engineered to maintain White minority rule. This was exactly the outcome. Consequently, the war continued with the international community lending, in spirit at least, its support of the nationalist parties by refusing to acknowledge the new government of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia because of its exclusion of the African nationalist parties in the negotiations leading to the settlement. Finally, following negotiations held in London at a peace conference upon the invitation of the British government, the Lancaster House Agreement formally ended the UDI, and Rhodesia became an official British colony. It was upon ratification of this agreement that name of the republic was changed to Zimbabwe and the first fully democratic elections followed in February 1980. In this election, the ZANU party won control of parliament in a landslide victory against the ZAPU party and ZANU leader Robert Mugabe became Prime Minister. Later in this same year, on 18 April 1980, the colony—known officially as the British Dependency of Southern Rhodesia—became the independent Republic of Zimbabwe. Robert Mugabe has led the Republic of Zimbabwe since 1980. His title changed to president in 1987. As of 2011, Robert Mugabe still holds this position.

The Republic of South Africa

For the greater part of the twentieth century, the principal political issue of concern to the international community about the Republic of South Africa was its racist and separatist social, political, economic, and cultural policy known as apartheid. Rooted in a notion of “racial separateness,” South Africa’s apartheid system—with its elaborate arrangement of codes, laws, policies, and provisions—reigned for more than forty years; commencing formally in 1948 and ending in 1993. Under apartheid, the rights of Black, colored, and Indian South Africans were drastically limited by law, and in relationship to the rights of White South Africans.

Though it coagulated with the adoption of the apartheid policy in 1948, racial discrimination was a fact of life in South Africa for much of the twentieth century. The origins of South African race relations can be traced to the nineteenth century when the territory functioned as the British-controlled Cape Colony. It was during this time that Pass Laws were established which greatly limited the ability of non-Whites to move about the settlement. The pass system continued in various forms for much of the 20th century. Early examples of separatist legislation included the Glen Grey Act of 1894, which limited land ownership rights for Black South African men and forced them into certain occupations through the imposition of labor taxes for underemployment. Early legislation that functioned as precursors to the apartheid
system were codified in the succeeding decades and included parliamentary acts that limited the rights of non-Whites to vote in elections. In some instances, these pieces of legislation limited voting for Blacks and Indians. In other instances, it eliminated the franchise altogether. Among the most significant pieces of legislation fostering a culture of racial discrimination was the South Africa Act of 1909. This legislation reified the existing racial order that privileged Whites. However, it offered the added dimension that Whites now had aggregate political rule over all non-Whites and were the only group that could be elected to Parliament. It was in this same year that the Cape Colony became the Union of South Africa. Upon its establishment, the Union of South Africa’s first leader was military officer and war hero, Louis Botha. As Prime Minister of Transvaal, which was the predecessor to the Union of South Africa, Botha, owing to his leadership in the Second Boer War, ascended to the position of prime minister of the new Union in 1910. It was through the administration of Louis Botha that Daniel Malan began his climb in South African politics. Malan became a major player in the solidification of apartheid beginning in 1948 when he was elected Prime Minister.

Malan began his relationship with South Africa government and party politics following a political fissure in the leadership of the South African Government in 1912. Two years later, in 1914, former Boer General J.B.W. Herzog founded the National Party of South Africa. It was under Herzog’s leadership that Malan became acquainted with the National Party. His first role was editor of his party’s newspaper the *De Burger*. Just four years later, Malan campaigned for seat in Parliament and was successful. This was the beginning of his climb in the political leadership in South Africa. He would eventually assume the role of Minister of the Interior and later Prime Minister; emerging as a crusader for South African nationalism and the eventual institutionalization of apartheid.

The general election of 1948 marked a turning point in the history of South Africa. It was in this election that the National Party, under the leadership of Daniel Malan, campaigned on a platform premised on the full implementation of an apartheid system of government and defeated the seated government under the leadership of United National South African Party leader and Prime Minister Jan Smuts. The National Party had been formed to advocate for the establishment of a Republic of South Africa, the formal institution of apartheid, and the advancement of Afrikaner nationalism. Its origins are readily located in the political context of the establishment of the Union of South Africa in the early twentieth century. The United National South African Party—which was succeeded by the South African Party—also supported a system of White minority rule, but made it clear that it was against apartheid. Similar to the National Party, the United Party originated in the early twentieth century following the founding of the Union of South Africa. The successor to what was known as the South Africa Party, the United Party reigned in South Africa from 1934 to 1948. Following the election of 1948, which was determined by a narrow margin, Malan formed a government in partnership with the Afrikaner Party in order to ensure a total majority in Parliament. Upon establishment of its government, Malan, as the party’s leader, became Prime Minister. He led this post until 1954.
Upon its election, the National Party laid the foundation for the political, social, and economic institution of apartheid. Though Malan held office for only six years, the apartheid system on which he and his National Party campaigned, would remain in place until its eradication in 1993. Though South Africa held general elections between 1948 and 1994, the apartheid government remained in place through the same arrangement that facilitated the initial election of Malan, the National Party, and their apartheid regime. By prohibiting non-White South Africans from exercising the franchise, the National Party ensured that it would remain in power and succeeded in doing so for forty-five years. Essentially, the National Party engineered a racist social arrangement that, absent the international political and economic pressure such as that levied upon South Africa in the 1980s, would have perpetuated itself indefinitely.

Apartheid was advanced through various pieces of legislation during Malan’s tenure, and that of the four Prime Ministers and three state presidents that served at the helm of the South African government before the system’s eradication in 1993. The imposition of apartheid legislation by the National Party was premised on the ideology of a system of grand apartheid that was initially conceived earlier in the history of the Union of South Africa. The principal objective of this system of grand apartheid was the creation of a structure of absolute racial segregation. This was to permeate all areas of life in South Africa. However, its most pointed areas of impact included voting, speech, press, religion, assembly, education, labor, and property rights. Legislation to this effect followed in the succeeding years and decades. The system of apartheid explicitly encroached on the area of the franchise with the adoption of the Separate Cape Natives Voters Roll Act of 1951. This legislation eliminated Black Africans from voting rolls; only allowing them to participate indirectly in certain parts of the electoral process. Further, this legislation made it clear that Africans were only to be represented by Whites in Parliament. The Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Public Safety and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1953, and the Riotous Assemblies Act of 1956 contravened the rights of Africans in the areas of speech, press, religion, and assembly. These pieces of legislation effectively gave South Africa’s Minister of Justice the power, cart blanche, to determine whether or not a person was a communist and to prohibit said persons from holding elected office and restrict their rights of citizenship in other areas as well. This legislation also gave the same office the power to “prohibit any person from attending any meeting being held,” and “declared it a crime to protest against any racial law or to support any campaign for the appeal or modification of any law.” The Native Laws Amendment Acts of 1952 and 1957 appended the efforts to contain the rights of non-Whites in the areas of speech, religion, press, and assembly. This act included provisions designed to prohibit Africans from assembling in so-deemed “White areas,” and allowed the state to deem people “idle” or “undesirable,” and sentence them to “labor in work colony, farm camp, refuge, etc., for up to two years.” It was in this same time period that the South African Parliament enacted the Population Registration Act of 1950. This policy resulted in the imposition of a system of race classification by which South Africans were
classified into three general racial categories, Black, White, and Colored and the added requirement that all people older than eighteen years of age must carry identification that delineated the racial group to which they belonged.\(^{31}\)

The system of grand apartheid also included restrictions on the education of South Africa’s non-White citizens. The Bantu Education Act of 1953 imposed these restrictions. This policy gave the central government jurisdiction over education, which had previously been a function of the provincial governments. It also provided for the reorganization of schools for African children so that they focused exclusively on preparing their pupils for “domestic and manual labor only.”\(^{32}\) In the area of labor, Africans were also prohibited from participation in unions that organized around race, and segregation was to persist in existing labor unions. These laws were imposed by the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924 and reified by the National Labor Act of 1954. The latter of these two gave White unions the power to negotiate and establish employment agreements for all employees, including Blacks, who were not party to the decisions. Provisions of the National Labor Act also prohibited African workers from resolving grievances or engaging in negotiations with their employers on any matter. This same legislation outlawed labor strikes for Black workers though their White counterparts were able to exercise this right in the context of labor disputes.

Some of the most heinous legislation adopted to maintain the system of grand apartheid were those designed to restrict the property rights of non-White South Africans. These included the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 and 1954, which prohibited Africans from land ownership outside of the bounds of designated areas and provided for residential segregation. In a similar vein, the Group Areas Act of 1950, 1952 and 1956 provided for the “complete residential and business segregation of the three races.”\(^{33}\) Finally, the system of racial segregation was solidified by legislation passed in the early 1950s that provided for segregation in transportation, prohibition of interracial marriages, and declared the practice of sexual relations between person of White and non-White ancestry to be a criminal act.\(^{34}\)

Much of the initial apartheid legislation was instituted in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, these policies would provide the legal foundation for the maintenance of apartheid in South Africa for the remainder of the system’s existence. Considered in relationship to the other activities taking place elsewhere in the rest of the African continent and in the African diaspora, the apartheid policies of South Africa’s National Party government were, in many ways, out of step. They worked to create, maintain, and enhance institutionalized and state legislated racism. However, this was in direct contradiction to the other parts of the world where racism, colonialism, and their vestiges were on the decline as a result of the various movements underway in the Black world. Further underscoring the relative backwardness of South Africa’s apartheid system of racism, segregation, discrimination, and separatism were the legislative and judicial victories of African American Civil Rights Movement, through which African Americans were able to realize a more full participation in all aspects of American life. However, the South
African apartheid system would continue for much of the twentieth century. Owing to its marked contrast to the more progressive racial policies adopted around the globe, the situation in South Africa prevailed on the consciousness of anti-colonial, civil rights, and human rights activists throughout the world. In the case of American and African American activists, the central concern was the involvement of the U.S. in matters concerning Southern Africa, which included the territories and nation states, described above. As will be explored in the subsequent section, the issue of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa was a point of contention among anti-colonial and African liberation activists in the U.S. and around the world. In the case of American activists, U.S. foreign policies toward Africa served as a point around which many of them rallied for the last half of the 20th century.

**U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Southern Africa**

Before 1960, the U.S. paid very little attention to anything related to Africa. This is evident through the failure of numerous U.S. presidential administrations to direct any State Department resources to Africa, including the assignment of ambassadors to the handful of states that were already independent before the 1960s.\(^3^5\) Even with respect to the whole region, the State Department did not create its Bureau of African Affairs until 1958. In the case of the U.S. Congress, the House of Representatives’ Committee on Foreign Affairs did not establish its subcommittee on Africa until 1959. It was not until 1973 that the Senate gave significant attention to Africa by establishing a Subcommittee on African Affairs, which, like the House subcommittee, was located within the Committee on Foreign Relations. At the outset, these interventions were of little substantive significance in light of the general ignorance of Africa on the part of most Americans. This included so-called learned Americans such as scholars, members of Congress, and diplomats.\(^3^6\) Thus, Africa—the very place from which the U.S. (and the British colonies that predated it) imported humans to work as slaves to fuel the agricultural economy that enabled the U.S. to emerge as a global capitalist superpower—was of little significance for much of American history.\(^3^7\)

The interest in Africa on the part of the U.S. changed drastically in 1960. The most significant strides were made beginning in 1961 with the inauguration of President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was the first president to assign an individual ambassador to each of the seventeen newly independent African states.\(^3^8\) However, the new attention paid to Africa was not merely an expression of goodwill on the part of the Kennedy administration. In some ways, this can be seen as an accident of history in that Kennedy happened to be elected president around the same time that the sweep of independence movements made its way through the African continent. The continent formerly dominated as colonies of the various European powers was now partitioned into multiple sovereign states, each with their own set of national interests.

At the outset, Kennedy not only established a corps of American diplomats to African states, but his administration also took steps to fully explore the possibilities
of and conditions for relations between the U.S. and Africa. At the core of these explorations was the desire on the part of the U.S. to do its part to prevent the spread of communism to the African continent. The objectives of the Kennedy administration, in cultivating these associations with African states in the early 1960s, were captured in State Department correspondence that had been classified during the Kennedy administration and in the years following. Per this communication, it was clear that the policy of Kennedy administration toward Africa was steeped in the ideological conflicts at the foundation of the Cold War. As part of a study commissioned by the Kennedy administration on the relationships between Africa and the U.S. the following conclusion was drawn: “What we do—or fail to do—in Africa in the next year will have a profound effect for many years....We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the [Communist] Bloc and the non-Communist World.”

Hence, U.S. relations with Africa for the greater part of the 20th century would be heavily influenced, if not completely informed, by the international political climate of the Cold War. This became increasingly clear as the U.S. began to approach its dealings with the various political struggles underway in Africa during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. These included the civil wars and the struggles to eliminate White minority rule in Southern Africa. U.S. policies toward the region—including Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, Angola, and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe—varied depending on the degree to which U.S. national and international interests interfaced with or conflicted with calls to aid in the eradication of White minority rule. However, on the question of majority rule in Southern Africa, it was clear through various foreign policy decisions, that the U.S.—particularly the Kennedy through Reagan administrations—erred on the side of those who sought to maintain the White minority dominance over Southern Africa’s Black populations. However, its position on these issues was subsumed under the umbrella of anti-communism.

Several key U.S. foreign policy decisions highlight the complicated way in which the U.S. engaged with the political struggles in Southern Africa during the 1960s and beyond. In the case of Angola, the U.S.’s involvement was consistent with its anti-communist leanings. This became apparent through the various U.S. foreign policy decisions that sought to aid the anti-communist forces in the Angolan Civil War. Throughout this twenty seven-year conflict, the U.S. provided significant material and financial assistance to the FNLA in their effort to defeat the communist front in Angola. However, this was not at all fueled by the desire to challenge Portuguese colonial rule. Thus, by lending aid in various forms to the FNLA, the U.S. worked to counter the leftist leaning MPLA, which, owing to the movements out of which it emerged, was readily associated with the communist bloc. These early 1960s actions by the U.S. set the tone for American involvement with Angola for the duration of the Angolan Civil War.

In the 1970s, the U.S. played a leading role in a coalition in support of the MPLA. This anti-communist coalition included the FNLA, UNITA, Zaire, and the Republic of South Africa. However, it represented a failed attempt, in the estimation of scholars such as William Minter—who characterizes the U.S. as having “lost
Angola’ to ‘Soviet-Cuban adventurism,’” which he further attributes to “the liberal ‘Vietnam syndrome’ and Cuba, the revolutionary thorn Washington has never been able to accommodate.” What is more, adds Minter, the U.S.’s failure and ultimate defeat in its attempts to support the MPLA coalition in Angola in the 1970s remains a sticking point in the milieu of U.S. foreign policy during the Cold War.

Exemplifying U.S. foreign policy toward Angola in the 1970s is the Congressional intervention—almost to the point of a reprimand—on the Ford administration through the U.S. Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Senator Dick Clark of Iowa sponsored this legislation in his capacity as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs. It prohibited the continued U.S. support of private groups engaged in the Angolan conflict, and became known as the Clark Amendment. Though it provided a check on the Henry Kissinger-helmed State Department from continuing to support the anti-communist coalition in Angola, it did not stop the administration from lobbying other nations and private entities to lend their support of the anti-communist coalition. Though this legislation was repealed in 1985, it was repeatedly violated in letter and spirit throughout its period of legitimacy. For example, the Ford administration, particularly its CIA director, George H.W. Bush, was successful at securing support from other nations (such as Israel) to aid in the anti-communist coalition in Angola by supporting South Africa’s efforts to invade the Civil War stricken nation on behalf of the coalition. These practices continued through the Reagan administration. In fact, Reagan himself was an open supporter of the UNITA forces and engaged in these efforts by advocating for South Africa’s continued aid to UNITA throughout much of 1980s.

Historian Gerald Horne best captures the mélange of U.S. foreign policy toward Zimbabwe in his 2001 book, From the Barrel of a Gun. As part of a sweeping, informative, and detailed overview of the complicated relationship between U.S. and Zimbabwe War of Liberation, Horne’s chapter on U.S. foreign policy toward Rhodesia and Zimbabwe astutely explains the complicated ways in which the various arms of the U.S. foreign policy establishment responded to the Zimbabwe conflict between 1965 and 1980. Horne refers to the subject of U.S. policies toward Zimbabwe as a “White House, Checkered Policy.” Steeped in the historical moment of African American liberation and African liberation on the continent, Horne points to the ways that these forces worked to influence the varying approaches to U.S. foreign policy toward Zimbabwe. Undoubtedly, U.S. policy toward this region was rooted in the international discord over race and the ideological conflict over communism. That is, the changing nature of domestic race relations coupled with the onset of the Cold War heavily influenced—and in many ways complicated—what may have been an otherwise simple approach to questions about exactly how the U.S. should involve itself with the Zimbabwe conflict.

During the Johnson administration, the conflicting views on these very issues resulted in inconsistent policy positions, which did not emerge with Johnson’s unanticipated presidency. For example, in 1962, U.S. diplomat Joseph Sisco clarified that, though the U.S. was having a difficult time supporting the United Kingdom on questions related to Southern Rhodesia during debates in the U.N. General
Assembly, it (the U.S.) was nonetheless committed to saving face for the British.\(^{46}\) Calling attention to the lack of an official policy position by the U.S. on the Zimbabwe issue, Senator Robert F. Kennedy, pointed out that the liberation struggles in Africa were “extremely important, yet we don’t really have much of a policy.”\(^{47}\) Kennedy further observed that the development of a policy position of some kind toward the region would fend off future issues.\(^{48}\) Ironically, however, Kennedy made these observations in 1963; two years before Ian Smith and his government announced the Universal Declaration of Independence. This lack of a policy position on the part of the U.S. became characteristic of the White House during the Johnson administration and beyond.

The adoption of key pieces of civil rights legislation by the U.S. Congress in 1964 and 1965, and the organizing efforts to ensure its enforcement, produced an African American electorate of a considerable proportion. In the post-civil rights era, many African American voters were concerned with the political struggles in Africa, just as they were about the conditions of other African descendents in the U.S.\(^{49}\) Because African Americans were able to influence the outcome of presidential, Congressional, and senatorial elections as a critical mass, their concerns about Zimbabwe—and the rest of Southern Africa for that matter—could not be ignored. This came to heavily shape African American politics and political participation during the Johnson administration. An example of the increasing relevance of African American concerns on matters of foreign policy during this period is the action by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., Arthur Goldberg, who, in voting against Rhodesia in the U.N. General Assembly, conceded that “to do otherwise would have caused us domestic racial difficulties and hurt our business interests in every African country.”\(^{50}\) What is more, President Johnson himself acknowledged the very real threat to his political stability, and that of his party, in the ensuing Congressional and presidential elections. He recognized the conundrum created by the Zimbabwe conflict in that continued opposition to Rhodesia (and thus support for Zimbabwe) would appeal to the interests of African Americans and to American interests in continental Africa. However, to do so would heavily risk straining relationships with the Republic of South Africa, who served as the model of race relations—that is minority rule—that Ian Smith’s government sought to maintain in Zimbabwe.\(^{51}\)

Further complicating the Zimbabwe issue was the concern for Johnson’s electoral stability and that of the Democratic Party. Johnson himself acknowledged the potential for the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe issue to have significant bearing on racial politics on the domestic front. In an era of political instability in the American South, Johnson’s support for the Black people of Southern Africa—be it real or imagined—was understood to be a mammoth risk for Democratic representation in the American South. Though the Democrats were once strong in the South, the party politics of the early 1960s, caused the region to gravitate toward the Republican Party which had, by and large, maintained its conservative position of race relations in the U.S. and abroad.

Throughout the Johnson administration, the White House, and the other parts of the U.S. foreign policy establishment, were forced to reckon with the relationship
between domestic and international race issues. Though many ill-informed politicians regarded Africans worldwide as proponents of communism, the Johnson administration had little choice but to respond, at least publicly, in a manner consistent with the sentiment of sanctions imposed on Rhodesia by much of the international community. It did so by supporting the imposition of sanctions in the U.N., and the president’s implementation of these sanctions through executive order.\textsuperscript{52} The Zimbabwe-Rhodesia question proved to be a thorny issue throughout the Johnson administration, and the administrations of the three presidents that succeeded him, before the Rhodesia-Zimbabwe conflict was finally resolved by the ratification of Lancaster House Agreement in 1979.\textsuperscript{53} Different from Johnson, the Nixon and Ford administrations, owing largely to their Republican Party affiliations, were less pressured to compromise their party’s position on Rhodesia.

When Republican Richard Nixon was elected President of the United States in 1968, U.S. foreign policy toward Zimbabwe again changed. Nixon’s narrow defeat over Hubert Humphrey proved to be a major victory for the cause of White minority rule in Rhodesia.\textsuperscript{54} While the Kennedy and Johnson years were marked by inconsistencies rooted in party politics and American race relations, the Nixon administration made no qualms about where its allegiance rested. This was particularly evident in the early years of the Nixon administration when Congress passed legislation that lifted sanctions previously imposed upon Rhodesia. These repeals were clear indicators that, to the Republican Party, including its president and Congressional leaders, the cause of anti-communism was a far greater cry than was the cause of anti-racism.\textsuperscript{55}

The change in U.S. foreign policy toward Rhodesia during the Nixon administration is highlighted by the adoption of legislation in Congress that became known as the Byrd Amendment. Named after its sponsor, Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia, the Byrd Amendment allowed the United States to resume trade and investments with Rhodesia to the satisfaction of American business leaders, most of who were principally concerned with their economic interests over the moral issues of democracy and majority rule in Zimbabwe. What is more, by enacting the provisions of the Byrd Amendment, Congress and the Nixon White House made it clear that its understanding of U.S. national interests superseded conventions established by international law.\textsuperscript{56}

With the ensuing demise of Nixon and his ultimate resignation, the conundrum of Rhodesia-U.S. relations was bestowed upon his successor Gerald Ford. However, as anticipated, the Ford administration carried forward some of the same policy positions initiated by its predecessor. In a tug of war involving the Rhodesian Lobby and the Republican Party on the one hand, and the key domestic entities and the international community on the other, the Ford administration further exemplified the complicated nature of the Rhodesia issue. Exacerbating the situation was the fact that the U.S. was the only state that failed to cast an affirmative vote in the U.N. on any issue put forth concerning Southern Africa sanctions; thereby supporting White minority rule.\textsuperscript{57}
The U.S.’s treatment of the Zimbabwe issue was complicated further in 1976 when Jimmy Carter defeated Republican Gerald Ford in the November presidential election. Like his Democratic predecessors, Carter assumed office with a considerable volume of support from African American voters. This included significant support from Black elected officials whose numbers had increased markedly by the 1976 election. Therefore, like Kennedy and Johnson, the Carter administration could not categorically ignore the domestic and foreign policy concerns of African Americans as Republican administrations had done. However, the Carter’s administration faced the appended obstacle of balancing the conflicting interests of African Americans with those of other government officials, including some in his own party. Similar to Johnson, Carter struggled to maintain a handle on the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia issue at all levels of government.

The effort of some figures in Washington to undermine the Carter administration’s foreign policy agenda on Rhodesia (and the whole of Southern Africa for that matter) was induced by the constant attacks levied against Andrew Young. Appointed by Carter in 1977 to serve as U.S. permanent ambassador to the United Nations, Young had been an aide of civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., and a former member of Congress. Young’s appointment proved to be controversial, particularly on matters concerning Southern Africa. His actions on behalf of the Carter administration in this capacity were much to the dismay of the pro-Rhodesia forces operating in Washington. To his credit, Young served as an important and unprecedented bridge between the Carter administration and the foreign policy interests of African Americans. Young’s involvement in the struggle for racial equality in the U.S. gave him a different perspective on the connection between American race relations and the racially charged conflict in Rhodesia. Young pointed out an observation from his first diplomatic visit to Southern Africa that the region “was headed toward a race war.”

Throughout his administration, Carter faced the efforts of several GOP members of Congress to undercut his administration’s foreign policy agenda toward Zimbabwe. These included actions taken by New York Senator Jacob Javits and New Jersey Senator Clifford Case (both Republicans) to introduce legislation that would prohibit the U.S. from enforcing sanctions against Rhodesia, with the proviso that the Smith Regime continues negotiations “and a government was freely elected.” Other actions by members of Congress included Congressman Robert Danon of California, who made a trip to Salisbury, only to return pledging to “raise holy hell in the United States Congress on behalf of Rhodesia.”

As it happened, the Carter administration proved to be the most steadfast in its approach to dealing with the Ian Smith regime in Rhodesia. This is certainly more than can be said about the administrations that preceded it. His appointment of Andrew Young to the high post of U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the U.N. was a key decision in shaping and articulating American foreign policy toward Zimbabwe. Though Young was lambasted for his connections to the civil rights and Black Power movements—and probably assumed his ambassadorship too late in the course of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesia conflict—his work in the Carter administration helped end
the U.S.’s public support for the Smith regime. Certainly, this is emphasized by the Carter administration’s role in the repeal of the Byrd Amendment in 1977.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Apartheid South Africa

U.S. foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa often found itself at the crossroads of anti-racism and anti-communism. Characterized by Alex Thomson (2008) as a great balancing act between conflicting interests, the U.S.’s collective record of policies toward South Africa were heavily influenced by the relentless desire of the U.S. and its allies to prevent the spread of communism. However, South Africa’s apartheid policy of racial separation placed the U.S. in a precarious position. On the one hand, its interests in defeating the communist Eastern Bloc caused it to aligned with South Africa’s Afrikaner Nationalist Party’s apartheid government. However, in doing so, the U.S. was supporting a national policy that endorsed, and in many ways engineered, a social apparatus premised of race-based subordination of Blacks that included separation and inequality. This resulted in the U.S. siding with Pretoria (the seat of South Africa’s apparent anti-communist government) over the African National Congress, which was the party of the Black majority. The latter, like most nationalist movements by Blacks throughout the world, had been hastily associated with Soviet Communism. This mirrored the hackneyed practice of associating any group espousing communist, socialist, or Marxist-Leninist values with communism of the variety advanced by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

Historically, the area occupied by the Union and later the Republic of South Africa—as the southern most tip of the African continent—served as an important port on the trade route initially between India and Europe (specifically the Netherlands and the United Kingdom) and later the U.S. The Dutch East India Company solidified the significance of this area as a critical trade location in 1652, as it emerged as the world’s first global corporation. However, nearly two and a half centuries later, in the aftermath of the Second World War, this route became even more important as it provided “access to the oil reserves of the middle east.” Thus, in an era of increased dependence on oil and the transportation requirements associated with this innovation, the southern tip of Africa became a key player in the international political economy. As Thomson further points out, U.S. economic interests heavily shaped U.S. policy toward South Africa. This was largely in consequence of internationalization of the U.S. economy in the post World War II era. Early on, these economic relationships largely included the automotive industry as the Republic of South Africa rose to become one of the U.S.’s most significant export markets for automobiles. However, this quickly expanded to include other non-automotive corporations who were attracted to South Africa’s noninterventionist position on foreign investments. As the Republic became a fertile ground for the development of these transnational corporations, economic relations with the U.S. grew exponentially. This was supplemented by the increase in
investments made by private U.S. based entities, also during the latter half of the 20th century. An additional force at play in the development of U.S. foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa was how to balance the U.S.’s strategic and economic interests in South Africa with the fact that South Africa’s apartheid system was regarded, worldwide, as a gross human rights violation. South Africa’s maintenance of a system of grand apartheid was in direct contradiction to American values—as espoused in the Republic’s founding documents—and to the efforts of African Americans to eradicate American racism and secure their civil and human rights. What is more, South Africa’s maintenance of apartheid into the 1960s and beyond was also incongruent with the independence movements that made their way through the African continent during the same decade. Accordingly, U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa during the second half of the twentieth century reflected the efforts of numerous factions; all focused on advancing what they believed to be the best interests of the U.S.’s and South Africa. As the record of U.S. foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa reveals, at times the importance of some of these competing interests would outweigh others. This was the case in the 1960s and 1970s and in the early part of the 1980s. Much like its policies toward the whole region of Southern Africa, U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa often manifested itself through the series of inconsistent and non-policy positions of the various U.S. presidential administrations during apartheid’s reign. Driving these inconsistencies were the unresolved conflicts between the U.S.’s various interests, coupled with the continued presence of racism on the part of some Americans who failed to see the fundamental human rights violation that apartheid represented. By some indicators, the U.S. often placed its strategic and national interests ahead of any concern for the human rights of South Africa’s Black populations who were the victims of apartheid’s wrath. Examining U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa beginning with the Kennedy administration, it is easily discernable that the U.S. approached this matter in a way that Thomas Noer originally called “benign neglect.” Coming into office at a critical point in the American Civil Rights Movement and the fall of European colonialism in Africa, the Kennedy administration dealt with South Africa in a manner consistent with what it wanted America and rest of the world to believe its policy on civil and human rights to be. Thus, in the international arena, the Kennedy administration supported the positions of the U.N. that repudiated apartheid. However, the administration’s positions on substantive issues revealed a host of inconsistencies. Among the most notable of the policy positions advanced by the Kennedy administration towards South Africa was the imposition of an arms embargo in the summer of 1963. In short, this embargo prohibited the sale of military equipment by any entity in the U.S. to South Africa. However, the arms embargo was merely a symbolic action by some measures. It was symbolic because it was a “voluntary” rather than a “mandatory” embargo. What is more, the policy was replete with so many loopholes—including the commitments to honoring existing contracts and already negotiated agreements with South Africa—that its imposition was
The substantive inconsequentiality of the arms embargo is highlighted by its proviso that the U.S. could, in fact, sell arms to the Republic of South Africa, so long as they were used in accordance with Cold War priorities. In sum, the Kennedy administration continued to set the tone for a duplicitous U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa. What is more, the U.S. vis-à-vis the Kennedy administration came to play an important part, through the CIA, in the aftermath of South Africa’s severance from the British Commonwealth in 1961. It was at this point, with the separation of Pretoria from London, that the CIA took a more active role in intelligence concerning South Africa, and was known to not only have had collegial relations with the South African government, but also for having had a role in the arrest of Nelson Mandela. Coupled with the continued sale of arms equipment to South Africa, the U.S., under the Kennedy administration was disingenuous, at best, on matters concerning the apartheid regime. This was consistent with the manner in which the Kennedy administration dealt with entire region of Southern Africa, and South Africa itself was no exception.

With Kennedy’s assassination in 1963 and the abrupt political transition in the U.S., the Johnson administration carried forth some of the same policy positions as the previous administration. The Johnson administration differed in that its symbolic overtures earned it a reputation for placing human rights issues over other interests—both strategic and economic. Perhaps reflecting the changing nature of race relations in the U.S., the Johnson administration took a harsher public stance against Pretoria on apartheid than its predecessors. In a 1966 address to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), Johnson contended that:

The foreign policy of the United States is rooted in its life at home. We will not permit human rights to be restricted in our country. And we will not support policies abroad which are based on the rule of minorities or the discredited notion that men are unequal before the law. We will not live a double standard—professing abroad what we do not practice at home, or venerating at home what we ignore abroad.

Similarly, in 1968, Vice President Hubert Humphrey made an address to the OAU denouncing White minority governments in Southern Africa. At a meeting of the OAU, Humphrey iterated:

To those who still believe that small minorities can indefinitely hold domination over large majority, I say: You ignore the most vital and inevitable movement of our time—self-determination…I say you tragically misread the will and determination of Africans everywhere. You misread history and fail to understand the future.

In this same address, Humphrey articulated the official position of the Johnson administration. He said:

Let us be clear where America stands. Segregation: We oppose it. Discrimination: we oppose it. Exploitation: we oppose it. Social injustice: we oppose it. Self-determination: we support it. Territorial integrity: we support it. National Independence: we support it. Majority rule—one man, one vote: we support it.
In addition to being the first American president to speak on issues pertaining to an independent Africa, Johnson’s sentiments expressed at the OAU in 1966, and echoed by Humphrey two years later, spoke volumes about the spirit of the Johnson administration’s policy on Southern Africa. This was a far stronger position in support of human rights than the administrations that preceded it.

However committed to the cause of human rights the Johnson administration may have been, its policy positions on South Africa reflected the struggle to balance various and conflicting interests. This intricate balance was made more complex by the tense relationship between Namibia (South West Africa) and the Republic of South Africa. This relationship grew increasingly apprehensive as South Africa made plans to occupy Namibia and extend its apartheid policy into the territory. The conflict over Namibia grew in significance and involved the U.N. International Court of Justice, which deliberated on the issue before finally rendering an advisory opinion in 1971. Its ultimate decision was that the presence of the Republic of South Africa in Namibia was in fact illegal, placing South Africa “under obligation” by standards of international law, “to withdraw its administration from Namibia immediately and thus put an end to its occupation of the Territory.” However, before this ruling was issued, the Johnson administration’s National Security Council recommended that the U.S. continue its “policy on South Africa,” which had thus far, “been something of an ad hoc combination of continuing to preserve our basically good relations with the Republic in light of our considerable trade, investment, and strategic and scientific (e.g. space tracking stations) interests there while at the same time making clear our opposition to apartheid.”

The Johnson administration’s policy positions were made clear by a series of specific actions. The most notable of these was National Security Action Memorandum 295 (NSAM 295), which was issued on 24 April 1964. This action, initiated by then National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, was taken while the International Court of Justice deliberated on the Namibia issue. NASM 295 was established as the Johnson administration’s policy of holding out for the ICJ’s ruling on Namibia, while it simultaneously encouraged South Africa to refrain from officially expanding apartheid into Namibia, which was the recommended course of action from South Africa’s Odendaal Commission. NSAM 295 served as the backdrop for the Johnson administration’s foreign policy toward South Africa.

In issuing NSAM 295, the administration, even after the ruling from the ICJ, succeeded in solidifying the Johnson’s “both/and” policy on South Africa. That is, the administration was both opposed to apartheid and committed to the preservation of its economic and strategic interests, and thus maintained some level of support in its relationship with the Republic of South Africa. If a theme prevails here, however, it is one of two warring yet irreconcilable policy positions advanced by the Johnson administration. That is, how could the U.S. successfully balance sets of interests, which are in apparent conflict with one another? In the case of South Africa, the active preservation of U.S. economic and strategic interest amounted to the passive subordination of human rights interests and thus the support of apartheid.
With President Nixon assuming office in January 1969, control of the White House returned to the GOP. In view of the abrupt transition between Nixon and Ford in the wake of Nixon’s resignation, the foreign policies of these administrations, as it pertains to South Africa, are best considered collectively. Different from the Democratic administrations that preceded it, the Nixon and Ford interaction became characterized as merely leaning toward support of White minority rule and were charged with fully embracing the continued subjugation of the Black majority in the region, particularly in the Republic of South Africa. Similar to previous administrations, the Nixon and Ford administrations fell far short of prioritizing human rights in its ongoing effort to balance the U.S.’s conflicting interests with respect to South Africa. The policy positions of the Nixon and Ford administrations were best captured by the National Security Study Memorandum 39 (NSSM), issued in 1969. The most prominent and telling clause contained in this document suggested, “the Whites are here to stay.” Though the very idea that “the Whites are here to stay” was disrupted by the fall of Portuguese colonialism in Africa in the mid-1970s, it nevertheless framed these two administrations’ policies toward the region.

NSSM 39 was a document that offered the administration several options for the course of action it could take with respect to South Africa. These options ranged from suggesting that the U.S. take up with White minority regimes in the name of “economic, strategic, and scientific interests,” to options suggesting that the U.S. disassociate itself from the Southern Africa conflicts altogether. Ultimately, the U.S. chose the second option, which stated that:

The Whites are here to stay and the only way that constructive change can come is through them. There is no hope for the Blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only lead to chaos and increased opportunities for communists. We can, by selective relaxation of our stance toward the White regimes encourage some modification of their current racial and colonial policies and through more substantial economic assistance to the Black states...help to draw the two groups together and exert some influence on both for peaceful change. Our tangible interests form a basis for our contacts in the region, and these can be maintained at an acceptable political cost.

Suffice it to say that the NSSM 39 strategy of observing the magnitude of White minority rule while encouraging South Africa to alter its racial policies, but not so much as to compromise the U.S.’s material interests in the Republic or the region—had failed. This can be attributed to Nixon’s insistence that his administration focus on issues deemed to be of greater domestic and international concern. The result was that for the whole of the Nixon and Ford administrations, the U.S. effectively contributed to the maintenance of the status quo on race relations in South Africa. Of the five presidential administrations between 1960 and 1980 considered in this chapter, none was more committed in spirit and letter toward the eradication of apartheid in South Africa than the Carter administration. Much like its predecessors, the Carter administration’s approach to the South Africa situation was a reflection of its approach to the entire Southern Africa region. Differently, however, the Carter
administration demonstrated a much stronger commitment to human rights in the region, and in the Republic of South Africa in particular, than did any of its predecessors. In practical terms, this meant that the administration, through a series of pointed actions and foreign policy decisions through the state department and in the U.N., worked to articulate U.S. opposition to apartheid in South Africa and the general principle and practice of White minority rule in the Southern Africa region.

Also different from his predecessors, Carter attempted to make Africa a high priority in his foreign policy realm. This was most evident through his decision to make Africa, particularly Southern Africa, the specific area of focus for his Vice President, Walter Mondale. In addition, through his appointment of Andrew Young as U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the U.N., Carter succeeded in creating a critical connection between the U.S. foreign policy establishment and the continued struggle against the vestiges of legally sanctioned American racism. Carter’s commitment to actively addressing the South Africa situation is best captured by his remarks on the subject at the commencement ceremonies of the United States Naval Academy in June 1976. Following a trip to Nigeria earlier that same year, the president proclaimed:

> We want to see a continent that is free of the dominance of outside powers, free of the bitterness of racial injustice, free of conflict, and free of the burdens of poverty and hunger and disease. We are convinced that the best way to work toward these objectives is through affirmative policies that recognize African realities and that recognize aspirations.\(^{87}\)

These sentiments were echoed by other players in the Carter administration including, for instance, Donald McHerny, who succeeded Andrew Young as U.S. Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the U.N. Like Young, McHenry was also an outspoken critic of apartheid South Africa and declared on one occasion, that, “we cannot, on the one hand, try to reach a resolution on the problems of Rhodesia, and Namibia, and on the other hand, mute our voices on the outrageous situation in Soweto.”\(^{88}\) Importantly, however, the Carter administration went to significant lengths to separate the issue of apartheid in South Africa from the other problems in the region.

Specific strategies taken by the Carter administration included the Vienna talks of May 1977. This meeting brought together representatives from the U.S. and South Africa for a “full and candid exchange of views concerning Southern Rhodesia, Namibia, and the future political evolution of South Africa.”\(^{89}\) The original idea was that the meeting would take place in either South Africa or the U.S. However, this bilateral meeting was held in Vienna, Austria beginning on 19 May 1977. Through the Vienna summit, the U.S. communicated its positions on the South Africa situation, including its commitment to separating the issue of South African apartheid from concerns about Namibia and Rhodesia. It was at the Vienna summit that the Carter administration was able to communicate its expectation of tangible changes in its domestic racial policies to South African officials.
In the face of growing U.S. pressure against White minority rule in South Africa, Pretoria demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the U.S. on its demands concerning Namibia and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. This included a readiness on the part of the South African government to levy pressure on Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith. What is more, the Republic of South Africa was even willing to work toward bringing a conditional end to their occupation of Namibia. However, Pretoria, through its Prime Minister, B.J. Vorster, refused to relent on the matter of apartheid. Thus, Pretoria showed little interest in bending to the demands of the U.S.

Different from its predecessors, the Carter administration, through a series of actions up until the Vienna talks, effectively issued an ultimatum to South Africa. This challenge, however indirect it may have been, set the stage for the administration’s key foreign policy positions and actions on apartheid for the balance of Carter’s term. These included an uncompromising position on some of Pretoria’s most racist policies and programs. In addition, the Carter administration publicly supported the liberation of Namibia, demanding the execution of full democratic elections. In addition, through Donald McHenry’s work in the U.N. (as deputy U.S. representative), the U.S. emerged as a founding member of the Western Contact Group (WGC), which included France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and West Germany. The purpose of this assemblage was to support the liberation of Namibia under terms established by the later adoption of Resolution 435 by the U.N. Security Council.

Though it was forced to reckon with the delicate balance between concerns of human and material interests in the Republic of South Africa, the Carter administration, to its credit, did so in a manner that showed greater concern for human rights than any of its predecessors. Though the fear of the spread of communism continue to heavily influence U.S. foreign policy, the Carter administration worked to foster stronger relationship between the U.S. and the developing world. This included Southern Africa. To its credit, the Carter administration, unlike others before it, lessened the concern that all oppositional movements in the Third World—such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa, and the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO)—were influenced by the communist Eastern Bloc; thus posing an immediate threat to U.S. strategic interests. To the point, Carter declared in 1977, “Being confident in our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once lead us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.” By embracing this position, the Carter administration lessened what previous administrations had employed as excuses for the continued privileging of U.S. strategic interests over human rights concerns. Consistent with this sentiment, the Carter administration went on to support the imposition of a mandatory arms embargo on South Africa by the U.N. in 1978 and Congress itself adopted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act in 1978. This action by Congress resulted in a block on the sale of nuclear and technology equipment and materials to the Republic of South Africa.

At once, the Carter administration made significant strides in the U.S.’s positions on apartheid however, at the same time, there were areas where the
administration compromised in the name of its human rights crusade. The principle issue with Carter’s actions and policy positions against Pretoria was that these produced very few substantive alterations in the state of race relations in South Africa. In effect, in spite of the political pressure from the U.S., the U.N., and a growing global anti-apartheid movement, South Africa maintained the status quo on apartheid and, in many ways, expanded its scope and wrath.

Through its focus on human rights, the Carter administration succeeded in fundamentally altering the U.S.’s relationship with the apartheid government controlling the Republic of South Africa. Its open opposition to apartheid fractured what had previously been a strong alliance between Washington, DC and Pretoria in the global war against communism. However, the Carter administration’s efforts were futile largely because of its reluctance to consider the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria. During this same time, Pretoria became increasingly autonomous in the production of the very military equipment on which it had been previously dependent on the U.S. Thus, the Carter administration’s imposition of arms embargoes proved to be materially inconsequential. Examined in its totality, this assessment is indeed apropos to the Carter administration’s foreign policy toward South Africa. That is, it was in the end materially insignificant.

The two areas covered in this chapter are among the many factors that are useful in contextualizing the emergence of a sustained involvement of African Americans in matters of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. The liberation struggles underway in Southern Africa during this time period made it difficult for African Americans, many of whom saw themselves and their struggles for racial justice and equality in the U.S. as indubitably related, to ignore the political movements against the vestiges of European colonialism half-a-world away. The practice of White minority rule in Southern Africa became an issue of sweeping concern. The injustice and human rights infringement that it presented undoubtedly reverberated through large sectors of African America. Adding to the magnitude of the Southern Africa human rights atrocities was the overall failure of the U.S. and its foreign policy establishment to institute a foreign policy agenda that privileged global concerns for human rights over U.S. strategic and material interests in substantive ways. Though the different presidential administrations between Kennedy and Carter advanced multiple policy positions, none went so far as to enact legislation on its own accord that would dramatically alter the state of affairs in Southern Africa. Even those who professed to favor global racial equality—such as Carter, Johnson and Kennedy—produced very little of substance in the end. The U.S. policy record on South Africa, in particular, is the most telling example of this.

In many ways, the complex web of U.S. policies toward Southern Africa set the stage for the emergence of an African American opposition to the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Although the Democratic Party was generally more responsive to the concerns of Blacks than was the Republican Party, both failed to overtly support the struggles for Black self-determination in Southern Africa. These policy positions became apparent against the backdrop of important political change for African Americans. With the emergence of a prominent group of political, intellectual,
and organization leaders, African American concerns about U.S. foreign policies toward Africa were thrust to the forefront of national political discourses. It was clear to the burgeoning Black political leadership that the U.S. was less concerned about preserving the rights of Blacks in Southern Africa than it was about protecting its political and economic interests in the region. These policy positions put the U.S. at odds with Black leaders who, in turn, employed alternative means of advocating their oppositional foreign policy concerns. Seen as oppositional to the interests of the Black political leadership—these policies fueled the development of African American adversarial diplomacy. Stated differently, the U.S.’s collective record of policy positions on Southern Africa were seen as oppositional to African American interests, thus placing the Black political leadership in an adversarial relationship with the state. The ways that African Americans connected the national with the international and mobilized in response to these oppressive foreign policies in the post-civil rights era is the subject of the succeeding chapters.

1 Specific clauses in the Atlantic Charter included, among others, a commitment to no expansion of existing territories; no territorial changes against the will of the people; the right of all people to self governance; unabridged access to raw materials; freedom from fear and want; freedom of the seas; abandoning the use of force; and a commitment to disarmament of opposing nations.

2 These principles were agreed to by the group of nations that became known as the Allies of World War II on 1 January 1942. This group of nations served as the forerunner for the modern U.N. See Stephen Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations, a Story of Superpowers, Secret Agents, Wartime Allies and Enemies, and Their Quest for a Peaceful World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003).

3 The year 1960 is significant for several reasons. First is that 1960 has been heralded as the “Year of Africa” and marked the beginning of the sweep of independence that would make its way through Africa during the first half of the 1960s. Second is that the year 1960 was the first time during which the U.S., vis-à-vis the Department of State, gave any significant attention to Africa. Third, the early 1960s was a time when issues pertaining to Africa became a part of the policy agenda of African American political leaders. Fourth, it was in the 1960s that the U.S. foreign policy establishment began to make clear its intentions to support white minority rule in Southern Africa. It is also worthy of note here that the 1960s was a time during which African American politicians, intellectuals, and organization leaders began to become involved in foreign policy issues. Thus, there was a type of opposition to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa that had not existed in wholesale form previously.

4 Other scholars of U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa have made the differentiation between strategic, material, and human rights interests. The works that have been most helpful in this study are those by Henry F. Jackson and Alex Thomson. See Henry F. Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982); and Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, 1948-1994: Conflicts of Interest (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

5 In the year 1960 alone, seventeen African states were declared independent from colonial rule. Between 1961 and 1968, 16 additional states had been deemed independent. See Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).


The first democratic elections were held in Zimbabwe in February 1980. This was the year following the ratification of the Lancaster agreement, which was agreed upon in Lusaka, Zambia at the Fifth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (1 to 7 August 1979).


9 Macqueen, *The Decolonization of Portuguese Africa.*


11 Zimbabwe operated under several different names before its final liberation in 1979. These include Southern Rhodesia from 1901 to 1965; Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979; Zimbabwe-Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979; Southern Rhodesia from 1979 to 1980; and Zimbabwe beginning in 1980.

12 The first democratic elections were held in Zimbabwe in February 1980. This was the year following the ratification of the Lancaster agreement, which was agreed upon in Lusaka, Zambia at the Fifth Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (1 to 7 August 1979).


14 *East Africa and Rhodesia Newspaper,* November 18, 1965, 204-205.

15 Ibid.

16 The U.N. Security Council adopted resolution 216 on November 12, 1965. It rebuked the UDI on the grounds that a White minority ruling government had enacted it, and called other nation states to not recognize the Smith regime. The vote was 10-1 with France casting the abstaining vote. The Security Council followed this action with the adoption of Resolution 217 on November 20, 1965. The full text of Security Council Resolutions passed in the year 1965 can be found at the U.N.’s Internet based archive, accessed 4 March 2011, http://www.un.org/documents/sc/res/1965/scres65.htm,


18 The most notable of these was the United States who maintained a consul-general in Rhodesia. The issue of the U.S. lifting sanctions levied against Rhodesia is covered in the succeeding section of this chapter as part of a larger narrative about U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa. See Horne, *From the Barrel of A Gun.*


20 See note 17.


22 Other provisions of the South Africa Act of 1909 included the establishment of English and Dutch as the official languages of the Union of South Africa. For a good source that chronicles the early

23 The newspaper, *De Burger* became known later as *Die Burger*. It was founded in 1914 and is still in circulation. As of 2008, it has a circulation of over 90,000. Though it was founded by the National Party and was used to promote apartheid, the newspaper was disassociated from apartheid in the mid 1980s. Its current editor, Henry Jeffreys assumed the leadership in 2006 and is the paper’s first Black editor. The paper is written entirely in Afrikaans. See the Die Burger website, accessed 4 November 2011, www.dieburger.com.


25 The five prime ministers of South Africa during apartheid were Daniel François Malan (1948-1954); Johannes Gerhardus Strijdom (1954-1958); Hendrik Frensch Verwoerd (1958-1966); Balthazar Johannes Vorster (1966-1978); Pieter Willem Botha (1978-1984). In 1984, the title of the head of state was changed to State President of South Africa. The holders of this office were Botha (1984-1989); Chris Heunis (1989); Frederik Willem de Klerk (1989-1994).


27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid., 48.
34 Ibid.
35 Jackson, *From the Congo to Soweto*, 21.
36 Ibid.
38 Jackson, *From Congo to Soweto*, 21; Plummer, *Rising Wind*, 308.
42 Ibid.
45 Horne, *From the Barrel of a Gun*.
46 See Joseph Sisco to “Mr. Secretary,” 82 September 1962, Adlai Stevenson Papers, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ; U.S. Department of States, Main Decimal File, RG 59, Civil Branch, National Archives, College Park, MD; U.S. National Security Council Records, RG 273, Civil Branch, National Archives; Paul Kesaris, ed., *CIA Research Reports: Africa, 1946-1976* (Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1982); U.S. Department of State, *Confidential U.S. State
Department Central Files: South Africa: Internal Affairs and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1954 (36 microfilm reels with printed guide) (Frederick MD: University Publications of America, 1984); in Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 135.


48 Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 135.

49 Ibid., 136.

50 Ibid., 136.

51 Ibid., 137.

52 Johnson implemented these through Executive Order 11322. The U.S. supported the sanctions legislation in the U.N. through an affirmative vote on October 12, 1965 "preemptively condemning the UDI;" through a joint resolution passed by the U.N. on November 11, 1965; through an affirmative vote in the U.N. Security Council "calling on all states to refrain from providing Salisbury arms, oil, and other commodities and to break economic relations with the rebel regime; and the December 1966 action by the U.N. of imposing mandatory sanctions on Rhodesia. Johnson’s support of this on the U.S. front was solidified by the issuance of Executive Order 1132. See Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 143.

53 See note 17.

54 Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 146.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid., 151.

57 Ibid., 154.


59 Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 159.


61 Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 160.

62 Andrew DeRoche, “Standing on Principles: Jimmy Carter and Zimbabwe,” Diplomatic History 23, No. 4, (Fall 1999), 657-85, 667. See also, Roger C. Carandlemire to James Carter, 16 January 1979, Series 2.2 Box 23, Folder 9, Fran Church Papers, Boise State University, Boise, ID, quoted in Horne, From the Barrel of a Gun, 161.

63 To the point, Alex Thomson argues that the balancing act on the part of the U.S. and its foreign policy toward apartheid South Africa involved working toward equilibrium on incompatible interests. In this case, those were the U.S.’s strategic, economic, and human rights interests. See Alex Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, Chapter 1.

64 Ibid.


67 Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, 7.


69 Thomson, 10.

70 Ibid.

71 Thomson, 10.

Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, 13.


Thomson, U.S. Foreign Policy Towards Apartheid South Africa, 35.

Ibid., 38.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Thomson, Foreign Policy Toward Apartheid South Africa, 54.

Ibid., 63.

Ibid., 38.


Thomson, 97.


CHAPTER 3

THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA AND THE NEW BLACK POLITICS

For all practical purposes, the Civil Rights Movement had ended by 1965. Several prominent events occurred during 1964 and 1965 that underscore this. With the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the principal objectives of the Civil Rights Movement had materialized at the national level. These pieces of legislation effectively engineered programs that would ensure that African Americans (and by extension, all Americans) would be able to enjoy the full benefits of citizenship that would be enforced by federal intervention. Further highlighting the end of the Civil Rights Movement was the recognition of the need to focus more attention on civil rights issues as they surfaced at the local levels. This was typified by the outbreak of the Watts Riots in Los Angeles in 1965. Lasting for almost five days and resulting in an estimated $40 million in property damage, the Watts Riots drew national attention to the continued presence of substandard conditions in housing, employment, and education.\(^1\) It was also around 1965 that the ideological rifts among Black activists became most apparent. The gravitation of activists in the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) to the ideological left in 1965 symbolized this; thus marking the beginning of the era of Black Power politics and the movement that became associated with this left-infused approach to racial advancement. This type of activism took center stage in the post-civil rights era.

The post-civil rights era ushered the beginning of a new African American politics. As this chapter illustrates, this new African American politics was multidimensional and materialized through a surge in electoral and intellectual politics. The spike of a Black Congressional politics beginning in 1968 exemplifies the new electoral politics. This group of duly elected national politicians succeeded in bringing matters of domestic and international significance to a broader national and global public. The emergence of a new intellectual politics was exemplified by the significant increase of Americans intellectuals who became experts on Africa and U.S. foreign policy, through their training in graduate and professional schools—often in African Studies, international relations, and international law. The new intellectual politics can be located in two primary camps. The first was comprised of those African American intellectuals who worked largely in American colleges and universities and on the staff of African American members of Congress. This group can be readily associated with the ideology of liberal integration that dominated civil rights activism in the 1960s. The second group of African American intellectuals was associated with the Black Power Movement that grew increasingly prominent during final years of the Civil Rights Movement. This group was very much connected to the growing African American left that offered a counter-narrative to the ideology of liberal integration that dominated Black political discourses in the 1950s and 1960s. Many of the intellectuals included in this second group also benefited from the educational opportunities available to African Americans in the 1960s. This group
differed, however, in that many of them were aligned with the radical Black Power politics that emerged during the mid 1960s. Thus, their mobilizing efforts on domestic and international issues tended to be more radical than the approaches that embraced the quality of political participation often associated with the liberal integrationists of the Civil Rights Movement.

As discussed in the previous chapter, adversarial diplomacy, for African Americans, centered on the Southern African liberation struggles in the post-civil rights era. Though African American activists embraced diverse approaches to participating in politics, a common thread among activists concerned with the liberation struggles was that the U.S. should be socially responsible in its dealings with Southern Africa. However, more than this, these activists believed that African Americans should actively pressure their government to achieve these ends. This included the belief that the U.S. should impose political and economic sanctions on those governments that systematically denied Blacks the right to self-determination. Focusing on Congressional politics, and moderate and radical intellectual activism, this chapter highlights the ways that African American activists worked to support the Southern African liberation struggles and thus engaged in adversarial diplomacy in the post-civil Rights era. Moreover, by displaying the ways that adversarial diplomacy materialized in post-civil rights Black politics, this chapter further highlights the ways that the activism of this period defined approaches to adversarial diplomacy.

**Adversarial Diplomacy and Congressional Politics**

Throughout the late 1960s and 1970s—the years immediately following the Civil Rights Movement—African Americans increased in representation among elected officials at city, state, and national levels. This was indeed a consequence of the voting rights legislation coupled with the efforts of grassroots Black activists who advocated a more militant approach in their quest for civil and human rights. The efforts of groups like the MFDP and SNCC advanced the political and social position of African Americans in ways that the Congressional legislation had not been able to do. By mobilizing the African American electorate and challenging the discriminatory practices of the Democratic Party, African American grassroots activists advanced the spirit of the Voting Rights Act and helped to usher the beginning of a new era in African American electoral politics. At all levels of the American political system, African Americans were being duly elected to offices. These included the scores of African Americans elected to boards of education, city councils, state houses, and mayors of major American cities. On the national level, one of the most notable areas where African Americans realized electoral success was in the U.S. Congress.

Before the late 1960s, African American representation in Congress was dismal. However, by the beginning of the Ninetieth Congress (1967-1969), the number of Blacks in Congress had climbed to a record seven. This included five African Americans in the House and one African American in the Senate. The
members of the House included Democrats William Dawson of Illinois, Adam Clayton Powell of New York, Charles Diggs of Michigan, Robert Nix, Sr. of Pennsylvania, Augustus Hawkins of California, and John Conyers of Michigan. The most senior of these was Dawson who was elected in 1943 and would serve a nearly three-decade tour in the House of Representatives before retiring in 1971. In the Senate, the lone African American was Republican Edward Brooke of Massachusetts. Former Congressman William Clay describes the years between the beginning of William Dawson’s first term in Congress in 1943 and the slow increase in representation of Africa Americans in Congress through the 1960s and the “lonely years in Congress." However the slow and steady increase of African American representation in the House of Representatives, coupled with surges of Black militancy and demand for equality and full citizenship lay the foundation for the marked increase in African Americans in Congress in the succeeding decades.

Following the Congressional election of 1968, the number of African Americans in the House of Representatives increased from five to a total of ten. The additions included William Clay of Missouri, George Collins of Illinois, Louis Stokes of Ohio, and Shirley Chisholm of New York. Chisholm was the first African American woman elected to the U.S. Congress. In addition, this was the Congress to which Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. returned following the ruling by the Supreme Court declaring unconstitutional the refusal of the House of Representatives to seat Powell in the Ninetieth Congress. This was the largest number of African Americans seated in Congress since the Forty-Fourth Congress (1875-1877) when seven Blacks in the House and one in the Senate totaled eight Black members.

In 1969, at the outset of the Ninety-First Congress, the African American members organized themselves as the Democratic Select Committee (DSC) of the House of Representatives. The move to organize African Americans in Congress was a response to the needs of the Black communities from which many of these representatives were elected. With the leadership vacuum created in the post-civil rights era, many Black members of Congress saw it as their obligation to function as stewards of both the interests of the constituents in their districts and of the interests of the whole of Black America. Thus, African American members of Congress, particularly those elected toward the end of the 1960s, embraced their work as “a mandate to speak forcefully and loudly in behalf of equitable treatment of minorities by government.” As Representative Augustus Hawkins of California stated most pointedly, “We represent not only our own districts but every Black person in America.” He added that, “It is very hard to reject the many letters we get from other areas where persons feel they are not getting sympathetic treatment from their Congressman. By combining expertise, we can serve this function.” It was in response to the foregoing that Black Congressional representatives began a two-year mission of organizing themselves so that they could band together and work to advance the interests of African Americans.

In a few short years, the DSC had been successful in bringing national attention to political and social issues involving African Americans. Among these were the public hearings held, at the insistence of Black members of Congress, to
investigate the murders of two Black Panther Party leaders Fred Hampton and Mark Clark in 1969. The members of the DSC also played a leading role in launching a Congressional investigation and hearings surrounding murder of two students and the injuring of twelve others at Mississippi’s Jackson State University in 1970. What is more, the DSC, particularly Representatives Hawkins and Diggs, succeeded in marshalling resources to support the establishment and institutionalization of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, which has, for more than forty years functioned as a service agency and policy think-tank supporting the work of Black elected officials throughout the United States. However, at the outset, the Democratic Select Committee was merely “a loose-knit group under the leadership of Charles Diggs that met periodically with the Speaker of the House.” These words, written by Congressman William Clay on New Years Eve of 1970, were at once a description of the DSC and at the same time a criticism of it. It was the limitations of a loosely organized “Select Committee” that prompted Clay and his Black Congressional colleagues to call for the establishment of a formal organization through which the interests of African Americans, as understood by those elected to Congress, could be advanced.

The move to create a formal Black organization in Congress gained significant momentum following the 1970 midterm elections. It was from this election that the number of African Americans in Congress increased. The new additions included Ralph H. Metcalfe of Illinois, Charles Rangel of New York, and Parren Mitchell of Maryland. With the number of African American in the House numbering thirteen by the beginning of the Ninety-Second Congress in 1971, and in response to the social and political issues articulated by African Americans, these representatives recognized the need to establish a formal organization of Blacks in Congress. This prompted Charles Diggs, as chairman of the DSC and the senior Black Congressman, to call a meeting of the DSC on 2 February 1971. It was from this meeting that the DSC members decided to form an official organization; thus the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) was created. The founding members of the CBC were Representatives Chisholm, Clay, Collins, Diggs, Rangel, Mitchell, Hawkins, Nix, and newly elected members John Conyers, Jr. of Michigan, Ronald Dellums of California, Ralph Metcalfe of Illinois, and Walter Fauntroy Delegate for the District of Columbia. From this group, Charles Diggs was elected as the CBC’s founding chair.

A June 1971 issue of Newsweek magazine featured, on its cover, a group photo of twelve of the thirteen founding members of the CBC. Lauding the Caucus as “The New Black Politics,” the article described this new group of “Negroes” in Congress as “the New Way to Overcome.” This article pointed to early efforts of the CBC’s members to bring attention to issues understood to be of importance to African Americans. Most importantly, however, the article pointed to the CBC’s role in filling an important void in African American leadership on the national level. In the absence of the major leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, owing to the assassination of some of the movement’s most prominent leaders including Martin Luther King, Jr., Malcolm X, and Whitney Young, Black political leaders, particularly elected officials, became race leaders by default. Different from the previous decade,
African Americans—through members of Congress and elected officials at the local levels—had representatives who, rather than being anointed by a movement or organization, had been duly elected.\footnote{15}

The CBC’s commitment to Black issues is exemplified by several of the early initiatives, legislation, and programs advanced by Black members of Congress when they were organized as the Democratic Select Committee. For example, in 1971, members of the DSC protested President Richard Nixon’s State of the Union Address owing to the President’s ongoing refusal to meet with the Black members to discuss issues on behalf of African America. Lasting for more than a year, the standoff between the Nixon and the newly organized CBC ended on 25 March 1971 when the CBC finally had a meeting with Nixon in the Cabinet room of the White House. It was during this meeting that the Caucus presented President Nixon with sixty demands to address issues of equality and justice for African Americans.\footnote{16}

Following this action was an invitation for Representatives Diggs and Clay to appear on the television show, \textit{Meet the Press}, to discuss the Caucus’ meeting with President Nixon.\footnote{17} Following the appearance of Diggs and Clay on \textit{Meet the Press}, the CBC went on to release its “Report to the Nation.” The report delineated the Caucus’ aggravations with the Nixon administration and its failure to respond to any of the sixty recommendations made by the caucus members in the President’s State of the Union Address. Nixon’s refusal to address the recommendations in 1971, coupled with his repeated disregard for the Caucus precipitated the CBC’s later action of issuing of what it called the “True State of the Union.” It was through this address—delivered on the floor of the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives on 31 January 1973—that the CBC issued its alternative statement. This substitute State of the Union Address called attention to the domestic and foreign policy issues that the Caucus believed to be of concern to African Americans.\footnote{18}

In many ways, the election of African American members of Congress in increasing numbers and the subsequent establishment of the CBC represented a turning point in African American politics. Although the total number of African Americans in Congress has never represented a voting bloc large enough to successfully pass legislation in Congress, their presence was meaningful nonetheless. Thirteen Black members of Congress meant that there were thirteen African Americans to serve on the various Congressional committees and subcommittees. This included some who would come to serve as committee and subcommittee chairs. The thirteen African Americans comprising the CBC also enjoyed the same privileges as all other members of the House and Senate. Complete with budgets for operational expenses, including staff, postage, and office space, the members of the CBC were poised to become a prominent force in national politics. Their ability to mobilize as a voting bloc on issues understood to be in the interests of their districts, to African Americans in general, or concerning continental Africa and the African Diaspora, brought these very concerns to the forefront of the national political discourses in ways that were previously impossible.\footnote{19}
In addition to advancing their individual and collective agendas on matters of significance to African Americans, the members of the CBC added another dimension to life on Capitol Hill and in the political and social circles in Washington, DC. With the ability to control human and fiscal resources in support of their work in Congress, CBC members, by hiring talented young African Americans to assume important roles and perform critical functions on their Congressional staffs, increased the presence of Blacks working in professional capacities on Capitol Hill exponentially. Over a period of ten years, young African American professionals—most often in their twenties and thirties—would come to serve as legislative assistants, schedulers, administrative assistants, and chiefs of staff to members of Congress. This not only facilitated the advancement of issues of concern to the members of Congress in their own right, but also created the space for many young Black professionals—educated in various fields often at elite universities—to engage in a quality of participation in American politics that was not possible before the 1970s. For example, George Dalley, who joined the staff of Congressman Charles B. Rangel of New York in 1972 at the age of 31 served as Rangel’s Chief of Staff for three different stints before his retirement in 2009. An attorney by training, Dalley joined Rangel’s Congressional staff as an administrative assistant. However, along with his three different stints on Rangel’s staff, Dalley would also serve as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, as member of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board in the Carter administration, and as Deputy Director of Walter Mondale’s presidential campaign.

These same Congressional offices also served as professional starting points for many African American who would later go on to hold elected office. Some would even be elected to the U.S. Congress. Barbara Lee, for example, served on the Congressional staff of Representative Ronald Dellums of California, eventually serving as his Chief of Staff. Lee’s personal and professional narratives are equally impressive. As a single mother, Lee attended Mills College while supporting her family with the help of general assistance programs. She graduated with her B.A. in 1973 and went to study at the University of California, Berkeley where she completed the Master of Social Work in 1975. Lee’s first entrée into politics was at the local level. She had been involved with the community organizing efforts of the Oakland chapter of the Black Panther Party and was active in Bobby Seale’s 1973 campaign for mayor of Oakland. Lee was first elected to public office in 1990 as a member of the California State Assembly. Following a six-year run in the California State Assembly, Lee was elected to the California State Senate and served from 1997 to 1998, before being elected to the U.S. Congress to fill the vacancy created by Dellums’ resignation.

In addition to the work of its members and their staffs on domestic issues, some members of the CBC also committed a substantial volume of energy and attention to foreign policy. In many ways, the House of Representatives became the institution through which Black concerns about foreign policy could be raised to a wider national and international public. Though they were active in, and outspoken on, a multitude of foreign policy issues, the part of the world of greatest concern to
members of Congress and their staff was Southern Africa. It was in light of the liberation struggles in Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, the continued presence of apartheid in the Republic of South Africa, that concern for the human rights of Black Africans prevailed on the agenda of the CBC (or at least certain members) early on, and has arguably continued well into the twentieth century. The Caucus’ early involvement in matters of foreign affairs predates the actual founding of the organization itself. Diggs, the CBC’s founding chairman, was named Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa in 1969 and served at the helm of this committee for a total of ten years. With Diggs in the leadership, this body was an entity within the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and functioned as the place for issues related to Africa to be legislated. In fact, earlier bills proposing the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa were originally legislated through the House Subcommittee on Africa and the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

First sworn-in to Congress in January 1955, Charles Coles Diggs had quickly climbed the seniority ladder in the House of Representatives. A native of Detroit, Michigan, Diggs studied at the University of Michigan and Fisk University before doing a two-year stint in the U.S. Army from 1943 to 1945. Eventually making his career in the funeral industry, Diggs completed his studies in Mortuary Science at Wayne State University (then Wayne State College) in 1946. He went on to pursue studies in law at Detroit College of Law (now the Michigan State University College of Law), during which time he was elected to the Michigan State Senate. Assuming office at the age of twenty-seven, Diggs became one of the youngest people ever elected to the Michigan State Senate. Through his election to the Michigan State House, Diggs’ emulated his father Charles Diggs, Sr., who was the first African American elected to the State Senate in Michigan. Three years later, Diggs made a bid for election to the U.S. House of Representatives defeating incumbent George O’Brien in 1954 Democratic primary. As with his election to the Michigan State Senate, Diggs’ successful bid for election to the House of Representatives made him one of its youngest members at the age of thirty-two.

Diggs quickly rose to prominence in Congress and in national Black Politics because of his outspokenness on issues of civil and human rights. He devoted particular energies to addressing the numerous instances of violence and terror visited upon African Americans by Whites. Of specific note were his efforts to bring to justice the two men who lynched Emmett Till in 1953. Diggs went so far as to accompany Till’s mother, Mamie Bradley, to the trial of the men who were charged with murdering her young son in Mississippi. In 1970, Diggs’ longtime colleague, Representative William Dawson died in office. It was this accident of history, combined with Charles Rangel’s defeat of Adam Clayton Powell for the Congressional seat for New York’s Eighteenth District, which made Charles Diggs the senior African American member of Congress in 1971. As the dean of the African American members of Congress, Diggs would come to play a leading role in the establishment of the Congressional Black Caucus and the Democratic Select Committee that preceded it.
Among Diggs’ most significant contributions to Congressional, national, and global Black politics was his work on issues related to Africa. Appointed to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1958, Diggs became a key figure on relations between the U.S. and Africa. As a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee for more than twenty years, Diggs would eventually serve as chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee’s Subcommittee on Africa. Elevated to chairman of the subcommittee in 1969, Diggs played a leading role in the creation of programs to provide financial assistance to the nation states of Africa in the aftermath of the anti-colonial struggles. In addition to serving as a place through which policies related to Africa could be legislated, the House Subcommittee on Africa—under the chairmanship of Diggs—provided a place through which Black Congressional staffers could involve themselves in Congressional affairs and matters of foreign policy related to Africa. Diggs—respected for the leadership role that he played among all Blacks in the House—would come to be regarded as an important person and connection through which many African Americans would gain legitimacy as Hill staffers before moving on to other offices and positions. It was through Charles Diggs, and his eventual chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa, that many African Americans who would go on to become major players in the founding and institutionalization of African America’s foreign policy lobby got their start. Most notable among this group of people were Capitol Hill staffers who made their first contributions to the development of U.S. foreign policy through their roles as staff to Charles Diggs in his capacity as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa.

Among the first people to work closely with Diggs on issues related to Africa was Goler Teal Butcher. Well known for her work in international law, Butcher was one of the first African American women to become significantly involved in international affairs and foreign policy. A lawyer by training, Butcher completed her legal education at the Howard University School of Law where she graduated summa cum laude in 1957. In her last year as a law student, Butcher served as Editor-in-Chief of the Howard Law Journal. She was the first woman elected to this position. After completing her legal studies at Howard, Butcher went on to earn an L.L.M. at the University of Pennsylvania, which prepared her for a career as a legal scholar and practitioner. Between 1963 and 1967, Butcher worked as a staff attorney at the U.S. Department of State in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South African Affairs. In 1971, when Charles Diggs assumed the role of chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Butcher worked for the House Foreign Affairs Committee as a legal consultant. In this capacity, she served as staff counsel for the Subcommittee on Africa, from 1971 to 1974. Her significance to the development and maintenance of an African American presence in matters of U.S. foreign policy during the 1960s, 1970s, and beyond cannot be overstated. In addition to her work with Diggs, Butcher worked in some of Washington’s most elite foreign policy circles and is respected as a steadfast advocate for the allocation of U.S. aid for Africa. As professor at the Howard University School of Law, Butcher taught courses and authored numerous articles on International law. Some of her most prominent work on the national scene included her service on the Clinton Presidential Transition
team where she led the transition for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).\textsuperscript{28} In addition, Butcher would play a major role in initiating the establishment of TransAfrica in 1977.

The election of a critical mass of African Americans in Congress was an important advancement for African Americans concerned with domestic and foreign policy. Individually, and through the CBC, African American members of Congress succeeded in drawing attention to matters of significance to their constituencies. This included both their electoral constituencies and the masses of African Americans on whose behalf they pledged to advocate. This feature of the new African American electoral politics would prove critical to the later development of the Black Foreign policy lobby. After all, it was the CBC’s ability to lend its name and stature that gave significant weight to certain policy matters of concern to African Americans.

However, the work of the CBC and its members on issues pertaining to African liberation and U.S. foreign policy occurred in concert with, and were, in many ways, aided by the burgeoning African American intellectualism and intellectual politics that began to take shape in the post-civil rights era.

It was through the House of Representatives that Black Americans—by way of their elected representatives—were able to articulate their foreign policy concerns. Because African Americans had limited access to the state institutions charged with the conduct of international relations, Congressional politics was one of the most effective avenues through they could challenge the state on its political and economic dealings with the governments of Southern Africa. In other words, Congressional politics, principally through Diggs’ leadership in the Africa Subcommittee, the CBC, and the House of Representatives in general, African American adversarial diplomacy gained traction. The specific ways that adversarial diplomacy became apparent in Congressional politics will be discussed in further detail in chapters four and five. However, the next section of this chapter will turn to a discussion about the development of a new Black intellectual politics in the post-civil rights era and how this quality of political activism in the 1960s and 1970s became an integral part of Black political organizing on international issues. In its discussion about the work of Black intellectuals on foreign policy—particularly the Southern African liberation struggles—the next section will underscore intellectual politics as an approach to adversarial diplomacy.

**Black Intellectual Politics and African Liberation in the Post-Civil Rights Era**

In the post-civil rights era, African American intellectual politics began to take on a different shape and encompass a wider reach than it had previously. With the systematic eradication of the legal barriers that were part of the American program of racial segregation and discrimination came the sharp rise in numbers of African Americans graduating from U.S. graduate and professional schools.\textsuperscript{29} This produced a sizable group of African Americans who established themselves as technocrats in many areas of intellectual inquiry. Owing to the international political climate of the
late 1960s and the 1970s, many of them focused their expertise on different aspects of the study of the Black world.\textsuperscript{30}

However, this new intellectual politics reflected the conflicted nature of African American politics in general. That is, there was no coherent ideology grounding African American politics in the post-civil rights era. This was the case on domestic and international issues. On the one hand, there were those Black intellectuals who worked primarily in colleges and universities, in policy organizations, think tanks, and in government. They worked in government through the various federal agencies and in support of members of Congress in volunteer and paid capacities. This type of intellectual politics reflected the ideology of liberal integration that came to dominate civil rights discourses. People associated with this brand of Black intellectual politics tended to be more moderate and worked within existing institutions to advance their political objectives. On the other hand, there were those African Americans, who were intellectuals in their own right, but did not subscribe to (and for a period, rejected) the idea that they could advance Black interests through existing institutions and systems. This track of intellectuals was associated with the Black radical tradition and often embraced mass mobilization and other tenets of the politics of the left as a strategy for African American and African liberation.

Though these distinctive intellectual camps employed different means to achieve their political objectives, in many ways, they worked toward the same end. Among the issues of greatest concern to both groups were the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Notwithstanding their ideological differences, each of these intellectual coteries played an important role in defining the means through which groups with limited access to the state institutions can advance their international interests at times when they run counter to the foreign policy positions of the state. In other words, both types of intellectual activism—the moderate and the radical—helped distinguish intellectual politics as an approach to adversarial diplomacy.

**Adversarial Diplomacy through Integrationist Intellectual Politics**

The moderate Black intellectuals worked largely in American colleges and universities as well as on the staffs of Black members of Congress with whose domestic and foreign policy interests they were aligned. This group largely consisted of professionally trained intellectuals. If there is a common theme among them, it is that many of them became interested in Africa and African liberation through their experiences as young adults. Many of these figures were either associated with, or influenced by, the activism surrounding civil rights in the U.S. and decolonization abroad. In many ways, the events of the day heavily influenced their chosen courses of study at university. Some of these people featured prominently in African American foreign policy activism in the post-civil rights era, and were pivotal in laying the foundation for the establishment of TransAfrica. Many names could be mentioned here to underscore the rising prominence of this group of African American intellectuals in the post-civil rights era. However, owing to the significant role that they would come to play in organizing African Americans in support of
progressive and socially responsible U.S. foreign policies toward Africa, this section focuses specifically on Willard Johnson, Herschelle Challenor, Ronald Walters, and James Turner. Not only do these four people feature prominently in the event and activities leading up to the founding of TransAfrica in 1977, but they also made important contributions to shaping the African American foreign policy in its early years. What is more, Johnson, Challenor, Walters, and Turner personify the types of contributions that moderate Black academics were able to make on the global Black freedom struggle in the post-civil rights era. Owing to the different ways that each of these scholars were connected to the activism of the civil rights era, their personal narratives underscore the connection that many African American academics made between the domestic and international political issues of the day.

Willard Johnson

A migrant to Southern California by way of Alabama, Willard Johnson was born in St. Louis in 1935. With his family, he moved to Southern California at an early age where they settled in Pasadena. Johnson’s interest in politics was cultivated early on through his participation in youth leadership programs at the Pasadena Boys’ Club. Its leadership initiatives included organizing high school students around regional student councils. The council for Johnson’s area was called the San Gabriel Valley Youth Council. He came to play a leading role in designing the council, which, owing to the novelty of the student council movements at the time, was very much under construction. Johnson was elected president of the group. It was through the Boys Club that Johnson got his start in international affairs as well. Johnson had already participated in domestic centered programs such as Boys State, which was a project of American Legion. This program had mock youth governments in each state. In California, Johnson was elected to the position of Lieutenant Governor of the youth group. However, the Pasadena Boys Club afforded its students the opportunity to participate in programs such as Model U.N., which Johnson describes as having succeeded in “putting an international flavor to the scene.” In short, the experiences with Boys’ State and model U.N. galvanized Johnson’s career in the study of politics and international affairs. Participation in these types of activities—coupled with the social and political movements underway in the U.S. and abroad during the 1960s—heightened Johnson’s awareness of domestic and international political issues. This awareness aided Johnson in making what he describes as a “an easy move…into African Studies” following his transfer from Pasadena City College to the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) in the fall of 1955.

As an undergraduate at UCLA, Johnson began to take a keen interest in the emerging decolonization movements in continental Africa. Johnson’s initial inclination was to take up a major in Middle Eastern Studies. However, at the prodding of one of his early academic mentors, James Goldman, he changed his intended field of study to African Studies. Reflecting on his mentor, Johnson recalls Goldman as “one of the preeminent Africanists...[who] showed me that you could
make a living; you could make a career out of taking Africa as a focal point.” As a student at UCLA, Johnson was also a founding member of the campus chapter of the NAACP. One of the chapter’s most notable achievements was when it sponsored a speech on campus by W.E.B. Du Bois. Johnson’s activism also included serving as president of the UCLA student body in his senior year.

Following the completion of his undergraduate degree in international relations, Johnson went to work for two years at the National Student Association. From there, he decided to further his formal education at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at The Johns Hopkins University. The decision to attend SAIS was motivated, in part, by an interest in a career in the U.S. Foreign Service. However, Johnson, in his words, quickly “came to see the advantages of academia.” At Hopkins, he graduated with distinction with a M.A. in African Studies in June of 1961 and went on to Harvard University to study for the Ph.D. in Political Science. He was only the second African American to graduate from SAIS. In 1964, Johnson took an appointment as Assistant Professor of Political Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). He graduated from Harvard one year later. Throughout his career at MIT, Johnson was known for his active involvement in teaching, scholarship, and activism, both in and out of the university.

In addition to his regular university teaching, research, and service activities, Johnson was active in matters pertaining to Africa and African politics and U.S. foreign policy for the whole of his career. It was through this work that Johnson became a pioneer among young Black academics who merged their cerebral interests with international political activism. The most prominent manifestation of this was Johnson’s work with his colleges in African Affairs and international relations and their collective efforts to mobilize African American interest in U.S. foreign policy around a program of collective action focused on the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. His work in this area dates back to the late 1960s when he was a critical part of the early efforts to galvanize the commitment of African American intellectuals to focus their teaching, research, service, and activism on the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. Johnson’s particular contribution to African Affairs and the cause of African liberation are exemplified through his involvement with the presidential campaign of George McGovern in 1972. There he served as director of the campaign’s Africa Policy Task Force. As Africa policy advisor, Johnson enlisted the support of several of his colleagues in the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA) to compose an Africa Policy Task Force. This ad hoc committee prepared a controversial report that was indeed sharp in its criticism of the U.S. and its support of White minority rule in Africa. He continued his involvement with Democratic Party politics by serving on the Foreign Affairs study group of the party’s advisory council.

Johnson’s political activities were no secret in the MIT community. A key player in the U.S.-based anti-apartheid movement, Johnson helped found an organization known as the Boston Pan African Forum. Actively involved in faculty governance, Johnson was an outspoken critic of the MIT administration and corporation. When anti-apartheid was the primary international political issue,
Johnson was a key player on campus issues regarding apartheid and the insistence that MIT take active measures to divest its holdings in corporations that supported apartheid and in the South African economy. In the faculty assembly, Johnson introduced a motion urging the MIT Corporation to actively oppose apartheid in South Africa through divestment and other measures. Owing to his involvement in the MIT Faculty and as an anti-apartheid crusader in the greater Boston metropolitan area, Johnson was even, at one point, nominated for a seat on “the Harvard Board of Overseers on a pro-South African divestment slate sponsored by the Harvard-Radcliffe Alumni Against Apartheid (HRAAA).” As one of the founding members of the national organization, TransAfrica, Johnson played a leading role in the series of events leading up to the decision to establish an official foreign policy lobbying organization.

Herschelle Sullivan Challenor

Herschelle Sullivan Challenor was also part of an emergent Black intellectual politics in the post-civil rights era. She was among the many young African Americans who were greatly influenced by the activism of the Civil Rights Movement and benefited from the movement’s success at eradicating racial segregation and discrimination. Her story also underscores the profound contributions that women made, early on, to African American politics both domestically and internationally as well as the challenges associated with being a Black woman intellectual activist and foreign policy scholar during the 1970s.

Challenor’s biography is abounding with important connections to the civil rights activism of the 1950s and 1960s. She was born in Atlanta in 1938 and raised in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. She was from an ostensibly middle class family. Both her parents were college educated. Her father studied at Morehouse and her mother at Spelman. The family’s move north was precipitated by her father’s desire to study engineering which, owing to the segregation rampant in much of the U.S., he was unable to do at the nearby Georgia Institute of Technology. Challenor herself would return to Atlanta some years later when she enrolled as a freshman at Spelman College in the fall of 1956. It was during her years at Spelman that Challenor first took interest in both domestic and international political affairs. Rather than graduating in the traditional span of four years, Challenor extended her studies to five years because she was awarded a Charles Merrill study abroad travel grant. This program afforded her the opportunity to live and study in Paris during the 1959-1960 school year. She could have scarcely chosen a more opportune year to study abroad, as her stay in Paris was on the eve of the independence of Francophone Africa. During her year in Paris, Challenor became active in the Organization of Students of Francophone Africa. It was through her time spent in Paris that Challenor’s interest in Africa began to develop. Perhaps unbeknownst to her, she would end up making her life’s work in various aspects of African affairs and advocacy.
Following her one year abroad, Challenor returned to Atlanta for her final year at Spelman. She recalls that her peers had elected her as president of the student body in absentia.\textsuperscript{43} This was the second year of the Atlanta Student Sit-In Movement. Owing to the role that she played in the Spelman Student Government Association, Challenor became one of the co-chairs (along with Lonnie King) of the Committee on the Appeal for Human Rights (COAHR) in its second year.\textsuperscript{44} This was due to the collaborative structure of the COAHR, which had been established as a partnership between the several universities in the Atlanta University Center. Challenor recalls, “we called ourselves co-chairs, but Lonnie lets it be known that he was the chair and I was the vice-chair.”\textsuperscript{45} It was the COAHR that authored and published the document, “An Appeal for Human Rights,” which was ran as a paid advertisement in the\textit{Atlanta Inquirer} on 9 March 1960. This document made demands for equity in all areas of public life and accommodations. This included an end to discrimination in education, employment, housing, hospitals, entertainment, dining, and law enforcement.\textsuperscript{46} Occurring in concert with other student sit-ins elsewhere in the U.S., the demonstrations that accompanied the\textit{Appeal} received significant local media attention over the span of several months.\textsuperscript{47} At the height of her work with the Atlanta student sit-ins, Challenor recalls the mixed reactions from her parents when she forewarned them of her potential arrest in consequence of her acts of civil disobedience. She recalls, “my mother was distraught, [and] my daddy said, well, that’s what you want to do, but be careful.”\textsuperscript{48}

Following the completion of her studies at Spelman, Challenor relocated to Washington, DC where she pursued graduate studies at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Like many of her peers, Challenor chose to cast her academic interests in the study of Africa. After graduating with a M.A. from SAIS in 1963, Challenor enrolled at Columbia University where she undertook doctoral studies in Political Science. She graduated with her Ph.D. in 1970.\textsuperscript{49}

Challenor’s first job was as assistant professor of Political Science at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. Consistent with the life of a junior professor, Challenor recalls being required to teach the “grunt” classes which, for her, included “two sections of race, class, and ethnicity.” Her experience at Brooklyn College was short-lived. Challenor recalls that she “got bored” with teaching and that it was something that she never really enjoyed. She says, “I remember when I was an undergraduate student at Spelman, “I always said…I don’t want to be a teacher…I was interested in more of an activist thing.”\textsuperscript{50} Consequently, in the interest of eventually abandoning the tenure-track faculty position, Challenor applied for the American Political Science Association’s (APSA) Congressional Fellowship Program. Her application was successful and she was to work in the office of Congressman Charles Diggs for the one-year duration of the fellowship. The year was 1971. This was just two years after Diggs became chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. It was through this appointment that Challenor became a major figure among African Americans working on issues related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.
Some of her most notable contributions to the community of activists working on matters of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa will become more apparent in chapters 4 and 5. However, suffice it to say that Challenor’s work—both early on and throughout her career—fits neatly into conceptualization of Black Women’s political activism—and Black womanhood, more broadly—that have been offered by scholars such as historian Gerald Horne. Horne’s notion of a “race woman” which he uses to characterize the work of Shirley Graham Du Bois is very much apropos to Challenor in that, like Graham, Challenor too, was “imbued with the ideology of racial uplift, and was determined to make a contribution to her people.”

Ronald Walters

Like his colleagues, Ronald Walters came to the Washington, DC policy circles through his academic interests and training in political science. However, his involvement in domestic civil rights activism is rooted in his upbringing in the American Midwest. Born on 20 July 1938, in Wichita, Kansas, Walters’ early political activism was cultivated through his involvement with his local youth council of the NAACP. As president of the youth council, Walters and his cousin, Carol Parks-Haun, organized a lunch counter sit-in at Dockum Drug Store in Wichita in the summer of 1958. Inspired by earlier protests such as the Montgomery Bus Boycott and the Little Rock Nine, Walters and his cousin successfully executed a lunch counter sit-in that predated the more famous Greensboro Lunch Counter Sit-in that began on 1 February 1960. By occupying the lunch counter for three weeks, even though they were refused service because of their race, Walters, Parks-Haun, and eight other students were eventually served by the establishment’s wait staff. This was at the insistence of the store manager who was concerned about the money he was losing in consequence of their protest. The outcome of this confrontation was indeed profound. It resulted in the desegregation of lunch counters within the entire Dockum Drug Store chain in the state of Kansas. Historians have lauded this incident as being among the first lunch counter sit-ins in the U.S. and for having helped to eradicate the practice of segregation in public accommodations throughout the U.S.

Walters’ impressive academic career began with his undergraduate studies at Fisk University. There he did his undergraduate studies in history and government and graduated with at B.A. in 1963. From Fisk, Walters went on to pursue graduate studies at American University in Washington, DC. He graduated from American with a M.A. in African Studies in 1966 and a Ph.D. in International Studies in 1971. Walters landed his first academic job two years prior to the completion of his Ph.D., when, in 1968, he was appointed to the faculty of the East African Studies Center and Political Science Department at Syracuse University. After a one-year stint at Syracuse, Walters took a faculty position at Brandeis University where he was the founding chair of the Afro-American Studies Department. The move to Brandies was pivotal in Walter’s career as it was here that he befriended Willard Johnson, who
provided an important connection and entrée for Walters into the southern African liberation struggles, particularly the struggle against apartheid in South Africa.

Walters could not have come to Boston at a more fitting time. It was during his first year in Boston that Walters, through his association with Johnson, became involved with the Polaroid Revolutionary Workers’ Movement. This movement was centered on a protest by workers at the Polaroid plant in Cambridge, who discovered that the Polaroid Corporation was actively supporting apartheid in South Africa by selling its identification card systems to entities in South Africa. It was these card systems that supported the “Pass System” to which Black South Africans were subjected; requiring them to carry identification passes at all times as they moved throughout the republic. Describing this type of activism as “all outside of my university work,” Walters became an active supporter of the workers at the Polaroid plant in Boston. Johnson and Walters had become compatriots in the struggle against apartheid and cultivated a lifelong friendship.

It was also through Johnson that Walters became associated with Congressman Charles Diggs. Diggs, having just become chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa, stopped through Boston en route from a visit to Africa and convened a small group of Africans from the surrounding universities. This was in December 1970 and included Johnson and Walters. From this meeting, it was agreed that Diggs would begin to hold hearings in Washington, DC on the status of Blacks (and race relations) in Africa. Almost serendipitously, Walters found himself back in Washington, DC two years later when he joined the faculty in the Department of Political Science at Howard University.

As a long-time chair of Howard’s political science department, Walters provided an important connection between Howard University and the burgeoning movement against apartheid and other forms of racism in Southern Africa. This was in addition to his university teaching and research obligations and his involvement with domestic political affairs. In many ways, the political science department at Howard, owing to its proximity to the Washington, DC political establishment, became an intellectual hub and meeting ground for the cultivation of an African American intellectual base focused on the efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Howard was frequently the site of various symposia, conferences, and meetings dealing with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and with African American political interest on the domestic front. Many of these activities, as will be explained further in the succeeding sections of this chapter, were possible because of the leadership of Ronald Walters.

**James Turner**

James Turner was also an important figure in Black intellectual politics in the post-civil rights era. Like his colleagues, Turner was immensely concerned with the state of affairs for Blacks in Africa, the U.S., and elsewhere in the world. Turner was an Africanist by training. Differently however, Turner represents, in a more pointed way, the point of intersection of two major strands of Black intellectual politics in the
1970s. That is, he was very much a part of the intellectual politics and would come to make his professional home as an academic. Through the leading role he played in founding the Africana Studies and Research Center at Cornell University, Turner both created and sustained an important academic base for many African Americans (and others) interested in study of Black world experiences as well as the practical application of the knowledge attained through these academic inquiries. At the same time, however, Turner was also very much connected to the Black Power politics of the 1960s and 1970s. Associated with people such as Amiri Baraka and Owusu Sadauki, Turner was an active part of the group of Black Power activists, which can also be characterized as intellectuals, who carried the activist momentum of the civil rights years well into the 1970s and became crusaders in the African American and African liberation struggles.

Turner’s concern for the global Black liberation struggles can be traced back to his years as a young adult coming of age in Harlem. At a point where Harlem was a vibrant intellectual, political, and social hub for African American intellectualism, Turner was exposed to the Black intellectual traditions that existed outside of the walls of colleges and universities. It was at the bookstores, rallies, and public speeches by notable Black world leaders such as Malcolm X, Queen Mother Moore, and James Lawson that Turner was exposed to the powerful rhetoric of Black liberation. As he recalls himself, “listening to the lectures, going to the bookstores, reading the material…they were all pretty much talking about the same thing—that the future liberation of Black people would be based upon their ability to have a liberating knowledge; a liberating education.”

Turner’s commitment to the ideals of a liberating education is also reflected in his own formal education, which occurred during the height of the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. and the anti-colonial movements on the African continent. He did his undergraduate studies at Central Michigan University. This was during the height of the Black student movements on college campuses. At Central Michigan, Turner’s intellectual activism had been fueled by early readings of critical texts such as Malcolm X’s *Malcolm X on African American History* and Carter G. Woodson’s *Miseducation of the Negro*. His activism gained momentum during his years as a graduate student at Northwestern University where he, like many African Americans interested in and concerned with Black people the world over, gravitated toward degree programs in African Studies. Outside the classroom, and consistent with the spirit of the times, Turner was active in the Afro-American Students Society at Northwestern. Organizations like this reflected commitment by Black Students to bringing the organizing tradition to college campuses. It was this activism, coupled with the focus on African Studies that Black students began to take action in response to the apparent void in course offerings and curricula in Black Studies.

It was in response to this absence of a Black studies curriculum that Turner would join numerous other progressive Black scholars who directed their professional energies to the development Black Studies. Early on in his career, Turner emerged as an outspoken proponent of a Black Studies curriculum, as reflected in his writings published in numerous periodicals and scholarly journals. His
most lasting contribution to the development of a new African American intellectual politics in the 1970s was the establishment of the Africana Studies and Research Center on the campus of Cornell University. He was appointed the center’s founding director when it opened in 1969.

Turner was closely associated with many of the activists who had been involved with SNCC, the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and other radical organizations. As much as these organizations were associated with Black Power politics, they served as the breeding ground for a type of radical Black intellectualism that would become increasingly apparent in the post-civil rights era. It is important to note that Turner served as important bridge between the moderate intellectuals and those who conducted much of their activism outside of colleges and universities. Through his connections with the initiatives and activists of the Black Left, Turner became an active participant in efforts such as those of the African Liberation Support Committee, which organized activities such as African Liberation Days in 1972, 1973, and 1974. Turner was also part of the leadership of the African American delegation to the Sixth Pan African Congress at its meeting in Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania in June of 1974. These two events are relevant here because they underscore the active involvement of James Turner in the efforts of African Americans to organize in support of African liberation in the 1970s. Moreover, through his associations with Ronald Walters, Willard Johnson, and Herschelle Challenor, Turner became an important player in the series of events aimed at creating an sustained presence of African Americans in discussions about U.S. foreign policy toward Africa prior to the founding of TransAfrica in 1977. His direct involvement with TransAfrica and the Black foreign policy advocacy circles would continue well into the 1980s.

As scholars of African politics, U.S. foreign policy, and international relations, Willard Johnson, Herschelle Challenor, Ronald Walters, and James Turner played an important role among African American academic intellectuals organizing in support of Southern African liberation. Surely, there were many others whose personal and professional biographies are similar to those discussed above. That is to say that there was a larger group of African American academics who came of age during the civil rights era and saw their educational achievements as a prerequisite for creating an academic and scholarly agenda that was concerned with the liberation of Africans and African descendants throughout the world from European colonial domination. As will be discussed in the succeeding section, these four scholars were part of a larger group of academics who worked to bring Black foreign policy concerns—particularly the Southern African liberation struggles—into the homilies of the American academic enterprise.

Challenging the American Academic Enterprise

The growth of African American academic intellectuals also succeeded in challenging the very nature of American higher education as it pertained to the production of knowledge about Africa, African Americans, and the other parts of the
African Diaspora. By aligning with the student movements, African American academics laid the groundwork for the development and institutionalization of Black Studies departments and programs at colleges and universities throughout the U.S. Among the many foci of Black Studies were the commitments to understanding the colonial conditions of African Americans in the U.S. as well as the conditions of Africans on the African continent and throughout the world.

The development of Black Studies is relevant to this narrative because these spaces often served as an intellectual breeding ground for African American activism on domestic and international issues. This was also a time during which Black academics posed challenges to the disciplines in which they were trained. This was both in the theoretical or conceptual sense as well as in the conduct of the affairs of their professional associations. The central issue here was that these disciplines (e.g. Political Science, African Studies, Sociology), in the estimation of many Black scholars, failed to appreciate the scholarly value of topics within their fields that were concerned with (or of concern to) African American scholars. Thus, African Americans began to establish parallel professional associations within their academic disciplines. Examples of this include the establishment of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS) in 1969, the Association of Black Psychologists (ABPsi) in 1968, and the Association of Black Sociologists (ABS) in 1970, and the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA) in 1968. These parallel professional associations often grew out of the existing Black caucuses within the mainstream organizations and fulfilled the void that many African Americans felt was created by the refusal of these dominant organizations to be inclusive of African Americans in their leadership and to engage the intellectual and professional concerns of African American scholars. Considering this section’s history of Walters, Turner, Challenor, and Johnson, the story most apropos to the subject of this chapter is the controversial story of the departure of some Black scholars from the African Studies Association (ASA) that lead to the founding of the African Heritage Studies Association in 1968.

Founded in 1957 the ASA had been the prominent professional association for academics in the U.S. and Canada focused on the study of Africa. However, consistent with the experiences of many African Americans involved in mainstream professional associations, African Americans active with the ASA had grown frustrated by the refusal of this organization to engage issues of significance to African Americans. The fundamental challenge waged against the ASA by African Americans (and some likeminded Whites) was that conservative White scholars controlled the ASA. In addition, the ASA leadership specifically prohibited Blacks from being elected to its executive board or leadership positions. Exacerbating the conflict was the refusal by the organization’s leadership to engage African American issues. That is, the ASA saw no relationship between the study of African Americans and the field of African Studies. Instead, the scholars active in the ASA’s leadership were specifically concerned with U.S. government agencies—namely the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Department of Defense, and the Department of State—and focused more on issues of policy and development.
Many Black academics such as Elliott Skinner, St. Clair Drake, Hollis Lynch, and Adelaide Cromwell Hill felt that the function of an African Studies Association should be different. They believed that there was, in fact, a relationship between African Studies and African American Studies. More pointedly, as scholars of the Black world, these people, along with Challenor, Walters, Turner, and Johnson, felt that the ASA should actively engage with the liberation struggles in Africa. They felt that the ASA should take public positions condemning apartheid. The organization’s leadership refused to even entertain the idea. Further fueling the conflict was the refusal of the ASA executive board to allow senior Black scholars to serve on its board of directors. In short, the ASA was, in the estimation of its critics, an organization of White scholars studying Africa and was very much in cahoots with the U.S. government whose positions on anti-apartheid and African liberation, both passively (in some ways) and actively (in others) supported the White minority rule in Southern Africa.

The frustrations between Black scholars and the White conservative dominated ASA leadership had surfaced previously. The most recent instance was the ASA’s conference in Los Angeles in 1968. When challenged on its reluctance to support the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and to include Blacks in its leadership, the only thing that materialized from the ASA leadership was the agreement to conduct a year long study of the issues. The conflict between Black academics and the White controlled ASA hit the ceiling at the ASA’s annual conference held in Montreal, Canada on 15 October 1969. It was at this conference that the ASA leadership was taken to task over the findings of its year long study on the implications and possibility for fully integrating Blacks into its organization. The study produced nothing beyond the maintenance of the status quo. Instead of allowing Blacks to be full members of the executive council, the ASA leadership decided to allow certain Black scholars to hold the rank of associate members. It was in response to this that Black Scholars—both senior and junior—including James Turner and Ron Walters, staged a disruptive protest at the Montreal conference. This included active physical efforts to shut down the conference. The politically charged Black caucus went so far as to walk into conference sessions, as they were taking place, and unplug microphones declaring that “there would be no conference” so long as the organization continued to discriminate against its Black members and for its refusal to oppose the oppression of Blacks in Southern Africa.  

The outcome of this was the establishment of the African Heritage Studies Association. The very people who protested the discriminatory practices of the ASA founded this organization. Different from the ASA, an international council made up of representatives from the U.S., Africa, and the Caribbean governed the AHSA. In addition, at the AHSA’s organizational meeting, Historian John Henrik Clark was elected the organization’s founding president. Its other founding members included Historian Nell Painter, P. Chike Onwuachi, the director of the African Studies Program at Howard University, and Leonard Jeffries, chairman of the Black Studies Department of the City University of New York. The year was 1969. One year later, in 1970, the AHSA held its own conference, which met on the campus of Howard
University in May 1970, which served as the foundation for what its founders saw as a true African Studies. Not all Blacks however completely disavowed themselves from the ASA. Some of them—including Willard Johnson—stayed and continued to press the organization to include Blacks in its ranks and address issues related to the liberation of Africa and the eradication of apartheid.62

Johnson’s decision to remain active in the African Studies Association was a conditional commitment. He remained committed to participating in the organization under the proviso that the ASA adopt a platform that included supporting the liberation struggles in continental Africa. Fellow Africanists Immanuel Wallerstein and David Robinson had recruited Johnson back to ASA. They saw Johnson as someone who could help reconcile the conflict between the African Americans and the rest of the White dominated ASA. The specific request was for Johnson to campaign for a seat on the board of directors, which, along with anthropologist Johnetta Cole, he did. However, Johnson’s campaign for the board was consistent with the conditions upon which he agreed to continue to participate in ASA. That is, the organization must actively support the liberation struggles in southern Africa. Johnson recalls rising to address the board—donning a dashiki—making a major appeal for the organization to have regular discussions about the liberation struggles in Africa and that its members and leadership should work to advance knowledge about the conflicts in Southern Africa in every possible way.63

Ultimately, Johnson was successful in his appeal and, along with Johnetta Cole, was elected to the ASA Board. The board also adopted Johnson’s resolution and agreed to make the liberation struggles in Africa of the highest order. However, the conflict continued when, according to Johnson, Africanist Ruth Schachter Morgenthau felt that the decision of the board altered the fundamental nature of the organization and thought that such an organizational change should be put before the membership.64 Upon consideration by the membership, the resolution failed. It was at this point that Johnson resigned from the board and dissolved his association with the ASA. His only connection to ASA beyond this was through Immanuel Wallerstein, who later enlisted Johnson’s involvement to become the co-chair of an ad hoc committee called the Association of Concerned Africanist Scholars.

The growth in numbers of Black academics in the 1970s undoubtedly represented the emergence of a new African American intellectual politics that had not been as extensive before the mid-1960s. Academics among the likes of Johnson, Challenor, Turner and Walters not only populated American colleges and universities, but they also served as the intellectual base supporting the work of members of Congress. They lent their technical expertise on African politics and international affairs and they challenged the very nature of the American university by pushing their academic fields to deal with issues related to African American and African liberation. These people tended to take two tracks. The first track was exemplified by people such as Johnson, Walters, and Turner who held academic appointments in colleges and universities while participating in the important work of the African politics and African studies beyond their university work. The second group of intellectuals was those who worked in non-academic capacities in support
of the very causes for which their colleagues labored within the university. They worked at policy organizations, think tanks, and on Capitol Hill. Collectively, however, this group of intellectuals played a critical role in building the momentum—particularly in Congress and among other Black academics—for the institutionalization of TransAfrica as Black America’s foreign policy lobby.

**Adversarial Diplomacy and the Black Left**

In addition to those African Americans supporting the liberation struggles in Southern Africa through Congressional politics and moderate intellectual politics, there was another cadre of Black activists who engaged with a host of domestic and international issues in the post-civil rights era. While others embraced liberalism in their approach to political organizing, there was a sizable cadre of Black activists that embraced radicalism and employed this approach in their advocacy efforts. This activist camp emerged out of the contested politics of the Civil Rights Movement and embraced Black Power as a strategy for political advancement. It included a wide range of intellectuals who rejected the idea that necessary change could occur by working within existing institutions. Moreover, this group included a wide range of intellectuals and laypeople that had become frustrated with the slow progress of ideology of liberal integration prevalent during the Civil Rights Movement. Like their counterparts active in other ideological circles, many Black radicals also embraced the nationalist notion that their plight in the U.S. was part of a global Black freedom struggle.

As one of the most profound and lasting manifestations of the Black radical tradition, Black power, as an ideology and movement, gained footing in the mid 1960s and carried the momentum of the Civil Rights Movement into the succeeding decade. Heavily dominated by activists from northern urban centers, the Black Power movement developed in tandem with the southern Civil Rights Movement. What it represented, however, was an ideological shift among Black activists, many of whom were involved with organizations such as CORE, the NAACP, and SNCC. The rifts present in these organizations and the overall dissatisfaction with civil rights integration gave rise to the creation of organizations like the Black Panther Party for Self Defense, the Organization US, and numerous other organizations that sprung up at the local levels.

Although the use of the term Black Power first originated in the early 1960s, its usage became more popular mid 1960s at the uttering of Stokley Carmichael. A SNCC activist, Carmichael had been arrested in consequence of his participation in the March in protest of the ambush and shooting of James Meredith. The latter had embarked upon his now-famous March Against Fear from Memphis, Tennessee to Jackson, Mississippi and was shot on the second day of the march. It was in consequence of Meredith’s shooting that some of the most protracted fissures of the 1960s Black politics became most apparent. In response to Meredith attack, a variety of activists from SCLC, SNCC, and CORE were arrested as a result of their participation in the demonstrations. Stokley Carmichael was among them. Following
his release from jail, a charged Carmichael declared to participants at the rally that “[t]his is the twenty-seventh time I have been arrested. I ain’t going to jail no more.” Carmichael's sentiments were representative of the frustrations that some Black freedom fighters had with the fact that liberal integration was the dominant ideology embraced by prominent African American political, intellectual, and organization leaders in their demands for civil rights. Instead of arguing that Blacks needed “civil rights,” an idea that he and other SNCC activists had supported throughout the Civil rights movement, Carmichael went on to say, “what we gonna start demanding is Black Power.”

Even before Carmichael’s major public expression of Black Power in 1966, the desire of African American activists for a more radical quality of political participation was evident. Certainly, the organizing activities of SNCC during the summer of 1964 are another example of this. It was through the efforts of SNCC activists—in launching the Mississippi Summer Project in 1964 against the opposition of the NAACP and with reluctant support from SCLC—that Black activists showed a clear commitment to creating an ideological and practical alternative to civil rights liberalism. Although they were in some ways oppositional to other civil rights groups, the SNCC activists succeeded in bringing militancy into the movement in ways that were previously underutilized. By establishing the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, SNCC activists succeeded in challenging existing institutions and beliefs. As Historian Clayborne Carson has observed, “they had created a strong base of northern financial support, prodded the federal government to act with increasing firmness on behalf of Black civil rights, and brought together a coalition of liberal forces in support of the MFDP challenge.” Moreover, adds Carson, “They had done this by developing distinctive and effective techniques of community organizing that relied on local leadership and on the use of militancy as a catalyst for mobilization.”

However, Black Power activism was not consigned to domestic politics. Black Power activists expressed a keen interest in Africa for a variety of reasons. In the mid-1960s, Black radical activists drew inspiration from the newly independent African nations for their fight against racism in the U.S. Others engaged with Africa while in exile. Other Black radical activists were greatly concerned with Africa and the liberation of African people from colonialism and all of its vestiges. This concern for Africa, while present for quite some time, increased in consequence of the marked number of African states that became independent in the 1960s.

In their concern for domestic and international issues, many Black radicals had followed the lead of the slain leader, Malcolm X. In the domestic sphere, Malcolm became an icon for radical Black American activists in search of an ideological alternative to civil rights liberalism. He was ever critical of the dominant civil rights establishment for its belief that Black liberation could be achieved through integration of existing institutions and apparatuses. One of his major qualms with the movement itself was that its leadership fell far short of calling America to consciousness on the prevailing ideology of race and racism. As William Sales has observed, Malcolm saw that, “behind the façade of racial equality, African Americans
were frozen at the bottom of the political, economic, and social pyramid, even though the structures of legal segregation and discrimination was being dismantled.”

In the international sphere, Malcolm’s travels to Africa and his efforts to bridge the African American condition with those of Africans on the continent were the basis upon which many African American activists undertook similar endeavors. Malcolm made three trips to Africa. The first was in 1959 when he traveled to Egypt on business for the Nation of Islam. However, the most transformative of Malcolm’s travels to Africa occurred on 13 to 21 April 1964. It was on this trip he visited several African countries and participated in radio and television interviews and met with leaders in various states including leaders of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Shortly after his return, Malcolm announced the founding of the Organization of Afro-American Unity (OAAU) on 28 June 1964. Less than two months later, Malcolm returned to the African continent for a tour that would last nearly five months. On this trip, Malcolm travelled as the representative of the OAAU. He met with numerous African leaders and, upon his 17 July 1964 address to the OAU, became the first American to address the international body. Malcolm’s 1964 sojourns to Africa were transformative indeed. It was in consequence of these visits that Malcolm came to embrace Pan-African internationalism as an ideological foundation for African liberation. Most importantly, however, Malcolm’s philosophies proved foundational to African Americans committed to engaging in the international Black freedom struggle.

SNCC workers were also motivated by the presence of young Blacks elected or appointed to powerful leadership positions in the newly sovereign African states. Though they had understood their condition and struggles in the U.S. to be related to those of Africans on the continent, the rise of Black leadership in consequence of the wave of decolonization in the early 1960s gave their belief in these connections—and the possibility that their labors might indeed bear fruit—added meaning. One of the most pronounced examples of the engagement of Black Power activists with Africa occurred in late summer of 1964 when a group of SNCC volunteers and staff made a tour to the African continent. This trip had been arranged and financed by Harry Belafonte who had connections to the Black African leaders in Guinea. Commencing on 11 September 1964, the SNCC delegation included “[James] Forman, John Lewis, Bob and Dona Moses, Prathia Hall, Julian Bond, Ruby Davis Robinson, Bill Hansen, Donald Harris, Matthew Jones, and Fannie Lou Hamer.” Their invitation from Belafonte to visit Guinea had been arranged through Sekou Toure, who was president of the newly independent nation. The SNCC delegation was indeed transformed by the experience. In addition to being encouraged by Toure to understand and embrace their struggle in the U.S. as part and parcel of a global Black freedom struggle, the SNCC delegation was also able to see, many for the first time, a society fully populated and led by Blacks. As Hamer herself has noted, “I saw Black men flying the airplanes, driving buses, sitting behind big desks in the bank, and doing everything that I was used to seeing White people do.”

There are several other examples of the ways in which Black American activists, located at the ideological left, engaged with Africa. In the late 1960s, the
Black Panther Party (BPP) was one such example. Though they are widely known for their domestic activism, the BPP did, in fact, have an international reach. This aspect of their work grew markedly in consequence of the exiling of Eldridge and Kathleen Cleaver in 1969. The regular publication of the newspaper, the *Black Panther*, now included an international section, which became a place through which the Cleavers could inform the rest of the Party (and other readers) of their activities while in exile. Though they would be expelled from the Party while in exile, the Cleavers effectively built an international office and arm of the BPP. The international office became a focal point for a type of African American (and thus, American) presence on the African continent. This type of presence in and engagement with Africa is exemplified by the ostensibly diplomatic activities that took place through the BPP’s office in Algiers. It was through the international office that Cleaver and fellow exiled Black Panther leader, Donald Cox, received foreign diplomats including Ambassadors from China and Korea as well as members of the African National Congress. As Leigh Raiford has observed, “In a country that maintained no diplomatic ties with the United States, the small international section in many ways constituted a U.S. embassy in Algiers.”

Let us return to the earlier discussion about Malcolm X and the OAAU. By exploring the OAAU’s development some important connections between Malcolm X and the 1960s and 1970s Black radical intellectualism become apparent. Though Malcolm was assassinated before the OAAU could mature in any significant way, his ideals, in many ways, lived on both through his contemporaries and through those who looked to his life and work as an ideological model. Indeed these people provided an important bridge between the 1960s and 1970s Black radical thought concerning African American and African liberation. One of the most telling examples of this connection is through the work of Historian John Henrik Clarke. Clarke was both a contemporary and a friend of Malcolm and advanced some of Malcolm’s ideas about Africa and the relationship between African Americans and African liberation well into the 1970s and for much of the remaining decades of the twentieth century. This is not to discount Clarke’s own work. However, Clarke was an important connection between Malcolm and the 1970s Black radical intellectualism owing largely to the important role that Clarke played—in concert with Malcolm—in the founding of the OAAU. In many ways, the conceptualization of the OAAU was the brainchild of both Malcolm and Clarke. As Clark himself has reflected, “I was the one who got the constitutions from the Organization of African Unity in order to model our constitution after it. Malcolm’s joy was that we could match up [our constitution with the African one]; we could find parallels between the African situation and the American situation.”

John Henrik Clarke was firmly rooted within the ongoing activism around Africa and African liberation. Indeed, he was one of the intellectuals credible in multiple political camps. Among academic intellectuals, if you will, Clarke’s work with the founding of the AHSA (discussed in the previous section) stands out as a foremost example of the ways in which Black Power activism came to infiltrate the academy and bring issues related to Africa and African liberation to the forefront of
scholarly debates and discourses. As Robert Harris, has observed, Clarke, “came from a tradition that researched, wrote, and taught Black history outside of the academy.” Though Clarke would win acclaim for his work, writings, and teaching as a historian, his “out of the academy” work is equally significant. Clarke was an associate of some of the most radical Black intellectuals who looked globally for inspiration and solutions to the Black American and Black world conditions. In the 1960s and 1970s, he was, in addition to his associations with Malcolm X, a contemporary of noted Black Power activists such as Robert F. Williams and Amiri Baraka. His connections to these circles run deep and can be traced back to the early 1960s when Black radical intellectuals and activists began to look for ideological alternatives to the integrationist that dominated the Black Freedom struggle in the U.S.

In fact, Clarke was part of the delegation who traveled to Cuba in July of 1960. The other participants in this sojourn included Williams, Baraka, and Harold Cruse. Though this exposition occurred during the pivotal year of 1960 in response to the Cuban Revolution, it remains apropos to this narrative for two primary reasons. First, in consequence of the Cuban Revolution, coupled with the execution of Patrice Lumumba in that same year, many Black radicals began to alter their ideological foundations. Many of them, including and perhaps exemplified by Baraka, began to ground their political activism within Black cultural nationalism. Second, the Cuba tour illustrates the long association between Black academics such as Clarke and the Black radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s. Clarke’s association with Baraka and others continued well into the succeeding decade, as Baraka became a major player in Black Power politics. In fact, Clarke was frequently associated with Baraka’s other activities and was involved in efforts to cultivate a national Black political agenda during the transformative years of the early 1970s. This would include the emergence and development of major Black political organizations associated with Black radicalism during the early 1970s such as the National Black Political Assembly, the Black Women’s United Front, the Congress of African People and the African Liberation Support Committee.

These organizations, and the Black radical politics with which they were associated, became increasingly prominent in the early 1970s. In comparison to the beginning of the 1960s when African Americans had very limited involvement in the liberation struggles in Africa, the 1970s saw a multifold increase in Black American participation in this area. By rooting their involvement in the Black freedom struggle within a nationalist framework, the Black Power activists contributed greatly to thrusting the issue of African liberation to the forefront of the African American political agenda in the early 1970s. By extension, they were an integral part of African American adversarial diplomacy in the post-civil rights era. They were rooted in ideologically and spatially different political camps than their counterparts working to bring about change within existing institutions. However, the Black nationalists had a major role in increasing the awareness of issues related to Africa and African liberation among African Americans.
At the very beginning of the 1970s, organizations like the Congress of Africa People (CAP) became a major player in organizing African Americans on domestic and international issues. Taking its origins in the Black Power conferences that were held between 1966 and 1968, the CAP really took shape in 1970. Held in Atlanta on Labor Day weekend of 1970, the CAP’s founding meeting brought together nearly 3,000 people. The Congress’ primary focus, at least initially, was directed toward Pan Africanism and Black self-determination. As the successor to the previous Black Power conferences, the CAP sought to fill a voice in organizational infrastructure that had contributed to the downfall of many Black Power movement organizations.

Though the CAP was a nationalist project, it—perhaps more than it is given credit for—was an important organization. The meeting in 1970 succeeded in bringing together a wide representation of Black leadership from across the ideological and political spectrum. This included, but was certainly not limited to, Black leaders who were affiliated with SNCC, SCLC, Operation Push, the National Urban League, and Black elected officials including the Mayors of Gary, Newark, and leading Black candidates in upcoming elections. The 1970 Congress also had an international component, which included representatives from Canada, the West Indies, Guinea, Zimbabwe and Angola. This is not to paint a picture of Baraka and the CAP as the great unifier in African American politics in 1970. This was far from the case. However, as Komoz Woodard has observed, the CAP, “represented an unprecedented degree of unity in the Black world, drawing as it did on both civil rights and Black nationalist leaders…the CAP signaled an important early step in the development of a national Black political community.”

Owing to its Pan African focus, the CAP was, in many ways, the ideological forerunner to collective effort of the Black left to mobilize mass numbers of African Americans around African liberation beginning in 1972. Though the other political and ideological camps had similar foci around Africa, the CAP succeeded in maintaining a presence among Black Power activists in these discourses. Different from these other camps, the Black Power activists’ approach to domestic and international political issues focused on mobilizing the Black masses around these issues. Though the Black Power leaders such as those named herein were indeed intellectuals—and many went on to be academics and work in various other capacities later in their careers—the radical component of the African liberation project had a mass appeal in ways that the other camps did not.

Some of the very people who attended the CAP and were involved in its planning would feature prominently in the Black Power politics throughout the 1970s. As it relates to African liberation and U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, activities associated with Black Power activism included founding of the African Liberation Support Committee, organizing the African Liberation Days in 1972, 1973, and 1974. The principal organizer of the ALSC and the ALD was Owusu Sadauki (Howard Fuller) who attended the first meeting of the CAP in 1970 in his capacity as a representative of Malcolm X Liberation University. Many of these same Black Power
activists were also instrumental in organizing the African American delegation to the Sixth Pan African Congress in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1974.

Though their approach to political participation deviated from the more acceptable and seemingly less threatening forms of Black politics, the activities of the Black Power activists remain significant to the overall narrative of African American politics beginning in the 1960s and continuing into the 1970s. Considering the activities of SNCC, CORE, the OAAU, and the CAP on issues related to Africa and African liberation, it is clear that a wide range of African Americans had an interest in Africa and saw their struggles in the U.S. as part and parcel of a global Black freedom struggle. The grassroots nature of SNCC, their embracing of the organizing tradition, and the fact that the organization sent a delegation to Africa disrupts notions that the international community was irrelevant to so-called non-intellectuals.

In myriad ways, the African American activism of the 1960s set the stage for what would be an electrifying and turbulent 1970s in African American politics. Over the span of a few short years, the ability of African Americans of all ideological variations to participate in politics had increased. The areas where the increased participation was most notable were in higher education and through elected office. It was through this new quality of political participation that African American politicians, intellectuals, and activists worked to push domestic and foreign policy issues understood to be of concern to African Americans to the forefront of Black political discourses. Black activists working toward the collective—albeit divided project—of racial advancement increasingly linked the freedom struggles waged by African Americans in the U.S. with the anti-colonial and liberation struggles in Africa. Though much of African American political discourse in the 1960s and 1970s were dominated by elites, these were not the only people concerned with and aware of the world beyond the borders of the U.S. Indeed the SNCC activists’ 1964 sojourn to Africa illustrates that even the seemingly commonplace Black American became aware of the world around them and the relationship between the domestic and international.

Articulating an association between the domestic and the international political struggles was also a project taken up by Black intellectuals of all ideological variations. Those working in the American universities and colleges challenged the very nature of the university and pushed the academy to engage issues relevant to the struggles of African Americans and Africa. Though they were frequently at odds with some of their counterparts in the universities who embraced liberal integration as the best approach to racial advancement, the cadre of radical Black intellectuals also embraced the notion of a connection between domestic and international liberation struggles. The rise of Black electoral politics, particularly at the Congressional level stands as one of the most important manifestations of Black political power. The ability of African Americans to be elected to Congress and to achieve enough seniority to assume leadership roles in the House proved critical to the Black freedom struggle both domestically and internationally. On the domestic front, it was through the labors of Black members of Congress and their staffs that
the key civil rights legislation was successfully legislated; extending the benefits of citizenship to Black Americans. In international affairs, the ascendancy of Charles Diggs to the chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa squarely placed the Congressional foreign policy debates in the hands of an African American for adjudication.

In the last three years of the 1960s and the first two years of the 1970s, the foundation had been laid for what would shape up to be a pivotal decade in African American politics. On the heels of the first meeting of the CAP, the founding of the Congressional Black Caucus, the institutionalization of the AHSA, the beginnings of the efforts to organize the African Liberation Days, and the activities underway in Congress through the House Subcommittee on Africa and among foreign policy scholars and Africanists working in and outside of the university, the first few years of the 1970s were dynamic times in African American Politics. Though the Black political community was indeed fragmented, many of their efforts, both individually and collectively, would materialize in transformative ways in 1972. It would be during this year that important strides would be made in advancing African American interests and positions on domestic issues as well as on issues related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. In other words, 1972 would shape up to be a pivotal year for African American adversarial diplomacy.

3 In the area of voting and elections, it was people like Fannie Lou Hamer and the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP), who posed vehement challenges to other manifestations of racism in American electoral politics. It was Hamer and her colleagues in the MFDP that aided in furthering the civil rights cause by calling attention to the overt racism of the American Democratic Party in ways that forced the party to be inclusive of African Americans in more than just name and idea only. See Chana Kai Lee, *For Freedom’s Sake: The Life of Fannie Lou Hamer* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Charles Payne, *I’ve Got the Light of Freedom: the Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
4 Ibid.
5 For example, between 1966 and 1978, African Americans—either through election or appointment—ascended to the office of Mayor in twenty-five American cities. These included major cities such as Los Angeles, Oakland, New Orleans, Detroit, Richmond, Gary, and the District of Columbia. Incidentally, it would be the African American mayor of Gary Indiana, Richard Gordon Hatcher, who would feature prominently in TransAfrica’s narrative for much of its history through service as the founding chairman and long-standing member of its Board of Directors.
8 Ibid.
9 This void in Black leadership was partially attributable to the neutralization of certain Black leaders by government surveillance. I discuss this further in the section of chapter 4 that deals with the National Political Convention of 1972 and how Black radicals were subjected to constant surveillance
by the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO). It was the neutralization of these leaders of the Black Left that created a void in leadership that would be assumed by Black elected officials.

Ibid., 111.


11 Clay, Just Permanent Interests, 117. Also see, William Clay Memo to the Democratic Select Committee, 31 December 1970 in Clay, Just Permanent Interests.


13 Ibid.


16 Ibid, George Dalley, interview with the author, 17 May 2011, Washington, DC.


20 Ibid.; George Dalley, interview with the author, 17 May 2011, Washington, DC.


22 The House Subcommittee on Africa would later be changed to the “Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health.”


24 Ibid.


26 Clay, Just Permanent Interests, 88.

Butcher was the only African American to serve at the director level in the Clinton transition team for foreign policy. See Saul Freedman, “Will Clinton Rally for Africa? Policy Experts Differ on Extent of Commitment by New President,” *Newsday*, 30 November 1992.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010, Cambridge, MA.

Ibid.


Karen Kaplan, “MIT Professor a Candidate for Harvard Board,” *The Tech*, Vol. 110, No. 7, 23 February 1990, 1. In 1996 following a 32-year stint on the faculty, Johnson retired from MIT at the age of 61. An astute and lively septuagenarian, Johnson has continued to be involved in various
academic, community-based, and internationally focused projects in the greater Boston area for the past fifteen years.

40 Herschelle Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011, Atlanta, GA.
41 By this I mean the French colonies that would be declared independent in the early 1960s, beginning most notably in 1960.
42 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.
44 The original signers of the Appeal for Human Rights were as follows: Willie Mays, who was President of Council For the Students of Atlanta University; James Felder, President of Student Government Association For the Students of Clark College; Marion D. Bennett, President of Student Association For the Students of Interdenominational Theological Center; Don Clarke, President of Student Body For the Students of Morehouse College; Mary Ann Smith - Secretary of Student Government Association For the Students of Morris Brown College; and Roslyn Pope - President of Student Government Association For the Students of Spelman College. Challenor would join the movement its second year following her studies abroad.
45 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.
47 See “Hartsfield’s Talk’s Fail: Students Call Downtown Boycott, Students ‘Disappointed’ in Merchants; Adults Plan Support,” Atlanta Inquirer, 28 November 1960, 1; “Atlanta Students Jam Bail: Arrests Climb Past 70,” Atlanta Inquirer, 11 February 1961, 1; “Chamber of Commerce Told: School Issue, Sit-ins, Not Same, Leaders Say,” Atlanta Inquirer, 17 December 1960, 1. These newspaper articles were made available through a recent effort to digitize key artifacts from the Atlanta student sit-ins. These documents (and others) can be found at the Atlanta Student Movement Website and online archive, accessed 16 April 2011, http://www.atlantastudentmovement.org.
48 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.
50 Herschelle Challenor, interview wit the author, 9 February 2011, Atlanta, GA.
53 Eick, Dissent in Wichita.

See, for example, Joyce Ladner, *The Death of White Sociology: Essays on Race and Culture* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1998)

The organizations ran parallel to the American Political Science Association (APSA), the American Psychological Association (APA), the American Sociological Association (ASA), and the African Studies Association (ASA), respectively.

Sociologist E. Franklin Frazier had been elected president of the ASA in 1963. Unfortunately, he died before taking office. Since then, several of the Black Americans have gone on to serve as President of ASA. These include, most recently, Political Scientist Pearl Robinson of Tufts University.


Personal communication with Willard Johnson via telephone, 1 April 1 2011; Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010; Challenger, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.

Personal Communication with Willard Johnson by telephone, 1 April 2011.


Ibid.

Carson, *In Struggle*, 133.

Ibid.


Ibid.

Carson, *In Struggle*, 134.

Carson, *In Struggle*, 134; Harry Belafonte, interview with the author, 8 February 2011, New York, NY.

Carson, *In Struggle*, 134.


Woodard, *A Nation Within a Nation*, 158.

Ibid., 161.

Ibid., 162.

Ibid., 164.

Ibid., 164.

Ibid., 163.
CHAPTER 4

THE WATERSHED OF 1972:
EMBEDDING AFRICAN LIBERATION INTO AFRICAN AMERICAN POLITICS

By 1972 the first Nixon administration was well underway and its policy positions had been adverse to the interests with which Black leaders were most concerned. Although Nixon was responsible for the appointment of more African Americans to positions in the Executive Branch than his predecessors, his domestic and foreign policies ran counter to the objectives of the majority of Black leaders. In foreign policy, the Nixon administration had openly supported the Byrd Amendment, which allowed the U.S. to resume the importation of Rhodesian chrome, despite the adoption of sanctions by the U.N. Security Council. For those concerned with the relationship between African liberation and U.S. foreign policy, the Byrd Amendment was seen as a clear attempt at undermining international law. The significance of the Nixon administration’s action was magnified by the fact that U.S. was both a charter member of the U.N. and a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Compared to the Johnson administration, the foreign policy agenda of the Nixon administration was unapologetically supportive of White minority rule in Southern Africa. On domestic issues, the tenuous relationship between Black leadership and the Nixon administration was further evident through the President’s refusal to meet with the newly formed Congressional Black Caucus in 1971. As discussed in the previous chapter, Nixon not only refused to meet with the Caucus but he categorically rejected all sixty of the recommendations made by the CBC when the meeting finally occurred.

For different but no less significant reasons, African American leaders were equally weary of the Democratic Party. Even though all Black members of the House were elected Democrats, the politics and political positions of the Democratic Party disillusioned many African American leaders. Though it was the party in control of the Congress during the adoption of the historic civil rights legislation of the 1960s, the Democrats were also in control of Congress during the entire Nixon administration and could not muster the support to defeat legislation such as the Byrd Amendment. What is more, the Democratic Party remained divided on critical issues lingering in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement. Owing to a multitude of factors, including the splintering of the party between the Southern dixiecrats and the Northern liberals in the 1960s, the Democrats were unable to achieve consensus on key issues such as the enforcement of the provisions of the civil rights legislation. This, together with the failure of desegregation to occur “with all deliberate speed,” hampered the party’s reputation on civil rights and weakened the overall confidence of African Americans in the party.

Challenging the Nixon administration and the Byrd Amendment were the major focus of Black intellectuals concerned with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. This was at the center of the work of those foreign policy scholars working with and in support of the work of Charles Diggs in the House Subcommittee on Africa. The
Black Left was also engaged in advocacy efforts in support of African liberation. The 1970 Congress of African People endowed Baraka and other radical intellectuals with an increased volume of political capital. Their success at organizing this massive conference provided critical momentum for Black radicals, the conference strategy, and mass mobilization in years following. These same activists began to organize around African liberation in 1971. Like the efforts of liberal Black intellectuals and Black elected officials, the domestic and international political efforts of Black radicals also realized critical milestones in 1972. The most notable of these were the massive African Liberation Day protests that occurred simultaneously in several U.S. cities in May of 1972. This set the stage for similar African liberation day events in 1973 and 1974.

By the year’s end, 1972 had been monumental in African American politics. It was in this year that the ideologically divergent cadre of Black leaders began to organize around issues related to African Americans. Many of them recognized the need to continue to work to improve the lives of African Americans and increase their political capital in the post-civil rights era. On the eve of a 1972 presidential election, prominent issues included the development of a Black presidential strategy and a National Black Political Agenda. However, Black leaders disagreed on the best approach to addressing this multitude of policy and strategy issues that lingered in the aftermath of the Civil Rights Movement. Still, these activists undertook the important work of attempting to build consensus around imminent and upcoming political issues. These efforts came together at various points in 1972. The most notable events underscoring the attempts at consensus building were the National Black Political Convention held in March of 1972 and the African Liberation Day held in May of the same year. However, as this chapter illustrates, despite their best intentions, the effort to achieve unity on Black political issues was unsuccessful.

Ideological divisions notwithstanding, 1972 was a significant year for African American activists in all ideological camps as they worked to support the Southern African liberation struggles. In January, the Black foreign policy scholars that were active in support of the work of Charles Diggs in Congress and in the American colleges and universities undertook efforts to mobilize themselves to direct their collective energies around foreign policy issues. Not long after these efforts began, a wide representation of African American leaders converged for the National Black Political Convention of 1972, from which the African liberation struggles emerged as one of many focal points. And, in May of 1972, the Congressional Black Caucus convened its African American National Leadership Conference on Africa. This was immediately followed by the first of what would be a series of African Liberation Days held between 1972 and 1975. In the end, these individual and collective efforts succeeded in making the Southern African liberation struggles—and foreign policy, more broadly—an integral part of the milieu of Black politics in the post-civil rights era. Although the events and initiatives of 1972 reflected the ideological diversity of Black political leaders, they represented an unprecedented amalgamation of African Americans around a foreign policy cause.
The AHSA Foreign Policy Conference: Barranquitas, Puerto Rico

The year 1972 proved to be a pivotal year for African American academics concerned with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. On the heels of the establishment of the African Heritage Studies Association, African American academics concerned with the relationship between African liberation and U.S. foreign policy began to organize themselves and coordinate their activities. These efforts reached a critical juncture in early 1972. It was then that some of the same African American academics that had founded the AHSA convened a meeting in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico on 12 January 1972. The purpose of this meeting was to mobilize and organize a corps of African American academics around a foreign policy agenda for Black America. Participants at this three-day retreat agreed to commit their individual and collective intellectual energies and scholarship on the important task of defeating White minority rule in Southern Africa. A Washington Post article described the meeting as having been held “on the premise that Blacks must assert themselves to help America’s attitude toward Africa the way that Jews have helped shape American policy toward Israel.” Consistent with the times, the general issue remained the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, with a particular focus on Namibia, the Republic of South Africa, and “the Portuguese Territories of Angola, Mozambique, and Portuguese Guinea.”

If there is to be a single person to credit with the organizing of the conference in Barranquitas, it is Herschelle Challenor. Though people like Willard Johnson, and Congressman Diggs lent their support in the planning and execution of the conference, Challenor was the principal architect. Her role on Diggs staff coupled with her connections in progressive foreign policy circles, made her an opportune person to lead this effort. Her motivations for organizing this conference were multifold. Her studies of issues related to Africa, African liberation, and U.S. foreign policy fueled her interests in the Southern African liberation struggles. In addition, Challenor’s involvement with the establishment of the AHSA had increased her concern for mobilizing African American foreign policy scholars to develop an academic agenda focused U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. What is more, Challenor was part of the group of scholars who recognized the need for a sustained presence of African Americans in issues related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. She, too, saw organizations like the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and the good work they were able to do in mobilizing the Jewish American community to influence politics in the U.S. to preserve the interests of the Israeli state and felt Black Americans should be similarly organized for Africa.

Challenor was successful at securing funding for the conference from the Phelps Stokes Fund. At the time, the president of Phelps Stokes was Frank H. Williams. An attorney by training, Williams had served as a special assistant to Thurgood Marshall when Marshall was special counsel to the NAACP. Williams also had a hand in organizing the Peace Corps and served as an ambassador to Ghana during the Johnson administration. Following his departure from government, and after a brief stint as director of the Center for Urban Research and Policy at
Columbia University, Williams went on to serve as president of the Phelps Stokes fund. Established in 1911, the Phelps Stokes Fund had a long track record for its philanthropy in numerous areas of African American, Native American, and African affairs. Owing to his diplomatic and foreign policy work, including service on the board of directors of the Council on Foreign Relations, Williams found value in the work of the AHSA and provided Challenor with a grant of $3,000 to fund the conference. Williams and Challenor had become acquainted through the Council on Foreign Relations, which Williams had encouraged Challenor to join, and was generally supportive of her work.

Held at the mountain resort called the Hotel Barranquitas, the conference brought together a sizable group of scholars and foundation leaders concerned with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. From the academic community, attendees included John Henrik Clarke from Hunter College and Cornell University; Johnetta Cole from the University of Massachusetts; Adelaide Cromwell Hill from Boston University; and Leonard Jeffries from San Jose State College. Also present were Ron Walters, Willard Johnson, James Turner, Inez Smith Reid of Brooklyn, as well as Tilden LeMelle, who was both on the faculty of Hunter College and affiliated with the American Committee on Africa. The conference also had participation from the official diplomatic community through the attendance of Hugh Smythe, who had previously served as U.S. Ambassador to Syria. Also present were representatives from foundations and research instructions. These included Robert Brown of the Black Economic Research Center; Walter Carrington of the African-American Institute; Haskell Ward from the Ford Foundation’s International Division, and Rev. James Joseph from the Irwin-Sweeny-Miller Foundation.

The outcomes of the Barranquitas meeting were manifold. Though no single agenda item was adopted, the group decided to harness its energies around five major areas. They agreed to serve as a brain trust for the CBC; providing assistance in the hearings on America-Africa relations that were to be held later in the year. They agreed to lend their expertise in support of progressive U.S. foreign policy toward Africa by testifying before Senate and House Subcommittees on Africa and at meetings where topics apropos to Africa were on the agenda. They also agreed to undertake efforts to partner with other Black groups interested in Africa and African liberation. The particular groups of concern were CAP, CORE, the Black Union organizations, and the SCLC. The group also agreed to launch a massive educational campaign on issues related to Africa, the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, and the importance of forging relationships between African Americans and Blacks on the continent.

The participants also agreed to focus their individual energies on advocating progressive U.S. foreign policies toward Africa. This meant that, wherever they may be located professionally—be it universities, policy organizations, or on Congressional staffs, these scholars would make African liberation of the highest priority and this would be reflected in their scholarship, service, and advocacy. In addition, specific plans were laid to organize a boycott against the Gulf Oil Company, and against coffee imports from Angola. Lastly, the participants at the Barranquitas
meeting made a key decision to form a political action committee that would be known as the Committee for Positive Action (CPA) of the African Heritage Studies Association. In addition, owing to the debates in Congress about the controversial Byrd Amendment, the participants recognized the urgency of working to defeat this legislation that was understood to be catastrophic to the cause of African liberation.  

The commitment made at the Barranquitas meeting to focus on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa materialized in different ways. This meeting began the initial discussions about the need to institutionalize an African American presence in foreign policy advocacy circles. These discussions would continue for several years before the idea would come to fruition with the establishment of TransAfrica. However most scholars and those who were involved at the time, regard the Barranquitas meeting as the real place of origin for the African American foreign policy lobby.  

**The National Black Political Convention**

In November 1971, Congressman Charles Diggs issued a formal call for what would eventually become known as the National Black Political Convention of 1972. Though the exact dates and location were yet to be announced, it was declared that the convention would be held in March or April of 1972. The objective of this massive gathering would be to develop “a national Black agenda and the crystallization of a national-Black strategy for the 1972 elections and beyond.” According to Diggs’ announcement, it was the hope that the convention would generate “strategies for maintaining practical unity in the national participation of Blacks in the Democratic and Republican conventions in local, state, and national elections.” This call to conference came on the heels of a dynamic eighteen-month period in African American political life. Immediately following the first meeting of the Congress of African People in Atlanta, Black leaders of all ideological persuasions began to strategize at the regional and national levels. These political camps, notwithstanding their ideological differences, saw the merits of the convention strategy and thus committed mobilizing Black leadership around the upcoming quadrennial elections. The enthusiasm that had been generated around the inaugural meeting of the CAP and the Black Power Conference in 1968 underscored the merits of the convention strategy and the possibilities created through this approach to political organizing. In the face of an increasingly fragmented Black politics, the convention strategy provided the space for the ideologically diverse segments of Black American leadership to come together with the objective of mobilizing African Americans around the most paramount political issues of the day. In the earliest days of the 1970s, one of the most paramount political issues was the upcoming quadrennial election and the need to strategize around the complex set of issues facing African Americans in the post-civil rights era.  

In the run up to the convention, Black leaders held several strategy meetings to determine the best approach to formulating and advancing some semblance of a Black Agenda during this critical election year. Consistent with the divided nature of
African American political leadership, the leaders involved in these various strategy sessions were, too, divided on the best approach. Reflecting the three dominant political camps, the major strategy groups were organized separately by Amiri Baraka, Richard Gordon Hatcher, and Charles Diggs. Each of them represented the participant base characteristic of the ideological camp with which the host was most closely associated. The first of these organizing efforts was launched in June of 1971. Hosted by the CAP, the June meeting was held on the campus of Howard University. It was themed, “Strategy for Unity: ‘72 and Beyond.” Hailing from different parts of the U.S., the fifty leaders present represented churches, regional and national organizations, non-profits, community centers and organizations, and themselves. This included former SNCC activists and individuals currently or formerly associated with the NAACP, CAP, and the Institute for the Black World (IBW). However, the meeting at Howard included very few local and state level elected officials. The few that were there were from the state of New York. From Congress, only Representative John Conyers sent a staff member from his office. Finally, a delegate from the office of the U.N. ambassador to Tanzania represented the international contingent.21

As could be expected, the tenor of the Howard meeting was in-line with that of the CAP. In other words, the major focus was on institution building and the development of unity among African people, including, most pointedly, the various communities of leaders working on behalf of Black America and the Black world.22 This is best captured by then CAP National Chairman Hayward Henry, who remarked, “Our movement must create a mechanism to unify its diverse elements.”23 Still, this strategy meeting was not without its ideological disputes. One of the conference objectives centered on the task of protecting Black leaders from various perceived threats from external forces. Consequently, some of the more radical participants were concerned that too much emphasis was placed on preserving the interests and positions of the moderate leaders. On this issue Baraka himself has observed, “At the D.C. meeting, the issue of unity was raised, but also the question of at what point did the attempt at some kind of unity, even operational unity become a compromise too heavy for a so-called revolutionary to sustain? Would positions taken for the sake of unity be so weak as to actually hold the race back, or at least render it without a vanguard to take the correct positions, no matter how ‘radical’ they might seem, to the mainstream?”24 All told, the risks associated with assembling a united front among Black leadership was a major point of trepidation between both camps present at the Howard meeting.25

A second strategy meeting was called by Richard Gordon Hatcher, Mayor of Gary, Indiana. Held on 24 September 1972 in Northlake, Illinois, Hatcher’s meeting brought together a more elite group of participants. Hatcher leaned on the celebrity of certain Black leaders, naming California Assemblyman Willie Brown, Coretta Scott King, Jesse Jackson, Julian Bond, Diggs, and Baraka as co-hosts. Indeed Baraka’s participation in this meeting illustrates the way that these ideologically diverse political camps persisted to attempt to work together in the name of racial unity. Other participants included a broad representation from members of the CBC as well
as prominent civil rights leaders. The major thrust of this meeting was developing a strategy for the presidential election itself. That is, whom, if anyone, should the leadership of Black America put forth as a candidate for president and vice president as had been done at the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in 1968.

The final of the three strategy meetings took place on 18 to 20 November 1971. Held at the Sheraton Park Hotel in Washington, DC, this meeting took on a format and character different from the previous two gatherings, owing to the fact that the Congressional Black Caucus hosted it. Convened as the “National Conference on Black Elected Officials” (CBEO), the CBC’s initiative brought more than three hundred people to the table to discuss various topics concerning Black political organizing. Similar to the Howard and Northlake meetings, the CBC’s conference was a diverse mix of Black political leaders that included Black elected officials, organization and movement leaders—including those from the Civil Rights and nationalist camps.

The CBEO brought some major issues to the forefront that underscored the divided nature of Black political leadership. The question of presidential strategy was one of them. It was at this conference that the Black elected leadership, particularly the CBC, was forced to reckon with the presidential candidacy of one of its members as it deliberated over the best approach to Black political empowerment. Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm had launched her presidential bid earlier that year, and the response from her colleagues was ambivalent, at best. It was at this conference that Chisholm publicly confronted her colleagues about their individual and collective response to her candidacy. Indeed their imperturbable treatment of her bid for the presidency was exemplified at the CBEO, when the conference organizers did not include her on a panel on the first day of the conference called, “The Development of Black Political Power in the Seventies.” This made the question of presidential strategy all the more critical and contentious. The major disputes at this conference lingered from the previous two meetings, as the attendees remained divided on the issue of a political strategy for the presidential election. This became most pronounced during a closed session meeting held during the conference. The closed session gathering was convened and chaired by Congressman Diggs and consisted of panelists Coretta Scott King, Richard Hatcher, Percy Sutton, and Amiri Baraka. Failing to achieve consensus through this meeting, Diggs decided to defer the issue to an appointed committee of four that would review each proposal and recommend the best approach. Ultimately, the committee’s recommendation, consistent with Baraka’s proposal, was to hold a national convention. This recommendation, in the estimation of Political Scientist Cedric Johnson, was “a means of placating the conflicting interests both between the radicals and the moderates within the ranks of national Black politicos.”

It was upon the recommendation of the advisory committee that Diggs issued the call to convention for the following year. The fact that Diggs issued the formal call is illustrative of a certain feature of Black American politics prevalent in the 1970s. It illuminates the preeminence, both real and imagined, of Black elected officials who tended to be more acceptable to the mainstream than were their counterparts who
were associated with other forms of Black political participation. This is not to
discount Diggs’ significance as a major figure in post-civil rights Black politics.
However, considering the other dramatis personae involved in the series of strategy
meetings preceding the CBEO, the deference to Diggs and the CBC’s conference
underscores the highly political nature of racial representation among African
Americans and the ways that African American elected officials would come to loom
heavily over political discourse in the succeeding decades. One of the prevailing
reasons for this trend has been the role that government surveillance has historically
played in monitoring the activities of Blacks who have been alleged to be in any way
radical. Though the practices of entities like the FBI’s Counterintelligence Program
(COINTELPRO) were existent prior to the organizing and execution of the National
Black Political Convention, and was outlawed in 1971, it took its toll on Black
movements. In the run up to the 1972 convention, government surveillance was a
regular fear and occurrence within Black organizing efforts. The regular appearance
of COINTELPRO informants at planning meetings to neutralize the efforts of
presumed radicals, while allowing the apparent moderates to continue their work,
played a major role in the elevation of moderate Black elected officials.

The initial announcement suggested that the convention would be held in
April or May of 1972. However, it was subsequently publicized that the convention
would be held in March. This gave the conference organizers less than four months
to coordinate the massive undertaking. Co-chaired by Diggs, Baraka, and Hatcher,
the grunt work of organizing the myriad details of the convention was accomplished
by the labor of staff and volunteers from the National Urban Coalition, the Joint
Center for Political Studies, the Institute for the Black World, and the Congressional
Black Caucus. This was in addition to the support from volunteers throughout the
country.

There were a number of U.S. cities that could have been suitable locations at
which to hold the National Black Political Convention. However, for multiple reasons,
none was more fitting than the midwestern town of Gary, Indiana. Previous
conferences such as the Congress of African People and the CBEO had been held
in Atlanta and Washington, DC. Thus, bringing a convention of this magnitude to
Gary accomplished several important things. It brought the Black mobilizing effort to
the Midwest. It also succeeded in putting Gary on the map and capitalizing on the
burgeoning Black politics in this relatively small midwestern city. With Hatcher in his
second term as mayor and the city’s recent population shift to a Black majority, Gary
was very much emblematic of the type of Black Political power scarcely seen at the
local level.

Hatcher had initially been elected mayor of Gary in 1967 and became the first
African American to hold this office. He was also only the third African American to
be elected mayor of a major American city. Hatcher was reelected in 1971 and
would continue to serve as mayor for an unprecedented five terms before his defeat
in 1988. Even before becoming involved in politics through elected office, Hatcher
was actively involved with civil rights activism and public service activities. Born in
1933 in Michigan City, Indiana, (just 30 miles east of Gary), Hatcher moved to Gary
after graduating from law school at Indiana’s Valparaiso University in 1959. Hatcher had done his undergraduate studies at Indiana University (IU) where he had won an athletic scholarship that helped finance his education. At IU, he was involved in the local NAACP and was part of the effort to protest restaurants that denied services to Blacks. This was the beginning of what would be a life long dedication to activism and public service. After moving to Gary to begin his legal career, Hatcher quickly became involved in local politics and community organizing activities. He lent his training in support of desegregation efforts in Gary and was an advisor to young adult chapter of the NAACP. His career as an elected official began in 1963 when he was elected to the Gary City Council as an at-large member at the age of thirty. Immediately upon being sworn in January of 1964, Hatcher’s colleagues on the City Council elected him to the position of Council President. He became the youngest person and the first freshman member to be elected to this powerful post.38 It was from the city council that Hatcher would go on to be elected mayor in 1968.39

In an era where a prominent Black elected official was an uncommon occurrence, Hatcher’s election propelled him into the national political spotlight and into some of the most influential Black political circles. His record as a civil rights champion caused him to emerge as one of the most prominent Black political leaders in the 1970s. His social and political circles included civil rights leaders, politicians, and celebrities such as Jesse Jackson, Bill Cosby, Dick Gregory, Harry Belafonte, and Nancy Wilson. In addition to the support these people lent to his political campaigns, he would come to work closely with many of them over the course of his career. This would include his work on domestic and international issues. In the domestic sphere, Hatcher’s major contributions on the national level include his work in organizing the Gary Convention. As a convention co-chair, he became a major spokesperson during the planning process, at the actual convention, and in its aftermath. He would also surface as a major figure in international issues through his involvement with TransAfrica. As the inaugural chair of TransAfrica’s board of directors, Hatcher provided an important connection between the domestic and the international, as his last ten years as mayor overlapped with his leadership and membership of TransAfrica’s governing board.40

On the second weekend of March 1972, a total of 6,776 people converged at Westside High School in Gary, Indiana as delegates to the National Black Political Convention.41 Organized under the theme, “Unity Without Uniformity,” the Gary Convention undoubtedly reflected the ideological miscellany of African American political leadership. Its composition of nationalists, mainstream elected officials, academics, and leaders of major African American organizations, set the stage for a complex gathering replete with dissimilar analyses of the convention and its impact. This became all the more apparent as the conference got underway. Some participants were steeped in the excitement of the moment and saw a mammoth achievement of merely having met.42 Others distinguished the convention as a decisive exemplar of the frontiers of unity among Black politicos.43 Though the mere fact of meeting was indeed an accomplishment, there were no more telling examples of the reality of disunity in African American politics than the deliberations encircling
the *National Black Political Agenda* and the lingering question of whether or not to establish an independent Black political party. These two issues were divisive points among the various political camps present at the convention. Even before the first day of the convention, in anticipation of the debates that would ensue, Baraka and CAP’s Hayward Henry had assembled a meeting of Black radicals in order to foster unity among nationalists in advance of the convention.44

The development of the *National Black Political Agenda* was a highly debated and deliberated process during and after the convention. However, the final product stands as the most imperative triumph of the Gary Convention. Notwithstanding the complex series of debates and deliberations, modifications, and amendments processed through various committees and caucuses, the adoption of the *Black Agenda* represented, in the estimation of Historian Manning Marable, “one of the most visionary and progressive statements ever issued by Afro-Americans about their position in this country.”45 Reflecting the wishes of the various factors present at the convention, the *Black Agenda* was a sweeping statement that was both visionary and provided for specific demands of the state and of Black America in the name of equality, equity, and racial advancement. It was foreground by a statement dubbed the “Gary Declaration” which was written by Historian Vincent Harding and William Strickland of the Institute of the Black World. The Gary Declaration, along with the full *Black Agenda*, was endorsed by the convention.

The preamble to the Gary Declaration located the problems of Black America at the intersection of American racism and the failure of the capitalist economy. It points to the ways that these two features of American life, politics, and economics have functioned to relegate Black Americans to an inferior social position and how this is perpetuated through existing social and political institutions.46 The preamble further called for a radical change in American values as a means of addressing the issues of inequality and systemic failure. The Gary Declaration goes on to call for the elevation of the needs of humanity above the material desires of individuals and the state.47 In its entirety, the Gary Declaration and the *Black Agenda* addressed several issues that were directed toward Black Americans and separately toward elected officials and to those aspiring to elected office. These two areas included recommendations on issues such as political empowerment; economic empowerment; human development; international policy for Black people; communications; rural development; environmental protection; and self-determination for the District of Columbia.48 Collectively, these areas included proposed reforms and initiatives aimed at increase representation of Blacks in Congress; self governance for Blacks at the local level; election of a mayor and local officials for the District of Columbia by the people of the District of Columbia; the development of Black financial institutions; an increased minimum wage; and a host of other specific policy solutions.

There were two major issues that were critical components of the *Black Agenda* that remained unresolved at the close of the Gary Convention. One was the resolution calling for an end to school busing programs that had been mandated by the courts. The proposal was to replace these programs with local community control.
Proffered by the South Carolina delegation, the anti-busing resolution was premised on a rejection of the “notion that Black children were unable to learn unless they were in the same setting as white children.” The second major issue was related to the Arab-Israeli conflict. This had become a topic in African American politics largely in consequence of the growing opposition to Israel by some Black radicals in the aftermath of World War II. Though Zionism had featured prominently among the ideologies espoused by early Black nationalists, it faced increased scrutiny in the post World War II years. This was largely in consequence of the criticisms levied against Jewish leaders by Black radicals such as Harold Cruse and Baraka. These two radical intellectuals regularly called attention to the gross contradiction apparent among Jewish radicals who supported the nationalist and Zionist project that Israel represented yet were outspoken against the nationalist aspirations champion by African Americans. It was in response to this issue that the District of Columbia Delegation authored a resolution that made the sweeping demand of “dismantling Israel.” The resolution declared that the establishment of Israel was a wholesale violation of the Palestinian’s right to self-determination. The controversial resolution also called for an end to U.S. military and financial support to Israel and that “the negotiations be ended with the freedom of representatives of the Palestinians to establish a second state based on the historic right of the Palestinian people for self-government in their land.” This divisive proposition was hammered out at a meeting held at the Howard University School of Social Work two weeks following the close of the Gary Convention. These two resolutions were contentious issues during the convention and in its aftermath. Though they would be negotiated and ratified for the sake of finalizing the agenda, they required compromises among the various ideological camps that not all participants were willing to make. Though concessions were ultimately made, the ideological rift between the people and organizations participating in the convention were further exacerbated. Nevertheless, the Black Agenda was ratified and released in Washington, DC on 19 May 1972, commemorating what would have been Malcolm X’s forty-seventh birthday. It should be noted, however, that the Black Agenda’s ultimate ratification was possible, in large measure, because of the retreat of some of the more moderate delegates from the deliberations and voting processes. The departure of many moderates from the Black Agenda—including members of the CBC—coupled with the parliamentary maneuvering of Amiri Baraka, the Black Agenda ultimately reflected the priorities of the Black radicals.

If the sole objective of the Gary Convention was to develop a national Black political agenda, it succeeded by some measures. However, It would be inaccurate to laud the Black Agenda as a complete success because it unquestionably left the Black political leadership divided on key issues. At once, the mere fact of assembling several thousand African American politicos at one event was an accomplishment. At the same time, however, many of the very causes around which the convention was organized remained unaddressed. Beyond the Black Agenda itself, there were some seminal issues that were neither resolved at the convention nor its aftermath. In particular, the two overriding questions of a Black presidential strategy and a
Black Political Party remained. Though they were separate questions in the long term, they were very much related in the ensuing presidential election. On the question of presidential strategy, African American leadership fell far short of any semblance of consensus. Shirley Chisholm proceeded to carry her campaign all the way to the Democratic National Convention. Walter Fauntroy complicated the issue even further by launching a presidential campaign of his own. On the whole, Fauntroy’s candidacy was of marginal significance. He only campaigned in the District of Columbia and won its primary, owing to his position as the District’s non-voting Congressional delegate. Chisholm, on the other hand proved to be more controversial. She had her share of supporters among the Black political establishment. Her advocates at the convention believed that the Black convention should endorse the Black candidate. Others lent their support to the mainstream Democratic Party candidates. By now, the two that had become frontrunners were Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. All the while, the Black Nationalists led by Baraka, remained strapping advocates of the establishment of an independent Black party that would presumably put forth its own candidate. As a compromise between the competing forces, the delegation ultimately voted to establish a National Black Political Assembly. Adopted in principle at the Gary Convention, the Assembly was organized at a subsequent meeting held in Chicago in October 1972.

Similar to the other efforts, the National Black Political Assembly also fell victim to the contending forces in Black American politics. Nationalists like Baraka hoped the Assembly would assume some of the functions that an independent party might have taken up. However some elected officials had different visions, which were heavily informed by the reality that they, for various reasons, had limited political independence. Hatcher captured this most pointedly in his cautious declaration that “you can be very Black and very unified in Gary…but when you get back home, your life, your patronage, and your political future depends really on how well you fit into the pattern of the very white regional machine.” The most telling example underscoring Hatcher’s position was when the CBC broke yolk and released its “Black Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights.” In so many words, this document declared the CBC’s commitment to working within the existing political structures to advance what they understood to be Black interests. By way of the “Black Declaration of Independence, the CBC effectively sought to privilege themselves over the Black nationalist as the principal spokespersons on Black issues on the national level.” Though this action was contrary to the wishes of other factions of the Black Political establishment, the CBC, by some indicators succeeded in elevating the position of Congressional representative in the realm of national Black politics.

In the aftermath of the Gary Convention, it was clear that there were still multiple and conflicting Black political agendas operating in African American politics. The Black political establishment was no more united after Gary than it was before. And though the convention succeeded in ratifying its National Black Political Agenda, it remains unclear if these organizing efforts produced the wholesale gains for Black America for which its organizers and delegates so adamantly hoped.
However problematic the events and issues surrounding the Gary Convention may have been, its production of the Black Agenda remains significant for its symbolic and substantive value. Surely, certain milestones were realized such as the strides that were made toward greater autonomy and home rule for the District of Columbia. Other examples underscore this as well. But the Gary Declaration and the National Black Political Agenda must also be appreciated for its contribution to the efforts of African Americans to mobilize in support of the liberation of Southern Africa.

By way of the Agenda, the Gary Convention made a significant statement about the concern for issues related to Africa and African liberation. The National Black Political Agenda and its preamble declared a connection between the conditions and struggles of African Americans and those of Blacks elsewhere in the world. This included, most specifically, Blacks in Africa. The Gary Declaration articulated the conviction that, “beyond these [American] shores there is more of the same. For while we are pressed down under all the dying weight of a bloated, inwardly decaying white civilization, many of our brothers in Africa and the rest of the Third World have fallen prey to the same powers of exploitation and deceit.” The substantive sections of the Black Agenda made sweeping demands in the realm of international affairs. It called for the end to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the termination of U.S. sanctions against Cuba, and the closing of the American military installation in Guantanamo Bay. The agenda also made a set of pointed demands concerning Africa, the Southern African liberation struggles, and U.S. foreign policy toward the region. It expressly called for the removal of U.S., and other foreign interests, from the whole of Africa and the removal of the U.S. presence as well as that of U.S. corporations in Southern Africa. The international affairs section also demanded that the U.S. support the movements against White minority rule in Southern Africa and that it submits to the sanctions imposed by the U.N. and cease all forms of trade with Rhodesia. Though its international focus paled in comparison to the attention paid to domestic issues, the Gary Convention made strides in solidifying international affairs—particularly African liberation—into the fabric of national Black politics at the elite level.

The divisions among the Black political establishment would persist on both domestic and international issues. However, the Gary Convention and the Black Agenda gave a considerable boost to those African Americans concerned with African liberation. The commitment of the various camps to organizing around African liberation continued to reflected ideological differences among the Black political leadership. The moderate elected officials, such those of the CBC, continued to aid in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa through their work in Congress. Diggs largely led these efforts through the Africa Subcommittee and was aided by the African American foreign policy scholars who worked in his office or in advisory capacities. The nationalists also continued to organize to support African liberation. By the summer of 1971, preparations had been underway for massive African Liberation Day protests that were schedule to take place on 27 May 1972. This was just over one week following the official release of the final version of the National Black Political Agenda. However, just days before the first ALD was held in
1972, the CBC convened another important leadership meeting focused on Africa and African Liberation. The African American National Conference on Africa was represented another attempt at unifying Black Leaders around an important political issue. This time the gathering clearly focused on Africa, African Liberation, and the role that African Americans might play in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward Africa.

The African American National Conference on Africa

For a significant part of the twentieth century, Howard University played an important role in the cultivation of scholarship and scholarly discourse about the myriad issues related to African Americans life. This included the arts, humanities, sciences, social sciences, law, and medicine. In the middle decades of the twentieth century, as African Americans intellectuals made the slow climb in the academy as both scholars and subjects of study, Howard became increasingly significant to the collective effort to advance the African American freedom struggle through the university. In the mid twentieth century, its School of Law served as the laboratory for the legal team that successfully challenged public school desegregation culminating with the Supreme Court’s decision in *Brown v. Board of Education*, (1954).

Howard’s aptitude to serve as a place for the types of organizing activities named above was, in many ways, a phenomenon that resurfaced in the late 1960s. Just a few years prior, students and faculty from colleges and universities across the U.S. and from different parts of the globe converged on the Howard campus for a conference called, “Toward A Black University.” The year was 1968. This conference was held in response to student protests earlier that year. Enraged that Howard had become, in their estimation, less of a “Black University,” Howard students took over the university’s administration building and barricaded a meeting of the Board of Trustees. Their basic demand was for the university to establish a commission to make Howard “more of a ‘Black Institution’ rather than being [merely] a replica of the dominant white institutions.”

With the increased involvement of African Americans in various aspects of American politics, Howard came to function as an important center for the for scholarly and activist discourses on Black world liberation. For example, it was at Howard that the founding meeting of the African Heritage Studies Association was held in 1971. In addition, one of the strategy meetings leading up to the National Black political convention had been held at Howard in that same year. By hosting events such as these, Howard had begun to expand its involvement in Black political affairs. Consequently, during the ensuing two decades Howard was a regular meeting place for Black intellectuals and activists as they organized and strategized around the various issues of political significance to African American leadership. Indeed U.S. foreign policy toward Africa as part of the overall effort of African American political and intellectual leaders to aid in the African liberation struggles was one of them. The university’s significance in this particular area was fueled in great measure through the important role that Ronald Walters and P. Chike
Onwuachi played on the Howard faculty. Walters had recently assumed the chairmanship of the Department of Political Science and Onwuachi served as the director of Howard’s African Studies Program.

One of the most notable events held at Howard that was focused on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa was the African American National Conference on Africa (AANCA), which took place on 25 through 27 May 1972. This conference was sponsored by the CBC, which had been founded just a year earlier in 1971. This was during the period that Congressman Diggs served as chairman of the Africa Subcommittee and thus served as chair of the two-day AANCA. At the outset of the conference, Louis Stokes, then-chair of the CBC conveyed to the four hundred participants that, “It is time to make America live up to her 200-year commitment to freedom and self-determination.” In this vein, the conference and its participants waged significant criticism against the Nixon administration for its foreign policies and diplomacy relations with Southern Africa. The charges waged against the U.S. were equally levied against France, and the United Kingdom, as these two nations also engaged with the Southern African liberation struggles in ways similar to the U.S.

The two-day conference reflected the ideological multiplicity characteristic of African American leadership organizing for African liberation. Indeed these philosophical divisions had recently become more apparent at the Gary Convention held just over three months prior. Participants from the nationalist camp included Owusu Sadakai who was, at the time, President of Malcolm X Liberation University and attorney and filmmaker, Robert Van Lierop. From the academic foreign policy camp, participants included Willard Johnson, Ronald Walters, Chike Onwuachi, John Henrik Clarke, and Inez Smith Reid of Barnard College, Columbia University. From the Congressional offices, participants included Congressman Charles Diggs (and key staff members, Herschelle Challenor and Goler Butcher), Louis Stokes, and several other members of the CBC.

In many ways, the African American National Conference on Africa (AANCA) was an amalgamation of various factions of African American political and intellectual leaders concerned with African Liberation. Its diverse representation mirrored that of the first meeting of the Congress of African People in 1970 and, of course, the Gary Convention just a few months prior. Differently however, the AANCA did not employ the mass mobilization strategy characteristic of the CAP and other nationalist organizations working for African liberation. At the same time, the CBC-sponsored AANCA reflected the materialization of what, for various reasons, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa of ten years prior was never able to be. As such the conference approach to mobilizing African American intellectuals in support of African liberation would be repeated four years later when the CBC would convene its African American Leadership Conference of Africa in September 1976.

The outcomes of the AANCA were at once tangible and at the same time intangible. There were over 400 delegates present but the conference “took no unified position or resolution.” Yet, through a series of 10 workshops, conference
participants made individual and collective calls for boycotts against business trading in Southern Africa. It also made appeals to “Black athletes, signers, and entertainers not to perform in the region.”  

Consistent with the objectives of the Barranquitas meeting, a prominent policy focus of the AANCA was to mobilize those present to support the effort led by Charles Diggs in the House of Representatives to appeal the controversial Byrd Amendment. The conference also called upon the White House and Congress to impose sanctions on areas of southern Africa operating under White minority rule. What is more, the group called for the boycott of Gulf Oil “through rejection of credit and pickets,” “boycott of products from Libya, South Africa, and Rhodesia, and for increased consciousness among Black Americans of African problems.” The most substantial of the outcomes of the conference was the agreement of the delegation to partner in establishing the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC). When it was established in 1972, the ALSC joined the collection of other organization in Washington, DC working to mobilize Americans in support of African liberation. These organizations included the American Friends Service Committee, the Washington Office on Africa, and the American Committee on Africa. Different from these multiracial organizations, groups, the ALSC was an ostensibly Black effort. Though it was relatively short-lived, the ALSC has been lauded for its importance in the trajectory of African American foreign policy lobbying organizations. As Komozi Woodard has observed, “Before the birth of the TransAfrica organization, the ALSC was one of the most important forces for African Liberation in African American history.”

In 1973, the year after the conference, its proceedings were published in a volume under the name, From Gammon to Howard: Proceedings of the African American National Conference on Africa. Though not all of the essays including the published proceedings reflected the conference’s attendance, the list of contributors to this volume is indeed impressive. The volume’s title, From Gammon to Howard was in recognition of the seventy-seven years between the 1972 conference and the meeting of Stewart Missionary Foundation for Africa held a the Gammon Theological Union in Atlanta on 13 to 15 December 1895. In addition, the published proceedings included contributions from well-known African American and diaspora leaders. This included greetings and a critical essay from Amy Jacques Garvey; as well as essays on various aspects of development, colonialism, racism and calls for actions on the active liberation struggles in southern Africa. On this topic, From Gammon to Howard included contributions from Samuel Adams from USAID, Paul Engo, Ambassador from Cameroon to the U.N.; and Karl Gregory from Oakland University; Abdulrahmin Abby Farah, Somalian Ambassador to the U.N., Mamdou Moctar Thiam Ambassador to the U.N. from the OAU, and Essiah Zhuwrara from the Front for the Liberation of Zimbabwe.

In some ways, the analyses of the outcomes of the Gary Convention can be extended to the AANCA. Like Gary, the AANCA was an attempt to unify the Black political elite around a particular and timely political issue. Though Gary was more broadly focused, the AANCA was expressly centered on Africa, and even more narrowly focused on the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. If the mere fact of
assembling such a massive and diverse group of political elites is a hallmark of success, then the AANCA was, by some measures, triumphant. However, if its goal was to achieve unity among Black politicians in their otherwise fragmented efforts to support the liberation efforts in continental Africa, then the AANCA fell short in some ways. A telling example of the failure to achieve unity occurred the day immediately following the close of the AANCA at the African Liberation Day March in Washington, DC. It was here that Owusu Sadaukai, who participated in the conference the previous weekend, made the last minute decision of refusing to appeal to his massive ALD audience to lobby their Congressional representatives to support the repeal of the Byrd Amendment. It had been the hope of the more moderate group of Black politicians (which included the academic intellectual contingent who had met in Barranquitas and the elected officials) that Sadauki would use his platform at the ALD to encourage the repeal of the Byrd Amendment and that the ALDSC would also support the boycott of the Gulf Oil Company. Sadaukai's actions in this instance were very much to the dismay of the Committee for Positive Action, who had assembled in Barranquitas earlier that year. They had set as one of their primary goals the establishment of a partnership with other organizations concerned with African Liberation. Sadauki and the ALDCC march were one such partnership. Unfortunately, this never materialized as they envisioned.

Given the clamor surrounding the National Black Political Agenda, Sadaukai’s actions at the ALD march were neither surprising or out of step with the sentiments of the Black Nationalist camp with he was affiliated. The AANCA and the ALD marches occurred during the peak of the post Gary Convention negotiations. The Black Agenda had been released just a few days before the AANCA and its adoption was steeped in controversy and disagreement. What is more, the commotion that would ensue around the National Black Political Assembly in the succeeding months stands as further explanation for the inability to achieve unity on the best approach to the various political issues of the day. This included those issues related to foreign policy and African liberation. At the same time, the divisions among Black political leadership on foreign policy issues can also be connected to the growing discontent that some political camps—particularly the nationalists—had about the presumptive leadership role that the CBC had begun to assume on certain political issues. Consequently, the CBC’s sponsorship of the AANCA may have rendered the hope for unity impossible from the outset.

These issues notwithstanding, the AANCA stands as an important moment in the trajectory African American adversarial diplomacy in the post-civil rights era. In addition, it was critical in building the momentum that would lead to the establishment of the African American foreign policy lobby four years later. It revitalized the conference approach to political organizing around the question of African liberation that was attempted ten years earlier by the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa. Though it did not generate a tangible manifesto or declaration, the AANCA and its published proceedings succeeded in articulating a set of concerns of African American political elites about Africa, African Liberation,
U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, and the role that African Americans should play in brokering these issues.

The 1972 African Liberation Day: Mass Mobilization and African Liberation

On Saturday, 27 March 1972 tens of thousands of Americans of all races and classes marched in the streets throughout the U.S. and Canada in one of the largest displays of solidarity on a political issue in American history. United under the banner of African Liberation Day, these protests brought together people in several American cities including San Francisco, New Orleans, Toronto, and Washington, DC. The largest of these demonstrations were the ones held in the Nation’s Capital. The news media reported an estimated attendance of 10,000 to 15,000. However the conference organizers insisted that the Washington march brought together well over 30,000 people. Collectively these marches were attended by over 60,000. Originally scheduled to take place on 25 May, in commemoration of the ninth anniversary of the founding of OAU, the ALD marches represented the largest gathering of a group of Americans on an issue of international significance. The particular issue in this case was the liberation of Southern Africa. Through the ALD marches, American citizens made a collective statement and took their government to task for its foreign policy positions that effectively supported the White minority regimes in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, and Mozambique.

The ALD demonstrations were coordinated by a group that had become known as the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee (ALDCC). However, the ALD concept was the innovation of Pan-Africanist and radical intellectual, Owusu Sadaukai (Howard Fuller). Sadaukai had been active in Black political circles since the early 1960s. A native of Shreveport, Louisiana, Fuller had moved with his family to Milwaukee as a child. Consistent with the migratory patterns and motives of other Southern Black families, the Fullers’ move to Milwaukee was precipitated by the hopes of realizing increased economic and employment opportunities in the urban north. After graduating from high school in 1959, Fuller matriculated as a freshman at Carroll College in Waukesha, Wisconsin. Like many African Americans attending predominantly White institutions in the early 1960s, Fuller was in the first class of students to integrate Carroll College. He was awarded an athletic scholarship and graduated with the B.A. in sociology in 1962. Immediately following the completion of his undergraduate studies, Fuller went on to study at Case Western Reserve University where her graduated with a master’s degree in school administration. After his first tour of graduate school (he would go on to earn a Ph.D. in Education from Marquette University in 1985) be became involved with prominent civil rights organizations including CORE and the Urban League. It was his work with these organizations that marked the beginning of his political activism.

A noted Black Nationalist and radical intellectual, who would eventually become prominent among Black power activists, Sadaukai’s leftist leanings were emerged from his early community organizing work. It was these activities that exposed him to the harsh realities of race and class based discrimination visited
Upon African Americans. Upon moving to North Carolina in 1963, Sadaukai connected with the Black political activism that had been ignited in the aftermath of the Greensboro student protests just a few years earlier. Through these associations, he became close friends with prominent SNCC leaders Stokely Carmichael and Cleveland Sellers. It was through his connections with Carmichael, Sellers, and the rest of the SNCC cadre that helped to organize the Student Organization for Black Unity (SOBU). It was also through his association with Carmichael that Sadaukai would develop his own Pan-African internationalist sensibilities. This was not long after Carmichael himself had extended his political activism toward a Pan-African focus. Sadaukai would later establish Malcolm X Liberation University in 1969 of which he served as president until the short-lived institution closed its doors in 1973. Sadaukai's rise to national prominence came in part through his work with other Black radicals. Chief among these was Amiri Baraka. Thus he became a major player in organizing the 1970 Congress of African People and the National Black Political Convention two years later. Through his outspokenness in two settings, coupled with an ideological footing in Pan-Africanism, Sadaukai emerged as one of the foremost Black radicals in the swelling movement among African Americans to aid in the eradication of White minority rule in Southern Africa.

Sadaukai’s move to launch the ALD effort had been inspired by a 1970 visit to the African continent. As an official representative of MXLU and SOBU, Sadaukai toured the African continent and met with the Black leaders in several Southern African nations. These included meetings with liberation leaders in Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Angola. It was at the insistence of these prominent African leaders, as well as that of Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere, that Sadaukai returned to the U.S. committed to supporting the liberation of southern Africa through activism on the American soil. These revolutionary leaders had impressed upon Sadaukai and his contemporaries that the best way for them to support the liberation struggles was by lobbying their own government. It was in response to these recommendations that Sadaukai returned to the U.S. and committed to lead the effort that would eventually help to put the lid on Portuguese colonialism and White minority rule in Southern Africa. Sadaukai’s commitment to these causes materialized through his leadership in organizing the series of African Liberation Day marches that would occur between 1972 and 1974.

Upon his return from his Africa tour, Sadaukai organized a meeting in Greensboro, North Carolina. It was at this meeting he began to assemble the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee. This group undertook the important tasks of strategizing for the first African Liberation Day that would occur on 27 May 1972. In an effort to build support for the ALD mobilizing efforts, Sadaukai appealed to a broad representation of Black political, intellectual, and organization leaders. In appealing to these diverse factions, Sadaukai articulated the threefold objectives of the ALD mobilizing effort, which included: “(1) to make the masses of African (black) people in the United States, the Caribbean, and Canada aware of the political conditions in South Africa and the armed struggles being carried out by their..."
brothers and sisters there; (2) to educate African (black) people in these countries about the relationship between what is happening in the United States and other places; and (3) to organize a national protest demonstration against the United States foreign policy which supports European colonist rule in Southern Africa.”

Though Sadaukai was largely located within the radical intellectuals and nationalists, his efforts to mobilize Black leaders in support of African liberation succeeded in amalgamating a diverse cadre of elected officials, organization, leaders, and intellectuals. With Sadaukai serving as chairman, the ALDCC’s core leadership group consisted of seven people. This included Antoine Perot (chair of the supporting council); Florence Tate (information director); Mark Smith (operations director); Mwanafunzi Hekima (logistics coordinator); Juadine Henderson (secretary-treasurer); and Cleveland Sellers (field coordinator). Despite the fact that Sadaukai was based in North Carolina, the ALDCC had a major presence in the Nation’s capital and was headquartered at 220 14th St., NW.

With the ALD march scheduled for Saturday 27 May 1972, the planned demonstrations began to muster a groundswell of support from among the political and intellectual leadership of Black America. Consequently, Sadaukai put together a national steering committee that extended the work of the ALDCC. Among its many functions, this group aided in coordinating the logistical details of executing a march that would not simply be confined to the nation’s capitol, but would, instead, include demonstrations in several major American cities. The steering committee included many of the same political elites that were involved in the Gary Convention, which was being organized almost simultaneously. This group also brought together people involved in the academic and activist foreign policy circles, many of whom were active participants in the Congressional Black Caucus’ African American National Conference on Africa, which concluded the day before the ALD march.

From the community of African American political and social organizations, members of the national steering committee included Reverend Ralph Abernathy (Southern Christian Leadership Conference); Ruwa Chiwi (United Africans for One Motherhood International); Reverend Charles Koen (United Front of Cairo, Illinois); Reverend Doug Moore (Washington, DC Black United Front); Huey Newton (Black Panther Party); and George Wiley (National Welfare Rights Organization). The ALDCC also included members of Congress including Representatives John Conyers of Michigan, Ronald Dellums of California, and Louis Stokes of Ohio. In addition to bringing together elected officials and people affiliated with organizations, the ALD planning efforts also included an impressively diverse group of Black leaders who operated independently of major political organizations. These included, among others, Angela Davis, H. Rap Brown, and Betty Shabazz. The community of Black intellectuals also supported the ALD planning efforts. Notable participants from this group included Inez Smith Reid, Nathan Hare, editor of the Black Scholar journal, and Historian Vincent Harding of the Institute for the Black World.

Though the ALD efforts enjoyed nearly across the board support from Black political elites, the NAACP denounced its efforts and its leadership. Roy Wilkins’, NAACP’s executive director publicly stated his opposition to the ALD activities. This
was largely premised on the NAACP’s rejection of Black Power radicalism. Interestingly, however, the NAACP was the one Black political organization of national stature that opposed the ALD efforts. The ALD organizing efforts also enjoyed a considerable volume of support among Black organizations. Some of these organizations were directly involved in the planning activities. Many lent financial support as well as name-only sponsorships to the effort. These included SCLC, SOBU, CAP, CORE, the National Council of Negro Women, Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Alpha Phi Alpha Fraternity and the Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization (IFCO). Of these sponsoring organizations, the IFCO remains significant because it financed major portion of the expenses associated with planning and executing the ALD marches. Support for the ALD also came in the form of endorsements from prominent organizations and public personalities. Individual endorsements came from Representative Parren Mitchell of Maryland; Andrew Pulley, vice presidential candidate for the Socialist Worker’s Party (SWP); and sociologist and university professor, Andrew Billingsley, among others. Other organizations signing their names to the ALD effort included the National Conference of Black Political Scientists; the National Black Political Convention; the Concerned Black Students of Kent State University; Concerned African Women; and the Black Student and Faculty Coalition of the University of Maryland, College Park; and the New York chapter of the Black Panther Party. In some instances organizations with available financial resources underwrote the costs for groups of protesters to travel to the various marches as well as provided transportation to the marches in various cities.

Of the several marches held throughout the U.S. on 27 May 1972, the demonstration held in Washington, DC was by far the largest. The DC march began at Malcolm X Park and made its way through the streets of the nation’s capitol. The demonstration made several stops en route to the Washington monument where the participants gathered for a massive rally. The notable stops along the way included the Portuguese and South African embassies, the U.S. Department of State, and the Rhodesian Information Center. At each of these locations, various activists read statements condemning each of these entities for the role that they played in supporting White minority rule in Southern Africa. The procession through the city concluded with a massive rally held at the Sylvan Park Theater. Crowds stretched from the outdoor amphitheater to the Washington Monument. The rally included a who’s who line up of speakers including Congressional Delegate Walter Fauntroy of the District of Columbia (D-DC) who served as the program’s master of ceremonies. Representing the Black Panther Party was Elaine Brown. Speaking on behalf of the BPP, Brown appealed to the protesters to work toward domestic unity and spoke vehemently against U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Congressman Diggs also addressed the crowd condemning the Nixon administration and American corporations for their support the White minority regimes in Southern Africa. The dashiki-donning Diggs further appealed to the participants to lobby their members of Congress to support more socially responsible U.S. foreign policies toward Africa.
Other speakers included Amiri Baraka and Sadaukai who made similar appeals and called for the continued use of mass mobilization in support of African Liberation. The ALD demonstrations that were held in other cities were no less impressive than the flagship protest in Washington, DC. The demonstration held in San Francisco brought together a diverse group of politicians, intellectuals, and organization leaders as well as representatives from the local entertainment community. The African Liberation Day activities in San Francisco began on 25 May with a demonstration in front of the Portuguese consulate. The protests started at San Francisco’s Raymond-Kimball Park and concluded at a massive rally over which then California State Assemblyman Willie Brown presided. The cast of speakers included Bobby Seale of the Black Panther Party; Guyanese Historian and prominent Pan African political activist, Walter Rodney; Communist Crusader, Angela Davis; Nelson Johnson from the Student Organization for Black Unity; Reverend Koen from the United Front of Cairo, Illinois; and Gary Mayor Richard Gordon Hatcher. The rally also included an entertainment line up featuring local artists and entertainers. Evinced through the presence of Hatcher and Koen at the San Francisco rally, the ALDCC effectively distributed its membership to ensure representation at all of the major protests. Julian Bond, John Conyers, and Rosie Douglas covered the march in Toronto. This demonstration began with a processional that made a presence at the British, Portuguese, French, U.S. and South African Consulates. In New Orleans the ALD march was heavily mobilized by organized labor. The principal group leading this effort was the Black Workers Congress (BWC), which launched a massive propaganda campaign. The BWC connected the conditions of Blacks in Southern Africa with the subjugated conditions Blacks were forced to live in New Orleans.81

On the American front, the African Liberation struggles also enjoyed the support of a wider array of activists spread throughout the U.S. Like the participants in the ALD marches, student groups and organized labor took varying actions in the name of African liberation. Some of these actions, which included peaceful protests as well as overt acts of civil disobedience, even occurred in advance of the ALD demonstrations planned for 27 May. At Columbia University, students protested the University’s holdings with corporations doing business in apartheid South Africa. In late April, students commandeered four classroom buildings and shut down a meeting of the University senate demanding that the University suspend its involvement with South Africa directly and divest its holdings in transnational corporations supporting White minority rule in Southern Africa, and those supporting the Vietnam War.82 Similarly, a collective of faculty, staff, and students at Johns Hopkins University called for an investigation into the University’s financial dealing with South Africa. In Washington, DC in March of 1972 “forty members of the Government Employees United Against Racial Discrimination (GUARD) demonstrated at the State Department in protest of the U.S.’s violation of the U.N. Security Council’s sanctions.”83 In Philadelphia, the Southern African Committee united with the CAP cadre and protested the Foot Mineral Company’s annual meeting held that year at Philadelphia’s Barclay Hotel. The activists’ primary
objective was to call attention to this company’s continued importation of Rhodesian chrome despite the sanctions legislation adopted by the U.N. In New Orleans, students at Southern University successfully lobbied the International Longshoremen Association’s Local 1419 to refuse the shipments of Rhodesian Chrome at the local Burnside Port. Though this attempt was, on the whole, unsuccessful, it was a prominent example of students partnering with organized labor in the name of African liberation. This event in particular attracted the support of Sadaukai himself, who, along with IFCO’s Rev. Walker and members of SCLC, travelled to New Orleans to join these students and their effort to partner with the predominantly Black Local 1419 in the name of African Liberation.

By employing mass mobilization to muster up support from African Americans for the African liberation struggles, Owusu Sadaukai and the ALDCC produced one of the most far-reaching displays of solidarity among Blacks in the U.S. and Canada aimed at drawing attention to an international issue. Cedric Johnson has further described the effort as, “the largest, post-World War II demonstration concerning African Affairs held in North America.” Though the ALD’s architect and principal organizer, Owusu Sadaukai, was a noted radical, his leadership of the ALD effort succeeded in amalgamating the ideologically divergent segments of the African American political leadership in the name of African liberation. Thus, the success of the ALD mobilization in 1972 showcased the organizing capabilities of radicalism in African American politics. This feat is particularly noteworthy in light of the dearth of attention given to Africa-related issues by much of the African American leadership and masses just ten years earlier. In essence, the Black Left succeeded in bringing together prominent Black American leaders on the critical issue of African liberation.

The Year 1972 in Review: A Triumphant Year for Adversarial Diplomacy

Replete with successes and failures, 1972 was a year when the various African American political camps attempted to unite on political issues. The Gary Convention is a telling example of some of the triumphs and defeats of this pivotal year. At once, it represented the largest gathering of Black American elected officials, organization leaders, and intellectuals in American history. At the same time, however, the Gary Convention failed to generate a Black Agenda that would enjoy the across the board support of the convention delegation, let alone emerge as a document that could somehow communicate the interests, needs, and hopes of the masses of African Americans. A coherent Black presidential strategy never materialized and the radical coterie of Black leaders faced constant threats owing to COINTELPRO surveillance. This served to legitimize the Black elected officials, particularly at the Congressional level, as racial spokespersons. Though the Gary Convention was convened under the theme of “Unity Without Uniformity,” it fell far short of achieve any semblance of unity on the very issues around which it was organized. Given the political climate of the early 1970s as well as the complicated set of dynamics around which the convention was organized, it is questionable if Black political unity was something that could be reasonably achieved.
Even in the absence of a coherent domestic policy program for Black America, significant strides were made with respect to the involvement of African Americans in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa in 1972. This is perhaps the greatest triumph of this eventful year. This is not to suggest that African American leaders were able to achieve consensus on the best approach to these issues either. However, through the various events discussed in this chapter, African liberation and U.S. foreign policy toward the region became matters of overriding importance in 1972. The foreign policy conference held in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico succeeded in mobilizing a core group of African American academic intellectuals and moderate organizations leaders around a foreign policy agenda that responded to the dearth of attention given to African liberation in American colleges and universities. The women and men who participated in the Barranquitas summit would continue to play an important role in support of efforts to repeal the Byrd Amendment and the overall effort in Congress to advocate more progressive and socially responsible U.S. foreign policies toward Africa. What is more, it was this same group that first began to articulate the need for a foreign policy lobby for African America. Though the other events of 1972 would also place Africa and African liberation at the forefront of political discourses, the participants at the Barranquitas meeting, including Herschelle Challenor and Willard Johnson, made clear their belief that an institution was needed through which the foreign policy interests of African Americans could be cultivated and advanced.

Though it fell short at unifying Black America leadership around the various political issues of the day, the Gary Convention did make a marked contribution in communicating the concerns of certain segments of Black America to a wider public. Owing to the divisiveness surrounding their ratification, the Gary Declaration and the National Black Political Agenda are limited in their ability to speak to the wide array of issues pertaining to African Americans. However, on the area of African Affairs, the Gary Declaration made a bold statement about the connection between African Americans and Africa. In particular, the Gary Declaration linked the struggles waged by African Americans with the liberation struggles in continental Africa. As well, the Gary Declaration articulated the long-held belief that African Americans should work to aid in the liberation struggles in continental Africa.

The African American National Conference on Africa also marked an important stride in the development of a foreign policy agenda for Black America. This CBC-sponsored event brought together key Black American and diaspora leaders to discuss various issues related to the Southern Africa liberation struggles. Undoubtedly, this conference was a reflection of the tenor of the Gary Declaration regarding the connection between African Americans and Africa and the role that the former should play in the liberation struggles of the latter. The fact that the Congressional Black Caucus sponsored the AANCA is also significant, as the CBC’s “sponsorship” reflected the increased privileging of the Black elected official as spokespersons for the race. This is owed in large measure to the government-sponsored efforts to neutralize the activities of Black radicals. Thus, the CBC and the Black elected officials, more broadly, became a more acceptable figure and form of
participation in American politics. However, these moderate leaders’ approach to political engagement often reflected the liberal integration camp of Black politics out of which they emerged. Consequently, they were limited in their ability to mobilize African Americans beyond the elite cadre that had long been involved in these very matters. Still, the AANCA remains significant because of its ability to bring together the leaders of key political organizations, along with elected officials and intellectuals (both moderate and radical), in a conference focused specifically on the relationship between African Americans and Africa.

Within the conceptual framework of adversarial diplomacy, 1972 stands out even further. The articulation of a collective concern for African liberation—though accompanied by a divisive organizing effort—highlights the specific manifestations of adversarial diplomacy among African American activists. Though they persisted to organize in fragmented ways, these activists continued to advance their foreign policy objectives through Congressional and intellectual politics. However, with the advent of the African Liberation Day movement, mass mobilization became a part of African American foreign policy activism. By extension, the activists involved with the ALD efforts defined mass mobilization as an approach to adversarial diplomacy.

In the trajectory of African American foreign policy activism, the events of 1972 also lay the foundation for an intense period of political organizing that would occur between 1973 and 1976. These include the ALD mobilizations that were held in 1973, 1974, and 1975. However, as will be discussed in the next chapter, the attempts to continue the ALD movement and to institutionalize the effort would falter in the face of sectarianism among the leadership of the Black left. Despite this, however, the ALD effort succeeded in bringing the issue African liberation to a wider public in the U.S., particularly among African Americans. The year 1972 is also significant in that it was the year when some of the first major discussions about the idea of developing an African American foreign policy lobby began to surface. Although five years would elapse before this organization, TransAfrica, would be founded, it was through the events of 1972 that it became clear that African American concerns for U.S. foreign policy toward Africa needed to be institutionalized. To use an alternative lexis, the Black American political activism around the Southern African liberation struggles, as they came of age in 1972, made institution building possible in ways that were not previously possible. Thus, these activities succeeded in defining institution building as an approach to adversarial diplomacy.

3 Johnson, 89.
4 Ibid.
5 There was no particular reason motivating the decision to hold the meeting at Barranquitas. Per Herschelle Challenor, the meeting’s organizer, the Barranquitas location was affordable and far enough away to be significant and focused. Herschelle Challenor, interview with the author, 9
February 2011, Atlanta, GA; personal communication Herschelle Challenor via telephone, 18 April 2011.


7 Ibid.


9 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011; Personal communication with Challenor via telephone, 18 April 2011.


12 Personal communication with Herschelle Challenor via telephone, 18 April 2010.

13 Ibid.


16 An additional follow through item from the Barranquitas meeting, or more pointedly through the CPA, was that Willard Johnson would direct attention to the organizing efforts of Randall Robinson and Chris Nteta in Boston later that year. It would be through associations like those with Willard Johnson that Robinson would be gradually introduced to the foreign policy and African liberation circles.

17 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2010; Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010.


19 Ibid.

20 Ibid.

21 Participants at Baraka’s strategy meeting included: Imari Obadele; Hayward Henry; Howard Fuller (Owusu Sadauki); Nelson Johnson from the Student Organization nor Black Unity (SOBU); Rev. Charles Koen of the United front of Cairo, IL; Imamu Vernon Sukumu of the CAP; Rev. David Eaton of Washington, DC’s All Souls Church; Les Campbell from Brooklyn’s “East” Cultural Center; John Cashin; Carl Holman from the National Urban Coalition; Alexander Allen of the National Urban League; former SNCC activist Cleveland Cellars; Clifford Alexander, formerly of the EEOC; Mel Turner; From the National Welfare Rights Organization; Vincent Harding from the Institute for the Black World; Yvonne Price of the NAACP; Harold Sims of the National Urban League; Richard Taylor and Lou Gothard of Philadelphia’s Black Affairs Council. See Johnson, 90.


23 Ibid.


25 Johnson, 90.


Ibid.

Ibid.

The four members of the commission included James Gibson from the Potomac Institute, CBC executive director, Howard Robinson; Antonio Harrison, and Congressman William Clay.

Ibid.


COINTELPRO had originally been conceived as a mechanism for the monitoring the activities of “hostile foreign governments, foreign organizations, and individuals connected with them.” Its original targets were individuals and entities presumed to be associated with communism. These included socialists and union leadership. COINTELPRO quickly expanded its reach and began to focus considerable attention on the student New Left, the Communist Party USA, the Socialist Workers Party, Martin Luther King, Jr., SCLC, Black Power radicals, and leadership in the civil rights movement.” As it targeted these individuals and organizations, COINTELPRO raised major concerns owing to its propagandist overtones, which often resulted in the embellishment of certain political activities in order to justify its overt violation of individuals’ rights. The growing Black radicalism of the late 1960s caused certain African American leaders to be most heavily subjected to the wrath of government surveillance through COINTELPRO. In fact, in 1967 FBI Director, J. Edgar Hoover announced that COINTELPRO’s specific focus would be on “black nationalist hate groups” in order to “expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organization and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and supporters.” What is more, Hoover articulated that the principal objective of COINTELPRO’s focus on Black nationalists was to “prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups” and to “prevent the rise of a ‘black messiah.’” A chief example of the presence of COINTELPRO surveillance surrounding the National Black Political Convention was the FBI’s targeting of Amiri Baraka. The FBI had specifically targeted Baraka as a Black extremist and named him, the Congress of African Peoples, and the Republic of New Africa as foci of its surveillance activities. Shortly after it was founded, the CBC held Congressional hearings on “government lawlessness” which included its major concern about COINTELPRO activities. See Kenneth O’Reilly, Racial Matters: The FBI’s Secret File on Black America, 1960-1972 (Detroit: Free Press, 1991), 345-347; Pepper, An Act of State: The Execution of Martin Luther King, Jr.; Churchill and Vander Wall, Agents of Repression, 37-62; Johnson, 99; Memorandum from G.C. Moore to E.S. Miller, captioned by National Black Political Convention, 3/72, West Side High School, Gary, Indiana, 8 March 1972. In Johnson, 101.


Johnson, 103.

Preceding Hatcher’s election as mayors of major American cities was Carl Stokes of Cleveland, Ohio. For further details about Hatcher’s biography and early electoral history see William E. Nelson, Jr. and Phillip Meranto, Electing Black Mayors: Political Action in the Black Community (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, 1977), 166-87; Johnson, 100-103; Richard Gordon Hatcher, interview with the author, 9 July 2010, Gary, IN.


41 The Gary Convention reflected the ostensibly elite character of African American politics and political leadership. Its size was reminiscent of the Congress of African people just two years prior, however, the Gary Convention’s elite makeup illustrates the fact that a massive gathering is not synonymous with mass mobilizing. The class dynamic came to the fore as some participants balked at the required registration fee of $25.00, contending that an amount of that magnitude categorically excluded much of working class and poor Black America. See Gerald West and Jeannye Thornton, “Young Blacks Upset at Third Party Shunning,” *Chicago Tribune*, 13 March 1972, 2. Also, see Johnson, 104.


44 Johnson, 97.


48 Ibid.


50 *National Black Political Agenda*, 11-12.


56 Ibid.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.
SOBU had already been active in support of the Southern African Liberation Struggles. So, Sadaukai’s travels to the continent were indeed consistent with the organizations’ sentiment and objectives. SOBU had launched the Pan African Medical Program (PAMP) in 1970 as one of its activities in support of the de-colonial efforts in Africa. See “Report on the First Pan African Medical Program Collection, The African World,” 6 February 1971, 4; Johnson, 138-139.

See Johnson, Revolutionaries to Race Leaders; Woodard, A Nation Within a Nation.

Lettter from Owusu Sadaukai to Ronald Walters, 17 February 1972, Ronald Walters Papers, Moorland Spingarn Research Center, Howard University, Washington, DC; Johnson, 139.


Johnson, 140.
Ibid., 141-142.


84 Johnson, 146.

85 Ibid., 142.
CHAPTER 5

THE DECLINE OF MASS MOBILIZATION AND THE CONTINUITY OF CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS: TOWARD A NEW FOREIGN POLICY STRATEGY FOR BLACK AMERICA

Shortly after the 1972 African Liberation Day demonstrations, the leadership of the African Liberation Day Coordinating Committee began to take steps to institutionalize itself. The effort would become known as the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) of which Owusu Sadaukai would serve as chairman. The decision to assemble a more organized front for the ALD effort was reached at a conference organized by Sadaukai in Greensboro, North Carolina in September. The vision for the ALSC was that it would serve as an umbrella organization to unite the different groups of activists mobilizing in support of the African liberation movements. Spread throughout the U.S., ALSC supporters mobilized at the local and national levels, embarking upon fundraising campaigns, as well as collecting medical supplies, clothing, and other goods to be sent to the nationalist movements fighting for independence in Southern Africa.

It was under the banner of the ALSC, that activists organized a second African Liberation Day that took place in 1973. The 1973 mobilization was held in honor of Guinea-Bissauan nationalist leader, Amilcar Cabral. A leader in the African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC), Cabral had been assassinated by the internal rivals who were conspiring with Portuguese anti-PAIGC forces. A highly revered radical intellectual, Cabral’s life, work, and writings had been foundational to the Black radical intellectuals and activists in the U.S. and elsewhere in the Black diaspora. Through his leadership in the crusade against Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique, Angola, and Portuguese Guinea, Cabral had become a heroic figure in the global Black freedom struggle. His martyrdom was not only a major blow to the movement, but it also was a reminder of the volume of work remaining in order to realize independence and self determination for the Black people of Southern Africa.

In size and scope, the 1973 ALD demonstrations far surpassed those of the previous year. The 1973 effort amassed participation from upwards of 100,000 marchers spread throughout more than twenty American cities. This reflected the intentions of its organizers, which were to focus greater attention to mobilizing at the local levels. Through local organizing, the ALSC hoped to call attention to the ways that local entities, including businesses and local governments, could be susceptible to supporting White minority rule in both intentional and unintentional ways. The theme of the 1973 demonstrations was, “There is no peace with honor—Africa is at war.” Its organizers articulated three pointed objectives, which framed the ALD efforts in the numerous cities where marches were to be held. These objectives were: (1) to increase global awareness about the liberation struggles being waged by Blacks on the African continent; (2) to heighten the consciousness of African Americans about the ways that U.S. involvement in the oppression of Blacks in
South Africa and the other territories in Southern Africa; and (3) to raise funds to provide material aid to the Southern African liberation movements.

African Liberation Day marches took place in thirty-five cities throughout the U.S., Canada, Africa, and the Caribbean. In the U.S., some of the most notable demonstrations were those held in Washington, DC, Harlem, Chicago, and Oakland. Like the previous year, the Washington, DC effort took marchers down Massachusetts Avenue past the embassies of South Africa, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, and the Rhodesian Information Office. Outside of the South African Embassy, Rev. Douglas Moore proclaimed to his fellow protesters that, “South Africa is the most deadly, debauched nation on the face of the earth. But it would not be able to exist without the United States’ support.” As they made their way through the city, marchers carried picket signs and chanted slogans denouncing White minority rule and European colonial domination and imperialism. Different from the previous year, the ALD march in Washington, DC ended with a rally at the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation’s (ITT) offices on L Street. With 4,500 people in attendance, the rally symbolized the need to focus on the role that multinational corporations play in perpetuating the subjugation of Black South Africans. Decrying the role of these corporations in the oppression of Black South Africans, activist John Lennon contended, “multinational corporations…everyday plunder and ravage Black Africans.” He further held that “these corporations are at the heart of world capitalism and make their profits by exploiting other people. If Africa is to be liberated, multinational corporations must be eradicated.”

In addition, Lennon’s participation underscores the fact that the ALD demonstrations had a multiracial reach even though it was coordinated by a Black front.

The Harlem demonstrations began at Patrice Lumumba Plaza and ended at Colonel Charles Young Park at 145th Street and Lenox Avenue. Some 500 people made the three hour trek along the path of the march carrying picket signs bellowing slogans such as “We are an African People,” and demanding that their government actively support the liberation struggles in Rhodesia, Guinea, Angola, Mozambique, and the Republic of South Africa.” With some 1500 people gathered at the rally, speakers appealed to the public to support the liberation struggles by “boycotting Portuguese products, protesting United States support of ‘the racist South African regime’ and boycotting American corporations with financial interests in White dominated African countries.” Harlem activist Omayemi Abeyeghe, characterized the ALD effort as “part of an attempt to publicize and educate Africans here and internationalize the liberation fights around the theme ‘One Struggle—many fronts!’”

The Chicago ALD protests began with an estimated 1500 people assembled at Chicago’s Dunbar High School who then made the four-mile trudge to Washington Park. The Washington Park rally was highlighted by remarks from poet Don L. Lee, who gave the major address for the day. Other speakers included internationally renowned actress and theatre personality, Val Gray Ward, as well as poet and playwright Eugene Perkins. Other notable attendees at the Chicago demonstrations included Illinois Poet Laureate Gwendolyn Brooks and as well as historian and
senior editor of *Ebony* magazine, Lerone Bennett. In his impassioned oration to the marchers at the Chicago rally, Bennett proclaimed, “We are the sons and daughters of Africa. We are a people with a past we cannot and must not deny. We are the second largest African community in the world and we have a special responsibility to the struggles of Africans in Africa and elsewhere.”

The largest of the ALD demonstrations of 1973 was held in Oakland. There, some 12,000 people marched through the streets of the city chanting, singing, and donning picket signs with slogans such as “Black Shall Prevail” and other sayings denouncing European domination of Africa.

The 1973 ALD demonstrations also enjoyed an impressive volume of support and participation from the international community of African leaders. Several leaders of the liberation movements came to the U.S. to support those African Americans that stood in solidarity with their struggles against European colonial domination. Among those travelling to the U.S. from abroad were Ahmed Sekou Toure, nephew of Guinean President Sekou Toure; Simpson V. Mutambanengwe of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU); Sikhanyiso Ndiovu of the Zimbabwe African People’s Union; PAIGC leader, Salvino D’Luz; and Guinean Ambassador, Elhadj Adbudlaye Toure.

An additional feature of the 1973 African Liberation Day mobilization effort was “to provide financial, material, and moral support to the liberation struggles...being fought against the colonial governments.” In support of this commitment, the ALSC embarked on a fundraising campaign with an ambitious goal of $40,000. The fundraising effort was coordinated by the United African Appeal, which had been established as the fundraising arm of the ALD effort. In his attempt to communicate the importance of the fundraising campaign, Sadaukai declared, “It's high time that Blacks in the United States give material support to Africans trying to wrest control of their lives from the hold of European colonialists.”

Interestingly, however, was Sadaukai’s divulging of the additional fundraising strategy of employing “traditional methods of fund-raising among Blacks—barbeque and chicken dinners, church suppers, card parties, dances and cabarets, sweet potato pies and coconut cake sales, street bars, and others.” By most reports, the ALSC’s fundraising was successful. By the end of the year, the $40,000 that had been raised was allocated to FRELIMO, PAIGC, UNITA, ZANU as intended.

With its multifaceted approach to aiding the African liberation struggles, the 1973 ALD effort was, by most indicators and reports, immensely successful. The question remains, how do we accurately measure and evaluate the success of this
effort. Using indicators such as the realization of its fundraising goal of $40,000, organizers of the ALD marches were successful. Further underscoring the success of the ALD was the ability of the event to attract a participant base of over 100,000. Not only was this a far greater turnout than the previous year, but also the fact that these demonstrations occurred in multiple cities speaks to the ALSC’s success in mobilizing activists at the local level. Suffice it to say that ALSC organizers accomplished the core objectives of providing material aid to the liberation movements; heightening the awareness of the liberation struggles underway on the African continent; and informing Black Americans about the degree to which their government perpetuates the subjugation of Blacks in Africa.

In a Washington Post article published on 21 May 1973—just days before the 1973 ALD demonstrations—Owusu Sadaukai made an insightful declaration when he spoke of the ALSC’s fundraising goal of $40,000. When asked about the likelihood of reaching such an ambitious benchmark, Sadaukai remarked that, “We are optimistic about it. The money is out there, no question about that, but the problem is reaching out to get it.” On the $40,000 target, Sadaukai went on to say, “If we miss the goal, we won’t be discouraged...at least the drive will be part of the process of politicizing Blacks in America, and they will become more aware and the next time more and more will participate.” I draw upon this example to illustrate two major points about the ALSC and the ALD activities. First is that the ultimate success of the ALD effort rests in its ability to politicize Black Americans in a way that had not been seen before. Rarely is it the case that an effort such as the ALD would actually achieve African liberation. However, the success of this type of campaign should, in most instances, be measured by its ability to mobilize and politicize a constituent base and increase their awareness and concern for a particular political issue.

Though the ALSC succeeded in its fundraising goal of $40,000, it remains unclear just whose contributions made this possible. If the fund was made up of a few large contributions from affluent Blacks rather than numerous small contributions from a larger public, then the claims of politicizing Blacks, in general, only carry so much weight. At the same time, however, contributing to the fundraising goal is only one indicator of politicization. Nevertheless, the ability to realize such an ambitious fundraising goal ($40,000 translates to almost $210,000 in 2011 dollars) and to mobilize a total of 100,000 people at demonstrations in thirty-five cities in solidarity with liberation struggles half a world away underscores the success of the ALD, to again quote Sadaukai’s own words, “politicizing Blacks in America [so that] next time more and more will participate.”

My intention is not to view the ALD demonstrations or the ALSC through rose-tinted glasses. After all, this group was abounding with its share of problems. I will discuss these issues and their contributions to the dissolution of the ALSC in the succeeding section. However, the ALD effort remains significant in the trajectory of African American efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy and mobilize in support of African Liberation. The African Liberation Days of 1972 and 1973 undoubtedly succeeded in bringing the issue of the White minority rule to the wider public than ever before. Though the ALSC would be rendered more or less defunct by 1975, it
provided critical momentum among a mass base of African Americans including celebrities, politicians, and intellectuals of all ideological variations that would continue in the remaining years of the 1970s.

Like their counterparts in other Black political camps, the activism of the ALSC represents a type of adversarial diplomacy. This underscores the point made in the previous chapter that the ALD effort succeeded in utilizing mass mobilization as a means through which a political faction may advance its foreign policy or international objectives at times when they have limited access to the state institutions or when their objects run counter to those of the state. As will be discussed in the next section, the splintering of the ALSC created an organizational void in African American efforts to engage with the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. African American politicians and intellectuals who continued their advocacy efforts beyond the ALSC and the African Liberation Day efforts would fill this void. In the closing years of the 1970s and in the early 1980s, the organizational role formerly assumed by the ALSC would be resumed with the establishment of the foreign policy lobby, TransAfrica, which involved some of the same people that worked with and through the ALSC and the ALD at its height in 1972 and 1973. In many ways, TransAfrica capitalized on the groundwork laid by the ALSC’s mass mobilization strategy as it embarked on its major foreign policy campaigns in the early 1980s.

Sectarian Politics and the Black Left: The Collapse of the African Liberation Support Committee

With the success of the ALD demonstrations of 1973, members and supporters of the ALSC were enthusiastic about the possibility of institutionalizing the organization. As it happened, the ALSC was an ad hoc and loosely organized effort. However, institutionalizing it would have created a more permanent mechanism for African Americans to organize in support of the African liberation struggles. If there was any effort that had the potential to be such a force in African America—prior to the founding of TransAfrica—the ALD and the ALSC were it. However, owing to the ideological divisions among African American political leaders, the idea of transforming the ALSC into an institution focused on African liberation would never materialize.

Underlying the inability of the ALSC to evolve into an institution focused on African liberation were the same sectarian politics that contributed to the substantive ineffectiveness of the Gary Convention, the Gary Declaration, the Black Agenda, and the National Black Political Assembly. Let us recall that the Gary Convention, its leadership, and its delegation were replete with ideological fractures. These were present during the planning, execution, and aftermath of the convention, as well as in the discourses surrounding the Black Agenda, the National Black Political Assembly, and the development of a Black presidential strategy for the 1972 election. Even the mêlée surrounding the adoption of the Black Agenda is evidence of these ideological conundrums that rendered the vision of “unity even without
uniformity” (to recount the convention theme) wholly impossible. Not only was the Agenda not finalized until well after the convention, it did not enjoy the across-the-board support at the convention that would suggest that anything close to unity had been achieved. This was further evident through the retreat of some of the more moderate convention delegates and leaders from the process. This included members of the CBC whose withdrawal left the leadership in the hands of the radicals. Further contributing to the eventual ratification of the Black Agenda was the political maneuvering and parliamentary aptitude of CAP leader Amiri Baraka.

Though the ALSC reflected the ideological diversity of the Black political establishment, with Sadaukai at the helm, it remained principally a left-infused Black Power political endeavor. This was the same group that had risen to political prominence through the 1970 meeting of the Congress of African People and the Gary Convention two years later. It was the radicalism of the left and the rejection of this approach by many moderate Black political leaders that muted the hope that the ALSC would become the African American organization focused on African liberation. In fact, the rift between these political camps (i.e. the Black Power activists and the more moderate intellectuals and political leaders) was evident at the ALD demonstration in 1972 when Sadaukai refused to make the appeal to the ALD marchers to lobby their members of Congress to support the effort in the House to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Though Charles Diggs himself would address the Byrd Amendment in his speech at the ALD demonstration in Washington, DC, Sadaukai’s action underscores the rift between the various political camps. The desire to forge a partnership between the ALDCC and the foreign policy lobbying efforts in the Africa Subcommittee had been one of the agreed upon outcomes of the Barranquitas meeting. However, according to Willard Johnson, “It was very clear that Owusu [Sadaukai] was not of a mind to bridge this gap between mobilizing, [and] organizing Blacks, [and] getting them concerned and involved in foreign policy issues and actually practically doing something that would change policy.” Consequently, although they worked together for certain purposes, the divisions among these various political camps in 1970s African American politics were indeed pronounced on domestic and foreign policy matters.

The second major factor contributing to the ALSC’s inability to morph into an institutionalized organization was the presence of ideological factions among the Black Power activists that were central to the ALSC effort. These activists had taken their cues from the mid 1960s expressions of Black radicalism that emerged as an ideological and practical alternative to the liberal integrationist program advanced by the organizations and leaders most prominent within the Civil Rights establishment. Accordingly, they turned to nationalism as an ideological framework for their political activism. These activists’ conceptualization of nationalism was premised on a race-first program rooted in the belief that race is the primary human characteristic uniting Africans, African Americans, and other African descendants elsewhere in the world. However, as the 1960s ended and the 1970s began, the limits of race unity became increasingly apparent. Though race prevailed as the dominant social cleavage in American life, it became apparent that a race-first ideology was indeed limited.
most apparent examples illustrating this fact were the complex set of dynamics surrounding the Gary Convention and its inability to achieve unity.24 The ALSC and the African Liberation Day mobilizations illustrate both the strengths and weaknesses of the activism of the Black left. The strength of Black left activism is underscored by its ability to employ mass mobilization as a political strategy in support of the African liberation struggles. Indeed the ALD mobilizations of 1972 and 1973 stand as hallmarks of the very best of this type of political activism. At the same time, however, the ALSC and its ultimate dissolution stands out as the most pronounced example of the limitations of Black nationalism and the overall activist strategy of the Black left; further underscoring the limitations, or perhaps impossibility, of racial unity.

Recognizing the limitations of nationalism and race-first politics, many Black radicals began to gravitate toward the goal of advancing a Third World Struggle. This aspiration reflected the desire of some activists to focus their political efforts on the struggles of the working-class and poor. These ideological fractures were the major basis upon which the activists involved with the ALSC began to splinter. Some ALSC activists such as Sadaukai and Abdul Alkalimat moved to formally embrace Marxism-Leninism as its ideological platform at the ALSC’s summer 1973 meeting held in Frogmore, South Carolina.25 A sizable group of ALSC activists were supportive of moving in this direction. This included the ALSC cadres in Nashville, Greensboro, Atlanta, and New Orleans. However, the move toward a Marxist-Leninist orientation emerged as a major point of contention for the coterie of ALSC activists that continued to embrace nationalism as an ideological foundation grounding their participation in the ALSC and other advocacy efforts. In the end, the actions at Frogmore caused many Black nationalists to retreat from the ALSC in the latter months of 1973.

The ideological splintering of the Black left became most apparent as activists endeavored to organize for domestic and international issues in 1974. It was in this year that a second National Black Political Convention was held in Little Rock, Arkansas. Organized by the National Black Political Assembly, the Little Rock Convention brought some of the most acute ideological disputes among African American political leaders to the fore. At Little Rock, Black elected officials such as Atlanta Mayor Maynard Jackson were shunned and almost blocked entirely from speaking at the convention. Sadaukai was a leader among those opposed to the inclusion of mainstream/moderate political leaders such as Maynard Jackson and Reverend Jesse Jackson in the convention. Sadaukai’s rejection of this brand of political leadership was premised on his belief that the “neo-colonialist petit-bourgeois Black elected officials are just as much the enemy as their White counterparts.”26 Steeped in their commitment to advancing a class-based struggle, Sadaukai and his leftist contemporaries extended their rejection of prominent political leadership to the elected and appointed officials representing the nation states of Africa and the Caribbean.

What is more, these radical activists also came to reject some of their former nationalist allies and ultimately excluded some of them from the 1974 Convention.
The most prominent yet divisive example of this was the exclusion of Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan. This was owed largely to the belief of Black radicals that Farrakhan had a hand in the assassination of their ideological role model, Malcolm X. The exclusion of Farrakhan proved to be controversial owing to the dissent among convention participants about this action on the part of the leadership. The decision to exclude a leader as popular as Farrakhan was regarded by some participants, including, for example, Reverend Leon Laird of Arkansas as, “one of the greatest things that brought about dissolution at the convention.” In the end, the rejection of certain Black political leaders—namely nationalists and integrationists—were premised upon the gravitation of activists such as Sadaukai, Baraka, and their associated organizations to the far left on the political spectrum. The motivations foregrounding these leaders’ decision to embrace Marxism-Leninism as their ideological foundation is best captured by the words of Amiri Baraka. Reflecting on this ideological evolution, Baraka observes:

Those of us who were still determined to serve the people began to understand that merely putting Black faces in high places, without changing the fundamental nature of the system itself, served to make that system more flexible and more dangerous, since for the masses of us…the hardship, exploitation, and oppression continued.

The ideological fractures among the Black left also permeated discourses concerning African liberation and ultimately proved to be the major factor contributing to the disintegration of the ALSC. These would become copiously perceptible during the ALD mobilization efforts of 1974 and would ultimately lead to the death of the ALSC as a whole the following year.

Endeavoring to expand their reach, the ALSC leaders took the 1974 ALD effort a step further than the previous years and declared the whole month of May to be “African Liberation Month.” Like previous years, the ALSC organized a demonstration for 25 May and set an ambitious fundraising goal. In 1974, the fundraising target was set at $75,000, which was to be used to provide material aid to the African Liberation movements. In addition to the ALD demonstrations scheduled for 25 May, the ALSC leadership added a series of programs commemorating Malcolm X’s birthday and organized an ALSC conference that was held the two days prior to the ALD marches. Convened under the theme, “Which Road Against Racism and Imperialism for the Black Liberation Movement,” the two-day conference brought some 800 participants to the campus of Howard University. Owing to its focus on the ideological contentions plaguing the Black left, the ALSC’s conference proved to be a pivotal event in the organization’s evolution. Undoubtedly, the conference had a decidedly Marxist-Leninist orientation. This was owed to the ideological framework grounding its leadership, including Sadaukai, Baraka, Carmichael, and other activists from the Congress of African People, the Youth Organization of Black Unity, the National Black Political Assembly, and the Socialist Worker’s Party, which collectively made up the bulk of the conference attendees.
Consistent with the class-based concerns on the far left, the conference tended to focus on the development of a strategy to facilitate the empowerment of the working class and poor. However, this effort was hampered by the obsession of some of the conference leadership (as evident through the conference theme), on resolving the ideological conflicts present among the Black radical political establishment. It may be an exaggeration to characterize the emphasis on ideological congruence as an obsession; however, as former SNCC national chairman Phil Hutchings reported following the conference, it was clear that the conference “dealt with problems of a theoretical nature as a precondition for base-building and a renewed emphasis on organizing new strata within Black communities, particularly Black workers.” In effect, the ALSC leadership’s persistent focus on ideological unity essentially overshadowed the more important project of building a base and addressing the fundamental issue of countering “Racism and Imperialism for the Black Liberation Movement,” which was also a critical component of the conference theme. Rather than having a unifying effect, the emphasis on developing a coherent ideology served to further divide the Black left. It would be these divisions that would ultimately sink the ASLC and eliminate any possibility that the ALSC might evolve into the political institution that would continue to mobilize African Americans to actively support the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

There was no time when the demise of the ALSC became more imminent than in the months surrounding the 1975 ALD mobilizing effort. Rather than bringing together the ideologically diverse mass demonstration focused on African liberation as had been done in the past, the fractures of the ALSC made a debacle of the overall 1975 ALD effort. This was exemplified by the mobilizations held in Washington, DC. Unlike previous years, the 1975 ALD effort in Washington, DC consisted of three competing demonstrations. Baraka and the CAP activists led one march. A second demonstration was stewarded by Stokely Carmichael (then Kwame Turé) and was supported by activists involved with Turé’s All African People’s Revolutionary Party (AAPRP), with the Socialist Worker’s Party sponsoring the third march.

Ultimately, the life of the ALSC and the African Liberation Day effort accentuated the limits of ideological unity in African American politics. These differences were an unmistakable factor dividing the Black left from the center. They also played a central role in dividing the left from the far left, or, rather, the Nationalists from the Marxists-Leninists. As it pertains to the efforts of African Americans to aid in the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, the ALSC represented both a triumph and a tragedy. The triumph lays in the fact the ALSC and the African Liberation Day idea provided an organizing model wherein mass mobilization was employed as a means of supporting the cause of African liberation. The narrative of this time period must reflect that the reality that the ALSC played a critical part in heightening the awareness among African Americans about the injustices being delivered upon Black people on the African continent. Later Africa-related organizing efforts advanced by African Americans such as those led by TransAfrica in the 1980s would benefit from the earlier work of the ALSC. However, the ALSC’s
tragedy was its failure to evolve into a permanent institution that would be able to continue its work beyond a few short years. Equally catastrophic are the reasons that the ALSC fell apart, which were because of the ideological conflicts among Black political elites.

Undoubtedly, the ALSC’s demise represented a significant loss in the landscape of 1970s Black politics and left a major void in the collective effort of African Americans to aid in the African liberation struggles during the last half of the 1970s. However, this void was only partial. The retreat of moderate leaders— including Black elected officials such as the members of the Congressional Black Caucus—from the Black radicalism of the ALSC, the Gary Convention, and the limited involvement of these leaders in the African Liberation Day activities beyond 1972 left this group poised to assume the leadership mantle on African liberation previously advanced by the ALSC. This is not to suggest that these leaders were not otherwise involved in African liberation related issues. Largely through Charles Diggs and his chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa, Black members of Congress had a strong presence in the Congressional foreign policy establishment. Thus, the movement among African Americans against apartheid in South Africa and other forms of White minority rule in the Southern Africa as a whole continued and was, in fact, ongoing throughout the life of the ALSC. However, with the dissolution of the ALSC by 1975, the Black members of Congress, particularly Charles Diggs, through his chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa, became the principal intermediaries for African Americans on U.S. foreign policy and African liberation related issues. This returned adversarial diplomacy to the realm of Congressional politics. Between 1971 and 1977, it was through Diggs’ office that the momentum to create a foreign policy lobby would reach a critical juncture concluding with the Congressional Black Caucus’ 1976 Leadership Summit on Africa.

The Continuity of Congressional Politics: Charles Diggs and the House Subcommittee on Africa

As discussed in chapter 3, the members of the Congressional Black Caucus became the principal arbiters of issues of concern to African Americans as they could be legislated in the U.S. Congress. In the area of international affairs, few people remain as noteworthy in Black Congressional history as Charles Diggs. By 1970, with the death of Representative William Dawson, Diggs had become the senior Black member of Congress. As founding chairman of the CBC, Diggs had become involved with a host of policy related issues both domestic and international. Indisputably, Diggs’ most important and far-reaching contribution of his twenty-five year tenure in the House of Representatives was his work on Africa. As one of few Blacks in Congress in the mid-to late 1950s, Diggs was selected to be part of the U.S. delegation to Ghana when the former British colony gained its independence in 1957. This trip was led by then-Vice President Richard Nixon whose foreign policies Diggs would go on to vehemently oppose during the years that Nixon served as President. The following year, he traveled to Ghana again for the All-African
People’s Conference in Accra. In 1959, Diggs was appointed to the House Foreign Affairs Committee; becoming the first Black to serve on this body. It was through this appointment that Diggs immediately claimed membership on the Subcommittee on Africa. Elevated to the chairmanship of the subcommittee in 1969, Diggs had earned the nickname “Mr. Africa” by his friends and colleagues in and out of Congress. Over the span of his quarter century run in Congress, Diggs was a critical power broker in every major foreign policy issue dealing with Africa and the relationship between U.S. foreign policy and aid toward the continent as a whole. Through the different campaigns, events, and efforts sponsored by his office, Diggs work on Africa and Africa related issues indisputably lay the groundwork for critical victories that would be claimed by African Americans in their efforts to revolutionize U.S. foreign policy toward Africa well into the 1980s.

In support of his foreign policy work with the Africa Subcommittee, Diggs enlisted the talent of African American foreign policy experts. This included people who worked directly on his Congressional staff as well as individuals who supported his efforts in volunteer and advisory capacities. Notable members of his advisory team included Ronald Walters and Willard Johnson. As discussed in chapter 3, Walters had recently taken over the chairmanship of the Political Science Department at Howard University and was thus in close proximity to the Washington, DC foreign policy community, of which Diggs had assumed a prominent role. Johnson remained in Cambridge on the MIT faculty and continued to advise Diggs and support the African liberation struggles through his activist work in the greater Boston Area. Recall that Johnson and Walters became acquainted through their anti-apartheid activism in Boston. It was there that Johnson and Walters made their initial encounters with Congressman Diggs in 1970 when Diggs stopped through Boston en route to Washington following a visit to Africa.31

Other prominent members of Diggs’ paid professional staff during the 1970s included Goler Butcher, Herschelle Challenor, and Randall Robinson. Butcher and Challenor’s contributions to the cumbersome drudgery of advocating progressive and socially responsible U.S. foreign policies toward Africa dates back further than any other Congressional staffers. Butcher came to work for Diggs as special counsel to the Africa Subcommittee after a four-year stint as an attorney at the U.S. Department of State and was present with Diggs when resigned from the U.S. delegation to the U.N. in 1971. Challenor was a part of the group of Black scholars who parted with the African Studies Association and formed the African Heritage Studies Association. After she came to work on Capitol Hill, her connections in these circles became critical to her work with Diggs and the Africa Subcommittee. Moreover, Challenor erected an imperative conduit between Diggs’ office and the greater community of African and African American scholars and activists concerned with U.S. policies toward Southern Africa.

Challenor had been a close associate of Willard Johnson through their work with the AHSA and in Political Science circles. It would be through this association that Randall Robinson would eventually be introduced into the Washington, DC circles in 1972. Johnson and Robinson had met in Boston through Chris Nteta.
Johnson and Nteta first crossed paths on 20 and 27 January 1972. At the time, Nteta, a South African exile, was living in the U.S. after having graduated from Harvard Divinity School. Robinson had graduated from Harvard Law in 1970 and was living in Boston where he worked for the Boston Legal Assistance Project for two years before moving on to work as a community organizer at the Roxbury Multi-Service Center. Robinson and Nteta were active in the Boston-based Southern Africa Liberation Committee, whose most imminent objective was to secure a commitment from the Harvard Corporation to divest its holdings in the Gulf Oil Company. This was less than one month prior to the Barranquitas meeting and four months preceding the African American National Conference on Africa that would be organized by Diggs’ Office and convened under the banner of the Congressional Black Caucus. Though Robinson was not involved in the Barranquitas meeting and did not play a prominent role in the AANCA, his relationship with Willard Johnson provided an important connection between the Gulf Oil Company divestment campaign and the broader community of African American foreign policy activists. In fact, it was partially through Johnson’s dual association with Robinson and the community of Africanists and foreign policy leaders gathered at Barranquitas that the commitment to supporting the boycott of the Gulf Oil Company emerged as one of the principal outcomes of the meeting. It would also be through Johnson that Robinson would eventually move to Washington, DC in 1975, initially to work for Congressman William Clay and later for Diggs.

By the mid 1970s, Charles Diggs was at the zenith of his tenure as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Africa. From 1971 to 1973 he chaired the Africa Subcommittee at the same time that he chaired the Congressional Black Caucus and wielded considerable influence in the House of Representatives. As chair of these two bodies, Diggs became a principal spokesperson among African Americans on Africa-related issues. In the overall scheme of Black American political leaders, Diggs’ stature in the House of Representatives afforded him an incomparable level of access among African Americans concerned with African Liberation. As a co-chair of the National Black Political Convention of 1972, Diggs used this platform to give a rousing speech on African issues at the convention. In cooperation with the other leaders of the Gary Convention, Diggs had a major role in ensuring that the African liberation struggles became woven into the fabric of African American politics in the 1970s. Diggs was even a player in the first African Liberation Day where he made an impassioned appeal to the demonstrators at the ALD march in Washington, DC on 25 May 1972 to lobby their Congressional representative to support the effort in Congress to repeal the Byrd Amendment.

The controversy surrounding the Byrd Amendment would be the basis upon which Diggs would resign from his appointment as a U.S. delegate to the U.N. in protest of the “stifling hypocrisy” of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Diggs had been appointed to the U.S.’s U.N. delegation by President Nixon in 1971. In December of that year, Diggs raised international controversy when he publicly resigned from the delegation in front of the U.N. General Assembly. In a speech that was received with thunderous applause and a standing ovation, Diggs explained that
his resignation was premised on his refusal to support his government’s continued sale of arms to Portugal and to the White minority regimes of South Africa. Diggs’ action at the U.N. was precipitated by the U.S.’s overt violation of the U.N.-recommended sanctions on Rhodesia. Just prior to the December 1971 incident at the U.N., the U.S. had made its policy positions regarding Portugal, Rhodesia, and the Zimbabwe War of Independence painfully clear. The U.S. had, by executive agreement with Portugal, approved a line of credit with Portugal through the U.S. Export-Import Bank. This loan—valued at $436 million was offered in trade for Portugal’s commitment to allowing the U.S. to continue its lease of Portugal’s Azores base. Black leaders in Africa and in the U.S. vehemently opposed this move because it was a roundabout way of the U.S. providing material support to Portugal as they endeavored to maintain their colonial stronghold in Southern Africa.

Throughout much of the 1970s, the campaign to repeal the Byrd Amendment remained the major crusade led by Diggs through the Africa Subcommittee. Building up international momentum around the Byrd Amendment effort, Diggs gained the support of prominent Black organizations including “community, civil, church, labor, and other groups.” In addition, Diggs built coalitions with the international community. These included the ambassadors and chargé d’affaires of close to 20 different African nations. During the six-year life of the Byrd Amendment, Diggs’ leadership was central to lassoing critical support in the House and in the Senate leading to the amendment’s repeal in 1977. Though his subcommittee chairmanship rested in the House, Diggs’ efforts also caused waves in the Senate. A December 1973 vote of 54 to 37 in the Senate was a major victory in the repeal effort. However, this vote carried added significance because it occurred following the termination of an attempted filibuster by a vote of 63 to 26. Representing two-thirds of the Senate membership, this vote was “only the 14th time since World War I that a cloture motion had been successful, cutting off debate on a bill” in the U.S. Senate. These are but a few examples of the multidimensional approach that comprised the effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment. Contrary to the positions of prominent leaders in the U.S. foreign policy establishment, it was Diggs’ stance that the Byrd Amendment was in fact detrimental to U.S. national interests. In a statement on the issue prepared during the Congressional deliberations, Diggs accentuated the point that “Africa, whose raw materials, together with Nigerian oil, are becoming more critical to the U.S. considers the repeal of the Byrd Amendment a priority issue…Under the Byrd Amendment, African has no choice but to see the U.S. as allying itself with the forces struggling to perpetuate colonialism in Africa.” Indeed the effort to repeal the Byrd Amendment had been a personal crusade for Congressman Diggs from the amendment’s enactment in 1971 to its ultimate repeal in 1977.

Through the Africa Subcommittee, Diggs and his staff also took an interest in the liberation struggles in South Africa, Angola, Mozambique, and Namibia. Different from some of the other means employed by African Americans to support African liberation, the campaign in and through the Africa Subcommittee focused specifically on activities that would challenge, and ultimately change, the mélange of U.S. policies that supported White minority rule in Southern Africa. During his run as
chairman of the Africa Subcommittee, Diggs had also undertaken important diplomatic missions to different parts of Africa. Some of earliest and most notable of these international sojourns included a trip to Nigeria in February 1969. On this fact-finding expedition, Diggs focused on ways to bring peace to the country that had been steeped in a Civil War for almost two years and to explore ways that the U.S. could provide aid to the people of this war-torn nation. Two years later, Diggs traveled to South Africa. The South Africa trip in 1971 was significant because it was a bipartisan assemblage that Diggs, an African American Democrat, organized to enable (or rather, force) prominent American politicians to observe apartheid first hand. On this fact-finding mission, Diggs met with Black leaders in the township of Soweto and visited several American corporations and he saw first hand the practices of racial segregation on the Black people of Southern Africa. This 1971 visit to South Africa was also significant because it occurred following an extended period of time where the South African government refused to issue a visa to Diggs. Upon his return to the U.S., Diggs undertook efforts to call these corporations to task on their business dealings in South Africa. This included a press conference immediately upon his return where he reported his findings and denounced the racist business practices of these U.S. corporations operating in South Africa. This was followed by a series of Congressional hearings organized by Diggs’ office that forced Congress, via the Africa Subcommittee, to deal with the problematic practices of U.S. corporations in South Africa.

Through the Africa Subcommittee, Diggs and his staff employed multiple strategies to achieve their desired ends. There were several instances where Diggs filed suit against the U.S. government for its economic policies that permitted trade with African nations that operated under White minority rule. For example, in 1974, Diggs sued the U.S. Department of Commerce, alleging that it violated international law by continuing to import fur seal skins from Namibia. This followed the 1973 incident where Diggs was part of a group that raised international fury by calling the Civil Aeronautics Board to task after it granted a request by South African Airways to land in its planes in the U.S. Though SAA had been granted landing rights in the U.S. in 1968, its application for renewal was called into question in light of South Africa’s policies that endorsed racial discrimination in its airline industry. This was at a time when South African Airways extended its home country’s discriminatory policies to its operations in the U.S. despite Congressional legislation that outlawed discrimination in the U.S., when Black Americans were unashamedly denied equal opportunity when it came to hires, promotions, and advances in South African Airway’s U.S. offices. In an effort led by CAB Bureau Counsel, Jerome B. Blum, Diggs, and by extension, the Congressional Black Caucus, was part of a critical instance where the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were considered in relationship to a matter of American Foreign Policy. Diggs crusade against South Africa resulted in him again being denied entry into the Republic in 1972.

It was through the leadership roles he played in the Congressional Black Caucus, the House Subcommittee on Africa, and in African American politics nationally, that Charles Diggs and his Congressional office became the center of
political activity for African Americans concerned with U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Functioning almost as an institution itself, Diggs’ office, perhaps more than any other entity in national politics, was the place where African liberation and the eradication of White minority rule were given the most significant attention in the U.S. foreign policy community. Diggs’ ability to attract the talent and commitment of African American foreign policy scholars and activists committed to advocating for the adoption of progressive and socially responsible U.S. policies toward Africa provided a critical connection between the broader African liberation support efforts in the U.S. and Black America. In national Black political affairs, Diggs’ leadership on Africa issues was particularly important in light of the fall of the ALSC by the mid 1970s. Although Diggs’ work on Africa dates back much further than that of the ALSC and its organizers, the collapse of the ALSC and its mass mobilization approach to African liberation created a partial void in the multifaceted effort of African Americans to support the African liberation struggles. Fortunately, however, Charles Diggs and his staff provided a level of continuity in this area because of their specific focus on affecting change in U.S. foreign policy through mobilizing the opposition in and out of Congress. Thus, their work became increasingly critical in the mid 1970s. This was not only in the realm of Congressional politics, but also in the sphere of African American political affairs, nationally.

Honing in on Apartheid: Toward an African American Foreign Policy Lobby

By 1976, South African apartheid had quickly taken center stage among the global community of activists concerned with African liberation. The liberation struggles in the other parts of Southern Africa had not waned, per se. The people of Mozambique had won their independence from Portugal in 1975, only to find themselves immediately steeped in a civil war that would last until 1992. Such was also the case for the people of Angola who would enter into a civil war that would last for twenty-seven years; beginning in 1975 and finally ending in 2002. The Unilateral Declaration of Independence imposed by Ian Smith’s government still maintained its stronghold on the people of Zimbabwe, as the U.S. continued to violate the U.N.’s sanctions against Rhodesia. The multiple entities concerned with African liberation in the U.S., and elsewhere in the world, continued to direct their limited resources in support of the Black people of these countries as they struggled for their independence and right to self-determination. However, as racial violence intensified in the Republic of South Africa, many individuals and organizations concerned with African liberation began to direct their attention to the global movement against apartheid.

The heightened violence inflicted upon Blacks in South Africa by the Republic’s apartheid government caused a resurgence of anti-apartheid activism around the world. In the U.S., organizations such as the Washington Office on Africa (WOA) had been actively supporting the liberation struggles in Southern Africa, broadly. As the campaign against White minority rule began to hone in on South Africa, organizations like this became actively involved in the U.S. movement against
apartheid and other forms of White minority rule in Southern Africa. The WOA served as an umbrella organization for other associations including the American Committee on Africa (ACOA). Notwithstanding their multiracial composition these organizations were often unfairly labeled “White organizations,” even though they often had Africans and African Americans in prominent leadership roles. As multiracial as these organizations may have been, they remained severely limited in their ability to effectively mobilize African Americans around African liberation and U.S. foreign policy. Although African Americans were involved in efforts to influence U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa, most prominently through Charles Diggs, the House Subcommittee on Africa, and the Congressional Black Caucus, these undertakings were closely tied to Diggs’ own celebrity. Still, there lacked a national institution or coordinated effort in African America that focused specifically on advancing the oppositional interests of African American in U.S. foreign policy.

This apparent void in African American foreign policy activism was the primary basis upon which Diggs’ office began to take steps to reorganize and recommit African American activists, organization leaders, and elected officials to developing a sustained presence and voice for African Americans on matters of U.S. foreign policy. It was Diggs’ staff and advisory team—which included Challenor, Butcher, Walters, Johnson, and Robinson—that convinced the Congressman to convene another leadership meeting focused on Africa. Convened under the banner of the CBC, this summit would be akin to the African American National Conference on Africa held in 1972. However, it would have far fewer participants. In the minds of its organizers the central issue framing the conference was generating a commitment to creating a sustained presence of African Americans among those forces organizing in opposition to detrimental U.S. foreign policies toward Africa. Owing to their connections to the broader community of Africa scholars and foreign policy scholars, Challenor and her colleagues that comprised Diggs’ foreign policy brain trust were clear that their principal objective at this conference was to generate momentum and support for the creation of a foreign policy lobby for African America. This idea had been discussed at the Barranquitas meeting just four years prior. However, given the changes in political dynamics in African America, the U.S. broadly, and in Southern Africa, the need for an institution focused on advancing the foreign policy interests of African Americans, as they were understood by certain sectors of Black political leadership, could not be more critical. The vision for a Black foreign policy lobby (and its possibilities) was partially drawn from other examples of successful lobbying efforts by ethnic constituencies. By creating such an institution, organizers hoped that their vision of an African American lobby could mobilize African Americans to support Africa in ways that organizations like, for example, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) successfully organized the Jewish American community in support of Israel. These efforts would finally reach a turning point at the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa held in Washington, DC 25 and 26 September 1976.
The CBC Leadership Conference and the Afro-American Manifesto on Southern Africa

With 120 people gathered from various African American organizations and social and political circles, the Congressional Black Caucus Leadership Conference on Africa took a bold stand with the unanimous adoption of the Afro-American Manifesto on Southern Africa. With representatives present from organizations including the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Operation PUSH, the AME Church, fraternities and sororities, labor organizations and elected officials, the leadership summit was the first of the numerous events aimed at mobilizing African Americans in support of the Southern African liberation struggles that actually adopted a statement. Although the summit stands on its own, it nonetheless benefited from the momentum of the various groups of African American activists mobilizing in support of African liberation struggles during the four years prior. In addition to being organized by the community of scholars connected to Charles Diggs and the Africa Subcommittee as well as the CBC, the Summit brought together leaders of some of the same organizations and entities that supported the African Liberation Day demonstrations.

The Manifesto reflected a keen awareness of the broader social and political context of continental Africa and the conditions of Africans the world over. It pointed to three root causes of “strife in Southern Africa.” The first of these was despotism and racism, which the Manifesto declared as polarizing “the White government and the African majority.” Charges included the denial of the full franchise and self-governance to Black Africans who comprised an overwhelming majority of the population, depriving Africans of basic civil and human rights and liberties, and the arbitrary assassination of Africans who protested their economic political, and social conditions.

The second root cause argues that the institutions of exploitation and racism had been sustained through the continued violence of Europeans. Within this declaration, the Manifesto credited the people of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa, for their efforts—though futile—to achieve change resulting in majority rule through traditional channels. These included more than fifty years of “petitions, representations, negotiations, and peaceful demonstrations and through the United Nations and international tribunals.” Drawing on the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto, the authors of the African American Manifesto articulated the preference on the part of the peoples of Southern Africa for peaceful change that would result in their realization of the full franchise and majority rule. Calling attention to the failure of this approach, however, the authors of the African American Manifesto supported the revolutionary approach to freedom in Southern Africa in recognition of the failed attempts at change through peaceful means.

Levying significant charges against European superpowers, including the United States, the Manifesto located a third root cause of political strife in Southern Africa. This was a function of economic exploitation by the European colonial powers and the support that these entities demonstrated toward the White minority.
The Manifesto charged the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Israel, and Japan with reinforcing “White minority ruled regimes through expanded investments violations of economic sanctions and arms embargoes, and by sales of military related equipment and nuclear technology to South Africa.” This problem was exacerbated by the Manifesto’s claim that these superpowers—combined with multinational corporations—controlled “over sixty percent of all trade with South Africa.” To this point, the Manifesto likened the advancement of the South African economy to that of the United States. It argued that, just as enslaved Africans provided the physical labor that fueled the U.S. economy for the first ninety years of the Republic and thus enabling it to become a global economic superpower, South Africa was similarly “built through the sweat and blood of Blacks.”

These root causes served as the basis on which African American leadership declared its universal support for the liberation of Southern Africa. Importantly, the Manifesto located its historical moment within the trajectory of the Pan African movement that was launched in 1900 by Henry Sylvester Williams and carried forward under the leadership of W.E.B. Du Bois through the five Pan African Congresses held between 1919 and 1945. Prior to the Leadership Summit in 1976, the most recent meeting of the Pan African Congress was held just two years earlier in 1974. Embracing Pan Africanism as a conceptualization of Nationalism, the Manifesto declared “that nationalism, not communism wash the African response to these root causes.” Thus, the Manifesto declared that the attempts by the United States (and other world superpowers) to blame challenges and protests to their political apparatuses on communist permeation only functioned, in the case of South Africa, to “confuse the issue and to align the United States once against with the racist forces of reaction and totalitarianism against the advocates of self-determination and progressive change.”

The Manifesto also expressed a direct concern about the swelling conflict in Southern Africa and how this can be reduced if suitable actions are taken; thus making a common understanding and agenda among Black Americans about U.S. foreign policy a matter of critical importance. The Manifesto went on to make a series of pointed proclamations about the liberation of Southern Africa and the conditions through which this objective should be realized. Recognizing South Africa as the foremost obstruction challenging majority rule in the broader Southern Africa region—owing in great part to South Africa’s illegitimate occupation of Namibia—the Manifesto called upon the President of the United States to take certain actions. It argued that the President should work directly with the OAU to provide “humanitarian and military assistance to the liberation movements,” in Southern Africa. The Manifesto also recommended the imposition of a compulsory arms embargo and an end to shipments of equipment used by the South African military. Expressing a steadfast belief in the United Nations, the Manifesto also called upon the President of the United States to support the finding by the “U.N. security council that South Africa’s continued illegal occupation of Namibia is an act of aggression and a threat of peace,” calling for action consistent with Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter which
grants the U.N. Security Council the authority to make interventions to maintain peace, “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.”

The last major section of the *African American Manifesto on Southern Africa* demonstrated a “by any means necessary” approach to the liberation of Southern Africa and the role that this cadre of African American leaders understood that they should play in it. The *Manifesto* declared support for armed struggle when deemed necessary and “affirm[ed] the right of the African liberation movements to seek necessary assistance from whatever sources available to achieve self-determination and majority rule.” The support for armed struggle was rooted in an understanding of the limits of negotiations through traditional channels and means. The *Manifesto* thus argued that the influence and involvement of the U.S. and other world powers in the affairs of Southern Africa through high-level diplomacy were ineffective unless they were focused on the realization of absolute liberation and democracy for the Black peoples of Southern Africa.

Levying charges against the South African government, the *Manifesto* charged the Republic with significant crimes against humanity in light of “its wanton killing of hundreds of African youthful demonstrators and its wholesale detention without legal redress of Africans and their allies.” Insistent on a response by the U.S. to these gross human rights violations, the *Manifesto* called upon the U.S. to provide refuge to the Africans forced out of Southern Africa because of their subjugated conditions. Further, the *Manifesto* declared its support for the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and its opposition to any recognition by the U.S. government of “the Transkei and United States corporate investment in ‘Bantuism’ whose independence will deny Africans their birthright to full economic and political participation in all of South Africa.”

Seeking to reframe the global civil rights narrative to focus more broadly on a program of human rights, the *Manifesto* expressed its rejection of any U.S. support for “minority rights” in South Africa; instead advocating a program of “human rights.” For, in the context of Southern Africa, the minority, and thus “minority rights” represented the upholding of the rights and position of the European minority currently oppressing the Black Africans of Southern Africa.

Leaning on the United Nations as a point of recourse for the situation in Southern Africa, the *Manifesto* argued for changes in the U.N. as a global body for the legislation of matters of inter-state and international significance. To these ends, the *Manifesto* called upon the U.S. to support the admission of the People’s Republic of Angola to the U.N. It also insisted upon the U.S. to “join the council on Namibia, contribute to the U.N. Trust Fund,” and it condemned any use by the U.S. of the veto in the U.N. Security Council in support of the government of South Africa.

In a call to action for all Americans, the final section of the *Manifesto* called upon a broad cross-section of the American people to understand the connection between the racist and oppressive conditions in Southern Africa and the state of race relations in the United States. Specifically, it called upon the American labor movement, civic leadership, and the media, political, and business communities to help hold the U.S. accountable for its “values and its historic commitment to self-
determination, freedom, and justice.” Lastly, the *Manifesto* made an explicit commitment on behalf of African Americans. It declared a commitment to organizing African Americans “and others of good will” to support the development of progressive American foreign policies toward Africa. It was this final declaration that served as the basis on which a cadre of African American leaders would begin their work in earnest to establish an African American foreign policy lobby for Africa and the African Diaspora in the Caribbean and Latin America.

1 Along with his brother, Luis, Cabral had founded African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde (PAIGC) as a mechanism to aid in the liberation of Cape Verde and Portuguese Guinea from Portugal.
3 Ibid.
4 Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010, Cambridge, MA.
8 Ibid.
9 The official name of this plaza was Dag Hammarskjold Plaza. In Harlem and other places where marches were held, ALSC activists unofficially renamed the parks and plazas after different African American and African Diaspora activists and freedom fighters.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
14 Greg Simms, “African Liberation Day is Success,” *Jet*, Vol. 44, No. 12, 14 June 1973, 12. Also note that the largest population of Blacks outside of the African continent is Brazil, followed by the U.S. Thus, Bennett is partially correct in his assertion that “we are the second largest African community in the world”. That is, if he is speaking of the “world” outside of Africa.
18 Ibid. Also, by some reports, the fundraising effort was successful, with the ALSC achieving its goal of $40,000. However, there is insufficient evidence at this point to validate the claim that this goal had been achieved. See Ethel L. Payne, “March in 30 Cities,” *Chicago Defender*, 29 May 1973, 3.
19 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.


30 Ibid., 154.

31 Ronald W. Walters, interview with the author, 9 December 2009, Washington, DC.


34 Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010.

35 Originally enacted in 1971, the Byrd Amendment was an amendment to the U.S. Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act. Authored by Democratic Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia, the legislation was an apparent violation of international law and was repealed by Congress in 1977. It was declared a direct violation of International Law by *Diggs v. Schultz* (152 U.S.App.D.C. 313) in 1972, though it would be five years before its Congressional repeal. It was repealed because of its violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions 216 and 217. See Jeremy Mattam Farrall, *United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law* (New York and London: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 247-248.


38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.


45 Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.

46 Ibid. Also, Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010.
The specific charges listed in the manifesto included White minority governments’ denial of universal franchise and African majority rule; the practice of deciding who shall control the nations’ arable land and productive resources; the deprivation of Africans of fundamental civil rights and civil liberties such as freedom of assembly, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of education, freedom to petition the government for redress of grievances, freedom against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the right to bear arms; and the arbitrary killing and imprisonment of Africans and their allies who peacefully protest the condition of oppression.

Developed and ratified in April 1969 by the fourteen independent nations of Central and East Africa, the Lusaka Manifesto recognized the troubled political conditions in the independent nation states of Africa and called for an end to White minority rule in all of Africa. This document was embraced by the OAU and the U.N. and served as the basis upon which a collection of southern African nations would launch their liberation efforts in the ensuing years.


Ibid.
CHAPTER 6

TRANSAFRICA

The Congressional Black Caucus’ (CBC) 1976 Leadership Conference on Africa engineered a mandate that there ought to be a sustained presence of African Americans working for progressive U.S. policies toward Africa and the African diaspora. The best way to accomplish this was by establishing a formal organization independent of the CBC. It was clear that an actual lobby to coordinate the loosely organized activities concerned with African liberation and U.S. foreign policy toward the region. The initial efforts to build such an organization took shape in the office of Michigan Representative and Africa Subcommittee Chairman, Charles Diggs. Following the Leadership Conference on Africa, the Congressman and his staff—namely Herschelle Challenor and Goler Butcher—agreed that Randall Robinson, who had worked in Diggs’ office as an administrative assistant, would be the best person to chair a small working group to launch a foreign policy lobby. On 1 July 1977, just shy of eight months following the CBC’s Leadership Conference on Africa, the newly formed organization, TransAfrica, was incorporated in the District of Columbia.\(^1\) Its foremost objective was to fundamentally alter U.S. policies toward Africa and the African diaspora so that the U.S. would stand on the side of Black self-determination.

TransAfrica was a critical intervention at a time when African Americans had little influence in American foreign policy. Examined through the conceptual framework of adversarial diplomacy, TransAfrica underscores the significance of institution building as an approach to adversarial diplomacy. During a period where African Americans clearly situated their foreign policy objectives in opposition to those of the state, and lacked access to the institutions where these negotiations normally take place, TransAfrica became the principal arbiter of African American interests in U.S. foreign policy. Its significance would increase as the organization grew in social and political prominence in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although African Americans—individually and collectively—were engaged in the work of adversarial diplomacy for quite some time, TransAfrica provided a means through which these concerns with U.S. international affairs and foreign policy, particularly toward Africa and the African diaspora, could be communicated and advocated on a national and international stage.

It would be altogether inaccurate to suggest that TransAfrica was the first African American lobby for Africa and the African Diaspora. In many ways, TransAfrica picked up in 1977 where the Council on African Affairs (CAA) had left off in the 1955.\(^2\) However, TransAfrica would ultimately succeed where the CAA failed because the domestic and international political climate of the late 1970s and early 1980s was far different from that of the 1940s and 1950s. Nearly three decades following the end of the Second World War, the constant association of Black activism with communism had waned. At the same time, programs like COINTELPRO had lost steam. Thus, government surveillance of certain types of
Black domestic and international activism was far less than it had been in the past. TransAfrica also benefited from, and was possible because of, the changing landscape of African American politics. Different from its predecessors, TransAfrica came along at a time when foreign policy issues—particularly the Southern African liberation struggles—had become prominent for many African American leaders. Previous efforts, such as the CAA, were marginalized by dominant African American activists who preferred to direct their resources to the domestic freedom struggle. Although for different reasons than the CAA, the American Negro Leadership Conference on Africa (ANLCA) in the early 1960s and the African Liberation Support Committee (ALSC) of the mid-1970s also had a limited reach.

TransAfrica undoubtedly benefited from the groundswell of interest in the African liberation struggles that had emerged in the early 1970s. As discussed in the previous chapters, the concern for African liberation was apparent through the National Black Political Convention, the African American National Conference on Africa, and the series of African Liberation Day demonstrations held between 1972 and 1975. As a result, TransAfrica was able to pick up where these engagements left off and drew upon many of the same activists for financial and organizational support. These connections were possible in part because the ALSC (though unmistakably led by the Black Left) was successful in amalgamating the different encampments of Black American activists, even if only temporarily. For example, activists such as former SNCC member Courtland Cox had been heavily involved with the Black Left, yet was one of the early members of TransAfrica’s board of directors, serving as a critical bridge between these often-conflicting political camps. In short, TransAfrica lassoed many of the African American activists concerned with African liberation under one organization. This is not to suggest that all of the political camps that had been actively supporting the African liberation struggles were an integral part of TransAfrica’s leadership structure. However, in comparison to the ALSC, TransAfrica emerged as a more moderate political organization. It was therefore able to bring together some of the previous activists.

Even though Congressman Charles Diggs would provide critical resources to develop TransAfrica, the idea of a Black foreign policy lobby was not his brainchild or that of the CBC. Rather, it was spawned by the community of foreign policy scholars who had been involved with Diggs through the House Subcommittee on Africa. This core group was comprised of Herschelle Challenor, Goler Butcher, Willard Johnson, Ronald Walters, James Turner, and Randall Robinson. In its expanded form, this group included many of the other participants from the African Heritage Studies Association (AHSA) and the foreign policy conference held in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico in 1972. Although TransAfrica’s organizers had been associated with Diggs and the CBC—with some of them serving on Diggs’ paid professional staff—the suggestion of an “Africa lobby” had grown from the ideas advanced by this larger community of activists. In other words, the decision to create a foreign policy lobby was predetermined. Yet, Diggs’ seniority in the House and in the Black Caucus made it possible to sponsor events, such as the Leadership
Summit on Africa, which cultivated organizational and financial support from prominent Black political and social organizations.\(^5\)

The mandate constructed at the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa was more than mere political symbolism. Major monetary pledges for the “Africa lobby” came from Black clergy including Dr. Maurice Dawkins from the Clergy Committee of the Opportunities Industrial Center and Bishop H.H. Brookings of the African Methodist Episcopal Church.\(^6\) Other supporters agreed to personally give money or work to raise capital through other sources. Mrs. Coretta Scott King helped raise funds and supported the organization. The National Council of Black Lawyers provided organizational support and Jay Chunn helped raise money on behalf of the National Association of Black Social Workers. Eugene Jackson, President of the National Black Network, pledged $100,000 in free advertising for the new lobby annually for five years, made one of the most substantial in-kind commitments. These pledges of support were augmented by financial commitments from numerous individuals ranging from twenty five dollars to $1000.\(^7\) With pledges totaling $13,725.00 in September 1976, the organizers of TransAfrica saw that there was significant support within the Black community and proceeded to move forward.\(^8\)

The Rise of Randall Robinson

As TransAfrica began to take shape, it became clear that Randall Robinson would be a major player in the new lobby. He would eventually emerge as the person to lead the organization and remained at the helm for twenty-four years. Robinson’s earlier anti-apartheid activism rendered him an ideal fit for the position. It was the consensus of his colleagues that Robinson demonstrated an unparalleled commitment to building the organization and to the broader cause for which TransAfrica was established. This catapulted him to the helm. As perspicaciously expressed by Africare cofounder and president C. Payne Lucas, “The reason that Randall emerged as its leader is because he was prepared to pay the price. Rarely ever do people in movements like this [show that they] are prepared to pay the price; the price to go to jail; the price to sacrifice their lives [and] their resources. [But] Randall had a fixation about it. So we couldn’t have picked a better person.”\(^9\)

Like many of his contemporaries, Randall Robinson drew a connection between his international political activism and his interactions with American racism. Undoubtedly, these experiences fueled Robinson’s commitment to the ideas and values of what numerous scholars have characterized as a race man. Robinson, however, would qualify as an international race man. That is, as a race man, his African American identity was a powerful and defining component of his humanity and his obligation to contribute to the project of racial uplift.\(^10\) Robinson even characterizes himself as such. In the foreword to Defending the Spirit: a Black Life in America (1999), Robinson writes, “Though it is no longer fashionable to say it, I am obsessively black. Race is an overarching aspect of my identity. America made me this way. Or, more accurately, white Americans have made me this way.”\(^11\)
Connecting his personal narrative to his international political activism, Robinson goes on to say:

They (White Americans) marred an otherwise unremarkable Southern childhood and, with the long-running effluvium of U.S. attitudes and policies toward the black nations of the world, preselected my adult career in global human rights advocacy. I can no more distinguish the beleaguered black self in me from my public advocacy than can untold many white American policymakers disengage their racist assumptions from the decades of multifaceted U.S. support for apartheid in South Africa and the corrupt dictatorships of Zaire, Liberia, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti.12

Indeed, these ruminations, coupled with Robinson’s impressive record of global human rights advocacy, are reminiscent of Robinson’s Pan African predecessors, such as, W.E.B. Du Bois, Max Yergan, and Paul Robeson. These activists, like Robinson, saw a connection between their African American experiences and those of other Blacks in Africa and its Diaspora.13

Randall Maurice Robinson was born on 6 July 1941 in Richmond, Virginia. He is the product of a family whose socioeconomic status was situated somewhere between middle and working class.14 Consistent with the limited professional opportunities available to Blacks at the time, both of Robinson’s parents were schoolteachers. To the extent that his parents realized a certain class position, it was due to their hard work. His parents, Doris and Maxie Robinson married in 1936, and had four children, Maxie, Jr., Jewell, Randall, and Jean. The eldest, Max, would achieve fame as a broadcast journalist. As a co-host of ABC’s World News Tonight from 1978-1983, Max was the first African American to serve as anchor of a broadcast news network.15 Jewell would go on to become an award-winning actress and curator; serving for many years as public program director of the Smithsonian Institution’s National Portrait Gallery. Like her parents, Jeanie would become an elementary schoolteacher in Washington, DC.16 And Randall’s personal and professional work is intricately woven into the story of TransAfrica.

Robinson’s race consciousness began to take shape during his childhood and adolescence in segregated Richmond. Recalling just how pronounced segregation was, he recounts, “with the exception of the Jewish corner grocers for whom I worked from age thirteen, I was twenty-two years old before I actually met a white person.”17 Moreover, owing to the norms of Jim Crow segregation, Robinson would not go to school with a white person until Harvard Law School. No wonder he describes segregation as the impetus for his involvement in domestic and international political advocacy. Robinson characterizes segregation as an “insult” that is both “searing and unforgettable,” one that has scarred him ineffaceably.18

In the fall of 1959, Robinson enrolled as a freshman at Norfolk State College (now Norfolk State University) on a basketball scholarship. Unfocused on his studies and enjoying the popularity that came with being a star basketball player, Robinson toiled through Norfolk State for three years before dropping out and joining the U.S. Army. Later, Robinson, like many young men his age who were not enrolled in college, was drafted for service in the U.S. Armed Forces in Vietnam. He would do a
three-year tour in the Army before resuming his studies at his parents’ *alma mater*, Virginia Union University where graduated with a B.A. in sociology in the spring of 1967. In his last year as an undergraduate, Robinson applied and was admitted to study at Harvard Law. He enrolled there in the fall of 1967 and would graduate in the spring of 1970.

It was at Harvard Law that Robinson’s international political activism began to take shape. As a student, Robinson regularly read texts that were not directly related to his studies but piqued his interests. He recounts having read, for the first time, texts like Franz Fanon’s *Wretched of the Earth*, C.L.R. James’, *The Black Jacobins*, and W.E.B. Du Bois’ *The Souls of Black Folk*. Robinson recalls that these books were never covered in his schooling—not even at the historically Black Virginia Union University. This intellectual acumen heightened his awareness of the political happenings in the world around him. To satisfy his interest in the Black world, Robinson wrote to the American Committee on Africa (ACOA) “for information on the anticolonial wars flaring in Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola against Portugal and its five-hundred-year-old African colonial empire.” One of the most profound pieces of information that Robinson would learn from the ACOA was that the Gulf Oil Company was “pumping thousands of barrels per day out of Angola, [and] was providing Portugal, Europe’s poorest country with forty-eight percent of its war budget.” Additionally, Robinson realized that Harvard University was the biggest shareholder in the Gulf Oil Company. As Robinson read and studied, he became increasingly aware of the atrocities of European colonial rule in Africa and the role that the U.S. played in supporting the European superpowers. He recalls:

> The more I read, the more excited and angry I had become. I could see no real substantive distinction between my American experience and the painful lot of the Haitians, South Africans, Mozambicans, Angolans, Zairians, Afro-Brazilians, and other blacks in other places about whom I was reading. The American official hand was everywhere and invariable on the wrong side.

Having discerned early on in his studies that he did not want to practice law, Robinson decided, at age twenty-nine, to devote his career to the “empowerment and liberation of the Black World.” He would graduate from Harvard Law School in 1970 and spend the remaining half of the year living in Tanzania on a fellowship funded by the Ford Foundation’s Middle East and Africa Field Research Program for Afro-Americans. Before departing for Tanzania, however, Robinson would begin his first organizing activities in support of the Southern African liberation struggles. While living in Boston, he launched the Southern Africa Relief Fund (SARF). This organization succeeded in raising four thousand dollars, which was given as a direct contribution to the liberation movements in Southern Africa. Robinson would personally deliver a financial contribution from SARF to the chairman of the Organization of African Unity upon his arrival in Dar es Salaam in the fall of 1970. This was the beginning of Robinson’s international activism that he would resume when he returned to Boston in January 1971.
Robinson describes his brief stint in Tanzania as “an enriching and life
changing time.” There he was able to witness, first hand, some of the legacies of
European colonial rule. Though Tanzania had won its independence from the British
in 1961, its cultural norms—like most of the former colonies—were predicated on the
belief in racial discrimination and European superiority. Like the SNCC activists who
had traveled to Guinea in 1964, Robinson was able to see a part of the Black world
that was different from the U.S. One of the most pronounced distinctions he
observed was that Tanzania had a Black president, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.
Understanding the privilege of his Americanness (framed via the false
representations that American media, government entities, and propagandists had
painted) and the limitations of international race unity, in the face of cultural
distinctions, Robinson knew that he was not Tanzanian and never could be. Still, he
remained committed to working on behalf of Black people wherever lived and
suffered at the hands of European colonial governments. Consequently, Robinson
decided that the best way for him to support the liberation of the African world was
by returning to the U.S. and actively challenging U.S. political and economic policies
that supported European Colonialism and its legacies on the African continent.

Returning to Boston in January 1971, Robinson took a job at the Boston
Legal Assistance Project (BLAP). Although he had little interest in practicing law,
Robinson decided to give the profession a chance. At base, BLAP provided pro bono
legal services for people who needed, but could not afford, counsel. Totally
disinterested in a career in corporate law, or the other areas in which many of his
Harvard peers would end up working, Robinson saw BLAP as an opportunity to use
his legal training in service of others. Citing numerous experiences with racial
discrimination in the legal field, Robinson ended his career as an attorney after less
than one year.

After leaving BLAP, Robinson took a job with the Roxbury Multi-Service
Center (RMSC). Situated in the Black community of Roxbury (a subdivision of
Boston), this job provided him with the flexibility necessary to earn a living while
continuing his activist work. While working at the RMSC, Robinson became heavily
involved in the local movements to challenge white minority rule in Southern Africa.
He quickly rose to the forefront of the Boston-based African liberation movement. It
was through this work that Robinson made his initial entrée into the Washington, DC
political circles. His major introduction occurred in late 1971 through his association
with Willard Johnson. As discussed in chapter 5, Robinson and Johnson connected
through their common advocacy work and were introduced by Chris Nteta, an exiled
South African who was also living in Boston having recently graduated from Harvard
Divinity School. Robinson and Nteta were heavily involved with the Boston-based
Southern African Liberation Committee, whose imminent objective was to secure a
commitment from the Harvard Corporation to divest its holdings in the Gulf Oil
Company. Willard Johnson and Nteta first crossed paths on 20 and 27 January
1972. Just three months later, on 20 April 1972, Harvard made clear its decision not
to divest its holdings in Gulf Oil. In response, Robinson joined forces with the
Harvard Law Students Association, which staged a six-day sit-in of Harvard
President Derek Bok’s Office. Johnson was on the faculty of Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was active in the Boston Pan African Forum, and other activities outside of the university that advocated progressive political and economic politics toward Southern Africa. Johnson had earned a reputation for his foreign policy advocacy work and for his active involvement in the divestment campaigns at MIT, Harvard, and in the greater Boston Area.

It was through Johnson that Robinson connected with the community of intellectuals who were actively supporting the work of Diggs in the Africa Subcommittee. Johnson also introduced Robinson to Congressman Diggs in 1972. Ultimately, the relationship between these two proved to be a critical bridge between the grass roots activism with which Robinson was involved in Boston and the wider foreign policy advocacy work that Johnson and his colleagues were involved in through the AHSA. In particular, Robinson’s Boston-based crusade against the Gulf Oil Company became a major point of interest to the group of scholars, activists, and organization leaders who had gathered at Barranquitas in January 1972.29

Robinson would continue working at the Roxbury Multi-Service Center until moving to Washington, DC in 1975 to work in the office of Congressman William Clay. He would stay there for one year before transitioning to work for Congressman Diggs. Through Diggs’ office, Robinson became directly involved with the happenings of the Africa Subcommittee and worked closely with prominent members of Diggs’ staff including Herschelle Challenor and Goler Butcher. It was from Diggs’ office that Robinson would rise to the forefront of the corps of African American activists advocating for progressive U.S. foreign policies toward Africa and the African Diaspora.

**Laying the Foundation for the African American Foreign Policy Lobby**

Nearly two years would elapse between the September 1976 Leadership Summit on Africa and the opening of TransAfrica’s first office in the spring of 1978. In the interim, the organization would operate out of Charles Diggs’ congressional office. The work group chaired by Randall Robinson would hash out the initial plans for the lobby. One of the decisions made early on was that the organization would adopt the name, TransAfrica, which was the innovation of Herschelle Challenor. The name was derived from the concept “TranAfricanism” which Challenor believed captured the role that African descendents should play in supporting the political struggles of Blacks on the African continent.30 Moreover, Challenor argued that the prefix “Trans” (instead of “Pan”) accurately captured their advocacy work without abandoning the fact they fully embraced their Americanness.31

The work group made other key decisions, which included establishing an institutional strategy, articulating a basic mission, developing a board of directors, and identifying potential funding sources. It was the consensus of the work group that TransAfrica’s primary objective “was to effect a 180-degree turn in American foreign policy toward South Africa and the general region.”32 They chose to focus on South Africa because, while the rest of the world appeared to be making
improvements in race relations, the situation in South Africa had grown progressively worse. Strategically, it made sense to focus on South Africa because of the three decades of apartheid and the increased racially charged violence that were present in the republic. This was most pronounced with the 1976 massacre of a group of schoolchildren nonviolently protesting the imposition of Afrikaans as the primary language taught in Black schools. Another protest followed this incident wherein some 12,000 black students who boycotted the language provision were violently attacked by the police resulting in the deaths of fifty-four people and the injury of some three hundred others. This confrontation became news around the world and caused a pronounced resurgence of the anti-apartheid campaigns.

Even though they had an identified cause and a mandate from prominent African American leaders, the workgroup recognized the herculean challenges associated with building an organization from the ground up. They needed financial support of gargantuan proportions. However, because so many American corporations invested in the South African economy, they knew they could not anticipate corporate support. Amplifying their impediments was the fact that they were attempting to build an organization rooted in the African American community yet focused on foreign policy. African American awareness about the Southern Africa situation had increased in light of the African Liberation Day Mobilization earlier in the decade. Robinson and his colleagues had predicted an uphill climb in building support among an African American community with limited knowledge about Africa, the Southern African liberation struggles, and the often-ignored, yet incredibly important, topic of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. This objective and the challenges associated with it framed the initial conversations about how to launch TransAfrica.

On a Saturday afternoon in April 1977, a core group (Randall Robinson, Herschelle Challenor, and Ronald Walters) met at the Washington, DC residence of C. Payne Lucas. This meeting was a critical juncture in framing the new lobby. One of the central issues that they grappled with was how to secure the fiscal resources necessary to present TransAfrica as a viable organization that others would support. This issue permeated discourses around TransAfrica for much of its history. The fundamental question at that point was whether or not to formally launch the lobby before amassing a substantial amount of money. Robinson argued that they should delay launching the organization until they raised $100,000. The hope was to have met this goal by 31 December 1977. However, his colleagues thought otherwise. At least initially, they deferred to Robinson’s judgment for reasons that are captured by Willard Johnson who recalls Robinson as “just more far-sighted and practical…than the rest of us…so that’s what we did.” In the end, however, TransAfrica would open its office doors and begin operations in April 1978 even though the financial goal had yet to be realized.

The workgroup also strategized about how to elevate TransAfrica’s national and international prominence. They knew that TransAfrica had to quickly gain recognition in Washington, DC political circles, among foreign policy lobbying organizations, and among African Americans, in order to be successful. Among the
first decisions the group made was to recruit Gary, Indiana, Mayor Richard Hatcher to serve as chairman of TransAfrica’s board of directors. It was the consensus of the group that Hatcher would be the best person to serve in this capacity. \textsuperscript{38} Ultimately, the strategy was to recruit a high profile chairman and to build the board of directors around him. The hope was to use Hatcher to attract other high profile Black leaders that would support TransAfrica and raise the profile of the young organization. To the extent that TransAfrica was able to grow and develop in its infancy, was largely because of the success of this strategy.

As mayor of Gary, Hatcher had quickly risen to the forefront of American politics. He was young, connected to the Black political establishment and the Democratic Party, and was regarded as a man of the utmost integrity. \textsuperscript{39} Because the two had known each other through their earlier 1970s activist work, Ron Walters agreed to approach Hatcher about serving as board chair. \textsuperscript{40} Although he would ultimately respond with assent, Hatcher was not without hesitation in doing so. Like many African Americans—including those who had been active in local, state, and national politics—Hatcher had limited knowledge of, or interaction with Africa, or international affairs. He recalls:

\begin{quote}
\begin{flushleft}
I had been very active in civil rights here in the United States and certainly, I was aware of some of the things that were taking place on the continent. But I really did not have great expertise in terms of Africa and the many countries in Africa. Like everyone obviously I was aware of South Africa and apartheid and [the] treatment of South Africans, [particularly] native South Africans. But I really asked him…matter of fact, couldn’t he find someone else that was more grounded in terms of the African continent and the Caribbean for that matter. I had been to the Caribbean. I had been to Africa but I didn’t consider myself much of an expert on them. At any rate he insisted that I was the person that they would like to have as the chairman. So I agreed to do that.\textsuperscript{41}
\end{flushleft}
\end{quote}

One might question the benefit or relevance of having a mayor of a midwestern city serve as chairman of the board of directors of an organization focused on foreign policy. Yet, reflecting upon these early strategic decisions, Walters recalls that having Hatcher serve as board chair accomplished the imperative task of “locat[ing] TransAfrica in the middle of the black community.” \textsuperscript{42} Walters adds that, “When he (Hatcher) became chair, [TransAfrica] got instant respect from everyone else…he lent his time to go sometimes with people and to help the organization grow. He was extremely important. Instant credibility: that’s what he gave it…everybody knew Dick Hatcher.” \textsuperscript{43} Not only would Hatcher agree to serve as chairman of the board, but he would remain in the role for fifteen years.

TransAfrica’s founding board of directors held its inaugural meeting on 10 December 1977. This included a reception to which members of the CBC and other prominent African American leaders and supporters of TransAfrica were invited. \textsuperscript{44} It was at this meeting that Hatcher was formally elected board chairman and Robinson was officially named executive director. \textsuperscript{45} In assembling its inaugural board of directors, TransAfrica drew from the community of activists and organization leaders.
who had earlier shown support for the creation of an Africa lobby. Among this group were many of the people who had participated in the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa and had been involved in the planning conversations for the new lobby. The board membership was augmented by leaders from the Black social, political, and labor organizations. With a total of twenty members, TransAfrica’s inaugural board of directors included Percy Sutton, President of the Borough of Manhattan; Samuel Proctor, Pastor of New York’s Abyssinian Baptist Church; Walter Carrington of the Afro-American Institute; William Lucy from the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists; and Dorothy Height from the National Council of Negro Women. Other board members included individuals who had been known supporters of the development of the Africa lobby such as Willard Johnson, C. Payne Lucas, Louis Martin, Courtland Cox, James Turner, Frank Savage, Bishop H.H. Brookings, Eugene Jackson, Ron Walters, Herschelle Challenor, and Robert Farrell.

An important aspect of the board membership was that it included representatives from the Black religious community, which had been deemed to be critical to successfully building a financial and organizational base for TransAfrica. Representing the Black clergy on the board of directors were Revs. Isaac Bivens, Ralph Nugent, and Robert C.S. Powell. These three men were prominent leaders in their religious denominations and provided a critical connection between TransAfrica and these communities. Powell, for example, was a prominent priest in the Episcopal church and was active in the leadership of the National Council of Churches (NCC). As chair of the NCC’s Africa Committee, Powell found TransAfrica’s work of extreme importance and his connections to the NCC secured funding for TransAfrica that would last for several formative years. At different points, the board of directors would include other prominent leaders in the Black church including, for example, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, pastor of Chicago’s 6,000 member Trinity United Church of Christ.

Many of the people who became early supporters of TransAfrica connected with the organization at an inaugural event held on the evening of Saturday 24 September 1977. It was on this day that Randall Robinson’s brother, Max Robinson, hosted a fundraising reception at his Washington, DC home. Max, who had been generally supportive of his younger brother’s activities throughout their lives, suggested the idea of hosting a poolside reception for TransAfrica earlier in the summer. By 1977, Max had grown quite prominent as a broadcast journalist and had access to well-resourced Black political and social circles. He used his celebrity status to help gather more than 100 people at his home to learn about, and lend their financial support to, the new lobby. Responding affirmatively to the invitation, which included a suggested donation of fifty dollars per couple or thirty-five dollars per single, attendees included representatives from a wide range of the Black political, social, and entertainment communities. Among these were Arthur Ashe; U.S. Treasurer Azie Morton; NCNW president, Dorothy Height; Thelma Daly, national president of Delta Sigma Theta Sorority; Bias Mokoodi, Ambassador from Botswana; and Lerone Bennett of Ebony magazine. William Lucy, who was a founder of the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, represented the Black labor movement. Attending
on behalf of the NAACP was Benjamin Hooks who had been recently named the organization’s executive director along with its national board chair Margaret Bush Wilson. Representing the National Urban League was its executive director, Vernon Jordan. Finally, owing to the central role that they all played in organizing the reception and TransAfrica’s early activities, the event included Congressman Diggs, Herschelle Challenor, Ron Walters, Randall Robinson, and host, Max Robinson.53

Exceeding all expectations, the reception at Max Robinson’s house generated close to $10,000 and developed a base of support from prominent Black leaders.54 Many of the people who came to the event, as well as the organizations that they represented, continued to serve as critical conduits in the enduring interlocution between TransAfrica and the broader African American political and social community. As TransAfrica undertook the daunting task of building a novel institution while working to influence U.S. policies toward Africa, the relationships established at this event became of increasing importance in the ongoing efforts to develop financial support. Even though TransAfrica fell short of amassing the $100,000 that Robinson had established as a precondition for launching the lobby, the organization would open its office doors in April 1978. The made-over one bedroom apartment in Dupont Circle was the modest beginning, as TransAfrica quickly built a local, regional, national, and international reputation.55

**Building an Organizational Base**

Immediately following the reception at Max Robinson’s home, Richard Hatcher and Randall Robinson extolled the success of the party and announced TransAfrica’s imminent strategy to continue to build financial support. Hatcher said, “Our goal is to raise $100,000 by December 31 of this year. Your presence here today [at the reception] brought us $7,500 closer to that target amount. TransAfrica, in the coming three months, will be holding fundraising affairs in several major cities around the country. We will need your contribution and general support to make this seminal Africa lobby effort the success that it so richly deserves to be.”56 Calling attention to their efforts, Robinson added that, “We are seeking to develop a formidable pressure mechanism through which black Americans can make their weight systematically felt in the foreign policy formation process.”57 Robinson and Hatcher’s remarks underscore that, at the time of its founding, and for much of its history, TransAfrica faced the ongoing and daunting task of securing a financial foundation while establishing itself as an entity within the African American community. In other words, in order for it to be successful, TransAfrica, and the cause of African liberation, needed to be relevant to African Americans.

One of the major questions facing TransAfrica’s organizers was whether the new lobby would be a mass movement organization or a centralized advocacy-focused association. Many of the early conversations about TransAfrica focused on building a mass base in the national Black community.58 In fact, the organization at times claimed to have between 11,000 and 15,000 members.59 It became clear early on that TransAfrica would be an organization largely of elites focused on foreign
policy advocacy through activities based in Washington, DC. Its elite composition was more by default than by design. TransAfrica could more readily depend on financial contributions from its affluent Black supporters than it could from its membership. In some ways, this presented a major impediment to TransAfrica’s appeal to the wider African American community. As long time TransAfrica supporter and former board member Harry Belafonte has recalled, the fact that TransAfrica was a centralized organization (with middle class to affluent Blacks as a major source of support), “necessarily limited our ability to become more broadly popular because [if] you’re not a mass movement organization you do not deal with mass movement criteria. In reality you necessarily cut off an avenue of information and experience and engagement that’s very different if all you do is advocacy and you’re not a mass movement organization.”

There would be one major instance where TransAfrica would take on the character of a mass movement organization. This was in 1984 when it rose to the forefront of the U.S-based antiapartheid movement through the Free South Africa Movement. Aside from this particular campaign, however, TransAfrica could be scarcely regarded as a mass organization.

Although TransAfrica was based in Washington, DC, its organizers clearly understood the importance of having a national reach in order to succeed in building support among African Americans. It was with this understanding that Robinson and Hatcher embarked on a national tour between January and May of 1978 to build support for TransAfrica. The strategy was to lean on prominent Blacks in several major American cities (with sizable Black populations and prominent Black elected officials) to engender pecuniary contributions for the new lobby and to build a corps of supporters at the local level. The first reception was held in Detroit on 22 January 1978 and was co-hosted by Detroit Mayor Coleman Young and Catherine Blackwell, a prominent Detroiter who was a patron of the arts and known for her interest in African affairs. A second benefit reception was held in Atlanta on 11 March 1978 and was hosted by Mayor Maynard Jackson; Georgia State Senator, Julian Bond; and long time civil rights activist and President of the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce, Jesse Hill. This time, Robinson and Hatcher brought with them a representative from the African continent, Olujimi Jolaoso, Ambassador to the U.S. from Nigeria. A third reception was held on 28 March 1977 at the Winfandel Hotel in Los Angeles and was hosted by Mayor Tom Bradley and Robinson and Hatcher brought Kenyan Ambassador to the U.S., John Mbogua as a special guest. On 5 April 1978, a fourth benefit reception was held at the Tower Suite of the Time/Life Building in New York City and was hosted by Congressman Charles Rangel, Percy Sutton, and Historian John Henrik Clarke. The ticket prices for each of these receptions varied. For example, the admission to the New York benefit was set at $100 per person while the suggested contribution for the Detroit reception was set at $50.00 per couple and $35.00 per single. Many of the people who assembled at these regional gatherings would become involved in the efforts to build local TransAfrica support groups. These groups would prove to be essential in the coming decade as TransAfrica continued its efforts to build a financial base, establish a mass of ongoing supporters, and embark upon its campaign against apartheid in
South Africa. In addition, some of the leaders in these cities would host benefit receptions for TransAfrica in years following, with Los Angeles and Detroit, in particular, holding fundraising receptions in 1979.66

Early on, many of TransAfrica’s organizers—including its executive director, Randall Robinson—were little known in the Black community and in Washington foreign policy advocacy circles. As a result of the political stature of Congressman Diggs, the CBC continued to play a major role in increasing the organization’s prominence. This continued connection was possible, in part, because Robinson remained on Diggs’ paid staff until his resignation in April 1978 to become executive director on a full-time basis. TransAfrica’s connection to Diggs and the CBC would prove to be even more essential when it came to officially launching the lobby in 1978, which took place on 20 May at the second session of the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa. This meeting was co-convened by Diggs, Representative Cardiss Collins of Illinois—who served as co-chairs of the CBC’s international affairs subcommittee—and Richard Hatcher on behalf of TransAfrica.67

Reminiscent of the Leadership Conference held in 1976, the second session brought together prominent Black leaders to engage with issues related to the conditions of Blacks in Africa. The first conference focused on the need to establish an institutional mechanism through which the foreign policy concerns of African Americans could be advocated. Now that TransAfrica had been established, this second session was focused on building support within the Black community for the new lobby and educating Black leaders about the ongoing issues in Southern Africa and how they might help. The day’s sessions included a progress report from Randall Robinson on the development of TransAfrica as well as a legislative update on African affairs from Congressman Diggs. Other sessions focused on articulating TransAfrica’s foreign policy objectives in the areas of U.S. policy toward South Africa; U.S. economic policy toward Africa as a whole; U.S. policies vis-à-vis the Caribbean; and strategic issues in the Horn of Africa.68

The conference concluded with Randall Robinson’s presentation of TransAfrica’s mobilization strategy.69 Robinson made clear TransAfrica’s intent to expand the circle of Blacks interested in foreign policy toward Africa with an objective of “cultivating a mass political base.”70 He also communicated that one of the major entities upon which TransAfrica would lean for organizational and financial support would be the Black churches, which he regarded as “a sustaining…institution in black America…with a captive audience.”71 Finally, Robinson expressed the organization’s initial strategy of “lobbying Congress and the administration, to create an informed network of Black Americans, and to build a grass roots base.”72 In doing so, Robinson hoped to make plain, as had many of his contemporaries and his predecessors, that, for African Americans, “the issue of international affairs is on a plane with our domestic concerns.”73 Board chairman Richard Hatcher also addressed the conference. In his remarks, Hatcher explained that his role would focus largely on fundraising, which had been underway since TransAfrica was incorporated during the previous summer. However, the fundraising
efforts would culminate with the First Annual TransAfrica dinner, which was scheduled to take place immediately following the Leadership Conference on Africa.

TransAfrica’s first annual fundraising dinner was held at the Shoreham Americana Hotel in northwest Washington. By design, this dinner—and subsequent ones—was a gathering of the Black elite with the twofold objectives of generating financial and organizational support for the lobby. The elite character of the fundraising dinners is underscored by the mere fact of location.\(^{74}\) Regarded as one of finest hotels in the Nation’s Capital, the Shoreham Americana was the Washington home of several U.S. Senators. It was also known for having been the location of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inaugural ball in 1933 and has hosted an inaugural ball every year since. The 500 dinner guests represented a who’s who among African Americans and included political and organization leaders, athletes, entertainers, and other Blacks who were supportive of the lobby and interested in African affairs.\(^{75}\) Full tables were purchased by organizations such as the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME); Johnson Publishing Company; the National Alliance of Postal and Federal Employees (NAPFE); and the Phelps Stokes Fund.\(^{76}\) The first dinner also drew participation from the Black fraternities and sororities, and prominent Black leaders from the local Washington, DC political community. These included, for example, DC mayoral candidates Marion Barry and Art Fletcher along with DC City Councilmembers Douglas Moore and Hilda Mason. Other notable participants included Eddie Williams, President of the Joint Center for Political Studies; Ben Brown, deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee; Lilse Carter, President of the University of the District of Columbus; and Roger Estep, who attended on behalf of Howard University President James Cheek. Interestingly, however, there were no members of the Congressional Black Caucus present, even though the caucus had hosted the second session of the Leadership Summit on Africa earlier in the day.\(^{77}\)

The first annual dinner included a rousing speech by Randall Robinson who provided an update on the organization and on African Affairs and U.S. foreign policy. Richard Hatcher echoed these remarks and continued to argue the connection between domestic and foreign policy. Remarks from these two men would be regular features of the annual dinners for the years that both served in the organization’s leadership. Another characteristic of the annual dinners was that they included well-known political leaders or entertainers as the master of ceremonies. For the first dinner, the emcee was Georgia State Senator Julian Bond.\(^{78}\) At subsequent dinners, the emcee would include Illinois Representative Cardiss Collins, along with Harry Belafonte, Ossie Davis, Sidney Poitier, and Brock Peters.\(^{79}\) It was also at the annual dinners that TransAfrica presented the recipient of its African Freedom Award. This award was to be given to an individual who made noticable contributions to the cause of Black world freedom over the span of a lifetime. Over the years, its recipients included Ella Baker, Rayford Logan, Alex Haley, and C.L.R. James.\(^{80}\) Like the other components of the annual dinners, the
African Freedom award was an additional means of drawing attention to Black American’s burgeoning foreign policy lobby.

TransAfrica’s leadership and board of directors knew that if the organization was to be effective, it also needed to engender the support of Blacks outside of the U.S. Accordingly, TransAfrica also used the annual dinners as an opportunity to establish new ties with prominent Black world leaders and strengthen existing alliances. The first dinner included the ambassadors from some twelve African nations and in other years, diplomats, heads of state, and movement and organization leaders from Africa and the diaspora would even serve as keynote speakers. During the first few years, speakers included, Tanzanian Ambassador to the U.S., Salim Ahmed Salim, who was former President of the U.N. Security Council, and, at the time, served as President of the U.N. General Assembly; Michael Manley, former prime minister of Jamaica and leader of the Peoples’ National Party of Jamaica; Maurice Bishop, then Prime Minister of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Grenada; South African Anglican priest and anti-apartheid crusader, Bishop Desmond Tutu, then General Secretary of the South African Council of Churches; U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the U.N., Andrew Young; and Ernest N. Morial, Mayor of New Orleans and President of the National Conference of Mayors. Engaging the Black leadership of Africa and the diaspora had been among TransAfrica’s strategies since its inception, as Robinson regularly courted these leaders by phone, by mail, and in person to secure their support of the development of TransAfrica. Through these exchanges, Robinson was successful in securing the endorsements from ambassadors and heads of state from numerous countries including Senegal, Botswana, Nigeria, Kenya, Zambia, Mali, and Lesotho. Cultivating these relationships was not motivated solely for securing financial commitments. These leaders also lent their names in support of TransAfrica’s work and allowed their names to be included in various printed materials including the invitations to the annual dinners which listed endorsements from Black leaders in the U.S. as well as those of African and Caribbean nations.

The Continued Challenge of Finances

In a 21 May 1978 article in the Washington Star, Georgia State Senator Julian Bond, who had served as emcee at the inaugural TransAfrica dinner, lauded the success of the gala. He insightfully described the event in terms befitting the vision of its organizers; suggesting that it was far more than a fundraiser, but that it was also a “consciousness raiser.” Bond is correct in his assessment, as the dinners were certainly consistent with TransAfrica’s mission of mobilizing public opinion about U.S. policies toward Africa with the objective of ensuring that they are in the best interest of African people throughout the world. However, the significance of the dinners as fundraisers cannot be overstated. With ticket prices set at $50 per person, the first dinner generated a profit of about $10,000 and the proceeds increased substantially in the succeeding years. Over the years, the dinners would also become a much-anticipated event in the national Black political community and
would undoubtedly be one of TransAfrica’s biggest fundraisers. Depending on the success of other fundraising efforts, revenue from the dinners would account forty to sixty percent of TransAfrica’s annual income in a given year. Even though they were successful at mustering support for TransAfrica through the initial fundraising dinners and the regional receptions, Robinson, Hatcher, and TransAfrica’s other core organizers were well aware of the fundamental challenge they would continue to face in raising funds for an organization whose focus was novel to most of the African American community. These monetary impediments were amplified by their attempts to build an organization with the influence of other ethnocentric foreign policy lobbies through a community whose resources paled in comparison to the constituencies supporting these other organizations. TransAfrica’s objectives were often compared to entities such as the “Jewish Lobby” which had been key in mobilizing political and economic support for Israel. However, TransAfrica was well aware of their unique and challenging position vis-à-vis other organizations doing the same work on behalf of different constituencies. In fact, Randall Robinson early on rejected the suggestions that TransAfrica was, in any way, comparable to the “Jewish Lobby,” contending that “Jews’ cultural and other variables are different in our case, and don’t have applicability to us.” Robinson went further to point out the financial challenges that faced African Americans in attempting to build support for their lobby, arguing that Blacks, on the whole, were not as financially well off as other racial groups. This limited their ability to fund a lobby at necessary levels. Because the organization could not anticipate steady financial support, it was forced to be entrepreneurial in order secure the resources necessary to sustain its advocacy work. It continued to lean on the African American community, which supported the lobby through the annual events and other fundraisers. When it came to these activities, the Black celebrities such as Harry Belafonte, Arthur Ashe, and Ozzie Davis were critical to the success of the lobby. Belafonte, who had supported TransAfrica since its founding, and served on the board of directors at various points was particularly instrumental in helping to raise money for the organization. In the summer of 1979, Belafonte held two events that raised significant amounts of money for TransAfrica. This included a second benefit reception in Los Angeles hosted by Mayor Tom Bradley on 15 July 1979 where Belafonte was announced as the special guest. Shortly thereafter, on 21 August, Belafonte gave a benefit performance at Constitution Hall in Washington, DC, which raised over $17,000 for TransAfrica. In addition to being a spokesperson and board member for the organization, Belafonte would continue to do fundraising for TransAfrica and use his celebrity status to appeal to other African Americans to do the same. As discussed earlier in this chapter, TransAfrica leaned heavily on the religious organizations for financial support. Although Robinson had initially indicated his hope to call upon Black churches to support the organization, the contributions from the religious community transcended the Black churches themselves. In addition to funding from the National Council of Churches, which had been possible because of Rev. Robert C.S. Powell (who was a member of TransAfrica’s board of
directors and chair of the NCC’s Africa Committee), TransAfrica received grants from other religious organizations concerned with South Africa. This included substantial, and sometimes multi-year, commitments from the World Council of Churches’ Programme to Combat Racism, the Coalition of Human Needs of the Episcopal Church, and the Women’s Division of the Global Board of Ministries. The contributions from these church associations were a part of their broader and long-standing concern for the conditions of Blacks in Southern Africa. As part of their humanitarian work, they also supported the advocacy efforts of other organizations such as the Washington Office on Africa and the American Committee on Africa, who were also actively mobilizing to aid in the eradication of apartheid.

As TransAfrica mobilized to advance its mission of influencing U.S. policies toward Africa and the Caribbean, its efforts were hampered by the fact that it was a lobbying organization. This became most apparent during the first year of operations. Beyond the religious organizations, TransAfrica appealed to numerous well-resourced corporations and foundations to support the organization financially. These included the Ford Motor Company, IBM, the Northrop Corporation, Anheuser Busch, Safeway, Washington Gas, and Amtrak. Leaders from all of these corporations (and numerous others) declined invitations to TransAfrica’s first annual dinner. In declining to support the lobby, these organizations gave various reasons. These included claims that corporations were not concerned with international relations; were not allowed to support causes of a political nature; and those that indicated that their funds were already committed. What is more, many of these corporations adopted policies prohibiting them from making grants to organizations that were not incorporated under the 501c(3) non-profit tax status. Organizations that enjoyed this tax status were extremely limited in their ability to engage in political activities. However, they are able to receive tax-deductible donations from individuals, foundations, and corporations. This became a major challenge for TransAfrica. Because it was incorporated as a lobby its activities were wholly political, TransAfrica did not fit within the 501c(3) guidelines. This necessarily limited the organization’s fundraising ability, particularly in certain sectors of the African American community. To forestall financial hardship and provide a means by which individuals, corporations, and foundations could make tax-deductible donations in support of their efforts, TransAfrica’s board of directors established a 501c(3) corporation as an appendage to the lobby. The name of this organization would be TransAfrica Forum.

**TransAfrica Forum**

TransAfrica Forum was established as the research and educational component of TransAfrica. It was incorporated in 1979 but did not become fully active until 1981. The forum had its own board of directors, which came from the membership of the board of TransAfrica. Because of scarce resources, both entities were based in the same office and shared staff. Legally, the organizations were separate. Yet, they both operated under the banner of TransAfrica and supported its
overarching mission, with Randall Robinson serving as executive director of both units. As a research and educational center, TransAfrica Forum became the place through which many of the Black academics involved themselves in TransAfrica’s affairs. In fact, many of the Black scholars who had served on the board of the lobby were also a part of the board of the forum and played leading roles in the forum’s activities. In essence, the establishment of TransAfrica Forum divided the work of TransAfrica. The lobby stewarded the work of advancing political positions. Whereas the forum took on a multitude of tasks and initiatives focused on educating and engaging the public on the complex subject of U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. 

TransAfrica Forum’s major strategy focused on engaging the wider academic (and sometimes political) community in generating scholarly discourses about various topics related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and the diaspora, development assistance, and the conditions of Blacks throughout the world. Over the years, its board of directors included significant representation from the academic community with Ron Walters, Willard Johnson, and Joyce Ladner (who would later go on to serve as president of Howard University) serving as chair. The forum’s activities included the production of the journal, TransAfrica Forum, which was published three to four times a year and included articles on a wide range of topics related to the Black world. The journal included contributions from the national community of scholars concerned with political, economic, and social issues in Africa and the diaspora. It was augmented by the production of “TransAfrica Issue Briefs” which were generated by TransAfrica Forum staff and focused on the particular foreign policy issues that were of greatest concern at the time. Because much of the attention early on was given to the anti-apartheid crusade, many of the issue briefs focused on South Africa. Other notable activities hosted by the forum would include an annual foreign policy conference. The first of these conferences was held in 1981 at Howard University and would, over the years, take place at other locations in Washington, DC, including some of the Congressional hearing rooms on Capitol Hill.

Through its various activities and initiatives focused on research and education, the forum enabled TransAfrica to take on the characteristics of a comprehensive African American foreign policy think thank. Because its leadership had placed so strong emphasis on building a high profile organization, TransAfrica and TransAfrica Forum quickly became a highly desired place for many young Black professionals who were interested in U.S. foreign policy toward Africa and were generally concerned with the Southern African liberation struggles. Although TransAfrica opened its offices in 1978, with a two person staff consisting of Randall Robinson as executive director and Dolores Clemons as administrative assistant, the organization had a steady stream of young staff members who would work in paid and volunteer capacities in support of the work of the forum and the lobby. This included, for example, Singleton McAllister who worked at TransAfrica for a brief stint as assistant director between 1978 and 1979. At only twenty-six years of age, McAllister came to TransAfrica after working in the office of Congressman Parren J. Mitchell of Maryland. Following her brief stint at TransAfrica, McAllister would return to the hill to work for Congressman William Gray of Pennsylvania.
also attracted people like Cecelie Counts who came to work at TransAfrica in the summer of 1981 while still a student at Harvard Law. After graduating from law school in 1983, Counts would return to TransAfrica on a full time basis where her salary was funded for one year through Harvard’s public interest law fellowship. However, she would remain at TransAfrica until 1988 and become the central organizer of the Free South Africa Movement between 1984 and 1986.  

As the organization grew, it was able to quickly attract the support and involvement of well-known African American athletes, actors, and entertainers. It was not uncommon to have the names of celebrities such as Harry Belafonte, Arthur Ashe, and Danny Glover listed as members of TransAfrica’s board of directors. As an organization that would always struggle to fund its operating expenses and to raise its prominence in the Black community, the support this group would be critical. People like Belafonte, Ashe, and Glover not only made monetary contributions to TransAfrica over the years, but they also used their celebrity status to appeal to others to do the same. The Black celebrities who became outspoken against apartheid mobilized other entertainers and athletes to establish Artists and Athletes Against Apartheid (AAAA). Founded under the auspices of TransAfrica in 1983, AAAA was co-chaired by Belafonte and Ashe and mobilized more than sixty artists to declare their opposition to apartheid, including entertainers such as Nancy Wilson, Stevie Wonder, Sammy Davis, Jr., Phyllis Hyman, and all of the members of the O’Jays. The group and its members made collective statements indicating their refusal to perform in South Africa until apartheid was abolished. In appealing to his fellow colleagues in the entertainment community to stand in solidarity with the anti-apartheid struggle, Belafonte reminded them that, “if you go to Johannesburg or Sun City…and play to audiences, extracting inordinate amounts of money for your services and leaving little behind, by your presence, you are encouraging apartheid.”

The African American Foreign Policy Lobby: Institution Building and Adversarial Diplomacy

By building such a comprehensive and high profile organization, TransAfrica’s leadership accomplished the dual tasks of building a financial base for the organization and raising its profile and relevance among prominent African American leaders and, to the extent possible, among the Black masses. Within a few years after it was founded, TransAfrica would become the preeminent African American organization focused on advocating progressive U.S. policies toward Africa. TransAfrica accomplished the imperative task of inserting Black Americans—through an indigenous organization—into the burgeoning anti-apartheid movement and into the broader conversation about U.S. foreign policy. This addressed a major void in African American political organizing that had become apparent by the end of the 1970s. Up until then, Congressman Diggs had been the principal authority among African Americans interested in African liberation and U.S. foreign policy, more broadly. However, culminating with his resignation from Congress in 1980, Diggs’
fall from political superstardom had an immensely adverse impact on African American foreign policy advocacy efforts in the late 1970s.\textsuperscript{104} African Americans’ ineffectual intonation in U.S. foreign policy was further emphasized by the controversial career of Andrew Young as U.S. Permanent Ambassador to the U.N. during the Carter administration. As discussed earlier in this study, the conditions surrounding Young’s coerced resignation from his ambassadorship highlights the limitations faced by African Americans who sought to challenge U.S. foreign policies through existing institutions. These circumstances combined to render African Americans almost powerless when it came to advancing their oppositional foreign policy interests as they concerned Africa and the African diaspora. Therefore, by institutionalizing a foreign policy lobby, TransAfrica’s organizers and its leadership ensured that African American concerns about U.S. policies toward Africa would be vocalized.

This is not to suggest that there were not other African American organizations involved in the U.S. African liberation movement or engaged in the broader work of adversarial diplomacy. In fact, in different parts of the U.S. there were local-level activists working diligently to educate African Americans about the backwards and oppressive state of race relations in Southern Africa. In their own right, these activists were instrumental in educating the public and pressing their locally elected officials to be socially responsible in their political and economic policies dealing with Southern Africa. For example, in Washington DC, many African Americans organized around African liberation through community-based organizations such as the Southern Africa Support Project (SASP).\textsuperscript{105} SASP worked with local churches, labor and youth organizations, and the local colleges and universities and emphasized grassroots organizing.\textsuperscript{106} In fact, many of the activists involved with SASP—including Sylvia Hill and Cecelie Counts—would come to play a major role in TransAfrica, particularly in its early years and during the Free South Africa Movement.\textsuperscript{107} Moreover, other prominent African American political and social organizations had also demonstrated an interest in Africa. This included organizations such as the NAACP, the Urban League, and many of the Black fraternities and sororities who had Africa committees as well as the Black churches who also demonstrated a concern with these issues. For this reason, they were included in the CBC’s 1976 Leadership Summit on Africa. However, there were a number of important distinctions between TransAfrica and these other associations concerned with the African liberation and U.S. foreign policy. That is, TransAfrica was to be the institution that would amalgamate these otherwise loosely organized efforts.\textsuperscript{108} Different from these other entities, TransAfrica would also function as a lobby in the literal sense. Thus, the organization would be free to take political positions on issues as lobbies do. Part of the vision of TransAfrica was that it would hold court with the other foreign policy lobbies.\textsuperscript{109}

With anti-apartheid as its primary focus, TransAfrica also became a major player among the multiracial community of organizations in Washington, DC mobilizing in support of the Southern African liberation struggles. Other organizations involved with these same issues included, for example, the
Washington Office on Africa and the American Committee on Africa. Undoubtedly, these organizations made important contributions to the U.S.-based African liberation movement. Many of them were established well before TransAfrica and would work in partnership with TransAfrica on decisive fundraising efforts and foreign policy campaigns as the African American lobby began to take center stage in the late 1970s and 1980s. While they had similar policy objectives, TransAfrica differed from these other organizations in a very important way. As multiracial as these organizations may have been—and some even had Africans and African Americans in key leadership roles—they were not Black organizations. Thus, TransAfrica became the indigenous African American organization focused on advocating progressive U.S. policies toward Africa. In many ways, Randall Robinson and TransAfrica would become in the 1980s what Charles Diggs and the Africa Subcommittee had been in the 1970s. That is, TransAfrica, as an institution, morphed into the foremost intermediary of African American adversarial diplomacy.

1 See TransAfrica Bylaws as modified on 23 September 1979, TransAfrica Archives, Box 3.
2 Active between 1941 and 1955, the Council on African Affairs also focused on the issue of African liberation at a time when colonialism was alive and well on the African continent. Led by middle class Black intellectuals, such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Max Yergan, and Paul and Eslanda Robeson, the CAA, like TransAfrica was an organization of elites. See Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: African Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997); David Henry Anthony III, Max Yergan: Race Man, Internationalist, Cold Warrior (New York: New York University Press, 2006).
3 Courtland Cox, interview with the author, 17 August 2010, Washington, DC.
4 In fact, overall, there was not a collective concern for Southern Africa or for international affairs among members of the CBC. To the extent that the CBC had an international agenda, it was stewarded largely by Diggs and a few other members such as Representative Ronald Dellums of California. See, for example, Raymond W. Copson, The Congressional Black Caucus and Foreign Policy (1971-2002) (Hauppauge, NY: Nova Science Publishers, 2003); Ronald V. Dellums and H. Lee Halterman, Lying Down with the Lions: A Public Life from the Streets of Oakland to the Halls of Power (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); C. Payne Lucas, interview with the author, 16 March 2010, Washington, DC; Herschelle Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011.
5 Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2010, Boston, MA.
7 Individual pledges came from J.R. Henderson of the Henderson Travel Service, Atlanta, GA ($200), Robert Browne ($250), Roscoe Brown, Jr. of New York University ($200), David Eaton, ($200), KoKo Farrow ($50 per month annually), Barbara Hansel ($200), David Ruffin ($25), Terry Wallace ($50), Willard Johnson ($250), Samuel C. Adams ($250), and Carl Rowan ($1000). See “Black Leadership Conference on Africa September 1976” financial and organizational support pledges sheet, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6.
9 C. Payne Lucas, interview with the author.
10 Hazel Carby, Race Men (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000); Anthony, Max Yergan.
11 Robinson, Defending the Spirit, xiii.
12 Ibid.
13 Francis Njubi Nesbitt makes this same point. See Nesbitt, Race for Sanctions, 104.
14 Robinson’s parents met when they were both students at the historically Black Virginia Union University. Describing his parents in affectionate terms, Robinson recalls that his father, Maxie
Cleveland Robinson, Sr. was a stellar athlete, “starring in every sport…the campus hero and a local legend.” He describes his mother, Doris Alma Jones, as “as a straight-A student and beautiful.” Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 9.


17 Ibid., 41.


19 Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 64.

20 Ibid., 65.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., 69.

23 Ibid.

24 One of the most notable contributions came from Harvard Law Professor Derek Bok. Bok would go on to serve as dean of Harvard Law before becoming president of the University. Ibid., 70.

25 Ibid., 79.

26 Ibid., 80.

27 Ibid., 85.

28 Ibid., 91.

29 Willard Johnson, interview with the author, 7 May 2011, Boston, MA.

30 The name “TransAfrica” derived from a paper that Challenor had written where she employed the concept “TransAfricanism” to characterize the relationship between the political struggles of Africans, African Americans, and other African descendents spread throughout the globe. Challenor, interview with the author; Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 107; Herschelle Challenor, “Trans-Africanism: A New Strategy for Black Americanism?” *Center Report* 5, No. 5 (1972), 7-10.

31 Challenor, interview with the author.

32 Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 119.


34 C. Payne Lucas had been active in African American political life since the 1960s and provided an important connection between TransAfrica’s founders and the other groups of African Americans concerned with Africa. Like many of his contemporaries, Lucas had gotten involved in political organizing during the Civil Rights Movement. After completing graduate studies at American University, Lucas became involved with the Peace Corps—climbing the ranks from volunteer to director of the Africa region over a period of ten years. Just a few years earlier, in 1971, Lucas and his colleague William Kirker co-founded the organization Africare which remains the preeminent African American non-government organization focused on providing development aid to Africa.

35 “Press Release Announcing the event held at Max Robinson’s House” 24 September 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6.

36 Willard Johnson, interview with the author.

37 Ibid.

38 Ronald Walters, interview with the author, 9 December 2009; Challenor, interview with the author.

39 Walters, interview, 9 December 2009.


41 Richard Gordon Hatcher, interview with the author, 9 July 2010, Gary, IN.

42 Ronald W. Walters, interview, 9 December 2009, Washington, DC.

43 Walters interview, 9 December 2009.

44 This also included Senator Edward Brooke, the lone Black in the U.S. Senate who was not member of the Black Caucus. See TransAfrica Reception, December 10, 1977 Washington, DC, list of names to be invited to the reception, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6.
Robinson would hold the title “executive director designate” until TransAfrica realized the financial goal of $100,000. Part of this money would be used to support staff salaries, including Robinson’s. In the interim, Robinson remained on Diggs’ congressional payroll. See Randall Robinson Letter to Coleman Young Dated 10 November 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6.

Percy Sutton had also been Malcolm X’s attorney.


TransAfrica letterhead from 1986, TransAfrica Archives Box 1.

“Invitation to reception at Max Robinson’s house” TransAfrica archives, Box 6, Folder 16.


The suggested donation was indicated in a form letter sent out under Randall Robinson’s name. This letter was printed on Charles Diggs’ office letterhead, which, at the time lists Randall Robinson as Diggs’ administrative assistant. See Randall Robinson form letter to unknown recipients, undated, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 16.

Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 107; Press Release Announcing the event held at Max Robinson’s House, dated 24 September 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 16.

There are different recollections of the amount of money raised at this reception. Randall Robinson reports in his autobiography that the reception generated $10,000. However, in a press release issued on the day of the reception, Hatcher and Robinson announced that the reception had generated $7,500. At the same time, Robinson mentions in his autobiography that the reception exceeded their expectations. Thus, it could be the case that the press release was written before the accounts from the reception had been reconciled and the $7,500 reflected the amount they hoped to yield. It could also have been the case that contributions to the reception continued to be received beyond the date of the reception. See Robinson, *Defending the Spirit*, 107; Press Release Announcing the event held at Max Robinson’s House, dated 24 September 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 15.

TransAfrica’s first office was located at 1325 18th St., NW, Ste., 202, Washington, DC.

Press Release Announcing the event held at Max Robinson’s House, dated 24 September 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 16.

Ibid.

The strategy of building a mass base was frequently articulated by TransAfrica’s organizers including Randall Robinson. This was mentioned in the press and at various events. See, for example, “New Lobby of Blacks Will Seek to Influence U.S. Policy in Africa” *Washington Post*, 22 April 1978, A9.

The existence of a membership base was consistent with the organization’s bylaws, which provided for varying levels of membership in the association. Article III of TransAfrica’s bylaws establish four categories of membership in the organization with associated dues. The membership categories at the time of incorporation in 1977 were general ($12.50); sustaining ($25.00); sponsor ($100.00); and life ($500.00). See TransAfrica Bylaws as modified on 23 September 1979, TransAfrica Archives, Box 3.

Harry Belafonte, interview with the author, 8 February, New York, NY.

The invitation to the event included a list of people who agreed to be sponsors of the reception. This included Mark Stepp who served as chairman of the Detroit Trans Africa reception committee and the following sponsors: Rev. Charles G. Adams; Richard Austin; Robert Battle III; Jerry Blocker; Rep. John Conyers; Wardell Croft; Rep. Charles Diggs; Lawrence P. Doss; Walter Douglas; Erma Henderson; Arthur L. Johnson; Clara Stanton Jones; Francis Kornegay; Josephine Harrel Love; Beverly Payne; Longworth D. Quinn, Sr.; Horace L. Sheffield, Jr.; Tom Turner; and Reginald Wilson. See Invitation to Detroit TransAfrica Reception; Detroit TransAfrica Reception Committee Press Release, dated 27 December 1977; Letter from Congressman Charles Diggs to Mayor Coleman Young requesting Young to serve as host of Detroit benefit reception, dated 10 November 1977; Letter from Tom Turner, President of Metropolitan Detroit AFL-CIO Council to Congressman Charles

62 The Atlanta reception was hosted by Shirley C. Franklin and Lee Richardson who were co-chairpersons of the Atlanta TransAfrica reception committee. Franklin would go on to serve as Mayor of Atlanta from 2002-2010 and at the time, Lee Richardson served as Director of Development for the Morehouse College School of Medicine. The reception was held at the home of Dr. and Mrs. Cleveland L. Dennard, 691 Beckwith St., S.W., Atlanta. See, invitation to Atlanta TransAfrica Benefit Reception, undated; Press Release, “Mayor Maynard Jackson, Senator Julian Bond, and Jesse Hill host benefit for new Africa lobby, dated 27 February 1978; letter from Lee Richardson to Richard Hatcher expressing interest in helping organize the Atlanta reception and following up on logistical details, dated 19 October 1977; TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 10. Also see “TransAfrica Lobby Group to Open D.C. Office,” The Washington Afro-American, 7-11 March 1978.

63 The Los Angeles Reception Committee was chaired by Marilyn Hudson and included Tommye Howard, Dr. and Mrs. Joseph Howard, Dr. and Mrs. Warren Brooks, Vickie Simmons, Paul Hudson, Margaret Ware, and Robert Farrell. See, Invitation to Los Angeles TransAfrica benefit reception, undated; letter from Randall Robinson to Carlton Goodlett of the National Association of Newspaper Publishers, dated 16 March 1978; letter from Randall Robinson to Paul Hudson, dated 13 December 1977; press release, “Mayor Thomas Bradley hosts benefit reception for new Africa lobby,” dated 17 March 1978,” TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 12.


66 Invitation to 1979 Detroit TransAfrica Benefit Reception, undated; invitation to 1979 TransAfrica Los Angeles Benefit reception with Harry Belafonte as special guest, undated; TransAfrica Archives, Box 1.

67 Unaddressed form letter from Representative Charles Diggs and Cardiss Collins, co-chairs of the Congressional Black Caucus International Affairs Subcommittee inviting participation in the second session of the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa to be held on 20 May, 1978, dated 5 April 1978, Congressional Black Caucus Archives, Box Unknown, Folder Unknown; Undated memo from Congressman Charles Diggs to Members of the Congressional Black Caucus announcing the reconvening of the Black Leadership Conference on Africa, Congressional Black Caucus Archives.

68 Black Leadership Conference on Africa reconvened by the Congressional Black Caucus and TransAfrica 20 May 1978 at the Shoreham Hotel 9:30AM, Washington, DC, Agenda, Congressional Black Caucus Archives.

69 Ibid.


71 Ibid.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid.

74 The annual dinner would be held at other prominent DC locations including the Washington Hilton Hotel. See, for example, Letter from the Washington Hilton Hotel to Randall Robinson confirming details for lodging for Bishop Desmond Tutu, dated 27 February 1981, TransAfrica Archives, Box 4, Folder 18.

75 The attendance of 500 fell short of the anticipated number of 1,000. See unaddressed form letter from Representative Charles Diggs and Cardiss Collins, co-chairs of the Congressional Black Caucus International Affairs Subcommittee inviting participation in the second session of the CBC Leadership...
Conference on Africa to be held on 20 May 1978, dated 5 April 1978, Congressional Black Caucus Archives.

76 TransAfrica Budgets, TransAfrica Archives, Box 1, Folder 1.
78 Invitation to TransAfrica’s first annual dinner in 1978, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder 6.
79 Letter from Randall Robinson to Sidney Poitier confirming Poitier’s agreement to serve as emcee at the fourth annual TransAfrica dinner, dated 8 April 1981, Box 4, Folder 18; Letter from Richard Hatcher to various African ambassadors inviting them to the annual dinner, date unknown, TransAfrica Archives, Box 5, Folder 6; Letter from Randall Robinson to Ossie Davis, dated 23 June 1982, TransAfrica Archives, Box 2, Folder Unknown; Opening Remarks for the Master of Ceremonies, Seventh Annual TransAfrica Dinner, Washington Hilton Hotel, 9 June 1984, Mr. Brock Peters, TransAfrica Archives, Box 2.
81 Address delivered by the Honorable Ernest N. Morial Mayor of New Orleans and President of the National Conference of Mayors, for the Eight Annual TransAfrica dinner, 1 June, 1985, TransAfrica Archives, Box 1, folder unknown; Address by His Excellency Salim Ahmed Salim, President of the Thirty Fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly, Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations, at the Third Annual TransAfrica dinner, 31 May, 1980, TransAfrica Archives, Box 4, Folder unknown; Transcript of speech delivered by the Honorable Michael Manley on the occasion of the Fifth Annual TransAfrica Benefit Dinner, June 5, 1982 in Washington, DC, TransAfrica Archives, Box 3, Folder unknown; address by Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice Bishop, to the Sixth Annual TransAfrica Dinner, 4 June 1983, TransAfrica Archives, Box 2, folder unknown; Invitation to TransAfrica’s 1979 benefit dinner on 29 May, 1979, listing Ambassador Andrew Young as the guest speaker, TransAfrica archives, Box 2, Folder 6; Letter from Desmond Tutu to Randall Robinson accepting invitation to speak at the fourth annual TransAfrica dinner, dated 24 February 1981, TransAfrica Archives, Box 4, Folder 18.
82 During the organizing efforts in 1976, 1977, and 1978 Randall Robinson regularly communicated with leaders of African and Caribbean nations enlisting their endorsement of TransAfrica. See for example, memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with H.E. Andre Coulbary of Senegal (printed on Rep. Charles Diggs’ Congressional letterhead), dated 26 January 1978, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with Ambassador Boakye of Ghana, dated 11 November 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with Ambassador Mookodi of Botswana, dated 11 November 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with Nigerian Ambassador, Olujimi Jolaso (this meeting was attended by Dorothy Anderson as well), dated 25 October 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with Kenyan Ambassador or Mbugua (along with Dorothy Anderson), dated 17 October 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file detailing meeting with Zambian Ambassador Ngonda, dated 8 November 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file detailing meeting with Ibrahim Sima of the Republic of Mali, undated, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, Folder unknown; memorandum from Randall Robinson to file, detailing meeting with Ambassador Makeka of Lesotho, dated 8 November 1977, TransAfrica Archives, Box 6, folder unknown.
83 See, for example, invitation to TransAfrica’s second annual dinner, 29 May 1979, which lists two categories of sponsors, TransAfrica Archives, Box 2, Folder 6; May 29 Sponsor list, dated 16 March 1979, TransAfrica Archives, Box 2, Folder 18.
85 This growth would be represented through the $62,000 in net proceeds from the 1981 dinner and a profit of $91,730 in 1985. These proceeds were significant considering TransAfrica’s operating expenses hovered at around $325,000 in the early 1980s. TransAfrica budgets, TransAfrica Archives,
187

Box 1, Folder 1. Also see, Michael Beaubien, “Making Waves in Foreign Policy: The Angry Rift Between the U.S. State Department and TransAfrica Highlights the Impact of Blacks in Shaping American Foreign Policy in the Third World,” Black Enterprise, April 1982, 42.
86 Jim Davis, interview with the author, 10 December 2009, Washington, DC.
87 Robinson, Defending the Spirit, 109.
89 Ibid.
90 Invitation to Los Angeles Benefit Reception on 15 July 1979 hosted by Los Angeles Mayor Tom Bradley and with Harry Belafonte as special guest, TransAfrica Archives; Belafonte, interview with the author.
93 Jim Davis, interview with the author, 10 December 2009, Washington, DC.
95 Mwiza Munthali, interview with the author, 19 November 2011; Challenor, interview with the author.
SASP was a multifaceted, grassroots, and community-organizing enterprise committed to raising public awareness about issues of foreign policy with a particular focus on Southern Africa. It was founded by activists Sylvia Hill, Cecelie Counts, Adwoa Dunn-Mouton, Kathy Flewellen, Rose Brown, and Cheryl Gardner and had grown out their earlier work with short-lived organizations such as the Southern Africa News Collaborate (SANC). SANC was founded in 1975 following the participation of some of these same foreign affairs activists in the Sixth Pan African Congress. Continuing the work of their earlier efforts through SANC, SASP—which produced a newsletter called Struggle, which was largely in the local Washington, DC-area, but also had a national reach. Struggle contained essays and other information that worked to educate everyday people on issues of U.S. foreign policy toward Southern Africa and informed them on ways in which they could involve themselves in the struggle which, while half a world away, was understood as directly related to their struggles to enjoy the benefits of full citizenship in the United States. SASP’s newsletter Struggle was in print for about three years and had a distribution of about 500. See Minter, “Interview with Sylvia Hill, September 23, 2003,” in Minter, et al, No Easy Victories. The original name of SASP was the “Southern Africa Summer Project.” This was changed to “Southern Africa Support Project” to reflect the organization’s broader work. See William Minter, “Interview with Sylvia Hill,” in William Minter, et al., No Easy Victories. Interview available at http://www.noeasyvictories.org/interviews/int11_hill.php. Accessed 19 July 2010; Sylvia Hill, interview with the author, 11 December 2009, Washington, DC.


The organizing capacity of SASP would prove critical to TransAfrica’s efforts to employ mass mobilization during the Free South Africa Movement when the latter was launched in November 1984.

C. Payne Lucas, interview with the author, 16 May 2010, Washington, DC.

These include, for example, the America Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the China Lobby, and the Cuban Lobby. See Herschelle Challenor, interview with the author, 9 February 2011, Atlanta, GA; Willard Johnson, personal communication with the author, 19 November 2011.
CONCLUSION

In an address at New York’s Riverside Baptist Church on 4 April 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr. gave several reasons for his opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam.¹ Most important among these was his belief that the Vietnam conflict was a manifestation of the internationalization of American racism. He insisted that he could not be opposed to racism and discrimination in the U.S. and not speak against the proliferation of these ideals and practices elsewhere in the world.² As a critic of the U.S.’s domestic and foreign policies, King contended that the absence of an integrated U.S. foreign policy establishment impelled American racism squarely into the U.S.’s conduct of international relations.³ For King, U.S. involvement in Vietnam and in the Dominican Republic was a direct outcome of racism in U.S. foreign policy.⁴ As Charles Henry points out, King argued that “men of the White West…have grown up in a racist culture, and their thinking is colored by that fact…they don’t respect anyone who is not White.”⁵ Premised on the belief in a lucid connection between the racism endured by African Americans and the U.S.’s involvement in Vietnam, King’s disposition was consistent with a growing concern among African American leaders about the way that the U.S. engaged with the rest of the world.

Although an exceptional example given his political stature, King’s opposition to the Vietnam conflict underscores the fact that African Americans have always had interests in U.S. foreign policy and have often employed non-traditional means to communicate these concerns. As was the case with domestic issues, African American activists used strategies such as collective action and the rhetorical tradition to communicate their foreign policy concerns. Although these interests had been historically marginalized, it became more apparent in the post-civil rights era. More often than not, the diplomatic interests of African Americans have been contradictory to the official foreign policy positions of the U.S. and have been advanced in the absence of access to institutions charged with the conduct of international relations. Moreover, King’s use of the pulpit to communicate his opposition to the Vietnam War underscores the multifaceted ways that African Americans have communicated their foreign policy concerns to a wider public when these interests could not be voiced through traditional means. By arguing a connection between domestic race relations and U.S. foreign policy, King’s outspoken opposition to Vietnam is a compelling exemplar of adversarial diplomacy.

In the post-civil rights era, African American involvement in the international system was framed around the belief that there was, in fact, a connection between the Black freedom struggle in the U.S. and the Black and Third World struggles around the globe. By speaking out against the manifestations of American racism in domestic and foreign policy both at home and abroad, African American activists advanced their diplomatic interests even though they were largely precluded from having full access to the institutions that had been traditionally charged with the conduct of international relations. The fact that they had very limited opportunities to have their foreign policy related concerns addressed was the basis for many African
American activists to look to alternative ways to communicate their objections to U.S. domestic and foreign policies. In the process, African American international political activism of the post-civil rights era defined the parameters and approaches to adversarial diplomacy.

**Adversarial Diplomacy and African American Politics in the Post-Civil Rights Era**

For African American political leaders, adversarial diplomacy tended to follow three major paths in the post-civil rights era. First was adversarial diplomacy exemplified by King. His outspoken opposition to Vietnam is characteristic of adversarial diplomacy that sought to challenge manifestations of American racism even though they did not directly involve Africa, African Americans, or other African descendants. Second was the desire of African American activists to connect with the politics of African nation-states that had struggled for their independence from European colonialism. These connections were often motivated by the desire of Black Americans to situate their domestic struggle against racism within a global Black freedom struggle. Through their direct engagement with the Black political leaders in the various African states, African Americans were also able to see the different ways that Black people lived in the parts of the world where they were the numerical majority. This presented an important counter narrative to the American system of race relations, which was premised on a belief in Black inferiority. Finally, beginning in the late 1960s, adversarial diplomacy was heavily centered on the desire of African American activists to aid in the liberation struggles on the African continent. African liberation was the impetus for the foreign policy advocacy efforts of Charles Diggs and the Congressional Black Caucus, the founding of the African Liberation Support Committee and, ultimately, the establishment of TransAfrica in 1977.

Although I portray adversarial diplomacy through African American politics, the diverse approaches taken by African Americans to advance their foreign policy interests are not characteristic of this group alone or of ethnic constituencies in general. Rather adversarial diplomacy can be used to describe approaches to international relations taken by any faction that has limited access to, or influence in, the state foreign policy apparatuses and thus must employ alternative means to magnify their foreign policy concerns in the international system. What is more, for ethnic minority groups with transnational alliances, adversarial diplomacy often occurs when these groups have aimed to advocate on behalf of the places in the world with which they claim transnational alliances. There is no more telling example of the characteristics described above than the diplomatic engagements between African Americans and Africa in the post-civil rights era.
African Americans and African Liberation:
Defining Approaches to Adversarial Diplomacy

As African Americans realized significant advances in their freedom struggle in the U.S., their relationship with the political affairs in the wider African diaspora also began to change. Milestones such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 succeeded in chipping away at the institutions of racism and segregation in the U.S. Consequently, African Americans were able to participate in domestic and international politics in ways that were impossible previously. At the same time, however, the situation on the African continent grew progressively worse. While many African states in the north had won their independence struggles, the Southern colonies—largely held by the United Kingdom and Portugal—were steeped in independence struggles followed by civil wars over White minority rule. Thus, as the Civil Rights Movement ended, African American adversarial diplomacy centered on the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

One of the most profound achievements of African American politics in the post-civil rights era was that, through an intricate web of political maneuvering, the issue of Black self-determination in Southern Africa became squarely woven into the fabric of Black political discourses. In other words, if there was any semblance of a Black Political Agenda, the issue of African Liberation was very much a part of it. Though ideologically fragmented on domestic issues, African American activists brought national and international attention to the fact that the U.S. was supporting the White minority regimes in Southern Africa. They understood these as legacies of European colonialism and manifestations of American racism, and insisted that the U.S. be socially responsible in its political and economic dealings with Southern Africa.

As I have shown in the earlier chapters of this study, the diverse approaches employed by African Americans in support of the African liberation struggles tended to reflect the political strategies characteristic of each ideological camp. For Black radicals, their commitment to African liberation materialized through mass mobilization. This is exemplified by the series of African Liberation Days held between 1972 and 1975 and the establishment of the African Liberation Support Committee (ASLC). For the more moderate Black political leaders, their commitment to African liberation proliferated through activism in Congress and other settings where elected officials could use their political capital to mobilize people and resources. This latter group included the cadre of African American academics who invoked their political activism in American colleges, universities, and in their professional associations. They also lent their talents in support of the lobbying efforts underway in Congress and played a critical role in the eventual establishment of TransAfrica.

Though these approaches to supporting African liberation varied greatly, they collectively present an example of the types of strategies that a politically marginalized group may employ to advance their diplomatic objectives when they have limited access to the institutions of official diplomacy, and when their foreign
policy objectives run counter to those of the state. In the case of African Americans, their efforts to support the African liberation struggles occurred almost entirely at the supra state level. As members of a racial group with transnational alliances, African American activists advanced their adversarial diplomatic interests through Congressional politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building. These multifaceted and non-traditional approaches to international relations can be examined through the framework of adversarial diplomacy. Doing so enables us to see that when a political faction (e.g. racial group with transnational alliances or a political party in disagreement with the foreign policies of the administration) has limited opportunities to advance their foreign policy objectives through official channels, then they will look to other means of amplifying these concerns both domestically and internationally.

**Congressional Politics**

In the course of a quarter century run in the U.S. House of Representatives (1955-1980) Charles Diggs became a prominent figure in nearly all areas of African American politics. However, his most profound impact was on U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. Although Diggs’ activism extended beyond the halls of Congress, his diplomatic and foreign policy work had the widest reach because of his membership and later chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa. His activism underscores the possibilities of adversarial diplomacy through Congress. Diggs used his Congressional seniority, his chairmanship of the Africa Subcommittee, and his leadership role in the Congressional Black Caucus to draw attention to the U.S. policies that effectively supported White minority rule in Southern Africa. In many ways, Diggs and his office had become an institution in and of itself.

As a representative of African America, Diggs’ diplomatic efforts situated the foreign policy interests of African Americans in direct opposition to the foreign policies of the U.S., vis-à-vis the Department of State, during the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. By not actively supporting the efforts to eradicate White minority rule in Southern Africa, successive U.S. Presidential administrations and Congresses, in effect, sided with the White minority regimes and the conflict over U.S. policies toward Southern Africa became, in many respects, a Black-White issue. As a steward of African American interests, Diggs’ ongoing challenges to U.S. policies toward Africa further placed African Americans in direct opposition to the U.S. on questions of foreign policy. In the end, this was one of Diggs’ most significant contributions. That is, he showed how a marginalized racial or ethnic group could advance its diplomatic interests through Congress, particularly when these interests necessitated a challenge to existing state policies. Moreover, Diggs’ activism showed how a lone representative in Congress could be a principal arbiter of adversarial diplomacy for a racial or ethnic group. Stated otherwise, Diggs’ 25-year run in Congress illustrates how adversarial diplomacy was possible through representative government.
Charles Diggs’ international political activism left an ineffaceable mark on American diplomacy in general and adversarial diplomacy in particular. More than three decades have passed since his fall from political stardom in 1980. Yet, Diggs’ international political activism through Congress remains a prototype. He used the position of Congressional Representative to draw international attention to issues pertaining to Africa (and U.S. foreign policy in general). In the process, Diggs illustrated that it is possible for a member of Congress, who identifies with a particular racial group, to use his or her status to challenge U.S. foreign policy.

Diggs’ use of his Congressional position to advocate for a particular U.S. foreign policy matter was not at all a novel concept in Congress. It underscores the argument that Congress should be, in fact, a co-determiner of U.S. foreign policy in partnership with the President. It is the system of checks and balances created by a three branch national government and aided by party politics that makes this so. In other words, through a series of exchanges and negotiations with the President, Congress should be able to have a major role in determining the best interests of Americans on questions of foreign policy. Instead, as Stephen Weismann has argued, Congress, in consequence of the politics of the cold war, had for some time, embraced a culture of deference to the White House on matters of foreign policy. However, Diggs disrupts this. His Congressional activism on African liberation points to the fact that Congress, through any of its members can take a proactive approach on foreign policy issues and engage in diplomatic missions of its own. In effect, Diggs has underscored Congress’ multi-functional role in U.S. foreign policy. That is, Congress’ international powers extend far beyond than merely being the branch of government authorized by the Constitution to declare war and the associated power of authorizing military appropriations on recommendation from the President. If there is novelty to Diggs’ Congressional foreign policy efforts, it is that his international political activism, nay, adversarial diplomacy, was framed around his ties to African America, the belief that race and the associated struggles against oppression transcended nation-state borders, and the conviction that African Americans ought to aid in the liberation struggles in Africa.

In the years since Diggs’ departure from Congress, African American Representatives such as Ronald V. Dellums and Maxine Waters—both from California—have engaged in international activism through Congress that fit neatly within the framework of adversarial diplomacy and the Diggs prototype. Like Diggs, Dellums was a founding member of the Congressional Black Caucus and served on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. During the zenith of the U.S. anti-apartheid movement, Dellums played a leading role in Congress adoption of legislation imposing economic sanctions on South Africa. He was a critical part of the movement in Congress that resulted in the adoption of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which included an override of a veto by President Ronald Reagan.

Even before her election to the 102nd Congress, Maxine Waters had been actively involved in U.S. foreign policy issues. As a member of the California State Assembly from 1976 to 1991, Waters used her political stature to support the
movement against apartheid. Her activism and concern for foreign policy issues continued in Congress. She has been prominent in African American political circles and an active supporter of TransAfrica and of Randall Robinson. As prototypes for the use of adversarial diplomacy through Congressional politics, Dellums and Waters (like Diggs) have shown that it is not only the White House and the Department of State who can speak on behalf of Americans in the international system.

Intellectual Politics

The organizing efforts of African American academics in the 1960s and 1970s illustrate yet another approach employed by a racial group when their diplomatic interests are in opposition to those of the state. These can also be readily situated within the framework of adversarial diplomacy. These efforts stand independently. However, they also proved to be an integral part of Charles Diggs’ Congressional lobbying efforts on U.S. foreign policy. As an independent entity, the cadre of intellectuals—exemplified by those discussed in this study—posed vehement challenges to American universities, their academic disciplines, and professional associations to engage the African liberation struggles in their discourses. By establishing organizations such as the African Heritage Studies Association, African American academics created spaces where their oppositional cerebral interests on domestic and international issues could be cultivated. Challenging these institutions and associations caused academic units and organizations focusing on African studies and international relations to deal with the litany of issues related to the liberation of Southern Africa. Otherwise, these entities and the people involved in them merely functioned as agents of the state; lending their technical expertise to validate existing U.S. policies that supported White minority rule in Southern Africa.

In the early 1970s, there was no organization, with a national reach, indigenous to African America that focused on U.S. foreign policy. In the absence of such an organization, Charles Diggs and the Africa Subcommittee became that institution. In many ways, his office fulfilled the functions of a foreign policy think thank, to the degree that a Congressional office could assume such a role. This was owed in no small measure to the commitment of a core group of African American scholars with expertise and interest in foreign policy and African politics that lent their talents to support the work of African liberation through the Africa Subcommittee. Rather than using their expertise solely in support of organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations, the Brookings Institution, the Congressional Research Service, and the Department of State, these scholars lent their talents in support of Diggs’ Congressional activism. Their work in both paid and volunteer capacities enabled Diggs’ office to absorb some of the functions of a foreign policy think thank for African Americans. That is to say that their scholarly endeavors provided the subject matter expertise necessary for Diggs—as Congressman and subcommittee chair—to take informed positions on foreign policy issues.
People like Herschelle Challenor, Willard Johnson, Ronald Walters, and Goler Teal Butcher provided a critical connection between the lobbying efforts of Charles Diggs in Congress and the broader community of scholar-activists concerned with African liberation. Many of these academics had spheres of influence that reached far beyond the Congressional offices and universities in which they worked. These connections were invaluable to the efforts to mobilize a wider group of scholars and activists to focus their intellectual energies on African liberation. The most telling examples of the use of these connections were the foreign policy conferences held in 1972 and 1976. These include the one that Herschelle Challenor organized in Barranquitas, Puerto Rico in January 1972; the African American National Conference on Africa, held in May of that same year; and the CBC Leadership Conference on Africa held in September of 1976.

Perhaps the greatest contribution that these Black intellectuals made to mobilizing African Americans around African liberation is that they were the masterminds behind the idea of creating an African American foreign policy lobby for Africa and the African diaspora. However, their work did not stop there. This same group was a critical part of the effort to institutionalize TransAfrica and many of them continued to lend their technical expertise to the organization, particularly in its early years. This same group was foundational to the development of TransAfrica’s educational affiliate TransAfrica Forum and comprised its scholar’s council. Thus, in addition to being regular supporters of all of TransAfrica’s multifaceted efforts to mobilize African Americans around the host of issues related to U.S. foreign policy toward Africa, this group was a major part of the organization’s brain trust. The community of academics active in the Black foreign policy advocacy circles both before and after TransAfrica’s founding has shown that technical expertise on U.S. foreign policy is an imperative component of adversarial diplomacy.

Mass Mobilization

Although they located their efforts wholly outside of the traditional institutions and channels of political advocacy, the international political activism of the Black left made an undisputable contribution to the effort to mobilize African Americans to support the liberation struggles in Southern Africa. In unprecedented ways, the ALSC-led African Liberation Day mobilizations ushered the Southern African liberation struggles to the forefront of issues of concern to the wider American public. Moreover, by launching an ambitious fundraising campaign (with a goal of $40,000 in 1973 and $75,000 in 1974) and mobilizing more than 100,000 people to stand in solidarity with African liberation struggles, the ALSC politicized Black Americans in what were then novel ways. In the process, the Black left succeeded in defining mass mobilization as an approach to adversarial diplomacy. These approaches materialized as the African Liberation Days between 1972 and 1975.

The African Liberation Days demonstrate that adversarial diplomacy can take on a decidedly social movement character. By way of explanation, when a political faction has limited access to, or influence in, the development of foreign policy
through traditional means, it will engage in contentious politics in order to advance its foreign policy and diplomatic objectives. The ALD marches were pioneered by Black radicals who rejected the idea that change in U.S. relations with Africa could be achieved through traditional channels. Thus, their efforts to mobilize mass demonstrations in support of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa were a groundbreaking use of contentious politics to marshal the support of African Americans for a political issue nearly half a world away. This was largely because they located their activism outside of existing institutions and, at times, rejected the invitations to support the advocacy efforts pursued in other spaces, such as in the House of Representatives.

Like their contemporaries working on Africa and foreign policy issues through Congress and in the universities, the leadership of the Black left was very much a part of the Black elite. That is to say that many of them were intellectuals in the professional sense and had academic credentials akin to those of their more moderate counterparts. The principal dissimilarity between the two groups was their approach to political engagement. Endowed with an impressive volume of political capital in consequence of the 1970 Congress of African People and the National Black Political Convention of 1972, Black radicals were thrust into the political spotlight. As part of an ideologically fragmented Black political community, the Black Left activists played a critical role in cementing African liberation as an issue of importance to African American politics in the post-civil rights era.

External and internal factors would ultimately render the organizing efforts of the Black Left more or less defunct by the mid 1970s. These included increased government surveillance of the activities of Black radicals and the pronounced ideological factions among the leadership. Still, the contributions of this kind of political activism had a lasting impact on African American politics in that it cemented mass mobilization as a viable strategy and approach to adversarial diplomacy. In other words, the efforts of the ALSC to mobilize African Americans to stand in solidarity with the liberation struggles in Southern Africa illustrates that groups lacking access to, or influence in, official diplomacy may engage in contentious politics to advance their diplomatic objectives. This was groundbreaking in the early 1970s, as this approach had only been utilized on domestic matters, as had been the case during the modern Civil Rights Movement. This organizing model was repeated in the 1980s, as African American activists, largely through TransAfrica, became a central part of the movement against apartheid when it crystallized into the Free South Africa Movement in November 1984.

**Institution Building**

The establishment of TransAfrica filled an imperative void in African American political organizing. At a time when African Americans still had very limited access to the institutions where official diplomacy took place, branding TransAfrica as an *African American* lobby for Africa and the African Diaspora ensured that there would be an institution focused on organizing African American leaders to advocate
progressive and socially responsible U.S. policies toward Africa and the African Diaspora. With a specific focus on Southern Africa—particularly South Africa—the establishment of TransAfrica also ensured an organized African American presence among the collection of national organizations working to support African liberation. Adding such an organization to the network of ethnic-based lobbies in Washington, DC was a critical political intervention for the largest racial minority group in the U.S. Building on a near century of African American international political activism, TransAfrica became the foremost intermediary between African America, the U.S., and the international community on issues of foreign policy. Moreover, its narrative speaks to the importance of institution building as a critical component of adversarial diplomacy.

TransAfrica represented an amalgamation of three different approaches to adversarial diplomacy previously advanced by the different entities concerned with African Liberation, but did so under the banner of an official institution. That is, TransAfrica benefited from the expertise of the community of African American foreign policy and Africa scholars. It continued to advance what were understood to be the foreign policy interests of African Americans through Congressional politics. And, at times, it employed mass mobilization and other forms of contentious politics in its foreign policy lobbying efforts. Perhaps more than any of the other examples used here to describe a particular approach to adversarial diplomacy, TransAfrica’s struggles to build organizational and financial support further underscores the limits and opportunities of adversarial diplomacy, particularly when it occurs through the establishment of institutions such as a foreign policy lobby that claims an ethnic or racial group as its constituency.

Owing to its origins in the Black Congressional and intellectual politics of the 1970s, TransAfrica’s early approach to influencing change in U.S. policies toward Africa undoubtedly reflected some of the characteristics of this type of political organizing. Like the Congressional and intellectual politics out of which it emerged, TransAfrica initially focused its energies primarily on lobbying Congress and the other national entities involved in shaping U.S. foreign policy toward Africa. This approach included lobbying the U.S. senators and representatives as well as the relevant committees and subcommittees of the House and Senate. This was in addition to lobbying the White House and the State Department about U.S. foreign policies toward Africa. The second characteristic of TransAfrica reminiscent of its origins in Congressional politics is that it was very much an organization of elites. That is, TransAfrica attracted a corps of African American professionals and academics, many of whom held advanced degrees from graduate and professional schools throughout the U.S. Indeed Randall Robinson was one of these people. As he assumed the leadership of African America’s foreign policy lobby, Robinson was aided by this group of young professionals who attached themselves to his celebrity, similar to the ways that Robinson and his contemporaries gravitated toward Charles Diggs during the previous decade. This group provided a quality of intellectual, organizational, and professional support that was critical to collective efforts to launch and sustain TransAfrica. In addition, through its various activities and
initiatives, TransAfrica brought together a large collection of Black American elites, which it leaned on, for material and financial support in its infancy.

For much of the 1980s, TransAfrica’s major foreign policy initiatives centered the eradication of apartheid in South Africa. Consequently, many of its lobbying efforts focused on mobilizing prominent political, social, and organization leaders of African America, Africa, and the African diaspora to support the movement to impose economic sanctions on South Africa’s apartheid government. Although this initial approach realized minimal impact at the outset, TransAfrica’s early focus on South Africa was an integral part of an overall surge in U.S. anti-apartheid activism. Different from existing anti-apartheid mobilizations, TransAfrica brought African Americans into the movement in a methodical way. Moreover, the evolution of the South Africa campaign in the early 1980s reflected TransAfrica’s organizational evolution during its initial years. Through the life of the South Africa campaign, Randall Robinson and TransAfrica’s supporters and staff would come to realize the limitations of lobbying in the traditional sense. They would quickly see that their efforts to lobby Congress, the State Department, and the White House on foreign policy would produce very little change. This realization caused Robinson to alter the organization’s approach and place greater emphasis on acts of spectacle and civil disobedience with the hopes of drawing attention to the U.S. policies that supported apartheid. The sit-in staged by Robinson, Mary Frances Berry, Walter Fauntroy, and Eleanor Holmes-Norton at the South African Embassy in November 1984 was a reflection of this alternative approach. This action resulted in the launch of the Free South Africa Movement just a few days later.

Although its full narrative is beyond the scope of this study, an analysis of the Free South Africa Movement is critical to understanding the early history and evolution of TransAfrica. Over the span of two years, TransAfrica served as the headquarters for a movement that resulted in the arrest of over five thousand protesters at South African embassies and consulates through the U.S. With the pointed objective of pressuring the U.S. Congress to adopt legislation imposing economic sanctions on South Africa, the TransAfrica-led Free South Africa Movement played a major role in the adoption of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986. This legislative victory was only the second time that Congress overrode a presidential veto on a foreign policy matter in the twentieth century. Although there was an active anti-apartheid movement in the U.S. before the establishment of TransAfrica, the efforts of this African American organization were instrumental in galvanizing the mass support necessary to force Congress to take action on an issue that it had evaded for almost 40 years. Though it attracted a smaller number of participants than the African Liberation Day marches of a decade prior, the Free South Africa Movement demonstrations are an example of how TransAfrica, as an institution, employed the strategies of its organizational predecessors. Though TransAfrica would never become a mass organization—as some of its organizers hoped it would—it nevertheless employed some of the political strategies associated with mass mobilization and contentious politics. In
doing so, it also capitalized on some of the momentum created by ALSC and its mass mobilization efforts during the first half of the 1970s.

The evolution of TransAfrica is also apropos to the conceptualization of adversarial diplomacy offered in this study. By mobilizing large numbers of Americans to engage in acts of civil disobedience, the South Africa campaign illustrates the different approaches that groups may employ to advance their foreign policy and diplomatic interests at times when their relationships with the relevant state apparatuses are adversarial. Moreover, TransAfrica’s early history underscores the point that when groups lack access to, or influence in, the institutions of official diplomacy and foreign policy development, they will employ other means in order to draw attention to international issues. As evident through the supra state efforts of African Americans to influence U.S. foreign policy related issues, adversarial diplomacy can take the form of mass mobilization, Congressional politics, intellectual politics, and institution building.

Rethinking Congressional Politics and International Relations: Expanding the Possibilities of Adversarial Diplomacy

In this study, I have defined adversarial diplomacy as a type of supra-state participation by private citizens, foreign policy lobbies, and other non-state entities in the conduct of international relations. I have delineated two conditions that give rise to adversarial diplomacy. A political faction must have foreign policy and diplomatic objectives that run counter to the official foreign policies of the state, and that said faction must also have limited access to, and influence in, the institutions of official diplomacy. Moreover, I have characterized the objective of adversarial diplomacy as one of reexamining the role of non-state actors in the conduct of international relations.

In my review of the international political activism of African Americans in the post-civil rights era, I described Congressional politics as one means through which adversarial diplomacy can materialize. However, while considering the international political activism of Charles Diggs, additional questions began to surface about the degree to which adversarial diplomacy captures instances in which a member of Congress engages in international relations with objectives that run counter to those of the state as defined by the administration. Could adversarial diplomacy also characterize the participation of state actors in international relations when they seek to challenge the foreign policies of the administration? For example, if we consider Congress to be, in letter and in fact, a co-determiner of U.S. foreign policy, how accurate would it be to place a member of Congress within a theoretical framework that is used to characterize the diplomatic activities of non-state actors in the international system. Would a member of Congress not be considered a state actor to some degree? Even though he or she may be aligned with a set of diplomatic interests and foreign policy objectives that challenge the administration, would it be accurate to suggest that a member of Congress is not a type of state representative? Take Charles Diggs for example. Suppose he was not associated with the Black
American political community. His activism, diplomatic missions, and foreign policy advocacy efforts would still fit within the framework of adversarial diplomacy in that they challenged the administration’s policies and occurred absent the endorsement of the White House or the Department of State. In other words, Diggs still saw the state (or its administration more pointedly) as his adversary on questions of foreign policy. However, if he was a non-African American member of Congress challenging the administration’s policies—were he a White representative, for example—his activism would still represent a type of adversarial diplomacy. Thus, the prevailing question is what do we call this person? If not a “non-state actor” could we simply call him or her a “state actor”? This would expand the concept of a state actor to include individuals affiliated with the state in some way, but not necessarily sanctioned by it. This concept of a state actor would also apply for example, to a member of Congress who engages in diplomacy that may contradict the administration; embracing the notion that Congress and the President should be co-determiners of foreign policy. It is when these two entities disagree on foreign policy issues that the relationship becomes adversarial; giving rise to a type of adversarial diplomacy that is distinct from the definition offered in this study as a conceptual framework for the participation of non-state actors, generally construed, in the international system. How does this expand the possibilities of adversarial diplomacy?

To work through this example, let us call the type of adversarial diplomacy engaged at length in this study, “type-one adversarial diplomacy.” Thus, we can call the adversarial diplomacy described in this section as “type-two adversarial diplomacy.” Type-two adversarial diplomacy tends to emerge in the face of intragovernmental or intra-state factions. Specifically I am referring to the ongoing power shuffle between the various branches of government in the U.S. combined with the oppositional nature of American party politics. The constitutional separation of powers characteristic of the government of the United States that makes type two adversarial diplomacy possible. The most common occurrence of this type of adversarial diplomacy is when one political party controls all or part of the legislative branch and the other party is in control of the executive.

Although they are distinct concepts in the practical sense, type-one and type-two adversarial diplomacy would be theoretically very similar. The principal dissimilarity is that type-one adversarial diplomacy is germane to the involvement of only non-state actors in the international system, while type two adversarial diplomacy can include both non-state and state actors. For example, a member of Congress could qualify as a state actor. Implicit here is that the member of Congress, though not an official representative of the foreign policy establishment (and thus the administration), can be considered a representative of the state nonetheless. Because the institutions of official diplomacy may not endorse his or her diplomatic activities, his or her activism would be considered adversarial diplomacy. The similarity between type-one and type-two adversarial diplomacy is that they are both manifestations of transnational activism and internationalism. The most pronounced difference between them is apparent when they are examined
through the framework of diaspora and citizen diplomacy. Owing to the fact that it represents a type of diplomacy engaged by state actors, type-two adversarial diplomacy would never involve citizen diplomacy. Still, type-two adversarial diplomacy can materialize in diaspora politics when the actor engaged in this type of diplomacy is a member of a particular ethnic group with transnational alliances and works to advance the transnational interests of that ethnic group from his or her official position.

Examples of type-two adversarial diplomacy include the diplomatic activities members of Congress at times when they endeavor to advance foreign policy interests that may be contrary to those of the White House and State Department. Again, there is no more telling example to illustrate this point than the international political activism of Congressman Charles Diggs in the 1960s and 1970s. Diggs used his membership and later chairmanship of the House Subcommittee on Africa as a platform for international fact-finding missions, meeting with foreign leaders while abroad, and challenging U.S. policies toward Africa through Congress. All of these actions were in direct opposition to the foreign policy positions of the Nixon and Ford administrations. In effect, owing to the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government, coupled with the oppositional nature of American party politics, Diggs international activism in Congress helped fuel the adversarial relationship between the Democratically controlled House of Representatives and the Republican controlled White House on matters of foreign policy and diplomacy. In other words, type-two adversarial diplomacy can occur when the capacity of an individual, interest group, or political faction to influence foreign policy or diplomacy is restricted because a lack of access to the entities in which this type of political negotiation takes place. To return to the example of Charles Diggs, though he had access because of his leadership role in Congress, Diggs’ access was restricted because his diplomatic activities directly challenged state diplomacy. Thus, depending on the issue, or which political party controls the White House or Congress, a member of Congress can engage in either type-one or type-two adversarial diplomacy.

Contemporary examples of type-two adversarial diplomacy include then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s 2007 visit to Syria. Pelosi traveled to meet with Syrian President Bashar Assad and sparked a national uproar that questioned the appropriateness of the House Speaker’s direct engagement with a foreign policy matter. This was at a time when the Democrats controlled both chambers of Congress and the Republicans controlled the White House. The inherently adversarial relationship between the two parties was apparent on domestic and foreign policy. Thus, Pelosi’s trip to Syria was much to the chagrin of the Bush administration, who felt as if the Speaker overstepped her boundaries by involving herself in what some believed to be an activity reserved to the Executive Branch and its representatives. However, if it is true that Congress should, in fact, be a co-determiner of U.S. foreign policy, then Speaker Pelosi’s actions were indeed an appropriate use of her role.
Another recent example of this type of adversarial diplomacy occurred during the 2008 U.S. presidential elections when Democratic Party nominee Barack Obama went on an international sojourn to the Middle East and Europe in July 2008.\textsuperscript{18} The purpose of this trip was to counter claims by his GOP rivals that Obama lacked foreign policy credentials and to demonstrate his ability to handle the job of Commander-in-Chief. Traveling to Israel, Jordan, Iraq, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Germany, and the United Kingdom, Obama’s objective was clear: to challenge the foreign policies of the Bush administration and the Republican Party. This was not only to the vexation of Obama’s GOP rival, but it was also a thorny issue for the Bush administration as Obama overtly criticized what he saw as an unfocused approach to the conflict in the Middle East.\textsuperscript{19}

The Ends of Adversarial Diplomacy

Throughout this dissertation, I have made an ambitious attempt to present adversarial diplomacy as an alternative theoretical framework for the participation of non-state actors in the international system. Let us recall that the basic premise of adversarial diplomacy is that non-state actors often have foreign policy objectives contrary to those of the state, and, at times, have limited access to the official channels of participating in the development of U.S. foreign policy. Focusing on the intersection of race and foreign policy, I have operationalized adversarial diplomacy through the narrative of African American activism in the post-civil rights era. With a platform focused on African liberation, the activities of this period underscore that African American activists have long indentified with the political affairs in Africa and the diaspora. This points to a central tenet of African American politics in the post-civil rights era, which was that the struggle against racism was a global one. Although apparent at different points in African American history, this notion of a linked fate was most pronounced in the post-civil rights era. As Ronald Walters has observed:

An essential problem was that the condition of slavery placed blacks at the bottom of American society, and racism kept them there. This shaped blacks’ interests in both domestic and foreign affairs as rehabilitative projects to construct positive relations between Africans and peoples of African descent, and between the nations and continents that contain such peoples.\textsuperscript{20}

What Walters has offered is an explanation of the origins of an adversarial logic in African American foreign policy activism. Through an understanding of the long-held concern for Africa, on the part of African Americans, the origins of African American adversarial diplomacy are clear. That is, in the post-civil rights era, African American adversarial diplomacy was a manifestation of their alignment with the political struggles of Black South Africans, which was in direct opposition to U.S. foreign policy. At the same time, this group had been categorically unsuccessful in advancing its foreign policy platform through traditional channels. Thus, as discussed at length in this study, African American activists employed Congressional
Politics, mass mobilization, intellectual politics, and institution building to advance their foreign policy concerns.

This study has highlighted adversarial diplomacy as a manifestation of racial politics. Although some African American foreign policy activists were concerned with U.S. foreign policy, generally, the focus on Africa was evocative of Pan African sensibilities. A central tenet of Pan Africanism, beginning in the late nineteenth century, has been the notion that Black world struggles were connected. This is evident in the political thought of activists such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Max Yergan, Paul and Eslanda Robeson, and Marcus Garvey. Indeed this mantra would continue throughout the remainder of the twentieth century as African American activists—such as those described in this study—began to mobilize in support of the liberation struggles in Southern Africa.

This notion of a linked fate is encapsulated through Robert L. Allen’s observation that, “the most profound conclusion to be drawn from a survey of the Black experience in America is to consider Black America as a semi-colony.” This idea of a semi-colony, often described as *domestic colonialism*, is useful in understanding the conditions of African Americans. Moreover, as Walters has discussed above, this adversarial relationship originated with slavery and was similar to the oppression endured by Blacks on the African continent who were subjected to European colonization. The major difference between the two entities is captured by Harold Cruse, who observed that, “the only factor which differentiates the Negro’s status from that of a pure colonial status is that his position is maintained in the ‘home’ country in close proximity to the dominant racial group.”

Although couched in varied terms, the notion of common experience of oppression among Africans and African descendents—along with the understanding that the state perpetuated this oppression domestically and internationally—was a prevailing belief in African American politics during the post-civil rights era. This feature undoubtedly informed the decisions of Black leaders to continue to advocate for progressive U.S. policies toward Africa. Their use of adversarial diplomacy—through Congressional Politics, intellectual politics, mass mobilization, and institution building—was rooted in race-first politics. Their common phenotype and experiences of oppression motivated these engagements, particularly the use of alternative means to communicate foreign policy concerns.

Much has changed in the African world since the early 1970s. The Black people of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe won their right to self-determination and there are now Black heads of state in these former colonies. With pressure from a global political and economic movement against apartheid, the Black people in the Republic of South Africa now live in a one-person-one-vote democracy. Indeed these were the major foreign policy concerns of African Americans in the post-civil rights era. At the same time, the nature of African American politics has also evolved over the last forty years. As African American activists began to organize around African liberation in the post-civil rights era, their approaches were defined by the fact that non-traditional means, such as those described in this study, were the only ways to effectively articulate and advance their foreign policy concerns. These non-traditional
forms of political participation allowed African Americans to participate in foreign affairs. Therefore, an organization like TransAfrica could rightfully profess to represent the foreign policy interests of African Americans.

This leads to the central question framing this final section. That is, given the evolution of race relations in the U.S. and the world, particularly in the last decade, what becomes of this race-based model of adversarial diplomacy? I do not intend to contradict myself here and suggest that adversarial diplomacy is irrelevant; or that it is a concept that befits only a certain period. However, if the major premises of adversarial diplomacy are that it occurs when a political faction (in this case a racial group) has limited access to state institutions and has situated its foreign policy interests in opposition to the state, then what becomes of African American adversarial diplomacy? Again, let us take TransAfrica, for example. By the early 1980s, it could, with little objection, claim to represent the interests of African Americans in U.S. foreign policy. This was most apparent in the aftermath of Andrew Young’s resignation from the position of U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. and Charles Diggs’ controversial resignation from Congress. In light of the fall of these two foreign policy leaders, African Americans were certainly unrepresented in foreign affairs. TransAfrica would fill this void by representing the foreign policy interests of African Americans in the national and international political communities. Giving added meaning to TransAfrica’s work—and increasing its political importance—was the poor representation of Blacks in all areas of U.S. foreign affairs.

Over the last forty years, African Americans have integrated (holding elected and appointed office) in American politics at the local, state, national, and international levels. There is no more telling example of the changing nature of American politics, and the integration of African Americans, than the 2008 election of Barack Obama, an African American, as President of the United States. Generations will elapse before scholars sort out the full impact of electing a Black man to the American presidency and the success of his administration. However, the symbolism of the Obama presidency can be dealt with immediately. Undoubtedly, Obama represents a partial triumph over American racism. It is no small feat that a Black man won the popular and electoral college vote (over a white man) for the presidency of a Republic that built its capitalist economy through the unpaid labor of enslaved Africans and continued to propagate a political, economic, and cultural apparatus premised on a belief in Black inferiority. But more than this, the symbolic victory of the Obama presidency disrupts arguments—which could be readily made three decades ago—that African Americans were not represented in U.S. foreign policy. How easily can one make this claim if the head of state is Black? Even if we look back just a few years before Obama’s election, for eight years, the nation’s chief diplomat, the Secretary of State, was also Black. Therefore we can beg the same question, how can African Americans claim to be unrepresented in foreign affairs given the integration of African Americans into the uppermost echelons of the American foreign policy establishment?

Let me return to a remark that Randall Robinson made in the late 1970s. In appealing to African Americans to support the development of TransAfrica, Robinson
contended that, for African Americans, “the issue of international affairs is on a plane with our domestic concerns.” Yet, given the evolution of U.S. and global politics since the late 1970s, we must question the relevance of such claims. For example, do African Americans, writ large, really embrace the notion of a linked fate with Africa in our current moment? I am not suggesting that African Americans are unconcerned with international relations or African affairs. However, a concern is very different from a belief in a linked fate. Finally, as it pertains to adversarial diplomacy and its fundamental premises, we must beg the questions of both how and what. That is, in an era when political symbolism is given increased meaning, or, when some scholars and pundits are arguing “post-racialism”, what are the foreign policy concerns of African Americans? Are they actually in opposition to the foreign policies of the state? Lastly, the question of how: now that the U.S. has elected its first Black president, and had an African American as Secretary of State for eight years, how do African Americans advance their foreign policy concerns, if, and when, they are premised on a disagreement with the state?

The changing nature of race relations in the U.S. and the world will continue to complicate a political and system that, for many years, overtly and unapologetically advanced a program of racial oppression. This political evolution has undoubtedly impacted American domestic and foreign affairs. In the post-civil rights era, race prevailed as the dominant social cleavage domestically and internationally. However, the then-imminent international political struggles have been won and some African Americans enjoy the social, political, and economic rights for which their forbearers labored. Consequently, African American activists concerned with domestic and foreign policy will be forced develop alternative means of communicating the fact the fact that, behind the façade of progress, the relationship between the state and some sectors of its citizenry remains adversarial. Racial oppression motivated African Americans to struggle with and for Black South Africans in a variety of ways, with adversarial diplomacy being one. Human compassion fueled African American activists when they lacked institutional, structural, and financial support. No doubt, human rights will continue to shape the political struggles and ignite activists to fight for a better world.

2 Charles Henry points out seven reasons being King’s opposition to the Vietnam War. These included the following: (1) Spending on the war was draining funds for domestic programs; (2) Young Black men were being killed at an extraordinarily high rate in integrated army units yet still faced segregated schools at home; (3) It was morally inconsistent for him to urge nonviolence at home while America applied violence abroad; (4) Winning the Nobel Prize gave him the responsibility to work for peace everywhere; (5) He opposed all forms of imperialism; (6) America needed a radical revolution in values that would lead it to place human rights above American profits; and (7) He opposed the war because he loved America and wanted to see it become a “divine Messianic force” not a world policeman. These seven reasons were articulated at King’s 4 April 1967 sermon at Riverside Church in New York City. See Charles P. Henry, “Introduction: Black Global Politics in a Post-Cold-War World,” in Foreign Policy and the Black (Inter)national Interest, ed. Charles P. Henry (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), 1.
Mass mobilization has been recognized as a form of contentious politics and has been used to characterize the mobilization of everyday people and includes activities such as marches and demonstrations, which have been commonly referred to as protests. For more on mass mobilization, see for example, Robert W. Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), Chapter 8.

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3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
7 A compelling example of this was the 1964 journey to Guinea by SNCC activists. Historian Clayborne Carson, in his work on SNCC, pointed to the ways that this trip was transforming experience for the SNCC activists. See Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 133; Fannie Lou Hamer, To Praise Our Bridges: An Autobiography (Jackson: KIPCO, 1967), 21, in Carson, In Struggle, 134.
9 Ibid.
11 Dellums was a regular critical of U.S. foreign policies toward Africa and other parts of the world through the end of his Congressional career in 1998. He eventually served as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
15 Mass mobilization has been recognized as a form of contentious politics and has been used to characterize the mobilization of everyday people and includes activities such as marches and demonstrations, which have been commonly referred to as protests. For more on mass mobilization, see for example, Robert W. Whitney, State and Revolution in Cuba: Mass Mobilization and Political Change, 1920-1940 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Yung-fa Chen, Making Revolution: The Communist Movement in Eastern and Central China, 1937-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), Chapter 8.
These other organizations included, for example, the Washington Office on Africa and the American Committee on Africa. Though these other organizations were multiracial in their leadership, membership, and staff, they were not Black organizations. Thus, their ability to mobilize African Americans around Africa-related issues was severely limited. As a result, TransAfrica became the unapologetically Black organization focused on African liberation.


Harold Cruse, Rebellion or Revolution (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), 77.

Oral Histories

Niikwao Akuetteh, Washington, DC, 20 May 2010
Harry Belafonte, New York, NY, 8 February 2011
Mary Frances Berry, New Orleans, LA, 12 July 2010
Kelly Brown, Berkeley, CA, 23 March 2010
Herschelle Sullivan Challenor, Atlanta, GA, 9 February 2011
Cecelie Counts, Washington, DC, 10 December 2010
Courtland Cox, Washington, DC, 17 August 2010
George Dalley, Washington, DC, 17 May 2010
Jim Davis, Washington, DC, 9 December 2009
Adwoa Dunn-Mouton, Washington, DC, 16 March 2010
Walter Fauntroy, Washington, DC, 16 August 2010
Ibrahim Gassama, Eugene, OR, 18 January 2010
Richard Gordon Hatcher, Gary, IN, 9 July 2010
Sylvia Hill, Washington, DC, 10 December 2009
Brenda Rhodes Jackson, Washington, DC, 17 August 2010
Willard Johnson, Boston, MA, 7 May 2010
Willard Johnson, Boston, MA, 8 May 2010
Jamadari Kamara, Boston, MA, 7 May 2010
Nicole Lee, Washington, DC, 23 October 2007
Hope Lewis, Boston, MA, 6 May 2010
C. Payne Lucas, Washington, DC, 16 March 2010
William Lucy, Washington, DC, 12 March 2010
Singleton McAlister, Washington, DC, 21 May 2010
Gay McDougall, New York, NY, 24 February 2010
Harriet Michel, New York, NY, 24 February 2010
Maryse Mills-Apenteng, Washington, DC, 17 May 2010
William Minter, Washington, DC, 10 December 2009
Mwiza Munthali, Washington, DC, 7 December 2009
James Turner, New Orleans, LA, 20 March 2010
Pearl Robinson, Boston, MA, 6 May 2010
Ronald W. Walters, Washington, DC, 9 December 2009
Ronald W. Walters, Silver Spring, MD, 18 August 2010
Cherri Waters, Berkeley, CA, 6 August 2010
Mark Wenner, Washington, DC, 18 May 2010
Roger Wilkins, Washington, DC, 18 May 2010
Archives Consulted

TransAfrica Archives, Moorland-Spingarn Research Center, Howard University
Personal Papers of Willard Johnson, in the hands of Willard Johnson
Personal Papers of Jim Davis, in the hands of Jim Davis
Personal Papers of Walter Fauntroy, in the hands of Walter Fauntroy
Personal Papers of Hope Lewis, in the hands of Hope Lewis

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**Periodicals**


“Hartsfield’s Talk’s Fail: Students Call Downtown Boycott, Students ‘Disappointed’ in Merchants; Adults Plan Support.” *Atlanta Inquirer*, 28 November 1960.


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